SUPIARSIH v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5560 · HCAL 1090/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1090/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5560
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1090 OF 2023
BETWEEN
| |Supiarsih |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and the applicant being absent in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and the name of the
putative interested party be amended to “Director of Immigration”.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 5 July 2023, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 29 June 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”). The
Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL00
1090_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant was not entitled to non-refoulement
protection in Hong Kong on any of the applicable grounds under the
Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Thus, the Board refused her
appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration
(“the Director”) dated 10 October 2022 and confirmed the same, which
rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
Amendments
3. In Form 86, the applicant named the Board and the Director as the
putative respondents, and the Board as the putative interested party.
4. In fact, only the Board should be named as the putative respondent,
and the Director should be named as the putative interested party.
5. Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of
the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the name
of the putative interested party to “Director of Immigration”.
The applicant’s case
6. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
7. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Indonesia, she would be harmed or killed by her
husband, Sunarwan, and his creditors as she stopped sending money to
him to repay debts to the creditors.
Oral hearing
8. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application.
However, the applicant was absent at the hearing on 24 September 2026.
9. As held in Re Abdus Salam [2019] HKCA 1091, an application for leave
to bring judicial review should not be dismissed for want of
prosecution merely because the applicant failed to attend the oral
hearing of the leave application. The correct approach is to treat
the applicant as having withdrawn the request for a hearing by reason
of the absence at the hearing, and to proceed to determine the leave
application on its merits.
10. Thus, this court will proceed to consider the merits of the Leave
Application based on the written materials before this court.
Grounds for judicial review
11. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
12. The applicant did not identify any ground for the intended judicial
review in Form 86, nor in her supporting affirmation dated 5 July
2023.
Discussion
13. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
14. Thus, despite the lack of any valid ground being advanced by the
applicant for the intended judicial review, this court will examine
and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural
unfairness and irrationality as aforesaid.
15. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an
oral hearing on 21 June 2023 and the applicant was present. Thus, the
applicant was given the opportunity to present her case to the Board
in person.
16. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board had given a
detailed analysis of all the aspects of the applicant’s claims and its
reasoning in rejecting the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement
protection.
17. The Board had laid out its assessment of the applicant’s claims in
paragraphs 41 to 55 of the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary
to repeat the same here.
18. In gist, the Board accepted that the applicant and her husband argued
about money and the applicant was required to send him some of her
earnings. However, the Board did not accept that the applicant was
harmed by her husband. The Board did not accept that the applicant
would have failed to raise that she had been hit by her husband three
times in 2020 and the Board considered it evident that the applicant
was embellishing her claims during the Board’s hearing. The Board did
not accept that the applicant had been truthful about her husband’s
employment, and she had undoubtedly attempted to present him as lazy
and a gambler for the purposes of her non-refoulement claim.
19. The Board considered that the applicant’s evidence in relation to her
discovery about the loans owed by her husband as confused and
inconsistent. The Board was of the view that the applicant’s evidence
indicated that her husband had only been to her parents’ house to
threaten them, no doubt to try to obtain money. The Board was not
satisfied that the applicant genuinely believed that her husband
intended to harm her upon her return to Indonesia and considered that
her claims that he would do so were highly speculative.
20. More importantly, the Board considered that, even if the applicant had
any fear of harm from the loan sharks or her husband, the applicant
could relocate to another part of Indonesia and it would be reasonable
and not unduly harsh for her to do so. The Board had given its
reasons for such a finding in paragraphs 53 to 54 of the Board’s
Decision.
21. Thus, the Board was not satisfied that there were substantial grounds
or a real risk that the applicant’s husband or the loan sharks would
inflict “black magic” or any harm amounting to torture, a risk to her
life, cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment or persecution upon the
applicant if she was returned to Indonesia.
22. The finding of facts, including the assessment of evidence and risk of
harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board in dealing with the
applicant’s appeal/petition. The Board was entitled to make its own
decision. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way
the Board reached its conclusion.
23. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no error of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
24. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
25. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 30th day of September 2026
| |(Gladys LEE) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant | | |
|or his solicitors must:| | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s solicitors|the putative |
|may be directed by the |on: 30/09/2026 |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order | |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any | |interested parties as |
|directions given within| |may be directed by the |
|14 days after the leave|Applicant’s ref. no: |Court / the putative |
|was granted (Order 53, |Nil |interested parties’ |
|rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |30/09/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and | |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance | |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 21072 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the Applicant proposes | |QA T/C 907/22 (formerly |
|to use at the hearing, | |RBCZ/5000774/22) |
|including the affidavit| | |
|in support of the | |Department of Justice, |
|application for leave | |Senior Assistant Law |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1