TAI MO PIU AND OTHERS v. LAM KA YEE EMMA

DCCJ 3848/2020

[2026] HKDC 837

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO 3848 OF 2020

----------------------------------------------

BETWEEN

----------------------------------------------

------------------------

DECISION

------------------------

1.  This is a sequel decision on the injunction order granted under the Judgment handed down on 15 July 2025 (the “Judgment”) which concerns an easement of right of way created under a Deed of Grant over a piece of land Lot 3326 in DD 116 situated in Yuen Long, which this Court declared the Plaintiffs (“Ps”) being the existing owners of the neighbouring land (Lot 3325) have acquired such easement defined and granted thereunder to their predecessors-in-title.

2.  This Court would adopt herein the abbreviations and nomenclatures defined in the Judgment, unless otherwise stated. The summary of the background of this case leading to the dispute over the RoW was provided in paragraphs 2 to 16 thereof. As to the background for the creation of the Deed of Grant, they are set out in 17 to 24 of the Judgment.

3.  In gist, the Defendant ("D"), being the owner of the servient land (ie Lot 3326), had sealed up the boundary by erecting fence wall at the west and south of the land since about February-June 2019 and further installed, amongst others, a new vehicular gate at the entrance to the RoW under her lock and key wholly depriving Ps (qua dominant owners) from the use and enjoyment of the RoW as acquired by virtue of the Deed of Grant.

4.  D's stance in this litigation up till the Judgment was that the Deed of Grant is invalid and ineffective in conferring any right of way vis-à-vis the owners of Lot 3325 all along. This Court after trial made a ruling to the contrary and entered judgment in Ps' favour as per the terms set out in paragraph 169 of the Judgment, quoted as follows:-

“169. Due to the above reasons, judgment be entered against D and it is ordered that:

(1) a declaration that Ps have acquired an easement of right of way as validly created and granted under the Deed of Grant to Lapereau, which was in turn legitimately and effectively passed on to Ps through the chains of title, and that the burden and benefit of such easement covenant run with the lands of Lot 3326 and Lot 3325 respectively, and the extent of the said right of way is that demarcated on the two plans annexed to D’s expert report dated 20/10/2021 under “Annex 1A” and “Annex 1A-1” thereto, which are reproduced in this Judgment as Annex 2;

(2) a declaration that the Deed of Cancellation as entered into between D and the owners of the G/F and 1/F of Lot 3319RP is invalid and ineffective to extinguish or otherwise cancel the the RoW as created and granted under Deed of Grant (as between Lot 3325 and Lot 3326) and that the easement of RoW as so created and granted under the Deed of Grant is still subsisting as between Lot 3325 and Lot 3326;

(3) a mandatory injunction that D shall demolish at her own costs within 28 days from the date hereof the fence wall currently enclosing the western boundary and such portion of southern boundary of Lot 3326 (as referred to in [155] above) so as to fully restore the RoW granted under the Deed of Grant in accordance to such extent as so found by this Court and declared in (1) above;

(4) In relation to (3) above, the parties are further directed to submit an agreed set of terms to facilitate the implementation of the mandatory injunction in line with the above findings of this Court and addressing further the matters as mentioned in [158] above, within 21 days and in such manner as provided under [157] above, and there be liberty to apply in connection with this purpose;” (emphasis supplied)

5.  Under paragraphs 157 and 158 of the Judgment, I directed the parties to explore a consensual resolution, in the spirit of the CJR, regarding the retention or demolition of a vehicular gate at the north-west entrance to Lot 3325 (i.e. also the entrance to the RoW) for reasons set out thereunder, failing which, they shall submit their respective proposals and submitted reasons within a time limit for this Court's consideration. Unfortunately, the parties could not come to any agreement and had to reappear before this Court on 19 November 2025 (“Nov 2025 hearing”) to seek this Court’s determination of this outstanding injunction matter concerning the existing vehicular gate.

History of the vehicular gate

6.  The history of vehicular gate is set out at paragraphs 30 to 32 of the Judgment thus:-

“Vehicular gate and man gate at the entrance of the Pathway

30. As per her own pleaded case, D admits that in about 1990, a big metal gate fit for vehicular passage, and another small metal gate (next to the said big gate) for human access were installed at the entrance of the Pathway leading to Lot 3326, Lot 3319 and Lot 3325. Both gates were installed by the same developer, and they were never locked, but accessible by anyone.

