Case Details
For Applicant(s):
sed that I retained doubts about the credibility of the May Claim (as there is no suggestion the Appellants were at risk of self-harm reflected in the earlier provided SWD Report, the NGO report or the new Hospital Authority (HA) medical reports that the father provided at the hearing on 22 May), I agreed to Ms Herbert’s request for time to prepare counselling reports; Mr Kwok further submits that the Board also failed to refer to any or adequate COI in assessing the availability or accessibility of medical treatments in India
Listing:
SALAUDIN RABIA, A MINOR BY HER NEXT FRIEND AND FATHER SALAUDIN AND ANOTHER v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
SALAUDIN RABIA, A MINOR BY HER NEXT FRIEND AND FATHER SALAUDIN AND ANOTHER v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 6092 · HCAL 2419/2024
Court of First Instance
HCAL 2419/2024
[2026] HKCFI 6092
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2419 OF 2024
BETWEEN
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:
Observations for the Applicants:
The Applicants are minor children of their Filipino mother in the now well-cited case of Fabio Arlyn Timogan [2020] HKCA 971 in which the Court of Appeal dismissed their mother’s appeal but allowed theirs upon laying down the proper principles and approach for assessing the non-refoulement claims of minor children separately from their parents’ claims even if based on the same primary facts, but shortly thereafter their mother passed away due to her illness, and that their claims have since been carried on by their Indian father (“Father”) as their next friend and who is himself also a non-refoulement claimant under a separate claim based on different facts, and upon which the Applicants now also rely on for their own claims based on various risks that they will face if refouled with their father to his home country in India instead of their mother’s home country in the Philippines, and for which they have since been provided with legal representation for their present application.
Their Non-refoulement Claim brought under their Mother’s Claim
Their mother, Fabio Arlyn Timogan (”Mother”) was born and raised in Tagana-an, Surigao Del Nete (Norte), the Philippines on 13 April 1978. After leaving school she worked as a domestic helper, married her husband and raised a family with their daughter in her home district.
However, their marriage did not fare well due to her husband’s violent temper and abusive behaviour towards her, and in 2002 she returned to work as a domestic helper in Manila before going to Kuwait in 2004 and then to Hong Kong in 2008, when she was then aged 30, to work as a foreign domestic helper.
In about mid-2009 while working in Hong Kong, the Mother met and formed a relationship with the Father, a national of India now aged 56 and who arrived in Hong Kong in January of the same year as a visitor but subsequently overstayed, and upon his arrest by the police in June 2009 the Father then raised his non-refoulement claim for protection on the basis of threats from his in-laws in India who disapproved of his marriage with his wife in his home country, and while being released on recognizance pending the determination of his claim, he met and formed a relationship with the Mother, and in June 2010 they went through some form of Islamic religious marriage in a mosque in Hong Kong.
After her last employment was prematurely terminated on 9 October 2010 due to her pregnancy from the relationship, the Mother did not depart for the Philippines and instead overstayed in Hong Kong, and subsequently also raised her non-refoulement claim for protection due to fear of being harmed or killed by her husband over her extramarital affair with the Father if refouled to the Philippines, and upon given birth to the 1st Applicant, a daughter born on 10 May 2011 (“Daughter”), and then the 2nd Applicant, a son born on 21 January 2015 (“Son”), the Mother also raised a claim for each of them based on her own claim of fear of being harmed or killed by her husband upon their return with her to the Philippines.
As noted above their claims were rejected by both the Director of Immigration (“Director”) and the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) for reasons not necessary to refer here, and after they were also refused by the Court for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, and while the Mother’s subsequent appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal which as noted above allowed the appeals of both Applicants upon holding that the Board had failed to consider their claims separately from their mother’s claim by reference to their individual and personal circumstances of each of them as to their own minor-specific non-refoulement bases in a manner consistent with high standards of fairness, and remitted their claims to a differently constituted Board for rehearing by the Mother as their next friend and to be represented by the Official Solicitor.
However, before the Applicants’ claims could be heard by the second Adjudicator for the Board, the Mother passed away on 1 October 2022 due to her illness, whereupon the Father subsequently obtained an order for guardianship of the Applicants from the District Court to proceed with their claims before the Board now based on the factual bases of his own non-refoulement claim of risks that they may face upon their return with him to India instead of their mother’s home country in the Philippines.
Father’s Non-refoulement Claim
The Father, Salaudin, now aged 56 was born in 1970 in West Bengal, India where he never received any formal education, and had worked as a salesman in some musical instruments shop for 14 years before starting his own garment business in 2003.
In 2007 he met and subsequently married a girl by the name of Sehnaz from a family said to be wealthy and powerful in his home village and which disapproved of their marriage and as a result had threatened to kill him that in January 2009 he fled from India for Hong Kong and raised his non-refoulement claim on the bases that if refouled to India he would be harmed or killed by his wife’s family as well as by his own cousins who blamed him for the killing of one of their brothers by his wife’s family for helping to arrange for their marriage ceremony.
By a Notice of Decision dated 28 January 2015 and a Notice of Further Decision dated 12 June 2017 the Director rejected the Father’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of his absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).
In his decisions the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Father’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from his wife’s family or his cousins upon his return to India as low due to the absence of or low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from them, that there is no evidence of any real intention of either of them to seriously harm or kill him other than just angry words and empty threats, that in any event these were private disputes between them only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Father if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in India with a large population of 1.3 billion people spread across a vast territory of more than 3.2 million square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Father as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other areas of the country away from his home district in large cities such as New Delhi where it would be difficult if not impossible for anyone to locate him.
The Father’s appeals against the respective decisions of the Director were subsequently also dismissed by the Board which agreed and confirmed the Director’s decisions, while his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decisions under HCAL 1731/2020 is to be separately dealt with by this Court as they were rendered by a different Adjudicator.
The Applicants’ Non-refoulement Claims
Meanwhile his relationship with the Mother did not fare well, and by 2018 they were separated after she moved out of their home, leaving the Applicants in the care of the Father, during which there were 2 separate episodes of suspected child abuse or maltreatment of first the Son and then the Daughter which then led to an investigation by the Social Welfare Department and with a Care and Protection Order issued by the Juvenile Court that placed both Applicants in a shelter run by the International Social Service Hong Kong (“ISSHK”) for 12 months as from 7 February 2020.
Upon the expiry of the Care and Protection Order, the Applicants were restored to the care of the Father on 5 February 2021, but sometime in April 2021 the Daughter disclosed to the Father that she had been repeatedly sexually assaulted by a male staff during her stay at ISSHK, and upon the matter subsequently being established as a sexual maltreatment case, the male staff was arrested and so charged, but was subsequently acquitted by the District Court in 2023 after the Daughter managed to give clear evidence of sexual assaults during examination-in-chief at the trial but became traumatized and hysterical during cross-examination by the defense and had to be withdrawn as a witness.
