T v. W

FCMP 38/2007

[2021] HKFC 169

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 38 OF 2007

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D E C I S I O N
(HADKINSON ORDER &
DISCLOSURE OF RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS)

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1.  There are currently 2 distinct applications before me:

 (1) The Respondent (“the father”)’s applications for:

(i) downward variation of the minors’ maintenance to nil starting from 1 September 2020;

(ii) monthly payment of $10,000 by the Applicant (“the mother”) to him as compensation for a period of 48 months or such other sum as determined by the court; and

 (2) The mother’s application for the disclosure of the father’s residential address.

2.  In respect of the father’s application of variation and compensation, there is also a preliminary issue of whether a Hadkinson Order should be made against him.

Chronology

3.  This case first started in 2007 and therefore, has a very long history.   For better understanding, I think it would be useful to set out the chronology of some relevant events concerning the court’s orders on the 2 minors’ maintenance:

26/8/2008	HH Judge Bruno Chan ordered the father to pay the 2 minors’ maintenance at: (i) $34,000/month until 1/10/2008, after which at $28,000/month ($14,000 each minor); and (ii) Lump sum of $290,000.
14/9/2015	Mother applied for upward variation and trial fixed on 6-7/9/2016.
6/9/2016	Father being absent and trial adjourned to 28-29/9/2016.
28/9/2016	Trial of the mother’s application proceeded in the father’s absence.
5/10/2016	HH Judge Bruno Chan ordered: (i) maintenance to be increased to $50,000/month ($25,000 each minor); and (ii) Mother’s lump sum application to be adjourned with penal notice endorsed for the father’s appearance.
18/1/2017	Father appeared and HH Judge Bruno Chan ordered (by consent): (i) Father to continue to pay maintenance at $50,000/month ($25,000 each minor); and (ii) Father to pay a lump sum of $160,000 by 2 instalments.
18/1/2019	Mother applied for upward variation of maintenance from $50,000 to $75,000/month together with a further lump sum.
25/1/2019	Father applied for downward variation from $50,000 to $28,000/month.
28/6/2019	Father applied for: (i) further downward variation to $16,500/month; (ii) Mother to pay a lump sum of $2,091,000 to him; and (iii) Mother to seek employment and pay the lump sum by instalments.
8/8 and 27/9/2019	Trial on the parties’ respective application for variation.
18/10/2019	Parties filed their Closing Submissions.
1/9/2020	Shortly before the handing down of the Judgment, Father applied for (inter-alia): (i) further variation of the minors’ maintenance to nil; and (ii) the mother to pay a monthly sum of $10,000 for 48 months or such other sums to him as compensation.
17/9/2020	Mother applied for (inter-alia) the father’s disclosure of his residential address.
22/9/2020	Court handed down judgment on the parties’ earlier 2019 applications and ordered: (i) minors’ maintenance to be increased to $52,000 per month ($26,000 each) as from 1/2/2019; (ii) Father to pay a lump sum of $100,000; (iii) Mother’s other applications for lump sums to be dismissed; (iv) Father’s other applications, including for variation from $50,000 to $16,500 to be dismissed; and (v) Father to pay costs $2,000.
5/10/2020	Father applied for leave to appeal against the 22/9/2020 Judgment.
3/12/2020	Father’s application for leave to appeal was refused.
7/6/2021	Mother issued Judgment Summons to enforce arrears of maintenance, lump sum payment and costs in the total sum of $1,187,000.
24-25/6/21	Hearing of arguments on the preliminary issue of Hadkinson Order and the mother’s application for the disclosure of the father’s residential address.

4.  It can be seen from the above chronology that just about 11 months ago (on 22 September 2020), I have handed down a 50-page Judgment[1] (“the 2020 Judgment”) on the parties’ respective application for variation of the 2 minors’ (both aged 14) maintenance payable by the father.  The history of the litigation has already been recited in the 2020 Judgment at §§3-15 therein and I have no intention to repeat the same here.  I think it is enough to recite the facts that in the earlier applications, the mother applied for (inter alia) an increase of the minors’ maintenance from $50,000 to $75,000 per month, together with a lump sum of $817,020.80, whilst the father applied for (inter alia) a downward variation of the maintenance payable from $50,000 to $16,500 per month with an order that the mother should undertake to seek gainful employment. 

