WU HING YIN REMZI v. CHEUNG SHUN WAH

HCA1891/2011

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 1891 OF 2011

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  This is an application for ex-parte injunction to restrain the Defendant from continuing to publish alleged defamatory statements about the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff and the Defendant are the only two candidates running for the J25 Constituency of the Kwun Tong District Council, the election of which is to be held this Sunday on 6 November 2011.

2.  It is trite law that the jurisdiction to grant an interim injunction to restrain the publication of defamatory statements is of a delicate nature which ought only to be exercised in the clearest case, and the court will only grant an interim injunction where the statement is unarguably defamatory.  Obviously, freedom of speech is an important consideration of the court.

3.  Initially I was inclined to grant the injunction, but after further reviewing the contents of the alleged defamatory material, I decided to refuse the application for the injunction.

4.  According to the alleged defamatory material supplied to the court, the Defendant said something about the damage caused to the banner of his election campaign.  However, after further reviewing the contents of the material, the Defendant might not be referring to the Plaintiff who damaged the banner.  He might refer to some person who shared the same political belief of the Plaintiff who damaged the banner.  What the Defendant might be saying in the email was that by voting in the Sunday election, the voters should send a message to the person who shared the same political belief with the Plaintiff that violence in politics should not be tolerated. So the Defendant might not have meant that it was the Plaintiff who personally damaged the banner.

5.  I agree that the Plaintiff has provided some evidence to show that some of the readers might understand the contents to mean that it was the Plaintiff who personally damaged the banner.  However, it is equally open to say that the material referred to a person who shared the same political belief with the Plaintiff who damaged the banner.  Hence, the Plaintiff’s interpretation of the material is not the only interpretation.  In fact, the other interpretation may equally be correct.

6.  As the alleged defamatory material did not necessarily suggest that it was the Plaintiff who personally damaged or caused to damage the banner, I do not accept that the Plaintiff has satisfied the stringent test for the granting of interim injunction in defamation cases.

7.  I therefore rescind the order I made just now and refuse the application.