RE B

HCB 6751/2019

[2026] HKCFI 1278

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS NO 6751 OF 2019

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BETWEEN

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D E C S I O N

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I. INTRODUCTION

1.  Before me is the Summons filed by the Applicants (the “Trustees”) on 8 April 2025 (the “Trustees’ Summons”) under section 29 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap. 6) for:-

(1) The Respondents (the “Administrators”) do file and serve an affidavit containing a full account of the Administrators’ dealings with the estate (the “Estate”) of the LSCY (the “Deceased”), in particular, a full breakdown of the work done in relation to the Estate and all fees and disbursements incurred and charged or to be charged against the Estate with all supporting documents including but not limited to all time records, bills, fee notes, invoices and receipts up to date of the Order to be made herein within 14 days; and

(2) In the event that the Administrators cannot provide the documents and/or information (the “Documents and Information”) requested, they shall, within 14 days, file and serve an affirmation to state, for each of the documents and information requested, whether they have ever been in their possession, custody or control (including power to procure the same from third parties), and if they had been in their possession, custody or control but no longer now, when and under what circumstances they have now become unavailable to be produced by the Administrators directly or indirectly.

2.  I shall refer to the relief in (1) above as the “Production Relief” and the relief in (2) above as the “Ancillary Relief”.

II. BACKGROUND

3.  This part sets out the background not in dispute.

4.  The Deceased and B (the “Bankrupt”) was husband and wife, with a son in their marriage.

5.  On 8 January 2008, the Deceased died intestate, leaving the Bankrupt and the son. On 19 August 2008, Letters of Administration were initially granted to the Bankrupt and one of the Deceased’s brothers (the “Deceased’s Brother”). Subsequently, in a HCMP action, on 26 September 2012 DHCJ Lok (as he then was) removed them as the administrators and appointed professional administrators (one of whom was subsequently replaced on 26 June 2013) to administer the Estate. The details of this saga are not relevant for the present purposes. Suffice to say that the administrators have since 26 June 2013 been the same administrators, and are the Administrators in the present proceedings.

6.  On 1 April 2019, the Deceased’s Brother presented a bankruptcy petition against the Bankrupt based on a judgment debt in the sum of HK$1,586,494.38 (the “Petition Debt”) as at 1 April 2019, the details of which are, again, not relevant for the present purposes. On 17 August 2020, the Bankrupt was adjudged bankrupt. On 3 December 2020, the Trustees were appointed as the trustees of the Bankrupt’s estate.

7.  On 13 January 2021, the Administrators lodged a proof of debt with the Trustees for a sum of approximately HK$67 million. On 7 June 2024, the Trustees rejected the proof of debt. In the rejection notice, the Trustees stated, among others, that a sum of HK$67 million which the Administrators regarded as due and owing to the Estate belonged to the Bankrupt. No appeal has been lodged against the said rejection of the proof of debt (the “Rejection of Proof of Debt”) in respect of this debt (the “Rejected Debt”).

8.  The value of the Estate is stated to be HK$102 million included the Rejected Debt. In other words, taken out the Rejected Debt of HK$67 million, the value of the Estate would be approximately HK$35 million odd.

9.  On 17 August 2024, the Bankrupt was discharged from bankruptcy. There is no dispute that despite the discharge, the Trustees still have duties to recover the Bankrupt’s assets for the benefit of the creditors.

10.  Since 2021, the Trustees have been requesting document and information from the Administrators in relation to the work they have done and the fees and disbursements in relation to the work. Mr Kurt Ng, counsel for the Trustees, stresses one specific feature of the work and the fees of the Administrators – on the rate of HK$2,500 which the Administrators allegedly had been charging, then by 13 May 2022, the Administrators, having charged HK$17,000,000 would have incurred 6,800 hours of work in relation to the Estate, while it appears to the Trustees that not much work has actually been done. For example, there has been no distribution of the assets. Nor there seem to be any work done to resolve any alleged obstacles to the distribution. Pausing here, I think to be fair to the Administrators, although the amount of hours appear on the high side and thus a beneficiary would have legitimate reason to know what have been happening, the mere amount of the hours of work may or may not shed any light on whether the charges were excessive, given that the appointment of the Administrators was made back in 2013. One would have thought that to avoid any unnecessary dispute, the Administrators would just how a breakdown of the work done and explain why the work had been carried out as it was.

