TM v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 1570/2021

[2023] HKCFI 2662

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1570 of 2021

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following;

	consideration of documents only;          or
	consideration of documents and oral submissions by counsel for the Applicant in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:

1.  Leave to apply for Judicial Review of the Board’s Decision be granted;

2.  The applicant must within 14 days after this decision issue the originating summons for the application for judicial review of the Board’s Decision in accordance with Order 53, rule 5 of RHC; and

3.  No order as to costs for this application.

THE APPLICATION

1.  The applicant applies for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision dated 20 August 2021 of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board’s Decision”), dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decisions of the Director of Immigration dated 18 August 2016 and 7 September 2017 (“the Director’s Decisions”), which did not accept the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement on all applicable grounds.

2.  By way of background, there was an appeal against the Director’s Decisions before another Board (“the previous Board”), which dismissed his appeal. Upon the applicant’s application for judicial review of the previous Board’s decision, the High Court quashed the previous Board’s decision and remitted the matter to the Board of another adjudicator for a fresh, de novo determination. In the proceedings before the Board, the legal representative of the applicant applied to the Board to adopt the oral evidence of the applicant given before the previous Board. The Board refused this application. This issue has become a contested issue for the Court.

3.  The applicant was represented by Mr Josh Baker, counsel on the instructions of Messrs. Patricia Ho & Associates, Solicitors, on pro bono basis.

4.  At the hearing on 12 September 2023, leave was granted to the applicant to amend Form 86 and file the supporting affidavit.

The applicant

5.  The applicant is a national of Iran. He entered Hong Kong on 8 May 2012 on the strengthen of an Italian passport. On 15 May 2012, he produced the said passport to the airline staff for check-in. However, he fled away and left the passport on the counter. On 18 May 2012, he approached the Consulate General of the Islamic Republic of Iran for assistance. Thereafter, he was arrested for entering Hong Kong with a false travel document. On 17 October 2012, he lodged a non-refoulement claim. His claim was made on the basis that, if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by (i) members of the Law Enforcement Forces of Islamic Republic of Iran (“NAJA”), and/or (ii) the Basij, and/or (iii) the Ministry of Intelligence and National Security of the Islamic Republic of Iran (“MISIRI”).

6.  According to the applicant, he was born into a Muslim family in Iran. In 2012, he converted from Islam to Christianity and was baptized in Hong Kong in 2013.

The first arrest

7.  The applicant attended a university and, upon graduation, he went to sightseeing in Shomal in Norther Iran with his family, relatives and friends. They stayed in Hashtgert Jadid in Majid’s house. On 9 February 2011, a group of men came and searched Majid’s house. The applicant and his group were arrested and accused for involving in the Green Movement, an anti-government movement. He believed that one of the men was the chief sergeant major.

8.  The applicant was handcuffed and taken to the police station. They were interrogated and some of the group were ill-treated. After one or two hours, the group were taken to Agahi Police Station, a place which was notorious for mistreatments and assaults for the detainees. At first, the applicant was led to outdoor and exposed under the winter cold for 30 or 45 minutes. Later, his personal items were all confiscated and the group were all detained in one small cell without heating and beddings. In three days, the applicant was interrogated under harsh conditions, deprived of sleep and suffered anxieties. He developed stomach pain which prevented from eating the cold and leftover food offered to them. On the fourth day, the applicant was taken to court and was forced to sign some unknown documents. Afterwards, he was released.

The second arrest

9.  Two weeks after the first arrest, the applicant went to Hashtgert again to pick up a car. He was again arrested by the intelligence agencies, either from NAJA, the Basij or the MISIRI. He was blindfolded and taken to an unknown location. He was told to write his personal information on pieces of paper but the pieces of paper were ripped off by the officers who were apparently not satisfied with the information the applicant wrote on the paper. He was threatened to be placed into a dog cage with a heating system. Later, he was taken to a small cell which he could not stand or lay down. It was humid and dark with insects biting him. He was only given a 30 seconds window or a couple of minutes for him to use the toilet, get water or wash his face. He had to urinate into a cup which was also used to contain his drinking water. He was constantly subject to verbal and physical assaults. He felt humiliated, disgusted and in despair.