5.  In the 2020 Judgment, and after hearing the parties who were both acting in person at that time, I granted the following orders:

(1)     The minors’ maintenance is to be increased from $50,000 to $52,000 per month ($26,000 each minor) backdating to start from 1 February 2019;

(2)     The father shall pay a lump sum of $100,000 within 14 days of the order;

(3)     The mother’s application for the other lump sum payments to be dismissed;

(4)     The father’s application for downward variation of the minors’ maintenance to be dismissed; and

(5)     The father’s application for an order of undertakings to be dismissed.

6.  On 1 September 2020, i.e. 3 weeks before the court handed down the 2020 Judgment, the father issued the present summons for a further variation of the minors’ maintenance to nil and for the mother to pay him monthly compensation of $10,000, for a period of 48 months.  Almost as a knee-jerk reaction, the mother (who was still acting in person at that time) issued her summons on 17 September 2020 asking for various reliefs, most of which are no longer relevant for the present hearing.  What remains is the mother’s application for the father’s disclosure of his residential address.

7.  At the call-over hearing, both these issues (the father’s further application for variation and compensation, and the mother’s application for disclosure of the father’s residential address) were fixed to be tried on 24-25 June 2021.  But when I prepared for the said hearing, I came to the view that the court may need to consider a preliminary issue, namely, in view of the special circumstances of this case, whether a Hadkinson Order should be considered against the father.  

8.  At the first day of hearing, the mother was represented by Mr. Jeffrey Li of counsel and the father was acting in person.  Mr. Li agreed with the court’s view that the preliminary issue of a Hadkinson Order should be argued first.  The father, being a practising solicitor himself, raised no objection to this course being taken. As a result, I adjourned the matter to the second day and allowed both parties to lodge their respective written submission on the subject.  After reading those submissions, and hearing them in court, I reserved my decisions on the preliminary issue of Hadkinson Order and the mother’s application for disclosure to be handed down, which I now do.

Discussion

9.  I intend to deal with the Hadkinson issue first, and the starting point should of course be a discussion of the legal principles of this seeming draconian order in family proceedings.

10.  I have in fact dealt with a similar case back in 2013[2] in which I have discussed in some details the Hadkinson principles.  That case was unreported and at §§20-21 therein, I recited the following principles from the case of Hadkinson v Hadkinson[3]:

“20. The starting point for discussion of this draconian and yet important measure is of course the case of Hadkinson v Hadkinson which was itself a family case albeit concerning the issue of custody of a child. The general rule was stated by Romer LJ at p.569 C-F as follow:

“ It is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against, or in respect of, whom an order is made by a court of competent jurisdiction to obey it unless and until that order is discharged. The uncompromising nature of this obligation is shown by the fact that it extends even to cases where the person affected by an order believes it to be irregular or even void…

Such being the nature of this obligation, two consequences will, in general, follow from its breach.  The first is that anyone who disobeys an order of the court (and I am not considering disobedience of orders relating merely to matters of procedure) is in contempt and may be punished by committal or attachment or otherwise.  The second is that no application to the court by such person will be entertained until he has purged himself of the contempt…”

21.     In the same judgment, Denning LJ after considering a line of previous authorities had this to say at pp.574H to 575C of the judgment:

“ Those cases seem to me to point the way to the modern rule. It is a strong thing for a court to refuse to hear a party to a cause and it is only to be justified by grave considerations of public policy. It is a step which a court will only take when the contempt itself impedes the course of justice and there is no other effective means of securing his compliance. In this regard I would like to refer to what SIR GEORGE JESSEL, M.R., said (46 L.J. Ch. 383) in a similar connection in Re Clements & Costa Rica Republic v. Erlanger (14):

“I have myself had on many occasions to consider this jurisdiction, and I have always thought that necessary though it be, it is necessary only in the sense in which extreme measures are sometimes necessary to preserve men’s rights, that is, if no other pertinent remedy can be found. Probably that will be discovered after consideration to be the true measure of the exercise of the jurisdiction.”

Applying the principle, I am of the opinion that the fact that a party to a cause has disobeyed an order of the court is not itself a bar to his being heard, but if his disobedience is such that, so long as it continues, it impedes the course of justice in the cause, by making it more difficult for the court to ascertain the truth or to enforce the orders which it may make, then the court may in its discretion refuse to hear him until the impediment is removed or good reason is shown why it should not be removed.”

11.  Therefore, starting from Hadkinson, it has become clear that the court could, under appropriate circumstances, exercise its discretion in refusing to hear a party’s application.