11.  However, while the Administrators have provided the account of the Estate to the Trustees, the Administrators have refused to provide any breakdowns of the work done. Further, in the Administrators’ affirmation filed in opposition to the Trustees’ Summons, while explanation was given as to what work they had done, there are no bills or breakdowns provided.

12.  This brings me to the central dispute of the Trustees’ Summons, namely, whether the Trustees are entitled to the Documents and Information in the first place. If the answer is in the negative, no matter how insufficient the Administrators’ answer appears, the Trustees would not be entitled to the Documents and Information. If the answer is in the affirmative, subject to the Court’s discretion, the Trustees would be entitled to the Documents and Information.

III. LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN RELATION TO SECTION 29 OF THE BANKRUPTCY ORDINANCE

13.  The margin note of the Trustees Summons is “S29 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap. 6)”. Section 29 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance provides that:-

“(1) The court may, on the application of the Official Receiver or trustee, at any time after a bankruptcy order has been made against a bankrupt summon before it the bankrupt or his spouse, or any person known or suspected to have in his possession any of the estate or effects belonging to the bankrupt or supposed to be indebted to the bankrupt, or any person whom the court may deem capable of giving information respecting the bankrupt, his dealings or property, and the court may require any such person to produce any documents in his custody or power relating to the bankrupt, his dealings or property.” (emphasis added)

14.  Mr Ng and Mr Keith Cheung, counsel for the Administrators, do not dispute the well-established legal principles in relation to an application under section 29, as summarised by Queeny Au-Yeung J in Ip Pui Lam Arthur and Another v Alan Chung Wah Tang and Another [2020] 2 HKLRD 608 at §22:-

“(1) The power conferred by section 29 is general, wide, unlimited, and discretionary in nature…

(2) The information or documents must ‘relate to the bankrupt, his dealings or property’ and not just any information that the trustee wants;

(3) The applicant must satisfy the court the essential condition that the provision of information or documents is reasonably required for him to carry out his functions…

(4) The applicant must also establish a prima facie case that the respondent is able to provide such information or documents…

(5) If the above criteria are met, the court must carefully strike a balance between the applicant’s reasonable requirements and the need to avoid making an order which is wholly unreasonable, unnecessary or oppressive to the person concerned. The burden is on the applicant to satisfy the court, after balancing all the relevant factors, that there is a proper case for such an order to be made…

(6) In considering if the information or document is reasonably required to enable the trustees to carry out their functions, great weight would be given to the views of the trustees. A production order is not necessarily oppressive merely because it is inconvenient for the party subject to it or would cause him a lot of work or make him vulnerable to future claims…

(7) Since a trustee is a stranger to the affairs of the bankrupt, he relies on orders for examination and production to reconstitute the knowledge of the bankrupt, which would enable the trustee to perform and discharge his duties effectively and with as little expense and as expediently as possible….

(8) The information and documents discoverable under section 29 of the Ordinance are wider than those discoverable under RHC O.24…Indeed, a trustee is necessarily engaged in a ‘fishing’ or speculative expedition to discover whether he has further avenues to recover the bankrupt’s assets for the benefit of the creditors… and

(9) That said, the trustee is not entitled to embark on expeditions that ignore costs and proportionality, or to extract information from persons in respect of a matter when there is no well-founded ground upon which to consider him prima facie capable of giving information, or to conduct an examination without any clear suspicions and to conduct it to determine if matters or facts might emerge which may be of interest or assistance…” (emphasis added)

IV. THE TRUSTEES’ POSITION

15.  The Trustees’ position is that:-

(1) The Documents and Information constitutes “information respecting the Bankrupt”.

(2) The value of the Estate, taking out the Rejected Debt of HK$67 million, would be approximately HK$35 million odd. The amount of the fees and expenses incurred by the Administrators in the sum of HK$17 million, representing about 48% of the value of the Estate, is a substantial portion.

(3) The evidence provided by the Administrators so far shows some work done by the Administrators (but no distribution having taken place yet), but it does not appear to justify such significant sum of fees and expenses.

(4) Therefore, it is necessary for the Trustees to obtain the Documents and Information to examine if the fees and expenses were really justified, and if not, the Trustees may take appropriate action to recover such fees and expenses for the benefit of the Estate. This would mean a larger amount would be available for distribution to the Bankrupt.