31. In about 2015, the original metal gate was replaced with a metal gate by D bearing the same measurements and erected on the same location (the 2015 metal gate) because the original gate was damaged as a result of a collision by a stolen vehicle in the same year. Such metal gate was not locked and was likewise accessible by anyone.

32. In 2019, when D and Mr Lee[1] sealed off the boundaries of their respective lands, D built a new small metal gate 13 at the fence wall facing the Footpath under her lock and key. After the Deed of Cancellation[2] was entered into, D further replaced the 2015 metal gate with a gate that was also under D’s lock and key (D’s metal gate).”

Ps’ pleaded case on the injunctive relief vis-a-vis the current vehicular gate

7.  In ASOC, among other things, Ps prayed under relief (b) for “an injunction that the Defendant do dismantle the fence wall on the Pathway, including any gates thereon, at her own costs and restore the Pathway and the Right of Way to their original state”.

8.  In Nov 2025 hearing, Mr Stanley Siu, counsel appearing for Ps, submitted that after the current vehicular gate (which is an auto-gate) built by D in about June 2019 (the “2019 Metal Gate”) is dismantled, D ought to be further ordered to rebuild a new vehicular gate at the same location in the same condition as the metal gate built in 2015 (i.e. the one as referred to in para 31 of the Judgment) (the “2015 Metal Gate”).[3] According to the parties, the 2015 Metal Gate was a manual vehicular gate with only a latch installed at the inner side without any padlock put thereon, so it had not been locked at all times, and be pushed open for vehicles to gain further access into the RoW zone[4].

D’s present contentions for keeping the vehicular gate

9.  D through her counsel, Mr Vincent Chiu (who also appeared for D at the trial) contends that the 2019 Metal Gate ought to be retained.

10.  To that end, Mr Chiu submitted at Nov 2025 hearing a proposed undertaking from D in the following terms for this Court's consideration:-

“1. D is to install (at her own costs) a remote control system for the purpose of operating the vehicular gate and granting access to the owners at Lot 3325 to access Lot 3325 (sic), via the Right of Way as granted under the Deed of Grant of Right of Way dated the 6 November 1995 (“Deed of Grant”).

2. D (and/or her husband) is/are to be the system administrator(s), who can operate the opening and closing of the vehicular gate and grant access to and control access of “user”. A “user” can operate the opening and closing of the vehicular gate.

3. Within 3 days of Ps’ compliance with the Deed of Grant, D is to grant access to 1 of the Ps as the “user” under this system (the “3325 User”)

4. Save as to access to the Right of Way in accordance with the Deed of Grant, the vehicular gate shall remain locked at all material times.

5. The above is without prejudice to the rights of the owners of Lot 3326, as the system administrators, to suspend the usage of the Right of Way by 3325 User in accordance with the Deed of Grant, should the 3325 User and/or the Plaintiffs fail to comply with the terms of the Deed of Grant.

6. Liberty to apply” (emphasis supplied)

11.  In essence, Mr Chiu made three points of submissions to advance D’s contentions:-

(1) Upon construction of the Deed of Grant (which was executed in 1995), the RoW granted was subject to the circumstances existing at the time of the grant, which included a vehicular gate (the “1995 Metal Gate”) at the present location. As the RoW was subject to the existence of a vehicular gate at the entrance thereto, there is no justification to request the demolition of the 2019 Metal Gate (“Point 1”).

(2) In any event, the existence of the 2019 Metal Gate (with access provided to Ps) does not constitute a substantial interference with the use of the ROW (“Point 2”).

(3) A mandatory injunction requiring the reinstatement of the vehicular gate (which had been removed in 2019) is not sufficiently certain, is wider than necessary, and would be impossible for D to comply with and should not be granted (“Point 3”).

Analysis

Overview

12.  As pointed out above, D’s case as presented at the trial was that the Deed of Grant is invalid and ineffective in creating any right of way easement in favour of the owners of Lot 3325 (at the time of grant) nor its successors-in-title (including Ps), which case was rejected by this Court.

13.  D pleaded no fall back alternative case in her Defence, nor raise any counterclaim that in the event the Court made a ruling against her, she would seek for the existing vehicular gate be retained with remote-control access device(s) provided to any of Ps.

14.  Viewed thus, in the absence of an agreement (reached by the parties despite a final chance was given to them to work out an amicable solution for such issue), this Court must now determine the outstanding injunction matter basing, in particular, on its prior findings, and the parties remain bound by their respective pleaded cases.