12.  In Mubarak v Mubarik[4], Ryder J had before him an application to vary periodical payments in circumstances where the applicant was in contempt for failure to pay a lump sum.  His Lordship held[5] that in considering whether to grant a Hadkinson Order, the following questions have to be answered:

“ (a) Is the husband in contempt?

(b) Is there an impediment to the course of justice?

(c) Is there any other effective means of securing compliance with the court’s orders?

(d) Should the court exercise its discretion to impose conditions having regard to the question:

(e) Is the contempt wilful (ie is it contumacious and continuing)?

(f) If so, what conditions would be proportionate? ”

The principles as set out in Mubarak above were accepted by the Court of Appeal in Hong Kong in CWG v MH[6] : per Yuen JA at §12 of the Judgment.

13.  It is to be noted that the circumstances of the present case are quite similar to those in Mubarak in that the defaulting party therein was in contempt by failing to pay the lump sum.  The father in the present case failed to pay both the lump sum, periodical payments and costs.

14.  Not long after the case of Mubarak, Sir Mark Potter P in the case of Laing v Laing[7] had a discussion on the use of the expression “contumacious” by Ryder J in Mubarak and did not find it an useful reference when applied to the wilful nature of the contempt relied upon to found the Hadkinson jurisdiction.  He said at §24 of the judgment:

“24. In the Hadkinson context, I do not regard the word ‘contumacious’ as a useful addition or supplement to the threshold requirement that the contempt should be wilful in the sense of a voluntary, deliberate, knowing (and continuing) breach, by a person well able to comply with the order if he or she chose to do so. Once that threshold is established, then, in deciding whether and to what extent to fetter the right of the applicant to proceed with an application for variation or relief by imposition of conditions, it will be relevant for the court to take into account the level of defiance displayed, as well as its effects, without resort to the problems of definition presented by use of the epithet ‘contumacious’.”

15.  I shall bear the above general principles in mind, in particular, the 6 questions posed in the case of Mubarak when I consider the particular facts of this case.

Is the father in contempt?

16.  In considering whether the father was in contempt, the court has to take into account of the following facts.

17.  The maintenance order granted by HH Judge Bruno Chan on 18 January 2017 included a periodical payment of $50,000 per month for the benefit of the 2 minors.  When the farther issued his first summons for downward variation to $28,000 per month (on 25 February 2019), he unilaterally reduced the payment to that sum, as if the court had to grant the application from the date of issuance.  

18.  On 28 June 2019, the father issued his second summons for further downward variation of monthly maintenance to $16,500 per month, and again, he immediately reduced payment to such sum.

19.  On 1 September 2020, the father issued his present summons for further downward variation of monthly maintenance to nil.  Again, he immediately stopped all payment upon the issuance of the summons. 

20.  The father’s unilateral reduction in or cessation of the payment of maintenance are in blatant disregard of the court’s order which was in force unless and until being varied.  It has been held that non-payment under a matrimonial order is in itself a contempt of court: Mubarak v Mubarak (Contempt in Failure to Pay Lump Sum: Standard of Proof) [2006] EWHC 1260 (Fam), [2007] 1 FLR 722.  I see no difference between an order of maintenance for children born within or outside wedlock.  The father must be in contempt of the Judge Bruno Chan’s order dated 18 January 2017 in the present family proceedings.   He is also in further contempt of the 2020 Judgment when the minors’ maintenance was raised from $50,000 to $52,000 per month.

Is there an impediment to the course of justice?

21.  An impediment to the course of justice, in the context of a Hadkinson application, can take two forms, ie the contempt, if continues, has made it more difficult for the court to ascertain the truth or to enforce the orders which it may make.  This was the test referred to by Denning LJ in Hadkinson (supra) at p.575 B:

“Applying this principle, I am of the opinion that the fact that a party to a cause has disobeyed an order of the court is not in itself a bar to his being heard, but if his disobedience is such that, so long as it continues, it impedes the course of justice in the cause, by making it more difficult for the court to ascertain the truth or to enforce the orders which it may make, then the court may at its discretion refuse to hear him until the impediment is removed or good reason is shown why it should not be removed.” (underline added)

22.  On 2 separate occasions, this court (both HH Judge Bruno Chan and myself) had assessed the 2 minors’ needs at $50,000 and $52,000, and the court had ordered the father to meet those needs.  According to Mr. Li for the mother (at §42 of his Skeleton Arguments), those amounts were determined by the court to be payable by the father to meet the ends of justice.  By paying nothing towards such needs of the minors, especially after the court was satisfied of the father’s ability to do so after a full trial, this has to be an obstruction or impediment to justice.   This is particularly so when it is clear that the mother has no independent financial means (except by relying on irregular financial assistance from a friend) and so the recalcitrant effort by the father in denying the court’s ruling must be detrimental to the best interest of the minors.

