RE KAMAL

CACV 212/2025, [2026] HKCA 45

On Appeal From [2025] HKCFI 1241

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 212 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 3750 OF 2019)

_______________

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________

Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  This is the applicant’s appeal against the order of Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Philips Wong (“the Judge”) dated 14 April 2025 ([2025] HKCFI 1241) (“the Leave Decision”) refusing his application for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) against  the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 8 November 2019 (“the Board’s Decision”), whereby the Board dismissed his appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 21 March 2018, refusing his non-refoulement claim.

2.  The appeal was listed to be heard on 9 December 2025.  The applicant was directed to lodge two sets of skeleton argument on or before 11 November 2025 and was warned that if he failed to do so, he would be deemed to have waived his right to have an oral hearing for the appeal and the hearing date would be vacated with the appeal being determined on paper.  The directions and the warning were communicated to the applicant by the Notice of Hearing dated 30 October 2025.  However, the applicant did not lodge any skeleton argument in support of his appeal.

3.  As the applicant failed to lodge a skeleton argument by the stipulated time, he was deemed to have waived his right to have an oral hearing and elected to have his appeal disposed of on paper.  The hearing date was thus vacated on 12 November 2025.

4.  The applicant’s background, the basis of his claim and arguments advanced before the Board as well as the Board’s reasons for rejecting his appeal are all set out in the Board’s Decision: see [4] of the Leave Decision.  The Judge has also set out in detail the grounds advanced by the applicant in support of the Leave Application and the Judge’s reasons for refusing the Leave Application: see [5] ‑ [9] of the Leave Decision. We will not repeat the details herein.

5.  By the Notice of Appeal filed on 22 April 2025, the applicant stated:

“I am not agree with the decision of the Court of First Instance and same as the Torture Claims Appeal Board and the Director of Immigration. The decision makers did not scrutinize my claim properly. This decision make my life danger and it make me liable to move to my home country where my life is not safe.” (sic)

DISCUSSION

6.  The relevant legal principles governing appeals in non‑refoulement cases are set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14].

7.  In particular, in an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal will only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant.  If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed.  The Court’s role is not to examine the decision maker’s decision afresh as if it were a fresh application for judicial review.  See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14(6)].

8.  In light of the above, it is thus incumbent on the applicant to point out the errors in the Leave Decision with sufficient particulars and specifics.

9.  However, nowhere in his Notice of Appeal does the applicant identify any error committed by the Judge with specific particulars or give any ground in support of his appeal.  He merely disagrees with the Leave Decision but fails to point out any error in it.  His assertions are all general, bare and vague allegations unsupported by specific particulars or evidence.  General assertions of his fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  The Judge had thoroughly considered the applicant’s case as well as the Board’s Decision, before deciding that his intended judicial review lacked merit: see [5] ‑ [9] of the Leave Decision.  Clearly, the applicant’s assertions do not constitute viable grounds of appeal and lack substance.  We see no basis to interfere with the Leave Decision.

10.  For the above reasons, the applicant’s appeal against the Leave Decision has no merit and is dismissed.