PANG SAN SOR v. WAN KUI CHUEN

DCCJ 5588/2025

[2026] HKDC 231

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO 5588 OF 2025

---------------------------------------------

BETWEEN

---------------------------------------------

-----------------------------------------

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

-----------------------------------------

1.  This is the Plaintiff’s application for final and interlocutory judgment to be entered against the Defendant in default of defence under Order 19 rule 7 of the Rules of the District Court (Cap 336H) by summons dated 19 December 2025 (the “Summons”).

2.  I allowed the application upon hearing the Plaintiff’s submissions. These are my reasons.

The Plaintiff’s pleaded case

3.  This is a water seepage case. The Plaintiff is the registered owner of the property at 4/F, No 30 Kowloon City Road, Kowloon, whereas the Defendant is the registered owner of the property at 5/F, No 30 Kowloon City Road, Kowloon (which is immediately above the Plaintiff’s property).

4.  Full particulars of the seepage problem have been pleaded in the Statement of Claim. It is the Plaintiff’s pleaded case that the seepage problem started in 2017 or 2018 and is still continuing. It led to the Plaintiff’s property (which was sub-divided into various units for rental) becoming unsuitable for occupation and use. There are also concerns that the seepage (both salt water and fresh water) has affected the structural integrity of the Plaintiff’s property. As identified in an expert report prepared by SH Consultants & Loss Adjuster Ltd, the seepage originates from the Defendant’s property.

5.  The causes of action relied upon by the Plaintiff are private nuisance, negligence, breach of the relevant Deed of Mutual Covenant and breach of duties under section 34H of the Building Management Ordinance (Cap 344). The Plaintiff essentially claims for injunctive reliefs (for the seepage to stop and for the Defendant to carry out necessary repairs) and also damages to be assessed (including loss of rental income and cost of repair).

Legal Principles

6.  The legal principles are well known. Under Order 19 rule 7 of the Rules of the District Court, judgment in default of defence may be granted based on the facts pleaded in the Statement of Claim only and the Court cannot receive any evidence: Ho Sai Cheong v Honest Gate Co Ltd [2024] HKDC 633 at §7.

7.  As to the Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive reliefs, it is well established that the Court has power to grant permanent injunctions in default judgment applications: Ho Sai Cheong at §8.

Analysis

8.  According to the various affirmations of service, the Writ was served on the Defendant by insertion into the letterbox. The Statement of Claim was served by ordinary post, and the Summons was served by leaving at the Defendant’s property. I am satisfied that there was due and proper service of the Writ and other Court documents on the Defendant.

9.  I granted an order that the service of the Amended Writ be dispensed with, since the only amendment was to correct a typo regarding the Plaintiff’s name in the title of the Writ: White Book 2026 §20/1/7.

10.  The Defendant has not acknowledged service and has defaulted in filing a defence within the prescribed time.

11.  I am satisfied that based on the Plaintiff’s pleaded case (the facts of which are very similar to that in Ho Sai Cheong), the Plaintiff’s claims are made out; indeed on those pleaded facts, the claim on private nuisance is unanswerable. The Plaintiff is accordingly entitled to the injunctive reliefs (both prohibitory and mandatory) sought and also an interlocutory judgment for damages to be assessed (see Ho Sai Cheong §§11-18). As counsel for the Plaintiff Ms Abigail Liu submitted, the Courts have regularly granted these remedies in similar water seepage cases.

12.  Ms Liu also very fairly drew my attention to the recent case of Lau Tin Fai v Gold Regal International Ltd [2025] 2 HKLRD 408, where Deputy District Judge Kenneth Lam held that a mandatory injunction order should be drafted with precision, and in particular in water seepage cases the mere reference to require the defendant to “do necessary acts” to abate the nuisance is not good enough. The learned Deputy Judge suggested the addition of a “by clause” to spell out the exact things that the defendant is required to do (§10).

13.  As a matter of first principles, there can be nothing objectionable to the requirement that mandatory injunction orders should be drafted with precision. But equally, each case must depend on its own facts, and the same applies to the drafting of an order, in particular how specific the drafter might be able to go. In water seepage cases where the defendant has not appeared, the plaintiff usually has not had access to the defendant’s unit to carry out investigations and tests, so it will sometimes be impossible for the plaintiff (and the Court when giving the order) to identify precisely whether it is the pipes, the kitchen sink, the balcony, the bathtub or the waterproofing membrane that is the real source of the seepage which necessitates repairs and maintenance. To require the plaintiff in such a situation to utilize the technique of adding a “by clause” may be asking too much. Alternatively, if this is insisted upon, the plaintiff will then put in a lengthy “by clause” in a lawyerly manner to include all possible sources of seepage that one can imagine so as to cover all bases. In this situation the usage of the “by clause” to improve the clarity and precision of the mandatory injunction order would be self-defeating. It would also mandate the defendant to essentially tear everything down in his flat and re-do the renovation in order for him to comply with the full terms of the order (when for example only a single pipe needs replacement).

14.  It goes without saying that the context would be completely different if say a full-blown expert report has been prepared which identifies the exact spots and sources of seepage. In that situation, the plaintiff should be able to be much more specific in working out the terms of the mandatory injunction order.

15.  On the specific facts of this case, I am satisfied that the terms of the order proposed by the Plaintiff (to carry out all necessary works to duly and fully remedy all defects leading to the seepage) is appropriately specific to let the defendant know what is required to be done.

Conclusion

16.  For these reasons, I made an order in terms of the Summons as amended. Such order shall be indorsed with a penal notice in accordance with Order 45 rule 7(4) of the Rules of the District Court.

17.  Costs should follow the event. The Defendant shall pay the Plaintiff’s costs of this action (including this application) with certificate for counsel, which I summarily assessed at HK$100,000.