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HCA 3998/2003
香港特別行政區
高等法院原訟法庭
民事司法管轄權
案件編號2003年第3998號
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主審法官 ：高等法院原訟法庭法官鍾安德內庭聆訊
審訊日期 ：2006年7月31日
判決書日期 ：2006年8月14日
判決書
1. 上訴人乃本訴訟的被告人。他不服聆案官在2006年3月29日作出的命令，向原訟法庭法官提出上訴。
2. 導致本上訴的背景事實，可簡述如下。原告人在2003年10月展開本訴訟，向被告人追討約一百八十萬元的債項。被告人否認欠債。
3. 聆案官在2004年5月10日作出命令，被告人需於命令日起計14天內，將文件清單存檔及送達原告人。
4. 被告人在2004年5月28日存檔擬親身行事通知書，並在其中提供了供送達文件用的地址（“辯方送達地址”）。
5. 原告人在2004年6月8日取得傳票，要求法庭頒布命令，除非被告人在命令日起計7天內將文件清單存擋及送達，其抗辯書及反申索書會被剔除，原告人亦可登錄依申索陳述書要求的濟助的判決（“除非命令”）。原告人將該傳票，送達辯方送達地址。
6. 該傳票在2004年6月18日進行聆訊。聆案官在被告人缺席情況下，頒布除非命令。該命令在2004年6月24日被送達辯方送達地址。
7. 被告人在2004年6月24日申請法律援助。根據《法律援助條例》（第91章）第15（4）條，及《法律援助規則》第7A條，所有法律程序均需暫停進行42天。該期間應在2004年8月5日後完結。
8. 原告人在2004年8月13日以被告人未依除非命令行事，申請登錄判決。法院在2004年8月23日登錄該判決。
9. 原告人基於被告人未支付判決債項，在2005年9月14日向法庭提出呈請，要求頒布破產令。
10. 被告人在2006年2月28日（即登錄判決後約18個月）取得傳票，要求法庭撤銷：
(a) 2004年6月18日頒布的除非命令；
(b) 2004年8月23日登錄的判決
（被告人取得的傳票指，前第（b）分段的判決日期為2004年7月3 日，但該日其實應為，除非命令指明的行事時限的屆滿日）。
11. 聆案官在2006年3月29日經聆訊後，撤銷了前第10段所述的傳票，被告人不服判決，提出本上訴。
12. 在考慮本上訴所涉的爭議時，本席同意原告人所引用的判例中提及的法律原則。為方便理解該等法律原則，本席將相關部分引述。
13. Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2006 第3/5/6段說：-
“1. An unless order was an order of last resort, not made unless there was a history of failure to comply with other orders. It was the party’s last chance to put its case in order.”
但上文所指的“未依從其他命令的歷史”，並非單指與訟的其中一方必須曾不依從早前已頒布的命令，而亦可指該一方從整體而言，在有關法律程序，其作為屬“不可辯解及過分的延誤”。英國上訴法院在Hines v. Birkbeck College and Another（1994年6月27日宣布的判決）說：－
“… [after referring to Pryer v. Smith [1977] 1 All ER 218]
Mr Hines seeks to extract from that case a principle which certainly is not apparent from the decision which the Court of Appeal reached, that in every case where an Unless Order is made, there must have been inexcusable and inordinate delay.
That submission is effectively destroyed by the judgment of Scarman, LJ which starts at page 432, but I read from a passage at page 433:
“Clearly, the judge was of the view that this inordinate and inexcusable delay must, in the interests of justice, be brought to an end. This situation arises from time to time in the interlocutory stages of a civil action. For instance, it is well recognised that a master, or a judge in chambers, may order that, in the event of particulars not being served within a certain time, the action shall stand dismissed or the defence struck out … Similarly, the court may order that if discovery is not made within a time set by the court, the court may dismiss the action.
Is it, then, really to be said that a judge, faced, not with a specific failure in respect of a specific step in the action, but with a whole course of acts and omissions which he characterises as constituting inexcusable and inordinate delay, cannot order the dismissal of the action if a timetable for further steps in the action is not met? I think it would be contrary to the whole conduct of litigation that this power should not be available to the judge in the situation that I have outlined.”
Browne, LJ agreed with both judgments.
That passage makes perfectly clear what in any event is elementary law that the Court has power in the case of a single breach of an order to follow that up by an Unless Order, as in the instances Scarman, LJ gives about particulars and discovery.”
(上文獲強調處，由本席後加)。
14. 上文亦說：
“2. Because it was the last chance, a failure to comply would ordinarily result in the sanction being imposed.
3. The sanction was a necessary forensic weapon which the broader interests of the administration of justice required to be deployed unless the most compelling arguments were advanced to exonerate the failure.
4. It seemed axiomatic that if a party intentionally flouted the order he could expect no mercy.
5. A sufficient exoneration would almost invariably require that he satisfied the court that something beyond his control had caused the failure.