V. THE ADMINISTRATORS’ POSITION

16.  The Administrators’ position is that:-

(1) The Bankrupt has no property right in the Estate, and the Documents and Information do not constitute property of the Bankrupt.

(2) The Documents and Information is not reasonably required for the Trustees’ function as trustees-in-bankruptcy.

(a) The Documents and Information would only be to ascertain the welfare of the Estate and safeguard the interests of the Bankrupt.

(b) By seeking the Documents and Information, the Trustees effectively only attempt to exercise the Bankrupt’s rights as legatees or beneficiaries of the Estate, but not as trustees-in-bankruptcy.

(c) Such rights as legatees or beneficiaries of the Estate are rights personal in nature to the Bankrupt and do not belong to the Bankrupt’s estate.

(3) The Trustees have not established a prima facie case that the Administrators are capable of producing the Documents and Information.

(4) The order sought is disproportional and oppressive.

VI. THE DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION CONSTITUTING INFORMATION RESPECTING THE BANKRUPT

17.  Mr Cheung refers me to various authorities for the trite legal proposition that prior to the completion of the administration of an estate, the beneficiary has no right in the property of the estate, but only has the right to see to it that the estate is properly administered: see Wong Suet Foon Shirly v Collector of Stamp Revenue [2021] 3 HKLRD 862 at §25 per Lam VP, Chu and Au JJA. He submits that therefore, the Documents and Information are no dealings and properties of the Bankrupt, and the Trustees’ Summons fails in limine.

18.  With respect, such submissions do not deal with the limb “information respecting the bankrupt” in section 29 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance. This term must be interpreted broadly to include any information that would shed light on the financial position of the Bankrupt, bearing in mind that the purpose of section 29 is to enable the trustees-in-bankruptcy to carry out their important function to discover and recover assets. Thus, the phrase “the bankrupt’s property, affairs and dealings” (emphasis added) is very often used to describe the information sought under section 29: see, for example, see Hau Po Man Stanley (in bankruptcy) v Joint and Several Trustees of Estate of Hau Po Man Stanley (in bankruptcy), CACV 225/2007, 17 December 2007 at §20.

19.  The state of the affairs of the Estate, of which the Bankrupt is a beneficiary, is in my view clearly the state of affairs of the Bankrupt as well. First, the asset value of the Estate would affect the value of the asset to be distributed to the Bankrupt (which would in turn be available to pay the creditors). Second, the costs and expenses incurred in the administration of the Estate would also affect the value of the asset to be distributed to the Bankrupt. Third, the right of the Estate to recover assets against any misappropriated assets or mis-spent costs and expenses would in itself have value in that the right would have an impact on the asset value and the amount of costs and expenses. Fourth, the right to have the Estate properly administered would in itself have value in that distribution upon proper administration including proper account of the asset value and the costs and expenses could be demanded.

20.  Therefore, while strictly, the Bankrupt’s right to the Estate, prior to the completion of the administration of the Estate, is not a right to any property of the Estate, such right constitutes or is in relation to the affairs of the Bankrupt, or constitutes “information respecting the Bankrupt”.

21.  Therefore, Mr Cheung’s submissions that the Bankrupt does not have any property right in the Estate and the Documents and Information is not any property of the Bankrupt, while correct as a matter of law, does not advance the Administrators’ opposition to the Trustees’ Summons.

VII. THE DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION REASONABLY REQUIRED FOR THE TRUSTEES’ FUNCTION

22.  For fees and expenses in the amount of HK$17 million odd for the Estate in the amount of approximately HK$35 million, the fees and expenses are significant, representing about 48% of the value of the Estate. Apparently to justify the fees and expenses, first, the Administrators say that the Bankrupt, as the one of the previous administrators, had refused to cooperate to give relevant information and this prompted various court applications. While various court documents and judgments or decisions are exhibited to the Administrators’ affirmation, no breakdowns have been provided. The general allegation that the Administrators would need much time and costs as a result of the Bankrupt’s failure to cooperate does not assist the Administrator much.

23.  First, the Administrators say that the Deceased’s Brother made demands for various properties from the Estate, leading to a petition presented in HCCW proceedings for just and equitable winding up of certain companies. As a result, apparently, the Estate had to incur costs and expenses to deal with the litigation. However, again, no breakdowns have been provided. The allegation is general, and does not assist the Administrator much.