23.  In this regard, I note that at §§95-109 of the 2020 Judgment, I have discussed in some details on the father’s failure in fulfilling his duty of full and frank disclosure, which was deliberate with an obvious intention to frustrate a reasonable investigation into his financial circumstances.  At §109, I came to the following conclusion:

“109. I am satisfied that the father was fully aware of his duty to give full, frank and clear disclosure of his financial circumstances, but yet he has chosen not to do so. Worse still, if one should compare his disclosure on bank statements this time with those in 2016, one would realise that back in 2016, the father had at least given 7 months’ bank statements (albeit with some pages and some months missing). But at the present trial, he saw fit only to produce one page (with the second page missing) of the bank statement of January 2019. Without any reasonable explanation given for such default, I have come to a conclusion that such failure on the part of the father must be deliberate with an obvious intention to frustrate a reasonable investigation into his proper financial circumstances.” (italics added)

24.  As a result, this court had to draw adverse inferences against the father at §§111-112 of the 2020 Judgement:

“111. In my judgment, a natural and reasonable inference to be drawn is that the father must be in a much better financial position that is presently claimed or otherwise there is no need for him to hide his income of financial resources. In view of such an adverse inference being drawn, I have also come to the conclusion that the father is not a truthful witness on his claim of impecuniosity or inability to pay the minors’ reasonable maintenance and his evidence in that regard must be rejected.

112. Although there is no evidence on the actual financial capability of the father, I am prepared to draw the further inference that he must be able to afford the reasonable monthly expenses of the minors which is now slightly increased from $50,000 to $52,000 per month, and the set up costs of $100,000.”

25.  With the father’s deliberate attempt to frustrate a reasonable investigation into his financial circumstances, I am satisfied that his disobedience of the court’s order on maintenance (i.e. his contempt) is such that, so long as it continues, impedes the course of justice in the cause, by making it more difficult for the court to ascertain the truth or to enforce the orders it may make.

Is there any other effective means of securing compliance with the court’s orders?

26.  It is noted that since the 2020 Judgment which was granted on 22 September 2020 increasing the maintenance payable by the father from $50,000 to $52,000 per month, the father has failed to pay a single cent on it, not even the costs of $2,000 as ordered.  The only way to enforce such an order is by way of judgment summons which was taken out by the mother on 7 June 2021.  In the case of YBL v LWC[8], the Court of Appeal has already ruled that the then procedures on judgment summons was not Hong Kong Bill of Rights compliance and has set out the proper remedial interpretations to read down the then Rule 87 of the Matrimonial Causes Rules, Cap.179A (“MCR”) by segregating the examination and committal processes.  All future judgment summonses, unless specifically issued as committal summons, will be treated as examination summons.  It is recognised that the effectiveness of judgment summons, as an enforcement tool, is greatly curtailed.

27.  Furthermore, I note that the father has, even up to this date, refused to disclose his residential address in these proceedings.  I will discuss more on this topic when I come to address the mother’s application for the disclosure of the father’s residential address in the latter part of this judgment.  But with the father’s insistence on not disclosing his residential address, the investigation into his means or properties by way of examination, for the purpose of enforcing the court’s order on maintenance, is unlikely to produce any fruitful result.  Therefore, I am satisfied that the mother has no other effective means of securing the father’s compliance of the court’s order on maintenance.

Is the contempt wilful?

28.  In paragraph 23 above, I have already recited §109 of the 2020 Judgment in which I was satisfied that the father had deliberately failed in his duty of full and frank disclosure in order to frustrate a reasonable investigation into his financial circumstances.  At §112 of the same Judgment, I was also satisfied that the father was able to afford the monthly maintenance of the minors at $52,000 per month.  On these findings, there is no doubt in my mind that the father’s contempt of the court’s maintenance order has to be wilful.  Moreover, it is to be noted that in the 2020 Judgment, I have granted a costs order of $2,000 against the father, which was really a very modest sum in view of the fact that both parties were acting in person at that time.  There was no attempt by the father to pay even this modest sum and this only demonstrates the father’s determination in flouting whatever orders to be made by this court against him.