6. The judge would exercise his judicial discretion whether to excuse the failure in the circumstances of each case on its own merits, at the core of which was service to justice.
7. The interests of justice required that justice should be shown to the injured party for procedural inefficiencies causing the twin scourges of delay and wasted costs. The public administration of justice to contain those blights also weighed heavily. Any injustice to the defaulting party, though never to be ignored, came a long way behind the other two. The guidelines in Hytec Information Systems Ltd v. Conventry City Council were referred to with approval in Lessy Sarl v. Pacific Star Development Ltd & Another [1997] HKLRD 1248”.
15. 本席亦需指出，法庭在考慮是否頒布除非命令時，亦應顧及有缺失的與訟一方，其缺失行為是否屬應頒布除非命令的類別：參看 Re Wickham (1887) 35 Ch D 272; Graham v. Sutton Carden & Co. [1897] 2 Ch 367; Morton v. Palmer (1882) 9 QBD 89; The Supreme Court Practice 1999第1冊，第62/B/96 段。
16. 在本訴訟，自2004年1月16日將“抗辯書及反申索”存檔，及在2004年5月10日經代表律師出席要求作指示的傳票聆訊後，被告人並未參予本訴訟的審訊準備工作。而自2004年5月28日存檔擬親自行事通知書後，他直至2006年2月（即約21個月後）才取得撤銷除非命令的傳票。在此情況下（及被告人沒有在2004年6 月18日出席應訊），聆案官頒布除非命令，並無錯誤。
17. 除上述Hong Kong Civil Procedure 的撮要外，原訟法庭法官李義（當時官階）在Chan Chun Lung Allen and Another v. Chan Tai Ho & Others HCA 4904/1996 (1999年8月26日)的“判案書”說：-
“In PT Bank Pembangunan Indonesia (Persero) v Tan Eddy Tansil [1997] HKLRD 57 (a case decided on 14 November 1995), the Court of Appeal was faced with deciding whether to extend time to permit compliance with an unless order for disclosure in aid of a Mareva injunction. Bokhary JA, as he then was, laid down the test as follows (at p 59):-
“The test to be applied here is, in my judgment, the one laid down by Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC giving the leading judgment in the case of In re Jokai Tea Holdings Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 1196 when he said this at p. 1203 B:
‘In my judgment, in cases in which the court has to decide what are the consequences of a failure to comply with an “unless” order, the relevant question is whether such failure is intentional and contumelious. The court should not be astute to find excuses for such failure since obedience to orders of the court is the foundation on which its authority is founded. But if a party can clearly demonstrate that there was no intention to ignore or flout the order and that the failure to obey was due to extraneous circumstances, such failure to obey is not to be treated as contumelious and therefore does not disentitle the litigant to rights which he would otherwise have enjoyed.’”
…
This decision has since been regarded by Courts at first instance in Hong Kong as representing a binding precedent on the principles to be applied (although not without the expression of some reservations) …
That the PT Bank Pembangunan case represents the law appears also to have been the view of the Court of Appeal in Lessy SARL v Pacific Star Development Ltd [1997] HKLRD 1248. …
I pause also to note that a trend is detectable in some of the English authorities to lower the threshold for refusing extensions of time where unless orders have been disobeyed, …
In the light of the Hong Kong authorities I have cited, I do not consider such an approach as yet to represent the law in this jurisdiction. The test I propose to adopt is that set out in the PT Bank Pembangunan case, taken from the Jokai case.
The question is therefore whether the 5th Defendant’s failure to comply was “intentional and contumelious” or whether, on the contrary, he has been able “clearly [to] demonstrate that there was no intention to ignore or flout the order and that the failure to obey was due to extraneous circumstances”, keeping in mind that the court should not be astute to find excuses for such non-compliance.” （上文獲強調處，由本席後加）（第11至14頁）。
18. 以上引述的判案書意指，法庭在考慮是否延展除非命令指明的時限時，需考慮：－
(1) 訴訟人是否故意或因侮慢而未依除非命令行事；
(2) “侮慢”並非指“蔑視”(contempt)；
(3) 未依除非命令行事的訴訟人，申請要求法院延展有關時限時，須清楚顯示他並非故意或因侮慢而未依命令行事；有關缺失，純因外來與他無關的情況所致。
19. 被告人在其誓章中提出的解釋，簡略而言是，他提供的辯方送達地址，其實僅是自2003年10月28日前已與他離異的妻子的住址。而他本人自2004年5月尾起，因公務須經常返回大陸。故此，他只在2004年8月下旬才知悉原告人在2004年8月23日已登錄判決。
20. 被告人上述的解釋，並未符合上述法律原則的要求，因為：－
(a) 辯方送達地址，是由他自己提供的。他選擇一個並非他經常前去的地址作為辯方送達地址，導致他未能及時知悉法律程序及/或判決，並非一個好的辯解理由；
(b) 他聲稱自2004年尾起，經常返回大陸，但他提供的離港紀錄顯示，在相關期間（2004年5月23日至8月22 日），他只有11個整天不在香港。
21. 被告人亦稱，他在2004年12月至2005年8月期間，曾與原告人展開“不損害權益”的和解商議。他因此誤以為，無須再理會本訴訟的法律程序。本席不信納被告人這個聲稱：－
(1) 導致2004年8月23日的判決的法律程序，是在2004年5 月10日至6月18日進行（見前第3至6段）。故此，被告人並無合理理由（包括前第19段所述理由），在2004 年12月前忽視該等法律程序；
(2) 自2005年9月中旬起，被告人應已知悉，原告人展開的破產呈請法律程序。在此情況下，被告人理應即時就2004年8月23日登錄的判決，採取相應行動。
22. 本席故此裁定，被告人未能清楚顯示，他不是故意或因侮慢而未依除非命令行事。
23. 高等法院在Chow Kai Sang v. Toi Samuel & Others [1996] 4 HKC 330的判決書，就法院裁斷因未依除非命令行事而提出的延展時限申請，是否須考慮申請人的訴訟理據，有以下論述：－
