LAU KA YEE MICHAEL v. HKSAR

FACC No. 9 of 2004

IN THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION 

FINAL APPEAL NO. 9 OF 2004 (CRIMINAL)

(ON APPEAL FROM CACC NO. 78 OF 2003)

_____________________

_____________________

___________________

J U D G M E N T

___________________

Chief Justice Li :

1.  I agree with the judgment of Sir Anthony Mason NPJ. 

Mr Justice Bokhary PJ :

2.  I agree with the judgment of Sir Anthony Mason NPJ. 

Mr Justice Chan PJ :

3.  I agree with the judgment of Sir Anthony Mason NPJ. 

Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ :

4.  I agree with the judgment of Sir Anthony Mason NPJ. 

Sir Anthony Mason NPJ :

Introduction

5.  This appeal from an order of the Court of Appeal (Stock, Cheung and Yeung JJA) refusing the appellant leave to appeal from four convictions involving sexual offences against a male student aged 15 is brought pursuant to leave granted by the Appeal Committee.  Leave was granted on the ground that it is reasonably arguable that substantial and grave injustice was done.

6.  The appeal raises questions as to the reception in evidence and probative value of oral statements made by, and conduct of, the appellant, relied upon by the prosecution as an admission, at a meeting in June 1995 at which Father Chiu Bit Shing (PW4), the appellant, the complainant and the complainant’s friend Kong Ka Wai were present.  The meeting was arranged by Father Chiu at the request of the appellant.  The questions are important because the prosecution case depended on the evidence of the complainant who suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and the trial took place 12 years after the first three offences and 10½ years after the fourth offence was alleged to have taken place. 

The convictions

7.  The appellant was convicted after trial of four offences on 27 January 2003 by HH Judge Maggie Poon in the District Court.  They were –

(i)    indecent assault on a male person contrary to s.50(b) of the Offences against the Person Ordinance, Cap. 212, on or about 4 January 1991;

(ii)    procuring the commission of an act of gross indecency contrary to s.51 of the same Ordinance on or about 5 January 1991;

(iii)    attempted buggery contrary to common law and s.50(a) of the same Ordinance on or about 5 January 1991; and

(iv)    indecent assault contrary to s.122(1) of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap. 200 on a day unknown in July 1992.

He was sentenced to 4 1/2 years imprisonment.

The prosecution case at trial

8.  The prosecution case was largely based on the evidence of the complainant.  His evidence, as well as that of Father Chiu and Dr Wong (PW6), the principal supporting witnesses for the prosecution, is summarised in the following paragraphs.

9.  The complainant was born on 13 July 1975 and brought up in a Roman Catholic family.  He had been a student at St. Joseph’s Anglo Chinese School at Kowloon Bay before the alleged offences occurred.  He and his younger brother were members of the Altar Boys’ Association.  The appellant, who was then a seminarian, was in charge of the Association and its activities.  The appellant and the complainant knew each other.

10.  In September 1990 the complainant became a student at the College of the Sacred Heart in England to continue his education.  The College was co-educational. 

11.  After the complainant returned to Hong Kong for a holiday in December 1990, he stayed overnight, at the invitation of the appellant, with the appellant in his room in the priests’ quarters at St. Joseph’s on the first Friday in January 1991.  It was then that the first three of the four alleged offences took place.

12.  The appellant, after discussing with the complainant how he was getting on at the English school, asked the complainant whether he knew anything about sexual intercourse.  The complainant replied “No”.  The appellant then said “I must do sexual therapy on you”. 

13.  The appellant then asked the complainant to take a shower in the bathroom attached to his bedroom.  While the complainant showered, the appellant took off his clothes, stood behind the complainant and shook the complainant’s penis several times.  The complainant was told to wait for the appellant in the bed.  While they were in bed without their clothes on, the appellant, with his hand, shook the complainant’s penis many times.  This was the basis for the first charge of indecent assault. 

14.  Throughout the night the appellant touched the complainant’s penis.  The appellant asked the complainant to sleep on top of him and treat him as a woman.  The complainant kissed him on the nipple and the neck with his penis touching that of the appellant.  This was the basis for the charge of gross indecency. 

15.  In the morning the complainant felt the appellant try to insert his erect penis in the complainant’s anus.  On the first two occasions, the complainant cried out “Stop”.  On the third occasion, the appellant made a more determined effort.  The complainant resisted and cried out “Stop” very loudly.  The appellant stopped.  These events were the basis for the charge of attempted buggery and an alternative charge of gross indecency on which there was, of course, no conviction. 