29.  To be fair to the father, I think it is necessary for me to mention that in his written submissions (at paragraphs 1(6) and 28), he did offer to pay “interim maintenance” in the sum of $5,000 per month as from 1 July 2021 so that his application for further variation could be proceeded with.  But I am afraid that this is yet another piece of evidence to show that the father was in fact able to pay at least some of the maintenance or judgment debts, but he deliberately chose not to do so.  He was only willing to offer a reduced payment when the court starts to consider whether the Hadkinson jurisdiction should be invoked.  I am satisfied that the father’s contempt must be wilful.

Should conditions be imposed?

30.  Bearing the above discussion in mind, I do not see any good reasons not to exercise my discretion in imposing conditions on the father before he would be allowed to proceed with his application for further variation of the maintenance order. 

What conditions would be appropriate?

31.  In the 2020 Judgment, evidence was heard and considered up to September 2019.  Therefore, when this court gave its ruling on the father’s ability to pay the increased maintenance at the level of $52,000 per month, it was only based on the evidence up to September 2019.  Whether there has been a substantial change of circumstances after that date is yet to be determined.  In the circumstances, I think it would be fair for the father to pay the arrears up to September 2019, before this court would allow him to proceed with his current application for further variation.

32.  At §9 of the mother’s affirmation filed on 10 May 2021 (based on which the judgment summons was issued), all the father’s arrears were listed out and if one takes into account the arrears from 1 February to 1 September 2019, the arrears of monthly maintenance for that period amount to $226,500.  If one should add the lump sum of $100,000 and the costs of $2,000, the total arrears amount to $328,500 ($226,500 + $100,000 +$2,000 = $328,500), excluding interest and surcharge.  In the mother’s judgment summons, there was a claim for interest and surcharge which was yet to be quantified.  Doing the best as I could, I think it is also fair for the father to pay a sum as security for such interest and surcharge. I will fix this at $100,000 to be paid into court, pending either the parties’ agreement on the quantum of interest and surcharge, or failing which the decision of this court. Therefore, the condition to be imposed is for the father to pay up part of the judgment debt at $328,500 to the mother and another $100,000 into court as security for the interest and surcharge before he would be allowed to proceed with his current application for further variation of the minors’ maintenance.  I would order that if the above payments were not made within 28 days from the handing down of this judgment, the father’s applications for further variation of the minors’ maintenance and for compensation to be stayed, and not to be restored without the leave of the court.

The mother’s application for the disclosure of the father’s residential address

33.  In the mother’s summons dated 17 September 2020, she asked for, inter alia:

“1. The [father] to update and file his residential address into court to facilitate future correspondence for the case;

…”,

34.  I think there is no dispute that the father has not provided his updated residential address to the court.  In his Form E dated 26 March 2021 (A/241-268), under section 1.16 (A/246) which required the father to state his present residence, he stated “No permanent residential address”.  But when he took the oath at the end of the document (A/267), he stated his residential address at “Unit 05, 29/F, 50 Wong Chuk Hang Road, Hong Kong.”  However, even this was not his real residential address because it was an address of a commercial building.  Furthermore, just days before the hearing, the father further changed his address to “21^st Floor, CMA Building, No.64 Connaught Road Central, Hong Kong” which, according to Mr. Li, was a shared work place in Central.  Indisputably, this was not the father’s residential address.

35.  When being confronted in court, the father still refused to disclose his residential address.  If I understand it correctly, his objection to disclosure was mainly based on 2 grounds.  First, he said the concealment of his residential address was needed in order to avoid harassment from the mother.  He said the mother did go to his work place before causing disturbance, resulting in him losing some of his company directorship.  He had to issue an application for injunction of which this court did grant such relief on an interim basis.  Second, he said that the mother had also concealed her residential address and therefore, he should not be criticised for doing the same.

Discussion

36.  As rightly pointed out by Mr. Li, there is a statutory requirement under O.41 r.1(4) of the Rules of High Court, Cap.4A (“RHC”) that:

“(4) Every affidavit …, unless the court otherwise directs, must state the place of residence of the deponent…”

That is why Form E requires the deponent to state his residential address.  Therefore, if the father wants a non-disclosure of his residential address, he needs to apply to the court for such direction, of which he has failed to do. 

37.  As to the explanations given by the father for such non-disclosure, it is true to say that this court has once granted an interim injunction for non-molestation against the mother, which has now been discharged upon her undertakings for non-molestation.  I think the mother must have learned a big lesson and the chances of her breaching such undertakings are very slim.  After all, she is well aware that the father will have no hesitation in applying for a committal order if breaches should happen in the future.  Furthermore, the fact that the father could always come to court to apply for further non-molestation reliefs, if needed, provides sufficient deterrent and there is no good reason for him to hide his residential address.