10.  Every time when the applicant failed to provide satisfactory answers, he would be assaulted. He was also accused for participating in the Green Movement and turned people against the government. On two occasions, he was forced to drink unknown bitter liquid. In one interrogation, he was water-boarded for hours. Meanwhile, he was subjected to different kinds of noises which not only caused him a temporary tinnitus but also deprived him from sleeps. All of these led to his mental stress.

11.  Three days before he was taken to court, he was again tied up and beaten with a thick baton, causing him excruciating pain. He was played a recording which contained the screaming of his brother. Finally, the applicant broke down and agreed to confess and sign whatever documents they asked him to sign. At that point, the applicant just wanted to be dead.

12.  While mentally prepared that they would kill him, the applicant was released on bail at $70,000 USD three days later. He went to see a doctor who prescribed some antibiotics. He also consulted a psychiatrist. After his release, he found out that his two brothers attended an anti-government demonstration which led to his arrest. As a result of the two arrests, the applicant was mentally ill and often had suicidal thoughts.

The third incident

13.  After months of recovery, the applicant resumed work. He shared the office spaces with two men named Mehdi A and Mehdi B. Mehdi A was an elevator services contactor. Initially, the applicant’s business was growing. He was outsourced with a profitable government contract. Six months later, Mehdi B told the applicant that Mehdi A was arrested by the intelligence agencies. It turned out that Mehdi A was connected with the antigovernment organizations. Since Mehdi A was arrested in his office, the applicant feared that the authorities would chase him again because he allowed Mehdi A to use his computer to make some political brochures and flyers. Therefore, the applicant departed Iran and eventually came to Hong Kong for protection. The applicant learned that most of his family members also fled Iran. Meanwhile, he found out that his relatives resented his conversion to Christianity.

14.  While in Hong Kong, the applicant still suffered mental illness. In June 2014, he started seeing a psychotherapist and was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. Details of his claim are set out at paragraph 9 of the Notice of Decision dated 18 August 2016 by the Director (the “Director’s First Decision”).

The Director’s Decisions

15.  The Director considered the applicant’s claim in relation to the following risks:

a.  risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115, (“the Ordinance”) (“Torture risk”);

b.  risk of violation of the right to life under Article 2 of Section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”) (“BOR 2 risk”);

c.  risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (“CIDTP”) under Article 3 of Section 8 of the HKBOR (“BOR 3 risk”); and

d.  risk of persecution by reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (“Refugee Convention”) (“Persecution risk”).

16.  By way of the Director’s First Decision, the Director dismissed the applicant’s claim on Torture risk, BOR3 risk and Persecution risk as the level of risk of harm was assessed to be low. In elaboration, the Director found that (i) on the totality of evidence he would not face any real or foreseeable personal risk of ill-treatments by the Iranian authorities [18] - [25]; (ii) his conducts were inconsistent with someone who feared that the conversion to Christianity would lead to ill-treatments and, on his own evidence, he could live a normal life after the alleged mental illness. Meanwhile, he was able to secure government contracts even after the alleged first and second arrests [26] - [35]; and (iii) internal relocation was available for the applicant [36] - [37].

17.  For reasons set out in the Notice of Further Decision dated 7 September 2017, the Director also found that the applicant’s right to life would not be violated and dismissed his claim on BOR2 risk (the “Director’s Second Decision”).

18.  The Director’s First Decision and the Director’s Second Decision will be referred to collectively as the “Director’s Decisions”.

19.  On 14 September 2018, the applicant’s appeal against the Director’s Decisions was dismissed by the first Board. On 22 October 2018, the applicant sought to make a subsequent claim which was refused by the Director on 11 December 2018.