16.  On the Saturday morning, the complainant was told to go home.  In the evening, he returned to the appellant’s room and requested that the appellant swear to what had happened the previous night.  The appellant refused, saying “ancient people who swore and told lies under oath were punished by God”.  The appellant then asked the complainant to leave. 

17.  The complainant said that he asked the appellant to swear to what had happened because he thought that, if the appellant as a priest swore to what had happened, it would show that what had happened was not evil.  The complainant had been disturbed and felt worried and uncomfortable about the events which had occurred.  He had not discussed the matter with his parents because his father was ill with cancer of the liver and he did not know what to say.

18.  When the complainant returned to England the next day, his family and the appellant saw him off at the airport.  While the complainant was in England, he and the appellant corresponded and talked on the telephone. 

19.  When the complainant returned to Hong Kong on 8 May 1991 to attend his father’s funeral, the appellant collected him at the airport and helped the complainant’s family in arranging the funeral. 

20.  Up to this time, the complainant made no complaint to anyone about the appellant’s conduct.  The complainant said he was only “a kid” at the time, that he did not know whether what the appellant had done was right or wrong and he did not wish to make a false accusation against a priest.  He did, however, warn his sister and his younger brother to avoid the appellant. 

21.  In September 1991, the complainant had a nervous breakdown.  He said that he was under great pressure because the appellant had hurt him and he had lost his father.  He had delusions and hallucinations.  He did not have medical treatment immediately.  Some months later, he was diagnosed by psychiatrists as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and then received psychiatric treatment, including medication. 

22.  He returned to Hong Kong on 10 June 1992.  On an occasion some time afterwards he went back to the appellant’s room.  While sitting in a chair, he was asked to take off his trousers.  The appellant’s hand then touched the complainant’s penis several times.  This was the basis for the final charge of indecent assault. 

23.  In the autumn of 1992, the complainant complained to his family of what had happened.  He continued his studies in Hong Kong, receiving psychiatric treatment until he returned to England in 1993 to further his studies.  While he was there he told his guardian what had happened to him.  He realised then that he had been sexually assaulted.  After his return to Hong Kong on 30 June 1994, he claimed to have made a report to Wong Tai Sin Police Station in early July 1994.  There is no record of that complaint and no action was ever taken on it. 

24.  After he had completed his education, the complainant took up employment in Hong Kong.  In that year, he met reporters from the Apple Daily and told them of his sexual abuse by the appellant.  In the same year he had meetings with Father Chiu Bit Shing, told him about the incidents in 1991 and 1992 and later informed him that he had told reporters about the incidents.  Father Chiu said this would affect the reputation of the Church and he would handle the matter.  The complainant had known Father Chiu for a long time.  Father Chiu also knew the appellant.  They had been students together and became friends.  Father Chiu had attended the ceremony when the appellant was ordained as a priest on 1 December 1991.

25.  In June 1995, the appellant telephoned Father Chiu and told him that an Apple Daily reporter had contacted him and wanted an interview for “a piece of news”.  The appellant requested him to arrange a meeting with the complainant in order to persuade him not to have published an article based on an interview given by the complainant to the Apple Daily.  Father Chiu had been appointed by Cardinal Wu, along with others, to deal with the matter.  In arranging and conducting the meeting, which took place in the evening of 20 or 21 June, Father Chiu described his role as that of a “middleman”.  He was not appointed, he said, to protect the reputation of the Church.  The complainant, however, said that Father Chiu wanted him to see the appellant face to face and tried to persuade him not to put the case to the newspaper. 

26.  Both the complainant and Father Chiu gave evidence of what transpired at the meeting.  Neither the appellant nor the complainant’s friend Kong Ka Wai, who were also present, gave evidence.  The complainant wanted Kong Ka Wai to attend to give him support.  Father Chiu obtained the appellant’s consent to Kong Ka Wai’s attendance. 

27.  Although there were some discrepancies between the versions given by the complainant and Father Chiu of what happened at the meeting, the substance of their accounts was similar.  It is convenient to begin with Father Chiu’s account of the meeting:

“I asked both parties ….. to tell their side of the story.  [The appellant] first of all pleaded to [the complainant] and asked him to forgive him, and he said that he knew it was wrong.  He also mentioned that when he himself was small, he had also been sexually abused by somebody.  The fourth matter was that he hoped that [the complainant] could stop the article from being published in the Apple Daily.  These were the four main messages coming out of the mouth of [the appellant] that night.”