38.  As one could see from the history of this case, HH Judge Bruno Chan had in fact made an order back on 21 April 2008 for the provision of the father’s residential address to be sealed in an envelope and not to be opened unless with the leave of the court. Inside an envelope in the court files, the address given by the father was one at the Lantau Island and the date given was 28 December 2015.  I do not know if that was still his current residential address, but I suspect not.  In this regard, I note that under Section 19 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance, Cap.13 (“GMO”), a maintenance payer has the duty to notify his change of address or otherwise, he may be subject to criminal sanctions:

“19. Person subject to maintenance order to notify change of address

(1) Any person for the time being under an obligation to make payment in pursuance of any order for the payment of money under the Ordinance shall within 14 days of a change of address give notice of his or her new address to such person, if any, as may be specified in the order by sending the notice by registered post to the last known address of that person or to such address as may be notified to him or her by that person for the purpose of this section.

(2) A person who, without reasonable excuse, contravenes subsection (1) commits an offence and is liable to a fine at level 2.”

Since Judge Bruno Chan had already ordered the father to provide his residential address, I am satisfied that he also has a duty to comply with section 19 of GMO to provide his updated residential address, if it has already been changed.

39.  As to the issue on concealment, it is not apparent from the record on why Judge Bruno Chan should have made such direction.  I suspect that it might have to do with the then high level of animosity between the parties.  It did not seem to be a big issue at the time as there was no issue on enforcement.  But now with the arrears of maintenance being at $1,187,000 and counting, I think it is reasonable for the mother to insist on the provision of the father’s residential address for the purpose of service and facilitation of her enforcement proceedings.

40.  I cannot see any good reason to deny the mother’s request.  After all, the mother has already issued a Judgement Summons for examination of the father as a judgment debtor, under which the father has to provide the answers under oath, including his residential address if asked for.  Therefore, I am satisfied that the father has to provide his current residential address as requested.

41.  As to the father’s complaint that the mother has also failed to provide her residential address, first of all, we are not here to deal with an application for the disclosure of the mother’s residential address.  Secondly, the mother is now legally represented and any difficulty on service is no longer relevant.  Thirdly, the mother is not a judgment debtor.  There is no issue of enforcement against her.  All in all, I do not accept that the father could rely on this as a valid reason to refuse disclosure of his updated residential address.

Conclusions and Orders

42.  Based on the above discussion, I am satisfied that in the interest of justice, it is proper for this court to exercise its discretion under the Hadkinson principles to impose conditions on the father before he would be allowed to continue with his application for further variation of the minors’ maintenance orders.  I am also satisfied that it is proper to order the disclosure of the father’s updated residential address.

43.  In the circumstances, I make the following orders:

 For the father’s summons dated 1 September 2020

(1) Unless the father shall pay a sum of $328,500 to the mother (through her solicitors and subject to the First Charge of the Director of Legal Aid, if any) to satisfy part of the judgment debt calculated up to 1 September 2019 and another sum of $100,000 into court as security for the interest and surcharge within 28 days of this order, his current application for further variation of the minors’ maintenance and for compensation to be stayed, and not to be restored without the leave of the court. 

 For the mother’s summons dated 17 September 2020

(2) The father shall provide his updated residential address to the mother within 28 days from the handing down of this judgment.

Costs

44.  The mother succeeds in both applications.  Despite the fact that she has withdrawn some of the prayers in her summons, I do not see how that has prolonged the hearings in any substantial way.  In the circumstances, the mother should be given costs of these summonses (subject to previous rulings on costs, if any), including all costs reserved, and such costs are to be taxed if not agreed.  There was an argument on whether counsel certificate should be given.  This case involves an argument on the Hadkinson principles which cannot be regarded as simple.  The long history of litigation has also added to the complexity.  The engagement of counsel is justified.  I will also grant a certificate for counsel.  As to the mother’s own costs, they will be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations.

[1] [2020] HKFC 199, Date of Judgment: 22 September 2020

[2] KEWS v NCHC, FCMC 13087/2008, unreported, Date of Judgment: 13 November 2013

[3] [1952] 2 All ER 567

[4] [2004] EWHC 1158 (Fam), [2004] 2 FLR 932

[5] At para 59, pp. 945-946, [2004] 2 FLR

[6] [2004] 4 HKLRD 141

[7] [2007] 2 FLR 200

[8] [2017] 1 HKLRD 823