20.  Thereafter, the applicant initiated the judicial review proceedings against the first Board’s decision. On 17 January 2020, the court quashed the first Board’s decision and remitted the applicant’s case to the second Board (different constituted) for fresh determination.

The Board’s Decision

21.  On 24 March 2021 and 25 March 2021, the Board heard the applicant’s appeal afresh. Both parties were legally represented. It considered the documents submitted by the applicant’s legal representative, and authorities and country of origin information (“COI”) submitted by both sides [4] - [5].

22.  Preliminarily, upon the applicant’s application, the Board considered the correspondence between the parties about whether to determine the applicant’s case on the papers as, alleged by the applicant, the cross-examinations of the traumatic past events would affect the applicant’s mental health. On the date of the oral hearing, the applicant confirmed that he was mentally fit to testify but indicated his reluctance to answer certain questions in relation to the first and second arrests. The Board reminded the applicant of his rights to ask for breaks whenever he felt necessary. It further rejected the submissions of the applicant’s legal representative that the audio recording of the previous Board hearing should be adopted in lieu of cross-examining the applicant as it would defeat the purpose of a fresh hearing [6] - [8].

23.  The Board examined the applicant’s immigration history and found that it was unfavorable to the applicant’s credibility [19] - [21]. In an attempt to ask the applicant questions with regards to the first and second arrests, the applicant expressed that he would have flashbacks if questioned on these aspects. As a result, no questions were asked as to the first and second arrests and the circumstances incidental to them [25].

24.  For the first and second arrests, the applicant’s duty lawyer, Mrs. Ho, and legal representative for the Director, Mr. Tong, made submissions. The Board summarized them at [27] to [30].

25.  The Board considered the COI on Green Movement in Iran and accepted that the applicant was briefly detained by the police in around February 2011. However, it found that, since the applicant was not cross-examined, the weight of his statements in relation to the events surrounding the first and second arrests should be discounted [32]. It noted that there was no objective evidence to corroborate the applicant’s accounts of these events, such as the length of detention, the ill-treatments suffered, and any interrogation against him. It also noted that the applicant did not seek medical treatment nor did he need rest after the first arrest, which indicated that the detention was brief and the ill-treatments minor [35].

26.  Insofar as the second arrest was concerned, the applicant submitted the Iranian Medical Certificate to substantiate his assertion that he had suffered serious mental illness during the first and second arrests. The Board rejected this assertion. It held that (i) the content in the medical certificate stated that the applicant received ten-month psychiatric treatments, which was inconsistent with his own evidence that he was mentally and physical fit to start a business of building contractor from scratch; (ii) if the situation was as bad as alleged, the applicant could have left the country sooner like what his brothers did; (iii) his ability to procure a profitable government contract was inconsistent with the claim that he was adversely targeted by the government; (iv) he was not required to report to the police or the NAJA after the second arrest and nothing eventful happened for around a year after the second arrest; (v) his versions in relation to why he was arrested again were illogical; and (vi) the Board placed no weight to the letter produced by Sarah Borwein who was only a general medical practitioner but not a specialist in psychiatry and thus her letter was a reiteration of what the applicant told her [36]. Meanwhile, the Board also cast doubt on the alleged bail after the second arrest [37].

27.  As to the third incident which is the subsequent arrest of Mehdi A, the Board also rejected it as untruthful. First, the applicant did not submit any objective evidence in relation to his business and the lease. Secondly, his decision to stay and start a business was inconsistent with someone who feared the local authorities. Thirdly, there was insufficient evidence to support the applicant’s assertion that his name was the only one in the lease. Fourthly, his assertion was unbelievable that only him, not the other colleagues who shared the same common area and might also have access to Mehdi A’s computer, was targeted. Fifthly, it was illogical that, if Mehdi A used the office area to meet his clients, the applicant and his other colleagues would not feel suspicious about his acts. Finally, the Board refused to accept that he would be prosecuted for this incident based on the alleged blank confession he signed during the first or second arrest [39].

