RE SIDDIQUE AAMIR

CAMP 167/2019

[2020] HKCA 554

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 167 OF 2019

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 37 of 2018)

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JUDGMENT

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Hon Chu JA giving the Judgment of the Court:

1.  On 15 January 2020, this Court (Chu and Barma JJA) handed down our judgment[1] refusing to give leave to the applicant to appeal out of time against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan given on 12 April 2019 refusing him leave to apply for judicial review.     

2.  On 16 January 2020, the applicant filed a notice of motion to apply for leave to appeal against our judgment to the Court of Final Appeal.  Despite the direction and the extensions of time[2] given by the Registrar of Civil Appeals, the applicant has not put in a written submission to support his application.

3.  Having considered the applicant’s notice of motion, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on paper without an oral hearing.  We have therefore proceeded to determine the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents in the case.

4.  The background to this case and the applicant’s claim have been set out in our judgment.  We will not repeat them.

5.  Under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484, leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

6.  The notice of motion stated the following:

“1.   The Learned Judges were wrong as a matter of law for not having applied the principle of irrationality to the decision made by the Director of Immigration on the 15^th January 2020 refusing my application for judicial review.

2.   The Learned Judges were wrong as a matter of the law for not having applied the principle of procedural fairness to the decision of the director [whereby] the Director was required to give reasons justifying the decision.” 

7.  We are of the view that the matters stated in the notice of motion do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  In the first place, they relate only to the circumstances of the applicant, and do not involve any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b).  Secondly, the attempt to challenge the decision(s) of the Director of Immigration was misplaced given there was an appeal against the Director’s decisions which was refused by the Board.  Further, the second ground was unarguable given that the Director had given reasons for both of his decisions.  

8.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).

9.  As the statutory requirements for giving leave to appeal are not met, we dismiss the Notice of Motion.