Thereafter the Daughter started to exhibit Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) and major depressive disorders with symptoms of flashbacks of sexual abuses, paranoia and disassociation as well as suicide ideations and self-harms which necessitate regular psychological counselling, therapies and treatments, as evidenced by her various psychological evaluation reports which also warned that her removal from Hong Kong would cause instability that would re-traumatize her, while the Son was also diagnosed to be suffering from Oppositional Defiance Disorder (“ODD”) as well as PTSD due to various traumas experienced at his young age including the passing of his mother, child-abuse incidents involving his father, and his negative experiences at ISSHK that have also necessitated regular psychological therapies and treatments for him.
Henceforth, while the Applicants’ appeals to the Board now being pursued by the Father on their behalf are based primarily on his own claim instead of the Mother’s, and as directed by the Court of Appeal to be separately considered by a differently constituted Board by reference to their individual personal circumstances, the claimed risks of the Applicants are in fact about their own individual child-specific medical/psychological issues that if removed to India that they would face a real risk of inhuman and degrading treatment amounting to BOR 3 risks on account of the various risks they will face and the absence of similar or appropriate treatments in that country or the lack of access to such treatments in a place where they could not call their home country and which is different in almost every aspect to what they have been used to in their entire life since their birth in Hong Kong that it is argued that they will be exposed to a serious decline in their state of health or reduction in their life expectancy contrary to their BOR 3 rights.
For the rehearing of their claims/appeals before the Board, the Applicants were represented by their lawyer from DLS and attended 4 oral hearings on 16 April 2024 and 14, 22 and 23 of May 2024 during which their father gave evidence and answered questions raised of their claims by the Adjudicator for the Board as well as with submission made on their behalf by their lawyer, while the Director was also legally represented with counsels of the Department of Justice, and by a Decision dated 10 September 2024 the appeals were dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the decision of the Director.
In its decision the Board accepted that the Applicants are not yet citizens of India as their father but believed that the Indian authorities would allow their late registration as citizens of India as it is reasonable to expect the Father to take steps to effect their Indian citizenship status so that they can return with him to his home country, and while giving benefit of the doubt on the credibility of the Father’s claim of risks of harm arising from his wife’s family and his cousins that it was of the view of no real risk of such harms towards the Applicants other than just remote or speculative given the long lapse of time since the Father’s departure of India and the lack of knowledge of the Applicants’ existence to his wife’s family and his cousins, and while also accepting the diagnoses and recommendations of the psychological evaluations of both Applicants and that they require ongoing therapies, and that any instability in removing them from their therapies or their peers and other supports would have detrimental effects to the treatment and health of both of them in particularly at their important developmental stages, but it was not persuaded by the Father’s exaggerated claims that there are no equivalent treatments in India or that he could not afford them or that any interruption in such treatments or the stability of the Applicants would meet the very high threshold of the Paposhvili test, that it also suspected that the Father had exaggerated his claim about the suicide ideations of the Daughter which were never reported by any of her previous reports until the Father’s evidence given on the last day of the hearing on 23 May 2024 before the Board when he made new claim that the Daughter had threatened to kill herself if removed from Hong Kong (“May Claim”) that it is not accepted that she is at a real risk of suicide or self-harm if removed to India or that she will not be able to access therapy or treatment there or that there will be any real risk of a significant reduction in her life expectancy or that it considered that her medical conditions meet the very high test in Paposhvili, nor do the Applicants face any real risk of proscribed harm under any other child-specific non-refoulement issues that the Board concluded that their non-refoulement claims for protection failed on all the applicable grounds.
Applicants’ Leave Application for Judicial Review
On 10 December 2024 the Applicants by their father as next friend filed their Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, and with subsequent legal representation put forward the following grounds as amended for their intended challenge:
(1) Breach of procedural obligations in failing to give any or adequate reasons for finding that the evidence submitted by the Applicants failed to demonstrate that their medical conditions did not reach the threshold established in the case of Paposhvili and/or to refer to any or adequate COI materials in assessing the availability and accessibility of medical treatments in India and/or to direct the Applicants to undergo medical examination to ascertain the nature and severity of their medical conditions for the purpose of assessing their claims under the Paposhvili test;
(2) Failure to properly apply child-specific approach and the Paposhvili test in assessing the Applicants’ claims by taking into account their young age;
(3) Irrationality/error of law in assessing the risk of self-harm in the case of the 1st Applicant despite having accepted the diagnoses and recommendations in her psychological evaluations that the Board somehow was not persuaded that she was at real risk of suicide or self-harm in rejecting her claim.
Before proceeding to consider these proposed grounds in turn, it would be relevant to first set out in more details the relevant parts of the Board’s decision that the Applicants propose to challenge, essentially the reasons of the Board for rejecting their claims based their medical conditions which the Applicants argued will expose them to CIDTP or BOR 3 Risk if removed from Hong Kong to India, and that they will face long-lasting trauma if deprived of the medical/psychological treatments that they have been receiving in Hong Kong but are either not available or accessible or that they cannot afford in India, and may increase the risk of suicidal ideations of the Daughter.
As noted above the Board did not take issue with any of those medical conditions of either Applicants, and that it also accepted the recommendations in their medical reports that they require ongoing therapy and treatments, and that any instability in removing them from their therapies and supports would have detrimental effects to their health, but found that the Daughter and Father may have exaggerated such effects as well as her suicidal ideation, and that in any event even if such risks were real that they failed to meet the very high threshold of the Paposhvili test for the reasons set out in its decision under “Medical conditions of the Appellants” starting from paragraph 159 (BD5/7/1228):
“Medical conditions of the Appellants
159. I accept the diagnoses in the psychological evaluations of Dr Tong in her reports for the daughter and the son. Ms Tam made no submissions suggesting I should not place weight on those diagnoses. I agree with the submissions of Ms Herbert that the medical conditions add to the vulnerabilities of the Appellants. Again, Ms Tam made no submissions to the contrary. I am not critical here of Ms Tam, I am just observing the implication from her submissions is that the Director does not contest the diagnoses of the Appellants and that there is no argument before me that their diagnoses do not make them additionally vulnerable.
160. I accept too the recommendations in the psychological evaluations and the counselling reports that the Appellants require ongoing therapy, and that any instability in removing them from their therapies, peers and other support people would have detrimental effects to the treatment and the health of the Appellants. Particularly given they are both in important developmental stages and have made some progress from the therapy that have undergone so far.
