PRIYANTO GANJAR JOKO v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5360 · HCAL 240/2026
Court of First Instance
HCAL 240/2026
[2026] HKCFI 5360
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 240 OF 2026
BETWEEN
| |Priyanto Ganjar Joko |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
|Π|consideration of the documents only; or |
| |consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant or |
| |counsel in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative interested
party be amended to “Director of Immigration”.
2. The applicant’s application to withdraw the application for leave
to apply for judicial review be refused.
3. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated 8 January 2026 and filed on 23 January 2026,
the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the
Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims
Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 16 December 2025 (“the Board’s
Decision”).
2. The Board found that the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement
protection failed on all the applicable grounds under the Unified
Screening Mechanism. Hence, the Board affirmed the decision of the
Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 13 October 2025, which
rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
Amendment
3. In Form 86, the applicant named the Board as both the putative
respondent and the putative interested party, when the Board should
only be the putative respondent and the Director should be the
putative interested party.
4. Thus, on this court’s own motion, the name of the putative interested
party is amended to “Director of Immigration”.
The applicant’s case
5. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Indonesia, he feared being killed by his ex-
girlfriend’s husband. The applicant met his ex-girlfriend at a school
gathering and had sexual relations with her on two occasions. The
applicant claimed that while he was in Hong Kong for sightseeing, he
received a phone call from his mother telling him that his ex-
girlfriend’s husband was threatening to kill him due to her pregnancy.
Withdrawal of the Leave Application
6. By way of an affirmation dated 8 September 2026, the applicant applied
to cancel all his non-refoulement claim including JR/Appeal (if any)
in Hong Kong. However, he did not state the reason for his withdrawal
application or that it was safe for him to return to his country.
7. Nevertheless, the Director informed this court on 16 September 2026
that the applicant wrote a letter dated 8 September 2026 to withdraw
the Leave Application. In the said letter, the applicant stated that
his issues in his home country had been resolved and he wanted to
return to his country as soon as possible.
8. There is no evidence to show that the applicant made the above
withdrawal application other than out of his own volition. With the
withdrawal application, it is clear that the applicant no longer
wishes to proceed with the Leave Application.
9. However, the Court of Appeal had held in Re Manik Md Mahamudun
Nabi [2022] HKCA 471 that:-
“The applicant on his own motion applied to the Court to withdraw his
application for leave to apply for judicial review. The Judge acceded
to his application, whereupon there was nothing outstanding in the
action. The Judge was correct to conclude the action by ordering a
dismissal of the application instead of leaving the action at large.”
10. Thus, it is right for this court to deal with the Leave Application
instead of leaving the action at large by granting leave to the
applicant to withdraw the Leave Application. The applicant’s
application to withdraw the Leave Application is therefore refused,
and this court will proceed to consider the Leave Application.
Discussion
11. It is not necessary for this court to discuss the merits of the
intended judicial review any more, as the applicant had confirmed that
his issues in his country have been resolved. In other words, it is
now safe for him to return to his home country. Thus, the basis of
his non-refoulement claim no longer exists.
12. It is clear that the applicant no longer needs non-refoulement
protection and the intended judicial review serves no practical
purpose.
13. It is well established that the court may exercise discretion not to
grant a remedy on judicial review if it would serve no practical
purpose, where it may have become otiose or pointless to grant a
remedy because the relevant detriment to the applicant has been
removed (see AW v Director of Immigration and William Lam, CACV 63 of
2015).
14. Even assuming that there were errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality in the Board’s Decision and the case were remitted to
the Board for reconsideration, there would simply be no more basis for
the applicant to claim non-refoulement protection as it was no longer
unsafe for him to return to his own country. The Board should assess
the risk of the applicant at the time of the proceedings, taking
account of information that has come to light to ensure that it is
able to make a “full and up-to-date assessment” of the current
situation (see Ubamaka Edward Wilson v Secretary for Security and
Another (2012) 15 HKCFAR 743).
15. It is therefore otiose and pointless to grant leave to the applicant
to proceed with the intended judicial review even if there were merits
in it. Thus, the Leave Application ought to be dismissed.
Conclusion
16. For reasons aforesaid, the application to withdraw the Leave
Application is refused and the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 23rd day of September 2026
| |(Gladys LEE) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant | | |
|or his solicitors must:| | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s solicitors|the putative |
|may be directed by the |on: 23/09/2026 |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order | |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any |Applicant’s ref. no: |interested parties as |
|directions given within|Nil |may be directed by the |
|14 days after the leave| |Court / the putative |
|was granted (Order 53, | |interested parties’ |
|rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |23/09/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and | |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance | |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 27413 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the Applicant proposes | |QA T/C 1820/25 (formerly|
|to use at the hearing, | |RBCZ 5001696/25) |
|including the affidavit| | |
|in support of the | |Department of Justice, |
|application for leave | |Senior Assistant Law |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1