15.  After carefully considering the submissions from both sides and all the circumstances on the evidence before this Court, I agree with Mr Siu’s submissions that the existing vehicular gate has to be removed from the entrance to the RoW.

16.  Fundamentally, Mr Chiu’s three points of submissions cannot alter the historical fact (as found by this Court and there was no appeal made against such finding) that D embarked upon a course that amounts to unlawful infringement of Ps' easement rights, actively depriving Ps of their legitimate use of the RoW by erecting the fence wall, demolishing the 2015 Metal Gate, and installing the 2019 Metal Gate at the same location locked against all of Ps.

17.  D's wrong still essentially persisted even after the Judgment was handed down. At the Nov 2025 hearing, both counsel confirmed with this Court that, despite the original fence wall was demolished in accordance with this Court’s earlier order, the existing vehicular gate had remained locked by D (as against the outside world) and Ps have still been prevented from using the vehicular access over the RoW, which this Court finds that D has in fact no justification for doing so (and for the relevant discussion in detail, see paragraphs 66 to 86 below).

18.  In these circumstances, it is plainly right that a mandatory injunction ought to be ordered forthwith compelling D to remove the 2019 Metal Gate from the RoW zone as declared under para 169(1) of the Judgment, so as to restrain the unlawful interference with the RoW: see Billion Star Development Ltd v Wong Tak Chuen [2012] 2 HKLRD 85, para 38.

19.  With such overview, I now proceed to deal with Mr Chiu’s three points of submissions in turn. Then I would explain the appropriate reliefs that ought to ordered as necessary to redress these wrongs.

Point 1

20.  With respect, the fallacy of Point 1 lies in conveniently ignoring that the 1995 Metal Gate, already existing at the time of grant, was never locked and remained accessible by anyone. The 2015 Metal Gate (installed to replace the collision-damaged 1995 gate) was likewise left unlocked at all times. In stark contrast, D locked the 2019 Metal Gate to exclude Ps from the RoW entirely until Judgment was entered, and has even thereafter effectively prevented Ps from exercising their right of vehicular access over it.

21.  In these circumstances, while the historical existence of a vehicular gate prior to 2019 represents a condition to be taken into account, such condition would objectively be interpreted to mean that any replacement gate must never be locked against any of Ps so as to prevent or obstruct their RoW (in particular the vehicular access over the servient land) at any time, upon the reasonable construction of clause 2(d) of the Deed of Grant, which provides that:-

“2. The parties hereto and their respective successors in title and assigns hereby jointly and severally covenant with each other that they will at all times hereinafter:-

...

(d) not install erect build or construct or permit or suffer to be installed erected built or constructed any erection affixion installation fitting structure or thing whatsoever or obstruct or cause any obstruction in any manner whatsoever at upon or over the said right of way.” (emphasis supplied)

22.  If D desires to erect a new vehicular gate at the entrance to replace the 2015 Metal Gate beyond the conditions existing at the time of the grant or at the time of the 2015 installation, she must establish a viable legal basis for doing so (for instance by entering into a variation agreement with Ps (qua dominant owners of Lot 3325) and all the other dominant owners of Lot 3319RP. Absent such agreement, any basis for D's erection of a new vehicular gate at the same location must not have derogated Ps’ RoW as acquired by virtue of the Deed of Grant, which is proprietary in nature (as opposed to mere personal right[5]), nor substantially interfered with Ps' reasonable use and enjoyment of the RoW.

23.  In light of the aforesaid, D’s proposed undertaking to provide a remote-control access device to only one of the three Ps (as user of the remote-control locking system to be installed at the vehicular gate) plainly constitutes a substantial derogation of Ps’ RoW over the servient land.

24.  Such a restriction would fundamentally contradict the Deed of Grant, which provides for a "FULL FREE and UNINTERRUPTED"[6] right of way to all of Ps (as the existing dominant owners) and includes an express covenant against obstruction in whatsoever manner at or upon or over the RoW according to Clause 2(d) thereof.

25.  In light of the aforesaid, the current terms in D’s proposed undertaking, if implemented, would continue to amount to unlawful and substantial interference with Ps’ RoW over Lot 3326 as acquired by virtue of the Deed of Grant.