24.  Second, it seems that the Administrators also rely on the proof of debt which was eventually rejected in the Rejection of Proof of Debt to say that much costs was incurred. However, again, no breakdowns have been provided. Further, no appeal has been ever lodged. From the materials provided to me, the general allegation again does not assist the Administrator much.

25.  Third, while there is no dispute that the Administrators some Estate accounts have been provided to the Trustees, no breakdowns or bills or the like that would explain the HK$17 million odd costs and expenses have been provided.

26.  Considering the significant amount of the costs and expenses incurred by the Administrators with little evidence of particulars (despite the Trustees’ demands) to support what they have done to substantiate the costs, the Administrators’ conduct in how they have incurred costs and expenses is clearly suspicious. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the Documents and Information is reasonably required for the Trustees to carry out their function.

VIII. THE ADMINISTRATORS’ PRIMA FACIE ABILITY TO PRODUCE THE DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION

27.  Mr Cheung submits that the Trustees have failed to establish any prima facie case that the Administrators would be able to produce the Documents and Information. With respect, such submissions are stated to be rejected. It is unimaginable that in the proper discharge of their duties, the Administrators would not have kept such Documents and Information. Notably, the Administrators have not positively denied that they keep such Documents and Information.

28.  In the premises, I find that there is a prima facie case that the Administrators would be able to produce the Documents and Information.

IX. BALANCING EXERCISE IN FAVOUR OF GRANT

29.  As regards the balancing exercise, in terms of proportionality, Mr Cheung submits that the Trustees’ request for documents is out of proportion because the Petition Debt, underlying the bankruptcy petition that led to the Bankrupt’s bankruptcy, was only about HK$1.5 million odd as at 1 April 2019 (see §6 above) but the Trustees have incurred about HK$470,000 of costs in pursuing the present Trustees’ Summons. He submits that to require the Administrators to disclose records of 14 years (counting from the year of the appointment of the Administrators in 2012) is also disproportional. In his submissions, the better option would be for the Trustees to have objected the Bankrupt’s discharge from bankruptcy or to have sought disclosure over the Rejected Debt which the Trustees regarded as belonging to the Bankrupt while the Administrators still apparently considered as part of the Estate. Mr Cheung’s submissions seem to think that the bankruptcy process is only for collecting the Petition Debt underlying the bankruptcy petition. Such thinking, with respect, is wrong. A bankruptcy action is a class action for the benefit of all the creditors. Therefore, in measuring proportionality, it is wrong to measure it against the Petition Debt only. Rather, one has to measure it by taking into account the target assets (here, being the realisable value of the assets of the Estate) against the costs of targeting such assets (here, being the costs of pursuing the present Trustees’ Summons) as well as the potential value of such targeting (here, being that the Trustees would be able to examine whether the HK$17 million costs and expenses incurred by the Administrators who have apparently not done so much work was justified). Taking into account these considerations, not only do I disagree with Mr Cheung, I agree with Mr Ng that the present Trustees’ Summons and the examination of the Documents is proportional.

30.  Mr Cheung further submits that neither the Bankrupt nor the Bankrupt’s son has indicated their favour to the Trustees’ Summons. However, I do not see any relevance of their positions.

31.  Mr Cheung also submits that after the completion of the administration of the Estate, assets to be distributed the Bankrupt may be sufficient to pay all the Bankrupt’s debts. This is exactly one of the very reasons why the Trustees’ Summons is important – to allow the Trustees to examine the work done in the past to see why if so much work has been done and thus so much costs have been incurred in the past, there would still appear not much progress in the administration of the Estate and no sign that there would be any distribution of assets soon. Such submissions in fact highlight why the Trustees have all the reasons in the circumstances of the present case to seek the Documents and Information to ensure that the Administrators have carried out their duties properly with an aim to realise and distribute the assets promptly.

32.  In terms of oppressiveness, Mr Cheung submits that it would be oppressive to require the Administrators to produce the Documents and the Information for 14 years is oppressive. With respect, such submissions cannot be maintained. First, the Documents and Information are documents and information which the Administrators should have been keeping and preparing in any event as the administrators of the Estate. They would have to do little more (if any) to produce the Documents and the Information. Second and in any event, “[a] production order is not necessarily oppressive merely because it is inconvenient for the party subject to it or would cause him a lot of work or make him vulnerable to future claims”: see §14(6) above.