Father Chiu also said that the appellant said “I have hurt you. I’m sorry.”  According to Father Chiu, the complainant was emotionally upset and verbally abused the appellant and the appellant:

“continued with his dialogue with an attitude of begging for forgiveness.”

The appellant also became emotionally upset “and he was crying badly”. 

28.  The complainant said that the appellant begged him not to put the story to the newspaper, apologised for hurting him sexually and said that he (the appellant) had been sexually abused when he was young.  The complainant stated that both the appellant and Father Chiu pleaded with him not to have the article published (a matter denied by Father Chiu), that the appellant broke down and cried and that he (the complainant) said that he had been sexually assaulted by the appellant, though he did not claim that he had given details of what had happened.  At the end of the meeting, he did not say that he would stop publication, though he was considering doing so. 

29.  The complainant had wanted the newspaper to publish the interview as he considered that the appellant would be a danger to children if he remained a priest.  However, after the meeting, he began to consider whether to stop publication and eventually decided to do so.  But the newspaper decided that it was too late to stop publication. 

30.  On 25 June 1995, the Apple Daily published an article describing an incident involving sexual abuse by a Catholic priest on an altar boy.  Four days later, the appellant was suspended from the priesthood.  He was then serving as a priest at the Trappist Monastery on Lantau Island.  In September 1995, he resigned from the priesthood. 

31.  In May 1999 the complainant made a further report to the police.  No action was taken. 

32.  In May 2002, the complainant watched a television programme about complaint of sexual abuse against members of the Church in which it was stated that no complaints had been received by the police.  Upset by this, the complainant went to the police and made a witness statement which resulted in the charges against the appellant. 

33.  Dr Wong Meng Kong, a psychiatrist, was called as a witness for the prosecution.  He was familiar with the complainant’s history having interviewed and treated him from time to time since 1995.  After experiencing his first breakdown in the summer of 1991, the complainant has been treated by psychiatrists in England and Hong Kong since 1992.  He was hospitalised in the Castle Peak Hospital twice in 1994 when he experienced hallucinations.  He did not tell the psychiatrists that he had been sexually abused until a complaint was recorded in the Castle Peak Hospital that he had complained to the police in 1994 that he had been raped by a priest. 

34.  Dr Wong was asked by the police to make a report on the complainant’s fitness to make a statement.  In his report of 9 May 2002, which was read to the Court, Dr Wong said:

“In my opinion, he suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, episodic remittance with psychotic episodes from September 91 to March 92 and from mid-June 94 to 10 October 94, and briefly in January 99.  He remained well between episodes.  He is currently fit to give a statement.  While it is possible that the recollection of past sexual abuse by the priest was delusional, given his clear and consistent recollection of events and the religious contents of his delusions, it is just as possible that the abuse actually occurred and might in fact be the principal precipitating factor of his schizophrenic illness.”

Dr Wong had seen the complainant on 8 May 2002, the day before his report.

35.  Dr Wong delivered two subsequent reports dated 9 September 2002 and 18 October 2002.  In the report of 18 October, Dr Wong expressed the view that the complainant’s recollection of alleged sexual abuse which had occurred after the onset of his illness in October 1991 may have been influenced by the presence of delusions but that “[r]ecollections of events prior to October 91 are unlikely to have been affected”.  Dr Wong considered that the complainant was in remission when he was giving evidence and that he was not suffering from residual delusional symptoms.  The fact that he was in remission made it unlikely that his evidence was affected by such symptoms.  Dr Wong did not consider that the complainant was suffering from any cognitive impairment. 

36.  At the conclusion of the prosecution case, HH Judge Poon heard argument on the admissibility of the admission at the meeting, stated that she was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that it was made voluntarily and concluded that it was not a case in which she would exercise the general discretion to exclude the admission.  The judge followed what is known as “the alternative procedure” in concluding that the admission was admissible: see Archbold Hong Kong 2004, §15-121; R v. Kwan Wai Hung [1973-1976] HKC 449. 

The defence case

37.  The appellant elected not to give evidence himself but called Dr Chung See Yuen, another psychiatrist, who had not interviewed the complainant but had read his medical records and reports, including those of Dr Wong, and observed the complainant giving evidence.  Dr Chung disagreed with Dr Wong’s opinion that the complainant was not suffering from delusional symptoms.  Dr Chung said:

“I believe it is more likely than not that the recollection of the past sexual abuse by the priest is a delusion or a residual symptom of the schizophrenia.”