26.  Point 1 is therefore plainly misconceived and rejected.

Point 2

27.  Mr Chiu relied heavily on Wee Siew Bock v Chan Yuen Yee Alexia Eve [2012] 3 SLR 1053, a Singapore Court of Appeal case, to support D’s contention on Point 2.

28.  In that case, during reconstruction work at their properties, the servient owner (the respondent) installed an automatic remote-controlled gate at the entrance of a passageway (over which the appellant had acquired a right of way easement) . The trial judge observed that this would be done within the respondent’s rights as servient owner and did not substantially interfere with the appellants (dominant owner)’s reasonable enjoyment of the easement.

29.  The Singapore Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge and held that the dominant owner only acquired a limited interest over the easement land. He could not insist on maintenance of the status quo if changes to the easement land did not substantially interfere with his reasonable enjoyment of the easement. The servient owner may use the easement land as he pleases, provided that he does not do anything that would substantially interfere with the reasonable enjoyment of the easement by the dominant owner (paras 60 to 64).

30.  In my respectful view, that would represent the general rule /principles on easement. The Court must be vigilant about the genesis of the individual easement right under consideration in each case. If it was created by a deed of grant like the present one, the terms of grant upon their proper construction may, in appropriate circumstances, play a decisive role over the matter.

31.  Further, what amounts to "substantial interference" is a question of fact, which has to be determined according to the particular circumstances of each case: Gale on Easements (21^st ed), paras 13-14.

32.  The general rule as relied on in Wee Siew Bock (as mentioned above) may of course be altered by "circumstances", as commented in the learned text from John Leybourn Goddard: A Treatise on The Law of Easements (8^th ed, 1921), which was cited and endorsed by the Singapore Court of Appeal at para 69 of the judgment:

“69. In relation to easements in the form of private rights of way specifically, John Leybourn Goddard, A Treatise on The Law of Easements (Stevens and Sons Limited, 8^th Ed, 1921) (“Goddard”) authoritatively summarised the position almost a hundred years ago thus (at p 389):

... [A] right of way along a private road belonging to another person does not generally give the dominant owner a right that the road shall in no respect be altered, or the width decreased; for his right does not entitle him to the use of the whole of the road, unless the whole width of the road is necessary for his purpose - and it is merely a right to pass with the convenience to which he has been accustomed; the right, therefore, merely extends to that portion of the centre of the road which is necessary for the due exercise of the right of passage; and the only obligation upon the servient owner is, that he shall not unreasonably contract the width of the road, or render the exercise of the right of passing substantially less easy than it was at the time of the grant. This general rule may of course be altered by circumstances, as was the case in Nicol v. Beaumont (1883) 53 LJ Ch 853; 50 LT 112], in which there was a grant of right to pass ‘in the same manner and as fully as if the same were public roads.’ [emphasis added]” (emphasis added)

33.  The above gloss to the general rule also echoes with the commentaries from Gale on Easements at para 13-07 (particularly point 3) and para 13-15, which provide that:-

13-07

“13-07 In B&Q Plc v Liverpool de Lancashire Properties Ltd, the owners of a retail park had granted B&Q a lease of a retail warehouse with a right to pass and repass over a service yard at the rear of one of the other units. The landlords proposed to construct an extension which would reduce the area of the yard and the turning circle available to B&Q’s vehicles, albeit that turning facilities were available B&Q within their own demise. Blackburn J adopted the following propositions of law:

(1) the test of an actionable interference is not whether what the grantee is left with is reasonable, but whether his insistence upon being able to continue the use of the whole of what he contracted for is reasonable;

(2) it is not open to the grantor to deprive the grantee of his preferred modus operandi and then argue that someone else would prefer to do things differently, unless the grantee’s preference is unreasonable or perverse;

(3) if the grantee has contracted for the "relative luxury" of an ample right, he is not to be deprived of that right, in the absence of an express reservation of a right to build upon it, merely because it is a relative luxury and the reduced, non-ample right would be all that was reasonably required;...”