33.  Another reason Mr Cheung submits for oppressiveness is that the Documents and Information contain legally privileged materials. A similar agreement was raised by the solicitors firm and dealt with by Au-Yeung J in Chen Yung Ngai Kenneth and Another v Hugill & Ip (a firm) and Another [2023] HKCFI 151. The salient legal principles in this regard can be summarised as follows:-

(1) The burden lies upon the party refusing to make the disclosure to establish legal professional privilege (§11).

(2) The following materials should not be automatically be regarded as privileged in their entirety:-

(a) “A fee note, bill of costs or statement of account, because it is brought into existence principally for the purpose of recording and charging for work which had been already completed. No privilege will attach where, eg the fee notes merely set out the dates and refer to the action taken in respect of which a charge is made…or where the fee note does not relate to the giving of advice at all” (§14(1)).

(b) “‘Mere collateral facts’, of which the address and identity of a client or an individual are examples, [t]hey are formalities that occur before the legal advice is sought or given and records nothing which passes between the solicitor and client in relation to the obtaining of or giving of legal advice” (§14(2))

(c) “Retainer agreements, which will only be privileged if they reveal the nature of the advice sought” (§14(3)).

(3) Any part that contains legally privileged materials can be covered up in the disclosure (§15).

34.  In the present case, the Administrators have at best made a bare assertion of legal privilege only. On the above legal principles, the Documents and Information, being time records, bills, fee notes, invoices and the like, do not appear to me to contain any legal privileged materials. In my view, the Administrators fail their burden to establish that the Documents and Information are legally privileged.

35.  Lastly, in reliance on The Joint and Several Trustees of the Property of So Ching Wan v Assen Limited (in liquidation) and Others [2020] HKCA 1081 at §8.21, Mr Cheung submits that the Trustees’ Summons is oppressive in the sense that the request for the Documents and Information would be requiring the Administrators to prove their wrong doing against themselves.

36.  In that case, the applicant had already made a positive allegation that the respondents had committed the crime of perjury and contempt of court, and had sought leave to issue contempt proceedings for that reason. The information sought there would effectively put the respondents into a position to prove the perjury and contempt, and thus the Court of Appeal in that case held that this was one of the valid reasons for holding that the request for the information was oppressive. However, in the present case, the Trustees have not made any positive allegation that the Administrators have done anything wrongful, but legitimately harbour suspicion as to why the Administrators would have charged so much when apparently, not much work has been done and no distribution of assets seems forthcoming. In the circumstances, in my view, the Trustees are entitled to “fish” the Documents and Information to see what has happened. This cannot be regarded as the impermissible request requiring the Administrators to prove wrong against themselves.

37.  Given my view that the request is reasonably required for the Trustees to carry out their function, and my view that the request is proportional and not oppressive, I shall grant the Production Relief.

X. JURISDICTION TO GRANT THE ANCILLARY RELIEF

38.  The next question is whether the Court has jurisdiction to grant the Ancillary Relief, ancillary to the Production Relief I shall grant.

39.  Mr Ng, for the Trustees, answers in the affirmative, referring to Ip Pui Lam Arthur and Another v Alan Chung Wah Tang and Others [2019] HKCFI 1398 at §§29-30 per Recorder Linda Chan SC (as she then was). That case was also a case on section 29 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance. In opposing a similar ancillary order, the opponent relied on an earlier decision by Recorder Eugene Fung SC (as he then was), also carrying a similar case name Ip Pui Lam Arthur and Another v Alan Chung Wah Tang and Another [2019] HKCFI 149 at §§39-42. In the latter case, his Lordship found that the Court had no jurisdiction in a section 29 application to make any such ancillary order.

40.  Disagreeing with his Lordship, Recorder Linda Chan SC said at §§29-30:-

“29. Sixth, I am unable to accede to the submission that the court has no jurisdiction to make an order in terms of §2 of [an ancillary order]…

30. Further and in any event, as Mr Chen submits, the court has inherent power under section 29 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance or the inherent jurisdiction to make an ancillary order to ensure that the exercise of its jurisdiction or the remedies it grants is effective. He relies on the well established principle propounded in AJ Bekhor & Co Ltd v Bilton [1981] 1 QB 923, a case concerned with the jurisdiction of the court to make an ancillary order requiring disclosure of assets in aid of Mareva injunction… I agree. Indeed, an order requiring a respondent to file an affirmation to explain the whereabouts of the documents which were once, but no longer in, the “custody or power” of the respondent is frequently made by the court under section 286 [formerly section 221] of the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap 32), which confers the powers on the court to make an order for private examination and production of documents against the respondent.” (emphasis added)