28.  The Board also considered his manner of departing Iran did not support his claimed fear of harm and his explanation unsatisfactory [40] - [43]. Further, it considered Mrs Ho and Mr. Tong’s submissions in relation to the verdict and summons against the applicant [44] - [45]. Having considered their submissions, the relevant COI and the applicant’s evidence, the Board refused to accept that the applicant was convicted of any of the alleged offences as stated in the verdict in absentia [47] - [49].

29.  For the applicant’s fear of risk of harm on the basis of his religious conversion, the Board examined the applicant’s religious activities in Hong Kong, his own admission that he lost faith in Christianity, the pastor’s visit to the applicant’s family in Iran, and the reactions of the applicant’s family and Muslim community. It therefore concluded that the applicant’s claimed fear of harm due to his conversion was groundless [51] - [66].   

30.  In considering the applicant’s mental health condition, the Board found that there was no formal psychiatric assessment report that supported his claim of PTSD. Meanwhile, in the CIC records at the “Past Heath History” section, the applicant gave a negative answer to the question as to whether he was prescribed any psychiatric treatment or medicine [67]. In addition, the Board gave no weights to the letters provided by the applicant from the claimed psychotherapists [68] - [71] and concluded that there was simply no sufficient reason to substantiate the applicant’s alleged mental health problems [72].

31.  The Board also considered the current situation of the applicant’s family members and rejected the applicant’s assertion that his family members were all adversely targeted by the local authorities [73] - [78].

32.  In light of the aforesaid findings, the Board concluded that there was insufficient reliable evidence that the alleged acts of torture had inflicted the applicant pain or suffering of certain severity or gravity [79] - [82]. Further, the Board also found that the applicant failed to established a risk of harm as an apostate or a political dissenter [83] - [105].

33.  In any event, the Board considered the COI on the legal system in Iran, the prison conditions and the general situation in Iran and concluded that state protection would be available to the applicant [106] - [121]. Therefore, it rejected the applicant’s claim on Persecution risk [122] - [123].

34.  As the Board found that the applicant’s alleged injuries during the first arrest failed to attain a minimum level of severity and his accounts on the second arrest untrustworthy, and that there was no evidence showing that those local police officers were acting with the consent or acquiescence of government officials or other person acting in an official capacity, his claim on Torture risk also failed [127] - [133].

35.  For the same aforesaid reasons, the applicant’s claim on BOR2 risk and BOR3 risk also failed [134] - [144]. In passing, internal relocation could be a viable alternative for the applicant [145] - [152].

36.  Therefore, the Board rejected the applicant’s claim and dismissed his appeal.                

Application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision

37.  The applicant has filed Form 86 dated 12 November 2021 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision.

38.  The applicant has, in Form 86, raised 5 grounds in support of his application. They are (1) error of law; (2) procedural unfairness/irregularity; (3) procedural unfairness/irrationality; (4) illegality; and (5) fair trial. For the present purpose, I consider it unnecessary to set out the details of each ground as I shall only concentrate on the ground of error of law and procedural unfairness within a very limited compass only.

DISCUSSION

The general legal principles

39.  The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Board complied with the public law requirements in coming to its Decision on the applicant’s appeal. The Court will not usurp the fact finding power vested in the Director and the Board. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1).

40.  The Court will bear in mind that the Board’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny.

41.  In Re: Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022, 9 September 2019, the Court of Appeal held:

“13. (1) … …Assessment of evidence and COI materials and risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board.”

42.  The Court of Final Appeal in Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, 30 November 2007 held:

“14. The requirement for leave to apply for judicial review is an important filter introduced by statute. Section 21K(3) of the High Court Ordinance, Cap. 4 and Order 53 rule 3(1) of the Rules of the High Court. Its purpose is to prevent public authorities from being unduly vexed with unarguable challenges. …

15. … … The test which should be applied is the arguability test. … A reasonably arguable case is one which enjoys realistic prospects of success. … It is in the public interest that challenges which are not reasonably arguable should not be given leave to proceed.”

