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HCAL 1941/2018
[2020] HKCFI 3079
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO. 1941 OF 2018
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Leoncio Julie Madriaga |
Applicant |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board/
Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office |
1st Putative
Respondent |
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Director of Immigration |
2nd Putative
Respondent |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge C P Pang:
Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review against the decisions of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/ Non‑refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) and the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) refusing the applicant’s claim of non-refoulement protection.
2. The applicant, born in 1967, is a national of the Philippines. She last arrived in Hong Kong as a domestic helper on 10 January 2009. She overstayed since termination of her employment contract on 24 December 2009 and remained in Hong Kong unlawfully. On 4 June 2014 she surrendered to the Immigration Department and lodged a non-refoulement claim. She was subsequently released on recognizance.
3. The facts of the case and the basis for the applicant’s non-refoulement claim are summarized at para [12-27] of the decision of the Board. Put simply, the claim was based on the fear that, if refouled, the applicant would be harmed or even killed by her uncle and cousins owing to a land dispute with her family. Some uncles of her and her father were murdered because of the land dispute in 1979. She was threatened that she would be killed if her family pursued the murder matter and the land dispute.
The Director’s Decision
4. By a notice of decision dated 28 September 2017, the Director rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds for reason that the claim was not substantiated. Having taken into account all relevant circumstances, the Director assessed that there are no substantial grounds to believe she would be at any real risk of harm; and state protection as well as internal relocation as a reasonable option are available to the applicant. The decision covered torture risk[1], BOR 2 risk[2], BOR 3 risk[3], and persecution risk[4]. The applicant lodged an appeal/ petition to the Board against the Director’s decision.
The Board’s Decision
5. The applicant attended a hearing before the Board on 6 July 2018.
6. By a decision dated 7 September 2018, the Board rejected the appeal/ petition confirming the Director’s decision. The Board’s decision covered all applicable grounds.
7. The Board gave detailed reasons for rejecting the applicant’s claim at para [70-96] of its decision. The essential reasons can be summarized as follows:
(1) the core of the applicant’s evidence, in particular, the killings and the land dispute, lacked credibility [72];
(2) the evidence regarding the land dispute unreliable and unconvincing [75];
(3) in any event, the Board found state protection and internal relocation available to the applicant [92, 96].
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
8. The applicant filed a Form 86 on 14 September 2018 for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Board.
9. In the Form 86 and affidavit in support, the applicant did not set out any grounds for the relief sought. She repeated that her life would be in danger in her country. She further said she and her mother are still fighting the case (land dispute).
10. No request for oral hearing has been made. The application is therefore considered on the papers.
Discussion
11. The relevant principles regarding appeals on non-refoulement cases have been set out comprehensively in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at paragraph 14. In particular, the role of the court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. The primary decision makers are the Director and the Board. While the court in non-refoulement cases will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, it should not usurp the role of the Board. Assessment of evidence, country of origin information, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board and the Director. The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board.
12. When the applicant pursued the appeal to the Board, the Director’s decision was superseded by the Board’s decision and is no longer susceptible to judicial review: Re Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549. Therefore, while the court needs to examine the decisions of the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, it is unnecessary to delve into the decision of the Director. This Observations for the applicant will only focus on discussing the latter’s decision.
13. In the present case, the Board in fact rejected the applicant’s appeal/ petition on the ground that it disbelieved the applicant and rejected the account of primary facts based on the implausibility in the applicant’s evidence. In any event, state protection and internal relocation are available to her. On the factual findings, there would be no factual basis in support of any of the applicable grounds.
14. As explained above, the assessments of evidence, state protection and internal relocation and risk of harm are primarily within the province of the Board and the Director. This court will not interfere with their decisions unless there is a public law ground for the court to do so.
15. The Form 86 and affidavit did not set out any particulars to demonstrate why the Board was unfair or unreasonable in the public law sense. Attached with the supporting affidavit were some documents which appear to be documents of the court in the Philippines relating to a land dispute between parties with the name of Madriaga (same as the applicant). I fail to see the relevance of the documents to the present application at all. Assuming that it relates to the land dispute the applicant claimed, the existence of a lawsuit relating to a piece of land cannot take her application any further. In the absence of any error of law or procedural unfairness being shown by the applicant, I do not find any reasonably arguable basis to challenge the findings of the Board.
16. Indeed, the applicant’s claims are too far-fetched and unconvincing. Her conduct in Hong Kong by her delay in lodging the claim for protection damaged her credibility and was inconsistent with someone in genuine fear for her life and safety.
17. Even if one gives her account the most favourable interpretation, the alleged past experiences demonstrate no real risk of future harm.
18. There cannot be any criticism of the determinations of the Director and the Board which plainly reasonable.
19. Having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law, irrational findings, or procedural unfairness in either of them. Nor do I see any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their decisions.
Disposition
20. For the reasons given, there is no prospect of success at all in the applicant’s intended application. Accordingly, I refuse to grant leave to apply for judicial review.
Dated 23 December 2020
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(Chung Lai Fan, Christine)
for Registrar, High Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicant:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must: |
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)). |
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Sent to the Applicant
on 23 December 2020
Leoncio Julie Madriaga
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil. |
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Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors
23 December 2020
Torture Claims Appeal Board/
Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
1st Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 8802/17/10/132/F464
Director of Immigration
2nd Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
QA T/C 2050/17 (Formerly RBCZ 3001266/14)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Office
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
[1] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.
[2] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under Article 2 of Section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.
[3] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of Section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.
[4] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
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