13-15

“In Australia the effect of Pettey v Parsons has been said to leave it open to the owner of land to make any use of his land open to an owner, including the erection of gates and fences, so long as there is no real substantial interference with the enjoyment of the right of way. There is a natural presumption that the servient owner should be entitled to fence his land; the servient owner is entitled to fence the common boundary and the dominant owner is entitled to access to the right of way by means of gates at such points as reasonably meet his requirements, subject, of course, to any express or implied terms of the grant.” (emphasis supplied)

34.  In light of the aforesaid, what Godfrey JA said in Lea Tai Property Development Ltd v IO of Leapoint Industrial Building [1996] 1 HKC 193 at p 198B-D (another authority cited by Mr Chiu) would likewise be general principles on right of way easement as recited by his lordship, just like what the Singapore Court of Appeal did in Wee Siew Bock. In my respectful view, the extent of application of these general principles must be considered against the proper construction of the relevant terms and conditions under a deed of grant (if available) governing how the easement is to be exercised in each case. However, it cannot be discerned from the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Lea Tai Property Development Ltd that there existed any DMC terms affecting the right of way, let alone being canvassed in that case (which was comparable to the operative clause (clause 1) or clause 2(d) of the Deed of Grant in the present case).

Construction of clause 2(d) of Deed of Grant

35.  In my judgment, upon reasonable construction of clause 2(d) against the Deed of Grant as a whole in light of the surrounding circumstances at the time of grant, it would appear to this Court that the continual erection of the auto-gate having user access granted by D to only one of the three Ps (according to D's proposed undertaking) would plainly contravene the Deed of Grant, rendering the continuation of the auto-gate at the easement land unlawful if the proposed terms are implemented accordingly.

36.  For, the auto-gate which was proposed to be locked at all times with a remote-control access device provided to only one of Ps, would constitute a kind of substantial obstruction to the remaining two owners (who would not have remote-control access devices in their own possession).

37.  Mr Chiu submits that D's current proposal (as originated from her solicitors' earlier letter sent to this Court dated 6 August 2025[7]) limiting access to a single vehicle, was based on Ps' own testimony regarding the parking capacity of Lot 3325. With respect, that is beside the point.

38.  The fact that all three Ps are family members (and only have one family car that was fit to drive through the narrowest portion of the RoW[8] to reach their own land, ie. Lot 3325) would not alter this Court's observation mentioned in paragraph 36 above.

39.  For, the RoW constitutes a proprietary interest affording all three Ps a variety of potential modes of reasonable use and enjoyment of the RoW in accordance with the Deed of Grant, rather than confining to the use of their own vehicle(s) over the RoW.

40.  Notably, according to the description of the grant, the uses of the RoW was not only confined to the owners of Lot 3325 existing at the time of grant (and their successors-in-title, i.e. Ps in this case), by also extends to “their respective tenants servants visitors workmen licensees and other persons authorised by them”[9]. In other words, the RoW would also allow various other persons as authorised by the owners of Lot 3325 to go pass and repass the RoW over Lot 3326 (with or without motor or other vehicles) for the purpose of going to and from Lot 3325 as defined in the Deed of Grant.[10]

41.  However, the existing automated vehicular gate, if locked at all times and accessible only by a remote-control held by an owner of Lot 3325, would necessarily obstruct various persons as legitimately authorised by Ps (such as delivery workers or social guests who are travelling on vehicle) from using the vehicular passageway over the RoW to gain access to Lot 3325, when the remote-control holder is away from the small house at Lot 3325 at the time.

42.  Notably, D never proposed in her undertaking that she and/or her husband (being the system administrator(s)) would be prepared to go so far to act as a 24/7 gate keeper readily available to open the gate for these authorised persons (who happen to travel by vehicles to visit Lot 3325), if and when needed, to use the RoW to gain access to Lot 3325, and egress therefrom afterwards. Realistically, D is not expected to take up such burdensome duties, but on the other hand, it would be fundamentally impermissible for D to enhance her own use and enjoyment of the servient land at the expense of the dominant owner's right of way easement either.

43.  In contrast, prior to the installation of 2019 Metal Gate, authorized visitors arriving by vehicle at any time could simply unlatch the 2015 Metal Gate from the inside to permit vehicular entry (such as when a deliveryman drove his motorbike carrying ordered food items to their customers waiting in the small house on Lot 3325). Given the scope of the RoW declared in the Judgment[11], even if a vehicle is too large to navigate the narrowest part of RoW[12], it can still enter into the RoW zone on Lot 3326 and stop nearest Lot 3325. This allows authorized persons, such as a visiting friend in a taxi or delivery workers handling heavy furniture, to disembark or unload goods at that proximate spot for final transport to Lot 3325.