161. Where the submissions before me diverge are whether the medical conditions of the Appellants are an independent basis upon which the Appellants can substantiate their claims for non-refoulement protection. Ms Herbert submits the Appellants will suffer CIDTP if they are removed from Hong Kong and will face long-lasting trauma due to their need for stability. On the evidence before me, I am not persuaded any interruption in the treatment or the stability of the Appellants meets the very high threshold in Paposhvili. I agree with the submissions of Ms Tam that there is insufficient evidence before me for me to conclude there are substantial reasons to conclude the therapy the Appellants need will not be available in the Philippines or India or that the Appellants will be unable to access the therapy they need in the Philippines or India. The highest that Ms Herbert submits is that the level of access to treatment is unknown. I do not overlook the father’s claims at the hearing that there are no counsellors or therapists in India, or his alternative claim that if there are, the level of service would be inferior to what the Appellants could access in Hong Kong and his further claim that in any event, he could not afford to pay for the therapy. I am not persuaded by any of those claims. It seems to me the father gave that evidence in any attempt to exaggerate the risk of harm to the Appellants. This is something he did frequently during his evidence to me, a trait in his evidence which I will repeat elsewhere in my reasons.
162. The High Court judgment of Tran Thi Dung & Ors adopted the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights in the judgment of Paposhvili. I note as well, the judgment of AM (Zimbabwe) – which was not discussed in the Tran – the United Kingdom Supreme Court also adopted the reasoning in Paposhvili.
163. Prior to the High Court judgment of Tran Thi Dung, in the judgment of NC, a decision allowing leave for judicial review, the Court of First Instance relied on an earlier judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of D. In D the European Court of Human Rights held that in the ‘exceptional circumstances’ of removing a person with a fatal disease to face unavailability of necessary medical treatment and lack of shelter and care, leading to a hastened death and acute mental and physical harm could amount to a breach of the prohibition on CIDTP, the equivalent of BOR 3. The later European Court of Human Rights judgment in Paposhvili concluded the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test in D is too restrictive and removed the requirement of the person facing an imminent risk of dying. In AM (Zimbabwe) the United Kingdom Supreme Court adopted the reasoning in Paposhvili and held the correct test is not whether a person is facing imminent death if removed. Rather the test should be whether the person is facing an ‘imminent of intense suffering’ or ‘an imminent decline in health or to a significant reduction in life expectancy’.
164. In the judgment of Tran Binh Luan, His Lordship Justice Chan referred to the judgment in D and AM (Zimbabwe) ruling to deny leave for judicial review as the medical evidence before the Board in that case did not demonstrate the applicants were at risk of intense suffering or imminent death due to the non-availability of care or treatment.
165. Returning to Tran Thi Do, his Lordship To therein rejected the argument that the Board misconstrued the reasoning in an earlier European Court of Human Rights judgment of N and as well as D and Paposhvili (it appears counsel did not bring the AM (Zimbabwe) judgment to his Lordship’s attention). His Lordship concluded the Board did not fall into error and that the Board had correctly set out the ‘absolute correct test’ as:
… the questions to be asked are that if substantial grounds have been shown for believing that if (the applicant) would to be removed, she would face a real risk on account of the absence of appropriate treatment in (country) or the lack of access to such treatment, or being exposed to serious, rapid and irreversible decline in her state of health resulting in intense suffering or to a significant reduction in life expectancy.
166. I agree with the submissions of Ms Tam. The evidence before me does not support the conclusion there are substantial reasons for considering even if the treatment is not available in the Philippines or India or the Appellants cannot access the medical treatment they require, that the Appellants will face a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in health that would result in intense suffering. Nor does the evidence before me support the conclusion that there are real and substantial reasons for considering the Appellants would face a significant reduction in life expectancy.
167. In reaching that conclusion, I have taken particular note the evidence about the suicide ideations of the daughter. Prior to the father making the May Claim, there is no evidence of the daughter expressing any suicidal ideation. The HA reports before me refer only to self-harm behaviour of the son. The NGO letter (provided with the second NNE) also makes no reference to suicidal ideation of the daughter – although I again acknowledge it is a very brief letter. There is no mention in the counselling report of the daughter expressing suicidal ideation, even though she has been undergoing therapy treatment with that NGO for several months. The only mention in the counselling report of the daughter self-harming is made in the context of it was reported to the author by the father. Whereas in Dr Tong’s report, the daughter reports she has self-harmed multiple times and has a moderate to high risk of suicide. I acknowledge Dr Tong’s comments she believes the father and daughter did not ‘feign’ or exaggerate her conditions. But it is remarkable that the records of the daughter compiled prior to father making the May Claim make no reference to the daughter having suicidal ideation or of daughter self-harming. It seems to me the father and daughter may, contrary to Dr Tong’s genuinely held view, have exaggerated her conditions. Otherwise, it is reasonable to expect the evidence of the daughter’s medical condition prior to the father making the May Claim would also record the daughter had a history of self-harm or suicidal ideation, given the serious nature of those matters. I am mindful too that, the stress of the hearing bringing the possibility of removal from Hong Kong to the attention of the daughter may have a detrimental effect to her medical condition. However, the evidence Dr Tong mentions is not only self-reported by the daughter, it is also of past instances, and on my reading of words used by Dr Tong, does not reflect any recent acts of self-harm or suicide ideation. Nor do any of the diagnostic evaluations in Dr Tong’s report, to my lay eye, demonstrate a risk of suicidal ideation. If those evaluations did have such a reflection, it seems to me reasonable to conclude Dr Tong also would have highlighted those diagnostic evaluations, rather than making reference only to the self-reporting of the daughter. On the balance of the evidence before me, I am not persuaded the daughter is at a real risk of suicide or self-harm. In reaching that conclusion, I do not overlook there may be more of a risk if the daughter is unable to access therapy and treatment. But for the reasons already expressed above, I am not satisfied the daughter will be unable to access or the treatment will be unavailable if she is returned to the Philippines or India. And even if the daughter is unable to access the treatment she needs, on the evidence before me, I am still not persuaded there is a real risk of a significant reduction in the life expectancy of the daughter.
168. Although I do not consider the medical conditions of the Appellants meet the very high test in Paposhvili, I do agree with the submissions of Ms Herbert that the additional vulnerabilities of the Appellants from their medical conditions are relevant to my assessment of the risk of harm to them if they are removed to the Philippines as unaccompanied minors. Or if the Appellants are removed to India with their father, my assessment of the reasonableness of assessing Internal Relocation. To that extent, I will have further regard to the vulnerabilities of the Appellants in my below assessment of those claims.”