41.  The above paragraph is specifically referred to with approval in the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Lau Siu Hung and Another v P&T International Inc. [2025] HKCA 1032. At §29, Chu VP and G Lam JA said:-

“… the court has power to require the respondent to account for documents found missing: Joint & Several Liquidators of Kong Wah Holdings Ltd v Grande Holdings Ltd (2006) 9 HKCFAR 766 at §§49-50. As Recorder Linda Chan SC said in Re Ho Yuk Wah David, a bankrupt [2019] HKCFI 1398 at §30, orders are frequently made by the court under section 286B requiring a respondent to explain on affidavit the whereabouts of documents which were once but are no longer in his custody or power…” (emphasis added)

42.  On the contrary, Mr Cheung, for the Administrators, submits that the Court has no such jurisdiction. He urges me to read the above cases with caution because the Court of Appeal’s judgment was on section 286B of the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 32) (the “CWUMPO”) while Recorder Linda Chan SC’s decision was a section 29 decision and she should have not relied on section 286B of the CWUMPO. Mr Cheung submits that the difference between section 286B and section 29 arises because in reforming the relevant legislative regime from the previous section 221 to the current section 286B, “the power to order a person to submit an affidavit to provide information was added”: see Lau Siu Hung and Another v P&T International Inc.’s case at §16. With respect, such submissions ignore the fact that section 29(1A) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance also contains the same provision requiring a person to submit an affidavit to provide information. I am unable to see there is any or any effective difference between section 286B and section 29.

43.  Insofar as it is suggested that such jurisdiction to order such an affirmation is inherent jurisdiction rather than a jurisdiction under section 29 (or section 286B), and therefore, given the margin note of the Trustees’ Summons only states section 29, the Trustees should not be allowed to rely on such inherent jurisdiction, I reject such suggestion. First, in my view, such jurisdiction is inherent in the statutory provisions themselves. In my view, the legislative intent is plain and obvious to confer such jurisdiction on the Court – if the Court can only require a person to produce certain documents, and cannot require such an affirmation, then it would be easy for that person simply to say that he does not have the documents, without providing any useful information which he should be able to produce, for example, how the document was disposed of. This, in my view, would defeat the purpose of the statutory regime. Therefore, the margin note simply stating section 29 (or section 286B), which inherently contains such jurisdiction, is sufficient.

44.  Second and in any event, if the jurisdiction is a standalone inherent jurisdiction, it is well-established that “[t]he citation of the erroneous jurisdictional bases in margin notes of summonses does not prevent the Court from granting relief under the proper basis”: see G v N [2024] HKCFI 655 at §8 per Mimmie Chan J. An important question is whether the “change” of the basis would cause prejudice to the respondent to the application: see Premier Fashion Wears Ltd v Li Hing Chung [1994] 1 HKLR 377 at 379(40) per Bokhary JA. In the present case, Mr Cheung has not been able to point to any prejudice, and I find none. Therefore, even if the jurisdiction is a standalone inherent jurisdiction, the Trustees would still be able to invoke such jurisdiction.

45.  In the circumstances, I take the view that the Court has jurisdiction to, and I should in the present case order the Ancillary Relief.

XI. CONCLUSION

46.  For the above reasons, I make the following order:-

(1) The Administrators do file and serve an affidavit containing a full account of the Administrators’ dealings with the Estate of the LSCY, in particular, a full breakdown of the work done in relation to the Estate and all fees and disbursements incurred and charged or to be charged against the Estate with all supporting documents including but not limited to all the time records, bills, fee notes, invoices and receipts up to date of the Order to be made herein within 28 days[1]; and

(2) In the event that the Administrators cannot provide any of such documents and/or information, they shall, within 28 days, file and serve an affirmation to state, for each of such documents and information requested, whether they have ever been in their possession, custody or control (including power to procure the same from third parties), and if they had been in their possession, custody or control but no longer now, when and under what circumstances they have now become unavailable to be produced by the Administrators directly or indirectly.

47.  For costs, I order the Administrators to pay the Trustees costs of the Trustees’ Summons, summarily assessed at HK$250,000.

48.  It remains for me to thank counsel for their assistance.