44.  However, the remote-control locking system proposed to be installed at the existing vehicular would now effectively terminate the exercise of Ps' entitled property right (vis-à-vis these authorised persons travelling by vehicle) at the entrance to the RoW, which can otherwise be legitimately exercised by them to travel along the whole vehicular passageway across the RoW zone according to the terms of the Deed of Grant.

45.  Further, as a real property right, not only that it is not a mere personal benefit of access over Lot 3326 conferred upon Ps, it actually runs with the land for the benefit of Ps' successors-in-title.

46.  For instance, Ps are prima facie entitled in law to partition their interests in Lot 3325 (with a three-story small house built thereat) and dispose of or deal with their respective shares as they like including through sale or lease. Should the three units of the small house be separately sold or leased to unrelated parties, D's proposed undertaking would remain fundamentally deficient (having only a single remote-control device to be shared among multiple, independent owner(s) and/or tenant(s) in such event), and viewing from such perspective, D's proposed terms of vehicular access would also in a way diminish the overall attractiveness to their potential buyers/tenants and hence the intrinsic value of Lot 3325 (as compared with the situation while the 2015 Metal Gate was still in place which had not been locked at all times)[13].

47.  In light of the aforesaid, D's proposed terms of vehicular access to the RoW (if allowed to be implemented) would plainly amount to a clear derogation from the grant of RoW as acquired by Ps by virtue of the Deed of Grant, and causing much inconvenience to Ps in relation to their use and enjoyment of the RoW, as compared the situation before the automated vehicular gate was erected by D in 2019.

48.  Fundamentally, D's proposal would effectively downgrade Ps' right of way easement from a proprietary interest into something akin to a mere personal license. D has unilaterally decided what she deems sufficient for Ps' family as a single unit, while entirely neglecting the true proprietary nature or the full spectrum of their easement rights. In my judgment, such a restriction amounts to a substantive rewriting of Ps' property rights, severely curtailing their potential reasonable use and enjoyment as clearly defined and permitted under the Deed of Grant.

49.  Given the above analysis, Mr Chiu’s submission on Point 2 is plainly misconceived and ought to be rejected when considered against the proper construction of the Deed of Grant as a whole in light of the surrounding circumstances at the time of grant.

A pleading point

50.  Mr Chiu took a pleading point by submitting that Ps cannot rely on Clause 2(d) because para 35 of the ASOC only pleaded that D’s conduct of erecting the fence wall offended clause 2, but did not go on to say that the erection of the 2019 Metal Gate was a breach of clause 2. Para 35 pleads thus:-

“35. The conduct of the Defendant by erecting the fence wall has wrongfully obstructed and caused obstruction to the Right of Way created and granted under the Deed. In the premises, the Defendant has wrongfully breached clause 2 of the Deed. The Plaintiffs suffer loss and damage as a result.” (emphasis supplied)

51.  With respect, I disagree. Para 35 of the ASOC has to be read in context. An earlier paragraph (ie para 33) clearly pleaded that there was a new big metal gate (ie referring to the 2019 Metal Gate) on the fence wall facing the government land in the northwest of Lot 3326 as follows:

“33. As far as the Right of Way which formed part of the Pathway is concern, the Right of Way was wrongfully fenced off by the Defendant by the said fence wall. The original metal gate at the entrance of the Pathway was wrongfully dismantled and removed by the Defendant. The Defendant then built a new big metal gate on the fence wall facing the government road in the northwest of Lot 3326. The Defendant also built a new small metal gate facing the Footpath. Both of the abovementioned new big gate and small gate were for her exclusive use.” (emphasis supplied)[14]

52.  In relief (b) sought under the ASOC, Ps specifically prayed for:

“An injunction order that the Defendant do dismantle the fence wall on the Pathway, including any gates thereon, at her own costs and restore the Pathway and the Right of Way to their original state;" (emphasis supplied)

53.  Viewed thus, the overall tenor of Ps’ own pleaded case clearly informed its readers that the fence wall as sought to be dismantled would include the 2019 Metal Gate. It is noted that the fence wall and the 2019 Metal Gate were built around the same time in 2019. According to the context of the pleading, it is evident that the pleaded basis for dismantling the fence wall and the "new big metal gate" is by virtue of clause 2 of the Deed of Grant. This Court does not see there is any unfairness nor prejudice for D to meet such case, nor would she be taken by surprise to answer P's case seeking dismantling of the 2019 Metal Gate by resorting to clause 2(d) in the circumstances.

