KAMAL MOHAMMED ANWAR v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 2169/2020

[2026] HKCFI 2359

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 2169 OF 2020

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons filed on 23 January 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 7 January 2026, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 8 July 2020.

2.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.  As my order was made on 7 January 2026, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 21 January 2026. Thus, the time for appealing against my order has expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.  In the Summons and his supporting affirmation dated 23 January 2026, the applicant claimed that he received the court’s order only on 22 January 2026 when it was already out of time to appeal. The applicant also alleged that he did not agree with this court’s decision and his problem still existed in his home country. However, such bare allegations cannot amount to any valid ground for his intended appeal at all.

8.  At the hearing of the Summons on 10 April 2026, the applicant explained that he received the court’s letter only on 22 January 2026 because the usual letter box for receiving mail was broken and the court’s letter was put in another letter box for returning mail. When he checked this other letter box on 22 January 2026, he found the court’s letter.

9.  I am prepared to give the benefit of doubt to the applicant and accept his explanation regarding why he received the court’s letter late. In any event, the delay was not for long. When he filed the Summons, it was only 2 days after the deadline for appealing.

10.  However, when the applicant was asked for his grounds of appeal, he merely said that he was compelled to leave his country to save his life, he had been living in Hong Kong as a law-abiding asylum seeker for some time without involving in any criminal activity and he felt safe to live in Hong Kong. He added that he had submitted everything truthfully in his claim and he prayed that this court could allow him to live in Hong Kong safely until his problems in his country were resolved. It is clear that what the applicant said at the hearing did not amount to any valid ground of appeal at all.

11.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

12.  The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above. Hence, there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.

13.  In the circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review. I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

14.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.