RE FAEEM AHMAD

CACV 1199/2025, [2026] HKCA 140

On Appeal From [2025] HKCFI 5850

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 1199 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 2151 OF 2020)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Leung J (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  This is the applicant’s appeal against the order of Deputy High Court Judge Michael Wong (“the Judge”) dated 2 December 2025 ([2025] HKCFI 5850) (“the Leave Decision”). By the Leave Decision, the Judge refused to grant extension of time to apply for leave for judicial review and dismissed his application for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 27 September 2018 (“the Board’s Decision”). By the Board’s Decision, his appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 22 February 2017, which refused his non-refoulement claim, was dismissed.

2.  The applicant is a native of India. His background, the basis of his claim and his arguments advanced before the Board as well as the Board’s reasons for rejecting his appeal were set out in the Board’s Decision: see [4] – [6] of the Leave Decision[1]. The Judge set out the grounds advanced by the applicant in support of the Leave Application and his reasons for refusing the Leave Application: see [11] – [17]; [20] – [61] of the Leave Decision. We will not repeat the details herein.

3.  In the applicant’s Notice of Appeal filed on 16 December 2025, his ground of appeal is a one-liner, namely:

“I am not satisfied with my ORDER.” (sic)

4.  The appeal was listed to be heard on 2 February 2026. By the directions made by the Registrar of Civil Appeals on 16 December 2025 (“the Directions”), which were received by the applicant on the same day, he was directed to lodge two sets of skeleton argument on or before 19 January 2026, failing which, he would be deemed to have waived his right to have an oral hearing for the appeal and the hearing date would be vacated with the appeal being determined on paper.

5.  The applicant did not lodge any skeleton argument in support of his appeal by the stipulated time. Accordingly, he was deemed to have waived his right to have an oral hearing and elected to have his appeal disposed of on paper. The hearing date was thus vacated on 20 January 2026.

6.  The relevant legal principles governing appeals in non-refoulement cases are set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]. In particular, in an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal will only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant. If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed. The Court’s role is not to examine the decision maker’s decision afresh as if it were a fresh application for judicial review.

7.  Apart from expressing his dissatisfaction, the applicant did not state any ground of appeal at all in his Notice of Appeal. He may only expect dismissal of his appeal on this basis alone.

8.  On 27 January 2026, the applicant lodged his skeleton submissions belatedly and without leave. So lodged in breach of the Directions and without leave, the submissions should not be entertained. They also could not serve to advance any ground of appeal not stated in the Notice of Appeal.

9.  In any event, the applicant essentially complains by way of his submissions that the decisions of the Director and the Board were unreasonable and unfair. He claimed that the Director had failed to appreciate or to properly consider the factor of the presence of state acquiescence to his situation, and the Board had placed too much reliance on the county of origin information (“COI”) but failed to take into account his personal background and experience.

10.  As correctly explained by the Judge at [54] of the Leave Decision, the assessment of evidence, COI and risk of harm were primarily within the realm of the Board and the Board was entitled to come to its own conclusion: see Re Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022 at [13]. In our judgment, the Judge was entitled in the circumstances to find that there was nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way the Board reached its conclusion upon such assessment.

11.  Therefore, even assuming his submissions are considered, this court in any event find the appeal to be without merit.

12.  For the above reasons, the appeal is dismissed.