In its assessments of other child-specific issues of the Applicants if removed to India as the Risk State, the Board again accepted the opinions of Dr Tong and other counselling reports on the need for the Applicants continue to receive proper therapies and treatments, but found the risk of them being deprived of such if removed to India even if real would not meet the very high test in Paposhvili, as it stated at paragraph 208:
“India as Risk State – child-specific issues
…
208. I have had regard too to the opinions of Dr Tong and the authors of the counselling reports about the need for stability in the lives of the Appellants. If they are separated from their therapies, friends and peers, that will have a detrimental effect on the mental health. I accept that if the Appellants are removed to India, that would face the above mentioned challenges (being unable to visit the gravesite of the late-mother, new living conditions, making new friends) arising from having to leave the only place they know, leaving their peers, teachers and their therapists and adjusting to a new life in India, as well as having to overcome language and cultural differences. They would face many hurdles to adjust to a new life in India. However, at the risk of repeating myself, it bears restating the medical evidence before me does not suggest their facing that instability would cause harm so serious it would meet the very high test in Paposhvili. Moreover, the Appellants would be in India with the most significant person in their life, the father.”.
The Board then concluded at paragraph 210 of its decision that the Applicants do not face a real risk of proscribed harm under any applicable grounds if removed to India:
“I found above, the Appellants do not face a real risk of Proscribed Harm under any Applicable Ground (directly or indirectly) from the family of Ms S and/or the Cousins. Nor do the Appellants face a real risk of Proscribed Harm under any Applicable Ground due to the child-specific issues. In reaching those conclusions, I have had regard to the vulnerabilities of the Appellants as children and the additional vulnerabilities arising from their medical conditions, including the medical opinion of their need for stability.”
The Applicable Principles under Paposhvili et al and Procedural Obligations
The Paposhvili test referred to in the Board’s decision and relied on by the Applicants for their claimed risks of facing CIDTP or BOR 3 Risk if removed to India due to medical issues, but which the Board found even if real would not reach its very high threshold, was set by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) in the case of Paposhvili v Belgium [2017] Imm AR 867 that has transformed the area of Article 3 medical claims whereby an applicant seeks to avail of the protection offered by Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights and resists removal to his home country on the basis of a medical condition.
The previous threshold, set by D v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 423 and N v United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 453, which required the applicant to be at risk of imminent death at the point of the proposed removal to his home country in order to successfully resist removal, was always stringently applied until Paposhvili found that imminence of death is no longer required, and that it is for the applicant to adduce evidence capable of demonstrating that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if removed, he or she would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3, which is still a demandingly high threshold for the applicant but not necessarily to provide a clear proof, and that if he or she is able to do so, the returning state can seek to challenge or counter it by dispelling any serious doubts raised by such evidence, but the risk alleged must be subjected to close scrutiny, and that the authorities must consider the foreseeable consequences of removal for the applicant in the receiving state in the light of the general situation there and the applicant’s personal circumstances, as the responsibility of the returning state is not to expose the applicant to a risk of treatment prohibited by Article 3, as the Grand Chamber concluded from its recapitulation of the relevant case-law elaborated as follows:
“186. In the context of these procedures, it is for the applicants to adduce evidence capable of demonstrating that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if the measure complained of were to be implemented, they would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (see Saadi, cited above, §129, and F.G. v. Sweden, cited above, § 120). In this connection it should be observed that a certain degree of speculation is inherent in the preventive purpose of Article 3 and that it is not a matter of requiring the persons concerned to provide clear proof of their claim that they would be exposed to proscribed treatment (see, in particular, Trabelsi v. Belgium, no. 140/10, § 130, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).
187. Where such evidence is adduced, it is for the authorities of the returning State, in the context of domestic procedures, to dispel any doubts raised by it (see Saadi, cited above, § 129, and F.G. v. Sweden, cited above, § 120). The risk alleged must be subjected to close scrutiny (see Saadi, cited above, § 128; Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07, § 214, 28 June 2011; Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, § 116; and Tarakhel, cited above, § 104) in the course of which the authorities in the returning State must consider the foreseeable consequences of removal of the individual concerned in the receiving State, in the light of the general situation there and the individual’s personal circumstances (see Vilvarajah and Others, cited above, § 108; El-Masri, cited above, § 213; and Tarakhel, cited above, § 105). The assessment of the risk, as defined above (see paragraph 183-84) must therefore take into consideration general sources such as reports of the World Health Organization or of reputable non-governmental organizations and the medical certificates concerning the person in question.
188. As the Court has observed above (see paragraph 173), what is in issue here is the negative obligation not to expose persons to a risk of ill-treatment proscribed by Article 3. It follows that the impact of removal on the person concerned must be assessed by comparing his or her state of health prior to removal and how it would evolve after transfer to the receiving State.
189. As regards the factors to be taken into consideration, the authorities in the returning State must verify on a case-by-case basis whether the care generally available in the receiving State is sufficient and appropriate in practice for the treatment of the applicant’s illness so as to prevent him or her being exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3 (see paragraph 183 above). The benchmark is not the level of care existing in the returning State; it is not a question of ascertaining whether the care in the receiving State would be equivalent or inferior to that provided by the health-care system in the returning State. Nor is it possible to derive from Article 3 a right to receive specific treatment in the receiving State which is not available to the rest of the population.
190. The authorities must also consider the extent to which the individual in question will actually have access to this care and these facilities in the receiving State. The Court observes in that regard that it has previously questioned the accessibility of care (see Aswat, cited above, § 55, and Tatar, cited above, §§ 47-49) and referred to the need to consider the cost of medication and treatment, the existence of a social and family network, and the distance to be travelled in order to have access to the required care (see Karagoz v France (dec.), no. 47531/99, 15 November 2001; N. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, §§ 34-41, and the references cited therein; and E.O. v. Italy (dec.), cited above).
191. Where, after the relevant information has been examined, serious doubts persist regarding the impact of removal on the persons concerned – on account of the general situation in the receiving country and/or their individual situation – the returning State must obtain individual and sufficient assurances from the receiving State, as a precondition for removal, that appropriate treatment will be available and accessible to the persons concerned so that they do not find themselves in a situation contrary to Article 3 (on the subject of individual assurance, see Tarakhel, cited above, § 120).
192. The Court emphasizes that, in cases concerning the removal of seriously ill persons, the event which triggers the inhuman and degrading treatment, and which engages the responsibility of the returning State under Article 3, is not the lack of medical infrastructure in the receiving State. Likewise, the issue is not one of any obligation for the returning State to alleviate the disparities between its health-care system and the level of treatment existing in the receiving State through the provision of free and unlimited health care to all aliens without a right to stay within its jurisdiction. The responsibility that is engaged under the Convention in cases of this type is that of the returning State, on account of an act – in this instance, expulsion – which would result in an individual being exposed to a risk of treatment prohibited by Article 3.”