Conclusion

43.  I shall first state my conclusion here. Having considered the evidence and the submissions by counsel before me, I decide to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision.

44.  As this is an application for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision, my reasons for granting leave should be brief as the issues may be the subject of the application itself.

45.  The reasons for leave to be grant are mainly two, viz. error in law for excluding the evidence of the previous Board’s hearing on the first arrest and the second arrest upon the application of the applicant and procedural unfairness. The Board’s conclusion on the facts of the claim as a result of the assessment of the evidence is that the Board rejected that the applicant was the target of the ruling party on suspicion of his association with The Green Movement, an anti-government organization; that state protection would be available to him; and that internal relocation would be a viable option to him. If the applicant succeeds in establishing that he is the target of the state, state protection and internal relocation will fall away. I shall state my reasons in details below.

The Board’s reasons

46.  The Board’s reasons for refusing to adopt the evidence in relation to the first arrest and the second arrest are:

i.  the applicant refused to be cross-examined on the facts either before or after those 2 incidents for the reason he had “flashbacks” of those incidents; [25]

ii.  he did not submit any medical evidence in support of the nature and severity of his physical injuries; he submitted the Iranian Medical Certificate to substantiate his assertion that he suffered immense mental ill-treatment during the first arrest and second arrest, but the Board rejected the record in the Certificate that he had sought psychiatric treatment for 10 months for the reason that he was able to build up a business of building contract from scratch; [36]

iii.  the Board did not accept Dr Sarah Borwein’s medical report which said that the applicant suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder relating to his detention in Iran and he had extensive counseling to deal with his nightmares, flashbacks, recurrent traumatic memories, negative cognitions, persistent negative emotional state, hypervigilance and poor sleep. [36]

The Board’s power to adopt the evidence of the previous Board’s hearing

47.  Counsel for the applicant had not addressed this Court on the jurisdiction of the Board to adopt the evidence in the previous Board’s hearing. Nor was he able to assist me on the contents of such evidence because he said he had not read the evidence himself. This issue may be relevant when the judicial review application is heard. The Court of Appeal in Afsar Khan v Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office [2019] HKCA 751, Hon Yuen & Au JJA, 10 July 2019 held:

“17. … for the court to grant relief in judicial review based on procedural unfairness, the applicant should also demonstrate that he has suffered prejudice by reason of that. …”

48.  On the question of whether the Board has jurisdiction to consider the evidence of the previous Board’s hearing, having considered the relevant statutory provisions, I find that the Board has the power to consider such evidence under sections 17 & 18 of Schedule 1A of the Ordinance:

“17. Appeal Board may determine own procedure

Subject to Part VIIC and any direction of the Chairperson, the Appeal Board may determine its own procedure in hearing an appeal.

18. Evidence considered by Appeal Board in an appeal under section 37ZR

(1) In an appeal under section 37ZR, the Appeal Board has the power to review the merits of the case, and accordingly it may consider—

(a) the same evidence that was before an immigration officer; …”

49.  Section 18 does not provide exclusive power to the Board as it clearly has the power to consider the oral evidence given before it, which is not provided for under this section. The adoption of the evidence in the previous Board’s hearing should be understood as the procedure for the proceedings before the Board, which the Board has power under section 17. The fact that the Board had entertained the applicant’s application seems to confirm this.

50.  As the Board has the power to adopt the evidence in the previous Board’s hearing as evidence, it becomes a question as to whether the Board’s decision refusing to adopt such evidence as the evidence for the hearing is Wednesbury unreasonable.

51.  The Board’s decision to refuse adoption of the evidence of the previous Board’s hearing relating to the first arrest and second arrest may be an error in law and procedurally unfair.

Section 37ZI of the Ordinance

52.  The law imposes a duty on the Board to consider all relevant considerations relating to the applicant’s claim under section 37ZI of the Ordinance:

“37ZI. Decision on torture claim

(3) A torture claim must be accepted as substantiated if there are substantial grounds for believing that the claimant would be in danger of being subjected to torture if the claimant were removed or surrendered to a torture risk State.