“15. The skeleton arguments of Mr. Ma and Miss Eu addressed the merits of the Plaintiff’s claim against the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants. That is because of the rule that on an application to set aside a default judgment, it is necessary for the party in default to demonstrate by credible evidence that he has a real prospect of success. I question whether that principle has any application to the present case. The primary relief sought by the Plaintiff on his summons was for leave to file and serve the particulars despite the expiry of the time limit. It was in effect an application for an extension of time. That is apparent from the rule cited in the margin of the summons - Ord. 3 r. 5. Indeed, it is not without significance that the relevant principles which I have extracted from the judgment of Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson are referred to in the Supreme Court Practice 1997, Vol. 1, in the commentary on Ord. 3 r. 5. Of course, if leave to file and serve the particulars despite the expiration of the time limit is given, the consequential order which the master would have to make would be the setting aside of the judgment and the order for the costs of the action. But the issue which Master Jennings had to decide was whether the Plaintiff’s time for serving and filing the particulars should be extended. I am not convinced that the merits of the case are relevant to applications for an extension of time even if the consequence of the refusal of that application is that the action is prematurely brought to an end.
16. However, there are two reasons which convince me that the merits of the Plaintiff’s claim have no relevance to the present case. Firstly, that is what Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson himself said in Jokai Tea at p. 1203C :
“... if a party can clearly demonstrate that there was no intention to ignore or flout the order and that the failure to obey was due to extraneous circumstances, such failure to obey is not to be treated as contumelious and therefore does not disentitle the litigant to rights which he would otherwise have enjoyed.”
In other words, once the failure to obey an “unless” order is not regarded as contumelious, the action should proceed as it would have done if the default had not taken place. After all, Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson had already said that “the relevant question is” (and the use of the singular suggests that this is the only relevant question) “whether such failure is intentional and contumelious”. That is borne out by the way Sir Nicholas dealt with the inter-relationship at pp.1201H-1202D between the application for leave to amend the Defence and the consequences of the failure to comply with the “unless” order. It is also borne out by the observations of Parker L.J. at pp.1205H-1206A. It is true that the merits were in fact taken into account in Jokai Tea, but only in connection with the concomitant question as to whether leave to amend the Defence should be granted. It is correct that the merits are not normally considered on an application for leave to amend but it was the complicating factor of the failure to comply with the “unless” order which triggered the need for the merits to be addressed on the application for leave to amend. It is also true that a default judgment had not been entered in Jokai Tea, but I do not regard that as significant because if time is not extended it is inevitable that judgment in default will be entered in due course.
17. Secondly, the principle that a party in default has to demonstrate by credible evidence that he has a real prospect of success has only been applied in the past to judgments entered in default against defendants. Again, it is not without significance that the principle is discussed in the Supreme Court Practice in the commentary on Ord. 13 r. 9, which gives the court power to set aside or vary any judgment entered as a result of the defendant’s failure to give notice of intention to defend the action. I am not convinced that the rationale for the rule applies with equal force to defaults by plaintiffs. After all, save in the case of a plaintiff who has failed to serve a Statement of Claim, the nature of the plaintiff’s claim is known, whereas the defence of the defendant who has not given notice of an intention to defend is not.”（上文獲強調處，由本席後加）。
24. 本席同意以上引述的法律原則。
25. 此外，被告人在其誓章中，亦未附交任何文件，支持其抗辯理由。故此，本席亦認定，被告人未能顯示其抗辯具充分理據。
26. 基於以上各點，本席同意聆案官2006年3月29日作出的命令，並駁回本上訴。
27. 與訟雙方同意，訟費的一般慣例（即所涉訟費應由有關法律程序的負方付予勝方），適用於本上訴。本上訴所涉訟費（包括任何前曾被保留日後處理的訟費），由被告人付予原告人。如雙方未能就訟費數額達成協議，交訟費評定官評定。
原告人：由西盟斯律師行轉聘方欣然大律師代表
被告人：自行應訊
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