Paposhvili was then brought into domestic law in the UK by the subsequent case of AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 17 when the Supreme Court agreed with the pronounced procedural requirements of Article 3 and departed from the N case where the test of whether the applicant’s illness has reached such a critical stage that it would be inhuman treatment to deprive him of the care which he is receiving and send him home to an early death was deemed too narrow, as the Court made the following observations on the basic principle:
“32. The Grand Chamber’s pronouncements in the Paposhvili case about the procedural requirements of article 3, summarized in para 23 above, can on no view be regarded as mere clarification of what the court had previously said; and we may expect that, when it gives judgment in the Savran case, the Grand Chamber will shed on the extent of the requirements. Yet observations on them may even now be made with reasonable confidence. The basis principle is that, if you allege a breach of your rights, it is for you to establish it. But “convention proceedings do not in all cases lend themselves to a rigorous application of [that] principle …”: DH v Czech Republic (2008) 47 EHRR 3, para 179. It is clear that, in application to claims under article 3 to resist return by reference to ill-health, the Grand Chamber has indeed modified that principle. The threshold, set out in para 23(a) above, is for the applicant to adduce evidence “capable of demonstrating that there are substantial grounds for believing” that article 3 would be violated. It may make formidable intellectual demands on decision-makers who conclude that the evidence does not establish “substantial grounds” to have to proceed to consider whether nevertheless it is “capable of demonstrating” them. But, irrespective of the perhaps unnecessary complexity of the test, let no one imagine that it represents an undemanding threshold for an applicant to cross. For the requisite capacity of the evidence adduced by the applicant is to demonstrate “substantial” grounds for believing that it is a “very exceptional” case because of a “real” risk of subjection to “inhuman” treatment. All three parties accept that Sach LJ was correct, in para 16, to describe the threshold as an obligation on an applicant to raise a “prima facie case” of potential infringement of article 3. This means a case which, if not challenged or countered, would establish the infringement: see para 112 of a useful analysis in the Determination of the President of the Upper Tribunal and two of the senior judges in AXB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] UKUT 00397 (IAC). Indeed, as the tribunal proceeded to explain in para 123, the arrangements in the UK are such that the decisions whether the applicant has adduced evidence to the requisite standard and, if so, whether it has been successfully countered fall to be taken initially by the Secretary of State and in the event of an appeal, again by the First-tier Tribunal.
33. In the event that the applicant presents evidence to the standard addressed above, the returning state can seek to challenge or counter it in the manner helpfully outlined in the judgment in the Paposhvili case at paras 187 to 191 and summarized at para 23(b) to (e) above. The premise behind the guideline, surely reasonable, is that, while it is for the applicant to adduce evidence about his or her medical condition, current treatment (including the likely suitability of any other treatment) and the effect on him or her of inability to access it, the returning state is better able to collect evidence about the availability and accessibility of suitable treatment in the returning state. What will most surprise the first-time reader of the Grand Chamber’s judgment is the reference in para 187 to the suggested obligation on the returning state to dispel “any” doubts raised by the applicant’s evidence. But, when the reader reaches para 191 and notes the reference, in precisely the same context, to “serious doubts”, he will realise that “any” doubts in para 187 means any serious doubts. For proof, or in this case disproof, beyond all doubt is a concept rightly unknown to the Convention.
34. This court is not actively invited to decline to adopt the exposition of the effect of article 3 in relation to claims to resist return by reference to ill-health which the Grand Chamber conducted in the Paposhvili case. Although the Secretary of State commends the Court of Appeal’s unduly narrow interpretation of the Grand Chamber’s exposition, she makes no active submission that, in the event of a wider interpretation, we should decline to adopt it. Our refusal to follow a decision of the ECtHR, particularly of its Grand Chamber, is no longer regarded as, in effect, always inappropriate. But it remains, for well-established reasons, inappropriate save in highly unusual circumstances such as were considered in R (Hallam) and R (Nealon) v Secretary of State for Justice (JUSTICE intervening) [2019] UKSC 2, [2020] AC 279. In any event, however, there is no question of our refusing to follow the decision in the Paposhvili case. For it was 15 years ago, in the N case cited at para 2 above, that the House of Lords expressed concern that the restriction of article 3 to early death only when in prospect in the returning state appeared illogical: see para 17 above. In the light of the decision in the Paposhvili case, it is from the decision of the House of Lords in the N case that we should today depart.”
In short, the old threshold for Article 3 as found in the N case and as described by Baroness Hale at para 69 that“… the test, in this sort of case, is whether the applicant’s illness has reached such a critical stage (ie he is dying) that it would be inhuman treatment to deprive him of the care which he is currently receiving and send him home to an early death unless there is care available there to enable him to meet that fate with dignity” is no longer applied, and that the “new” test set out in AM (Zimbabwe) is that removal must result in a “serious, rapid and irreversible decline” in the applicant’s state of health resulting in intense suffering or a significant reduction in life expectancy, and that it is no longer necessary for an applicant to risk dying immediately upon, or shortly after, return to his or her home country.
However, in the contest of Article 3 medical claims based on mental or psychological illness including risk of self-harm and/or suicide, the threshold which an applicant must meet in order to avail themselves of the protection of Article 3 was not always so clear cut, as applicants have sought to establish that mental illness and self-harm/suicide risk should be treated differently from physical illness and, in so doing, avoid the almost unattainable threshold set by the N case, in that one fundamental difference is that the removal process itself can be a prominent causative factor in the illness or risk, as the asylum process, immigration detention and deportation can all have a devastating impact on the applicant’s mental health, as in the case of R (on the application of Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWHC Admin 2554 where the applicant presented evidence of the impact which the removal and the experience of living in the receiving country would have upon her suicide risk (at para 84), and that in J v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 629 the applicant identified the rejection of his asylum application as a contributing factor to his subsequent hospitalization (at para 6).
In AA (Algeria, Mental Health) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKIAT 00084, in which the applicant had a history of imprisonment and detention related to violent disorder, depression, and self-harming behaviour, the Court emphasized that the risk of suicide or self-harm must be assessed at different stages of removal: notification of decision, pre-removal detention, transit, arrival, and release (at paras 36-41). By establishing a specific methodology for the self-harm/suicide risk context, the Court appeared to acknowledge the different challenges faced by applicants and tribunals in this area.