But Dr Chung was unable to say whether the complainant was in remission or not when he gave evidence. 

HH Judge Poon’s decision

38.  In her judgment, HH Judge Poon gave reasons for holding that what the appellant said at the meeting amounted to an admission, that it was voluntary and was not affected by any inducement offered to him or oppression of him and for ruling that evidence of the admission should not be excluded in the exercise of her discretion. 

39.  HH Judge Poon regarded the reliability of the complainant’s evidence as the critical issue in the case.  The question was whether, in the light of his schizophrenia, his evidence was affected by delusions associated with that condition.  The judge accepted the evidence of Dr Wong in preference to that of Dr Chung, largely because Dr Chung’s evidence was based on the reading of reports, and his observations of the complainant at the trial and not on any interview.  Further, Dr Chung was unable to give an assessment as to whether the complainant was in remission or not. 

40.  The judge was impressed with the complainant’s demeanour as a witness, with the directness of his answers and with his frankness.  She described him as an honest, credible and reliable witness.  Having considered carefully the various aspects of the complainant’s evidence, after giving “full weight” to the admission, she accepted his evidence.  After taking account of the disadvantages affecting the appellant, including the lapse of time and the absence of any record of the meeting, the judge convicted the appellant of the four offences. 

Court of Appeal

41.  The Court of Appeal, in its reasons for judgment, stated that there was a real question as to whether the complainant’s allegations arose from a deluded mind.  In this respect, counsel for the appellant argued that the trial judge had failed to assess properly the evidence of the complainant, the medical evidence called by the prosecution and the defence and that the judge was wrong to attach weight to the complainant’s demeanour. 

42.  The Court of Appeal acknowledged that, had the case simply rested on the complainant’s evidence, it would have been uneasy about the allegations of sexual abuse on the basis that they may have been mere fabrications of someone suffering from mental illness.  However, viewing the evidence in its entirety, particularly the evidence of the appellant’s admission at the meeting organised by Father Chiu, the Court concluded that the convictions were properly entered against the appellant. 

43.  The Court considered that there was a clear admission by the appellant at the meeting of his guilt in circumstances where he made no attempt to assert his innocence.  This admission was a refutation of the suggestion that the allegations were simply the product of delusions. 

44.  The Court rejected the suggestion that Father Chiu was minded to obtain an amicable settlement because it was to be preferred to a publication in the Apple Daily which would be detrimental to the appellant and the Church.  The Court referred to Father Chiu’s acknowledgment that he was concerned with the reputation of the Church and quoted his evidence:

“I respect the view of the complainant because the interview was with him and not with Cardinal Wu.  So if he wanted the article to be published let it be published.  If he did not want it to be published then let it not be published.  I had never received any message that you just mentioned expressly or impliedly from the Church.” 

45.  The Court went on to say:

“It was suggested to the complainant and agreed by him in cross examination that Father Chiu had said that irrespective of whether the allegations were true or false the ideal solution would be for an apology to him.  This suggestion was not put to Father Chiu and considering his response to the suggestion we had earlier mentioned this could not possibly be the purpose for which the meeting was organised. 

In our view it is a totally unbelievable proposition and so inherently incredible that Father Chiu would arrange a meeting so that a priest should be asked and in fact agreed by him to make an apology for an alleged sexual abuse of an altar boy regardless of the truthfulness of the allegation.”

46.  The Court rejected the submission that the admission was inadmissible because the appellant was induced to make it to a person in authority.  There was, as the Court said, no inducement on anyone’s part except the appellant’s hope that the article would not be published. 

47.  The submission that the admission should be excluded on the discretionary ground was likewise rejected.  The admission had probative value which outweighed any prejudicial effect it might have.  Although there was no contemporaneous record of the discussion, it would have created a lasting impression in the minds of the participants.

48.  The Court considered that the trial judge was entitled to accept the reliability of the complainant’s evidence.  It was consistent in relation to the acts of misconduct.  There were adequate explanations for the lack of any complaint for a considerable time. 

49.  Likewise, the judge was entitled, for the reasons given by her, to prefer the evidence of Dr Wong to that of Dr Chung and to proceed to convict, despite the disadvantage to the defence arising from the destruction or possible destruction of the complainant’s complaint to the police in July 1994, the erasing of the recordings of the two meetings between Father Chiu and the complainant and the 1999 statement made to the police.  The judge assessed the evidence after taking this disadvantage into account. 

