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CACV 235/2026, [2026] HKCA 963
On appeal from [2026] HKCFI 1077
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 235 OF 2026
(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 857 OF 2021)
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| Before: |
Hon Chu VP and Cheng J in Court |
| Date of Hearing: |
5 May 2026 |
| Date of Judgment: |
19 May 2026 |
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J U D G M E N T
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Hon Chu VP (giving the Judgment of the Court):
Introduction
1. This is the appeal of the applicant against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Levy (“the Judge”) given on 4 March 2026[1] dismissing his application for leave to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review is in respect of the decision dated 3 June 2021 of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) which dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision dated 10 August 2018 of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) rejecting his claim for non-refoulement protection. While the Director’s decision did not extend to the torture risk[2] ground because of the previous rejection of the applicant’s torture claim, the Board’s decision covered all the applicable grounds, namely torture risk, BOR 3 risk[3], persecution risk[4] and BOR 2[5] risk grounds.
Background
2. The applicant is a national of Pakistan born in 1983. He entered Hong Kong illegally and was arrested by the police on 30 January 2008. On 12 February 2008, he lodged a torture claim which was rejected by the Director on 6 February 2014. On 21 February 2014, he lodged a non-refoulement claim on the basis that if he returned to Pakistan, he would be harmed or killed by his uncle, Sabir Ali, who has powerful political connections, due to a land dispute. Details of the applicant’s claim, the grounds advanced before the Board as well as the Board’s reasons for rejecting his appeal have been set out in the Board’s decision[6]. We will not repeat them.
3. The Board heard the applicant’s appeal against the Director’s decision at an oral hearing on 29 April 2021. The Board dismissed the appeal, having found the applicant’s account to be incredible as it was lacking in basic details, inherently implausible and illogical. For example, the applicant was unable to tell the size of the land which he had farmed for seven years, his family did not report his kidnap to the police and his account on matters relating to the ownership of the disputed land and transfer of title was internally inconsistent and different from his written claim. The Board thus rejected the core factual basis of his claim. The Board further found that, even accepting the applicant’s evidence, the risk of harm was low with the available state protection and internal relocation alternatives. The Board concluded that the applicant failed to establish the threshold required for protection under all the applicable grounds.
The Judge’s decision
4. The applicant filed a Form 86 on 10 June 2021 to apply for leave to judicially review the Board’s decision. He did not set out any grounds for seeking relief. At the hearing before the Judge on 8 January 2026, the applicant asserted that he needed more time as there were fresh attacks on his house and his parents had advised him it would be dangerous to return home.
5. The Judge refused to grant leave for the applicant to apply for judicial review for the reasons encapsulated in [8] and [9] of the Form CALL-1 dated 4 March 2026. In summary, the Judge was satisfied that the Board had correctly applied the law relating to the applicable grounds and observed a high standard of fairness, and the applicant had not provided any valid grounds to support his application and had failed to show any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s decision. The Judge concluded that the intended judicial review had no prospect of success.
This appeal
6. By a Notice of Appeal filed on 12 March 2026, the applicant appeals the Judge’s decision to this Court on the ground that the Board had considered his claim lightly and his enemies are still looking for him.
7. The applicant’s written submission lodged on 17 April 2026 states that: (1) the Judge failed to apply principles of irrationality and procedural fairness to the decisions of the Board and the Director, and did not analyse his claims properly; (2) high standard of fairness is required as his life and limb are in jeopardy and the decision has the effect of finally disposing of his torture claim making him liable to be removed from Hong Kong; (3) the Board did not give him sufficient chance to arrange relevant evidence to support his claim and his appeal; (4) he will face hardship and will be harmed by his political enemies if he returns to his home country; and (5) the Board had relied on source of news which is not officially recognised or is simply hearsay, and had failed to evaluate whether there was a consistent pattern of gross and mass violation of human rights.
8. At the hearing, the applicant did not have anything to add to what was stated in his notice of appeal and written submission.
Our reasons for decision
9. In assessing the merits of the appeal, we have regard to the legal principles which this Court has adopted in dealing with appeals in non-refoulement cases: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]; Re Md Shohel Sheak [2018] HKCA 714 at [13]; and Re Limbu Birkhaman [2019] HKCA 50 at [11]. In particular, the role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board. In the determination of an appeal against the refusal of leave by the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeal will only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant. If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed. It is not the role of this Court to examine the decision of the Board afresh as if the appeal were a fresh application for judicial review.
10. Further, it is well established that the assessment of evidence, COI, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board and the Director as they are the primary decision makers. The Court, in its supervisory role, will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board: Re Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022.
11. We are of the view that the grounds of appeal and submissions put forward by the applicant have no merits. First, the criticisms of the decisions of the Board and the Director that the applicant made in this appeal were not raised before the Judge. It is not permissible for him to put forward grounds of appeal or arguments that were not made to the Judge, especially when these grounds are fact-sensitive. Second, the grounds and submissions made in this appeal are general assertions unsupported by particulars. Third, the grounds and submissions do not engage with the reasons given by the Board in rejecting the core basis of the applicant’s claim and evidence on credibility grounds. Some of them are entirely irrelevant. For example, the assertion that the applicant fears he will be killed or harmed by his political enemies because of his involvement in the opposition party bears no relation to the factual basis of his claim. Fourth, the complaint about not being given an opportunity to arrange evidence is simply not borne out by the facts in this case. At the hearing before the Board, the applicant did not seek to adduce any evidence or ask for time to adduce evidence. Quite to the contrary, his written testimonies and materials in support of his claim were all before the Board. Fifth, and in any event, the applicant has not identified the matters which the Board should have but failed to consider. Sixth, there is no basis for the assertion that the Board relied on hearsay or unofficial source of news. It can be seen from its decision that the Board thoroughly and comprehensively analysed the available country-of-origin information before concluding that any risk of harm that the applicant might face would be mitigated by the availability of state protection and internal relocation alternatives. Seventh, given that the applicant did not put forward any ground in his application for leave to apply for judicial review, the Judge cannot be faulted for holding that his intended judicial review had no prospect of success. The applicant has not been able to demonstrate with particulars any error in the reasoning of the Judge. There is no proper basis for this Court to disturb the Judge’s decision.
12. For the above reasons, we dismiss the appeal.
| (Carlye Chu) |
(Yvonne Cheng) |
| Vice-President |
Judge of the Court of First Instance |
The applicant, unrepresented, acted in person.
[1] [2026] HKCFI 1077
[2] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.
[3] This refers to risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.
[4] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non‑refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
[5] This refers to the risk of being arbitrarily deprived of life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.
[6] https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2021/HCAL000857_2021_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf"
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