In J, the Court considered that cases concerning the risk of death resulting from the non-availability of treatment in the receiving state are not precisely analogous to those concerning the risk of suicide (at para 42), having earlier described the various stages at which degrees of risk would need to be evaluated in a suicide risk case as follows:
“26. First, the test requires an assessment to be made of the severity of the treatment which it is said that the applicant would suffer if removed. This must attain a minimum level of severity. The court has said on a number of occasions that the assessment of its severity depends on all the circumstances of the case. But the ill-treatment must “necessarily be serious” such that it is “an affront to fundamental humanitarian principles to remove an individual to a country where he is at risk of serious ill-treatment”: see Ullah paras [38-39].
27. Secondly, a casual link must be shown to exist between the act or threatened act of removal or expulsion and the inhuman treatment relied on as violating the applicant’s article 3 rights. Thus in Soering at para [91], the court said:
‘in so far as any liability under the Convention is or may be incurred, it is liability incurred by the extraditing Contracting state by reason of its having taken action which has as a direct consequence the exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-treatment.’ (emphasis added).
See also para [108] of Vilvarajah where the court said that the examination of the article 3 issue “must focus on the foreseeable consequences of the removal of the applicants to Sri Lanka…”
28. Thirdly, in the context of a foreign case, the article 3 threshold is particularly high simply because it is a foreign case. And it is even higher where the alleged inhuman treatment is not the direct or indirect responsibility of the public authorities of the receiving state, but results from some naturally occurring illness, whether physical or mental. This is made clear in para [49] of D and para [40] of Bensaid.
29. Fourthly, an article 3 claim can in principle succeed in a suicide case (para [37] of Bensaid.
30. Fifthly, in deciding whether there is a real risk of a breach of article 3 in a suicide case, a question of importance is whether the applicant’s fear of ill-treatment in the receiving state upon which the risk of suicide is said to be based is objectively well-founded. If the fear is not well-founded, that will tend to weigh against there being a real risk that the removal will be in breach of article 3.
31. Sixthly, a further question of considerable relevance is whether the removing and/or the receiving state has effective mechanisms to reduce the risk of suicide. If there are effective mechanisms, that too will weigh heavily against an applicant’s claim that removal will violate his or her article 3 rights.”
And in Y (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Development [2009] EWCA Civ 362, in which the Court of Appeal analyzed the fifth stage of the test established in J and recognized that, in the case of suicide risk, ‘what frequently matters is whether there is a real and overwhelming fear, not whether it is well-founded’ (at para 5(1)). The Court therefore proposed an addition to the fifth principle: ‘that what may nevertheless be of equal importance is whether any genuine fear which the appellant may establish, albeit without an objective foundation, is such as to create a risk of suicide’ (at para 18).
However, in cases since following J, the UK Court of Appeal appeared to have rowed back on these principles in Tozlukaya v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 379, when the Court held at para 62:
“Although the court’s approach in these mental health cases derives from D v United Kingdom, it was stated in J v Secretary of State (at para 42) that the circumstances are not precisely analogous. One material difference is that the risk in the [suicide] context arises not just from the person’s removal to a place where the condition is likely to worsen, but from the direct impact on that person’s mental health of the decision to remove. Nonetheless the similarities are in my view more important than the difference.”
Subsequently in RA (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 1210, the Court of Appeal declared that there is no ‘important difference of approach in the domestic cases on suicide risk’ (at para 49). Although the Court at first appeared willing to acknowledge the critical differences between physical and mental health conditions, it was not prepared to allow an adjustment to the Article 3 test, and in the subsequent case of Wasif v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 82 the Court of Appeal reiterated the requirement for exceptional circumstances on the same basis as the cases of D and N (at para 101).
As noted above, then came the Paposhvili case that expanded the circumstances in which a person could resist removal to a third country on Article 3 grounds to include situations in which substantial grounds have been shown for believing that he or she would face a real risk, on account of the absence of appropriate treatment in the receiving country or the lack of access to such treatment, of being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering or to a significant reduction in life expectancy, as the Grand Chamber, before proceeding to outline those procedural developments as noted above which placed a greater responsibility on the returning country to make clear that treatment in the receiving country must be deemed accessible by reference to the practical circumstances likely to be faced by the applicant, made the following observations:
“183. The Court considers that the “other very exceptional cases” within the meaning of the judgment in N v the United Kingdom (§ 43) which may raise an issue under Article 3 should be understood to refer to situations involving the removal of a seriously ill person in which substantial grounds have been shown for believing that he or she, although not at imminent risk of dying, would face a real risk, on account of the absence of appropriate treatment in the receiving country or the lack of access to such treatment, of being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering or to a significant reduction in life expectancy. The Court points out that these situations correspond to a high threshold for the application of Article 3 of the Convention in cases concerning the removal of aliens suffering from serious illness.
184. As to whether the above conditions are satisfied in a given situation, the Court observes that in cases involving the expulsion of aliens, the Court does not itself examine the applications for international protection or verify how States control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens. By virtue of Article 1 of the Convention the primary responsibility for implementing and enforcing the guaranteed rights and freedoms is laid on the national authorities, who are thus required to examine the applicants’ fears and to assess the risks they would face if removed to the receiving country, from the standpoint of Article 3. The machinery of complaint to the Court is subsidiary to national systems safeguarding human rights. This subsidiary character is articulated in Article 13 and Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, §§ 286-87, and F.G. v. Sweden, cited above, §§ 117-18).
185. Accordingly, in cases of this kind, the authorities’ obligation under Article 3 to protect the integrity of the persons concerned is fulfilled primarily through appropriate procedures allowing such examination to be carried out (see, mutalis mutandis, El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630/09, § 182, ECHR 2012; Tarakhel, cited above, § 104; and F.G. v. Sweden, cited above, § 117).”
The Paposhvili criteria was then applied to mental illness in Savran v Denmark (Application no. 57467/15), in which a Turkish national diagnosed with paranoia schizophrenia faced a proposed deportation, the ECtHR accepted that his medical condition did not meet the D/N threshold as it was stable due to a regime of medication, supervision and psychological support, while the prescribed medication was also available in Turkey and could be heavily subsidized or provided free of charge if appropriate, but the Court confirmed that a regime of supervision and support was essential, and applying Paposhvili, the ECtHR found in favour of the applicant on the basis that Denmark had failed to ensure that a supervision scheme would be available and accessible to the applicant particularly as his entire family resided in Denmark and would not be able to assist him in Turkey.
In 2019 the Danish Government requested that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber, and by a judgment dated 7 December 2021 the Grand Chamber while accepting that schizophrenia is a serious mental illness did not consider that condition can in itself be regarded as sufficient to bring the applicant’s complaint within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention, nor had it been demonstrated that his removal to Turkey exposed him to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his state of health resulting in intense suffering, let alone of a significant reduction in life expectancy.