The arguments in this Court

50.  Mr Peter Duncan SC for the appellant accepts that what the appellant said and did at the meeting constituted admissible evidence.  He contends, however,

(1)    The evidence as to the “admission” was so tenuous, and the words said to constitute the “admission” so equivocal, that either:

(a)    it should have been excluded in the exercise of the judge’s discretion; or

(b)    no weight should have been attached to it in the absence of the judge demonstrating that she was acutely aware of the possibility that the remarks attributed to the appellant were an apology – designed to appease the complainant – but not a confession.

(2)    Alternatively to (1): the so called “admission” lacked specificity and therefore could not have assisted in the establishing of any of the four charges against the appellant.

(3)    The evidence, relied on by the prosecution as an “admission” by the appellant, was critical to the decision of the Court of Appeal to uphold the convictions.

Mr Kevin Zervos SC for the respondent challenges these contentions.

The exercise of discretion not to exclude the evidence and the probative value of the admission

51.  The appellant’s first submission is that the evidence as to the admission by the complainant and Father Chiu was so unsatisfactory and the apology was so equivocal that it had no probative value or weight.  The appellant points to the fragmented and sketchy nature of the complainant’s evidence in chief, the fact that notes were not taken of what was said, the destruction or disappearance of the documents already mentioned, the absence of a sufficient contextual background to the remarks attributed to the appellant, the existence of significant inconsistencies between the evidence of the complainant and Father Chiu, and the purpose of the meeting (which was not to discuss the truth of the allegations but to stop publication by the Apple Daily of the proposed article).  According to the appellant, there was a failure on the part of the courts below to distinguish between an apology and a confession and to recognise that, in the circumstances, an apology may well have been a more effective means of inducing the complainant to stop publication than a denial of the allegations.  A revealing indication of the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence supporting the admission and of its equivocal character, counsel for the appellant suggests, was the trial judge’s reference to “the gist of the admission”.  The consequence of all this, so the argument runs, was that the trial judge’s exercise of discretion not to exclude the evidence miscarried. 

52.  It is convenient to consider, first, the question whether the appellant’s statements and conduct at the meeting amounted to an unequivocal admission of guilt or were no more than apology.  As Thesiger J (dissenting on another point) said in Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Harz [1967] 1 AC 760 at 786:

“A statement of fact which suggests an inference as to any fact that is relevant and which is adverse to the interests of the person responsible for the statement is ….. generally, admissible against him, although it is ‘hearsay’ and is usually described as an ‘admission’.”

In the case of crime, an apology will constitute an admission if it is a statement against the interests of the author of the statement. 

53.  Although an equivocal admission may be admitted in evidence, where a conviction is based on such an admission and there is no other evidence to support the conviction, the conviction will be quashed: R v. Chan Yun Hung [1987] 2 HKC 228 at 231E.  Moreover, where an admission is equivocal so that that its prejudicial effect is out of proportion to its probative value or weight, it will be excluded on the ground that its reception will prejudice a fair trial: see Secretary for Justice v. Lam Tat Ming (2000) 3 HKCFAR 168 at 178J-179J, per Li CJ.

54.  Although the trial judge did not explicitly pose for consideration the question whether the appellant’s statements and conduct amounted to an unequivocal admission, she concluded that there was an admission in unqualified terms of conduct which supported the complainant’s allegations.  The terms of the apology, the reference to being sexually abused when he was young, his breaking down and crying, the seeking of the meeting by the appellant and the context in which it was sought (which must have involved his knowledge of the substance of what was to be published), taken together, provided a strong foundation for the conclusion that there was an unequivocal admission which supported the complainant’s evidence. 

55.  Other matters relied upon by the appellant were of no significance.  The fragmented and sketchy nature of the complainant’s evidence in chief was almost certainly due to his difficulty in understanding the need to speak to the primary facts and to a language problem.  On critical matters, as his evidence unfolded, his answers were clear and precise.  Although his evidence in chief did not provide context, his cross-examination and other evidence, particularly the evidence as to the circumstances in which the appellant sought the meeting and his purpose in doing so, provided an adequate context to enable the trial judge to characterise what was said by the appellant as an admission. 