(4) A torture claim must be rejected in the absence of substantial grounds for the belief referred to in subsection (3). (Amended 7 of 2021 s. 15)

(5) In determining whether there are substantial grounds for the belief referred to in subsection (3), all relevant considerations are to be taken into account, including, where applicable, the following matters in relation to the conditions in the torture risk State—

(a) whether there is a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in the torture risk State; and

(b) whether there is any region within the torture risk State in which the claimant would not be in danger of being subjected to torture.”

High standards of fairness

53.  The Court of Final Appeal in Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar (2004) 7 HKCFAR 187, C.J. Li, Mr Justice Bokhary PJ, Mr Justice Chan PJ, Mr Ribeiro PJ and Lord Millet NPJ, 8 June 2004 held:

“51. In considering the potential deportee’s torture claim, the necessary high standards of fairness should be approached as follows: (1) The potential deportee, who has the burden of establishing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture if deported to the country concerned, should be given every reasonable opportunity to establish his claim. (2) The claim must be properly assessed by the Secretary. … ”

54.  Against the statutory requirements and the Court of Final Appeal’s decision set out above, the Board’s reasons refusing to adopt the said evidence seem to be inadequate to justify its decision. There is no reason why the said evidence should not be considered by the Board. The only objections given by the Board are that the applicant refused to be cross-examined and it had the power to cross-examine the applicant because there was a re-hearing order by the court. The applicant had given his reasons for refusing to repeat his evidence as it would cause flashbacks to him. This allegation was supported by Dr Borwein’s letter dated 5 March 2021[1]. In this letter, Dr Borwein said:

“John has been a patient in this clinic since 24 September 2013. He has been on numerous occasions both by myself, and by one of our counsellors, Jill Devlin, who is currently in Australia. … He had extensive counseling to deal with his nightmares, flashbacks, recurrent traumatic memories, negative cognitions, persistent negative emotional state, hypervigilance and poor sleep … It is my medical opinion that John should if possible be excused from direct questioning, and that other ways be found to evaluate his case.”

It is clear that the doctor’s medical opinion is based on the facts stated in the letter. The Board had placed no weight on the evidence without giving Dr Borwein an opportunity to explain how she had come to such conclusions. If the applicant had not called Dr Borwein as witness, the Board has power to call the doctor to give evidence under section 22 of Schedule 1A of the Ordinance.[2]  The Board’s decision seems to be unfair to the applicant.

55.  Therefore, it seems that there is no reason for the Board to exclude the oral evidence in the previous Board’s hearing. If the Board considers the said evidence and finds that it is unreasonable for the applicant to refuse to be cross-examined on the said evidence, it may take this into account in determining the applicant’s credibility.[3]

56.  The Board’s decision has put itself in a position of not being able to comply with section 37ZI of the Ordinance and the higher standards of fairness. There seems to be other options open to the Board to adopt the said evidence, such as setting out the questions to the applicant’s duty lawyer who might pass them to the applicant in advance so as to reduce the stress of the cross-examination. It is a matter to be worked out between the parties and the Board.

57.  As the said evidence is not before the Court, it is not possible for me to consider whether the said evidence is, in fact, the same evidence that the applicant had given to the Director in the screening process. The adjudicator had only considered the evidence given to the Director, it is in doubt if he had taken into account all relevant considerations as provided under section 37ZI of the Ordinance.

58.  The applicant succeeds to show that he has a realistic prospect of success in his intended application for judicial review of the Board’s Decision.

DISPOSTION

59.  I grant leave for the applicant to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. The applicant must within 14 days after this decision issue the originating summons for the application for judicial review of the Board’s Decision in accordance with Order 53, rule 5 of the RHC.

60.  Since counsel informed this Court that he rendered his service pro bono, I shall make no order as to costs for this application. I am grateful for counsel’s assistance.

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1