The Grand Chamber nevertheless reaffirmed and elaborated in its judgment that the same principles apply to cases concerning the expulsion of seriously ill applicants irrespective of what particular type of medical issue, physical or mental, that underlay their health condition as the standard is sufficiently flexible to be applied in all situations which may constitute treatment proscribed by Article 3 irrespective of the nature of the illness as follows:
“137. The Court has consistently applied the same principles in cases concerning the expulsion of seriously ill applicants, irrespective of what particular type of medical issue – sematic or mental – underlay their health condition. In the Paposhvili judgment (cited above), before it proceeded to formulate the new standard, the Court had regard to case-law relating to applicants suffering from both physical and mental illnesses (see paragraph 127 above and the range of authorities cited in Paposhvili, cited above, § 179). In the wording of paragraph 183 of the Paposhvili judgment, the standard refers to “a seriously ill person”, without specifying the type of illness. Thus, it is not limited to any specific category of illness, let alone physical ones, but may extend to any category, including mental illness, provided that the situation of the ill person concerned is covered by the Paposhvili criteria taken as a whole.
138. In particular, in its relevant part, the threshold test established in paragraph 183 of the Paposhvili judgment (cited above), rather than mentioning any particular disease, broadly refers to the “irreversibility” of the “decline in [a person’s] state of health”, a wider concept that is capable of encompassing a multitude of factors, including the direct effects of an illness, as well as its more remote consequences. Moreover, it would be wrong to dissociate the various fragments of the test from each other, given that, as noted in paragraph 134 above, a “decline in health” is linked to “intense suffering”. It is on the basis of all those elements taken together and viewed as a whole that the assessment of a particular case should be made.
139. In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the standard in question is sufficiently flexible to be applied in all situations involving the removal of a seriously ill person which would constitute treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention, irrespective of the nature of the illness.”
Accordingly, from the latest development of the jurisprudence, in particularly those by the ECtHR and the UKSC in relation to claims under Article 3 of the Convention to resist return of aliens by reference to ill-health, it is worth repeated the applicable procedural requirements to be observed respectively by the applicant and the returning state as follows:
That it is for the applicant to adduce before the returning country evidence capable of demonstrating that there are substantial grounds for believing that if removed he or she would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3;
That where such evidence is adduced in support of an application under Article 3, it is for the returning country to dispel any doubts raised by it by subjecting the claimed risk to close scrutiny, and to address relevant COI including reports of reputable organizations about treatments in the receiving country;
That it is for the returning country to verify on a case-by-case basis whether the care generally available in the receiving country is in practice sufficient to prevent the applicant from being exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3, and also to consider the accessibility of the care treatment to the particular applicant including by reference to the costs if any to the existence of family or social network, and to its geographical location; and
That if serious doubts continue to surround the impact of removal, the returning country has to obtain an individual assurance from the receiving country that appropriate treatment would be available and accessible to the applicant.
It is on the basis of these applicable principles and procedural requirements that I shall now proceed to consider the Applicants’ proposed grounds for their intended challenge of the Board’s decision, of which I propose to start first with Ground (3) given its complaint against its factual finding on what was essentially the cornerstone of the claimed risk of the Daughter’s self-harm/suicide ideations if refouled to India.
Ground (3): Errors in Assessing 1st Applicant’s Risks of Self-Harm
Mr Jonathan Kwok of counsel who appeared for both Applicants at the hearing of their leave application submits that the Board’s finding that the Father and Daughter had exaggerated her conditions ([167] of Decision and cited above at para 21) is irrational in the public law sense and/or lacks evidential basis, and that it impermissibly substituted Dr Tong’s clinical/professional judgment with its own perception of the evidence and unsustainable assumptions, despite having earlier accepted Dr Tong’s diagnoses of the Applicants’ medical conditions as well as recommendations in the psychological evaluations and counselling reports that they required ongoing therapy as noted above.
While it is true from the recorded history of the Daughter’s claim that there was no mention or reference of any suicide ideations on her part in any documents or reports before the Board prior to the Father’s evidence given at the hearing on 23 May 2024, as recorded at [52] of the Decision as follows:
“Close to the outset of the final day of the hearing on 23 May, the father made new claims that the Appellants had threatened to suicide if forcibly removed from Hong Kong. Specifically, he said, the Appellants told him, words to the effect that if they are forced to leave Hong Kong, they would ‘jump from the terrace of their school building’. I will refer to this as (the May Claim). While I expressed that I retained doubts about the credibility of the May Claim (as there is no suggestion the Appellants were at risk of self-harm reflected in the earlier provided SWD Report, the NGO report or the new Hospital Authority (HA) medical reports that the father provided at the hearing on 22 May), I agreed to Ms Herbert’s request for time to prepare counselling reports for the Appellants …”
Henceforth the sole basis for the Board to have doubt about the credibility of that “new” claim of suicide ideation particularly on the part of the Daughter is that it had never been raised until at the last day of the hearing on 23 May 2024, of which the Board allowed the Applicants to submit further counselling reports, and which were considered and assessed by the Board at [167] of its Decision as cited above, in particularly the Psychological Evaluation Report dated 15 July 2024 on the Daughter, which the Board cited extensively at [83] of its Decision, and in which Dr An Tong Gong (initially referred to as Dr Gong but later as Dr Tong by the Board in the decision) diagnosed the Daughter’s medical conditions as the result of cumulative and complex traumatic experiences from a young age caused by the conflicting relationship between her parents and her mother’s departure and eventual death, and then strongly exaggerated by her negative experiences of sexual assaults at the ISSHK shelter and emotional breakdown at the sexual assault trial of the male staff, which have since intensified her senses of insecurity, helplessness and hopelessness by the ongoing non-refoulement proceedings, and contributed to her social withdrawal, markedly low self-esteem and ultimately suicidal ideation, of which Dr An Tong Gong in her clinical judgment found unlikely to be the exaggeration of the Daughter or the Father, and which needs to be addressed urgently through parenting and professional support (see BD5/6.5/1135 - 1136).
Given such cumulative effects and impacts on the Daughter, and the facts that the Board had accepted the diagnoses and recommendations of all her psychological evaluations and counselling reports, and of which were not challenged by the Director, it seems to me that Ground (3) is reasonably arguable in that the Board had no proper evidential basis to find that the Father and the Daughter had exaggerated her medical conditions or suicidal ideation, and/or that it is irrational for the Board to base on its own assumptions to find that none of the diagnostic evaluations in Dr An Tong Gong’s report demonstrated a risk of suicide ideation on the part of the Daughter. Which thus brings me to the remaining 2 proposed grounds of the Applicants which can be appropriately considered together.