56.  The reliance placed on the expression “the gist of the admission” ignores the context in which the judge was dealing with discrepancies between the evidence of the complainant and Father Chiu with respect to the meeting.  The judge, disregarding the discrepancies which she regarded as minor, used the expression “gist of the admission” to capture the important aspects of the admission which both witnesses remembered. 

57.  With one exception, the discrepancies did not relate to the statements or conduct of the appellant relied upon as an admission.  The exception concerned the complainant’s evidence that the appellant apologised for “hurting” him “sexually” and Father Chiu’s evidence that the appellant merely apologised for “hurting” the complainant.  This difference is not a reason for doubting the accuracy of their account of the substance of what transpired and the judge’s impression of it, in view of the large measure of agreement between them.  A similar comment applies to the complainant’s recollection that the appellant admitted hurting other altar boys and Father Chiu’s inability to recollect such a statement.  Differences of this kind may well be referable to lapse of time. 

58.  On the issue whether what transpired at the meeting was an unequivocal admission or a mere apology, the appellant relied on the complainant’s evidence that Father Chiu had said to him in a conversation leading up to the meeting that

“whether your allegations were true or false, an apology would be suitable to you”

and that during the meeting Father Chiu, as well as the appellant, tried to persuade him not to allow publication of the article.  This evidence was to be contrasted with Father Chiu’s evidence that he was acting throughout as a “middleman” and “did not express any view”.  Father Chiu may have had an interest and an inclination to understate the part that he played in any attempt to persuade the complainant to accept an apology from the appellant.  Be this as it may, this difference between the evidence of the two witnesses on this point leaves undisturbed the large measure of agreement between them. 

59.  The appellant uses the complainant’s evidence in this respect to suggest that the trial judge overlooked the possibility that the appellant, assisted by Father Chiu, was simply apologising, without making any admission, in order to persuade the complainant not to allow publication. 

60.  This suggestion has no plausible foundation.  The complainant’s statement that Father Chiu had said that an apology would be an ideal solution, whether the allegations were true or false, was never put to Father Chiu.  Nor was it put to Father Chiu that he had arranged a meeting so that a priest should make an apology for sexual abuse of an altar boy, even if the allegation were untrue.  Father Chiu’s answers to such a suggestion could be divined from other evidence which he gave:

“I respect the view of the complainant because the interview was with him and not with Cardinal Wu.  So if he wanted the article to be published let it be published.  If he did not want it to be published then let it not be published.”

As there was no evidence that Father Chiu made such a statement to, or in the presence of, the appellant, there was no evidence that the appellant had such a purpose in mind. 

61.  The suggestion made on behalf of the appellant is, as the Court of Appeal said, “totally unbelievable” and “inherently incredible”.  The possible adverse consequences of a priest making an unqualified apology for sexual abuse of an altar boy when that sexual abuse may not have occurred were so drastic and so obvious that the appellant could not rationally have contemplated such a course.  The suggestion involves the extraordinary hypothesis that, aware that the allegations were untrue, the appellant nevertheless deliberately offered an unqualified apology, simply in the hope that the apology would be enough to induce the complainant to stay his hand and that the appellant took this course at the meeting before the complainant indicated at the meeting that he would or might stay his hand on receiving an apology. 

62.  Accordingly, the submission that the exercise of the discretion not to exclude the admission miscarried or that the admission lacked any weight must be rejected.  The admission had substantial probative value and its reception in evidence did not prejudice the fairness of the trial. 

Lack of specificity of the admission

63.  True it is that the appellant’s admission was in general terms and did not identify one or more of the four offences of which the appellant was charged.  The absence of specificity in this respect would have constituted an insuperable problem had there been no other evidence to support the charges.  The admission on its own would not have constituted evidence that an offence was committed on any of the four occasions alleged.  But the complainant’s testimony provided such evidence.  The importance of the admission was that, though non-specific as to the occasions alleged, it supported the complainant’s testimony that he had been sexually abused by the appellant, testimony which, without that support, might have been regarded as doubtful by reason of the complainant’s history of paranoid schizophrenia. 

Disposition of the appeal

64.  The conclusions already reached, namely that the trial judge’s exercise of discretion not to exclude evidence of the admission did not miscarry and that the admission had substantial probative value, must result in the dismissal of the appeal.  The appellant’s third submission, which emphasised the importance of the admission to the prosecution case, was predicated upon the Court accepting one of the appellant’s earlier submissions and those submissions have been rejected. 

Order

65.  The appeal is dismissed. 

Chief Justice Li :

66.  The Court unanimously dismisses the appeal.