Grounds (1) & (2): Flawed Approach to Assessing Risks of CIDTP on Medical/Ill-Health Grounds & Failure to Adopt Minor-Specific Approach
For these grounds Mr Kwok submits that the Board’s approach to assessing non-refoulement on medical grounds is flawed in that it failed to give any or adequate reasons in finding that the threshold in Paposhvili was not met despite having accepted that there was no argument that the medical diagnoses of the Applicants do not make them additionally vulnerable ([159] of its decision), and that they required ongoing therapies and treatments that the instability created by their removal from their therapists, peers and other support people would have detrimental effects on their health, and in particularly so as they were at “important developmental stages” ([160] of decision), and for which the Board failed to explain why the anticipated deterioration of their health would not cause them intense suffering or lead to significant reduction in their life expectancy other than the fact that they would be accompanied by their father if removed to India that its failure to give reasons in finding that the Paposhvili threshold was not met amounted to material irregularity which tainted its decision.
Mr Kwok further submits that the Board also failed to refer to any or adequate COI in assessing the availability or accessibility of medical treatments in India for the Applicants, which is an indispensable part of the Paposhvili test and an essential part of the procedural requirements, as it was clearly held in AM (Zimbabwe) that returning state is better able to collect evidence about the availability and accessibility of suitable treatment in the receiving state (at [33] of its judgment), and instead that the Board was just skeptical of the Father’s claims that there were no counsellors or therapies in India, that even if there were that their level would be inferior, and that he would not be able to afford them in India as again just exaggerations without making any necessary findings on such regards, and by just mentioning of some COI in passing when the Father’s evidence on the availability and accessibility of such treatments in India were challenged by the Director to be insufficient but without conducting any proper analysis of any up-to-date relevant COI materials on its own or as a “joint endeavour” exercise by the Board that simply constitutes a reviewable error.
Mr Kowk submits that in fact there were relevant COI materials submitted by the Applicants for their appeal before the Board, such as the UK Home Office’s Country Information Note – India: Medical and healthcare provision, Version 2.0, April 2023 (HB5/9/1254 – 1261) which showed that across India there were few trained psychiatrists and limited access to mental health care in particularly in rural areas and was concentrated in the private sector, while the DFAT Country Information Report – India, 29 September 2023 (HB5/10/1263 – 1267) showed that the supply of mental health workers was insufficient to service demands with a shortage of trained mental health treatments for people with mental illness in India, but which the Board failed to take into consideration adequately or at all in its assessment of the availability and accessibility of mental health services for the Applicants in India, and instead just brushed aside the Father’s concerns as exaggerations.
Lastly, Mr Kwok submits that when the Fabio principles are juxtaposed with the Paposhvili test, the Board failed to take into account that ill-treatment is liable to have a greater impact on a minor, as held in Bouyid v Belgium ]GC], no. 23380/09, § 86, ECHR 2015, and cited in Paposhvili at [174] where the ECtHR held that the threshold of minimum level of severity is “relative” and “depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim”, and that the Paposhvili test calls for an assessment of the claimant’s projected life expectancy that its relevancy to a claim involving a minor cannot be overstated, but that even though the Board was alive to the Applicants’ vulnerability as minors, and that their medical conditions would cause them “additional vulnerabilities”, the Board failed to specifically direct itself on the issue that if the Applicants’ mental health deteriorated whether it would lead to a significant reduction in their life expectancy, nor did it appear to have addressed the issue of whether their mental health issues would cause them intense suffering, bearing in mind that what may not be “intense suffering” to an adult may reach that threshold if the applicant in question is a minor, as in the case of the Applicants.
To deal with that last point first, it would be relevant to refer to what Lord Wilson said in AM (Zimbabwe) at [31] in the consideration of what the Grand Chamber meant when it referred to “significant” reduction of life expectancy in the Paposhvili case:
“It remains, however, to consider what the Grand Chamber did mean by its reference to a “significant” reduction in life expectancy in para 183 of its judgment in the Paposhvili case. Like the skin of a chameleon, the adjective takes a different colour so as to suit a different context. Here the general context is inhuman treatment; and the particular context is that the alternative to “a significant reduction in life expectancy” is “a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in … health resulting in intense suffering”. From these contexts the adjective takes its colour. The word “significant” often means something less than the word “substantial”. In context, however, it must in my view mean substantial. Indeed, were a reduction in life expectancy to be less than substantial, it would not attain the minimum level of severity which article 3 requires. Surely the Court of Appeal was correct to suggest, albeit in words too extreme, that a reduction in life expectancy to death in the near future is more likely to be significant than any other reduction. But even a reduction to death in the near future might be significant for one person but not for another. To take a person aged 74, with an expectancy of life normal for that age. Were that person’s expectancy be reduced to, say, two years, the reduction might well – in this context – not be significant. But compare that person with one aged 24 with an expectancy of life normal for that age. Were his or her expectancy to be reduced to two years, the reduction might well be significant,”
Henceforth, if in the case of an adult suffering from similar mental or psychological conditions including risks of self-harm and suicide ideations, to return him to his home country where he is expected to have supports from his family and friends and to be able to access appropriate treatments that one may not argue that he will be exposed to a risk or treatment contrary to Article 3 or BOR 3 Risk or reaching the threshold for its application, but in the case of a minor child as the Daughter with her specific medical conditions and in particularly her personal circumstances, to remove her to a place which may not be called her home country and certainly where she has never been before with a different culture and where she does not speak the language or has friends or family support other than her father who has also been away for years, and no less significantly a place known to have serious issues of rape and sexual assaults on young girls and females, it seems to me reasonably arguable that the Board had failed to assess properly or at all the risks that the Daughter will be exposed to if removed to India after seemingly just brushing aside her suicide ideation as exaggerations, and that it also failed to assess properly or at all the availability or accessibility to the care treatments for her in compliance with the procedural requirements set out in Paposhvili, adopted in AM (Zimbabwe) and expanded in Savran before arriving at its conclusion that such risks did not meet the threshold of the Paposhvili test or amount to BOR 3 Risk.
In the premises, and for these reasons, I am of the view that these 2 grounds of the Applicants are also reasonably arguable for their intended challenge of the Board’s decision, and thus meeting the threshold for leave to be granted as laid down in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676.
Disposition
Accordingly, I grant leave to the Applicants to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision based on their proposed grounds as stated above, and direct that they shall file and issue the originating summons within 14 days of this decision, and to serve a copy thereof together with all the relevant documents on the Board as respondent and the Director as interested party, with costs in the cause of the application.
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
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Form CALL-1