54.  Fundamentally, in determining whether a mandatory injunction ought to be granted to order the removal of the 2019 Metal Gate, the Court must evaluate the totality of the relevant circumstances. One prime consideration would naturally be the state and quality of the RoW, and how it shall be exercised under the terms of the Deed of Grant, and this would no doubt touch upon its construction as a whole (including clause 2(d)).

55.  In these circumstances, I cannot accept Mr Chiu's submission that the Court should adopt a “blinkered” approach by divorcing the issue of "substantial interference" from the construction of the Deed of Grant, both of which are recognized by legal authorities as central to the subject inquiry as demonstrated above. Therefore, there is in truth no substance in the pleading point as contended.

D's contention of no-"substantial interference"

56.  Upon closer examination, D's contention that the 2019 Metal Gate (if implemented with her proposed remote-control access granted to Ps) would not amount to a "substantial interference" cannot really get off the ground.

Wee Siew Bock is materially distinguishable

57.  Unlike the respondent in Wee Siew Bock, who offered "the Appellant equal access to the Easement Land by means of a remote control and a set of manual keys for the Auto-Gate"[15] even when the former planned for the intended installation of the remote-controlled gate as part of the reconstruction of her properties, but that was objected by the dominant owners.

58.  Whereas, D here fenced off the entirety of Lot 3325 and has kept the 2019 Metal Gate (also an auto-gate) locked against Ps since its installation in 2019 throughout to Nov 2025 hearing. Viewed thus, despite that both cases involve automated gates on easement land, the factual matrix of Wee Siew Bock is materially distinguishable.

59.  By any measure, D’s conduct has constituted a plain and obvious substantial interference with Ps' reasonable use and enjoyment of their RoW from the start all the way up to Nov 2025 hearing.

D's conducts of continuing to lock up the vehicular gate against Ps post Judgment

60.  In these circumstances, and upon further consideration of the present outstanding matter in relation to the existing vehicular gate after reviewing the parties' pleaded cases in light of the authorities and counsel's submissions from both sides, this Court comes to a clear view that it would be neither right nor just to allow the 2019 Metal Gate (which was unlawfully installed against the Deed of Grant in the first place) be kept at the same location (which had been locked against Ps throughout the litigation for years) obstructing their reasonable use and enjoyment of the RoW any longer, particularly, after taking further into account of D's post-Judgment conducts.

61.  To recap, D proffered an undertaking in Court at Nov 2025 hearing that "D is to grant access to 1 of the Ps as the "user" of this (remote control locking) system". Before the hearing, D's solicitors also sent an earlier proposal in their letter to this Court dated 13 August 2025 (copied to Ps' solicitors) that "the vehicular gate will be locked and access through the vehicular gate be provided by D to Ps' one vehicle through the issuance of an authorised remote control".

62.  Importantly, all these proposals were put forward while D had continued to fully obstruct all three Ps from using the vehicular access over the RoW. D has neither opened the automated gate for nor shared any access device with Ps pending the Court's determination of this outstanding matter, despite this Court's clear finding that the replacement of the 2015 Metal Gate by D installing a new metal gate of her own under her lock and key and erection of fence wall has plainly constituted an unlawful interference with the easement of the RoW[16].

63.  This Court have not lost sight of Mr Chiu's submission that the Deed of Grant provides that the usage of the RoW would be suspended where the owners of Lot 3325 were in breach of their obligations under clause 2 and 3 of the Deed. And on that basis, he seeks to further argue that given the existence of the original vehicular gate at the time of the grant, the Deed must have envisaged that if the owners of Lot 3325 suspended their use of the ROW, the gate would serve as an effective control mechanism to deny access until they resumed compliance with their obligations.

64.  Be that as it may, this Court already analysed in detail under the Judgment why D failed to establish any non-compliance with the Deed of Grant by Ps or their predecessors-in-title[17], D is bound by such ruling, against which no appeal was made.

65.  As seen in this light, the fallacy in Mr Chiu's argument is thus apparent: while D may generally use her land as she pleases (and in this case purportedly to facilitate the enforcement of the terms under Deed of Grant), she cannot do so by crossing the boundary into unlawful interference with the Ps' RoW (as declared by this Court to be validly and effectively acquired pursuant to the Deed of Grant). Regrettably, she has plainly committed such an infringement for 6 years before the Judgment was entered, and her commission of tort has even persisted after the handing down of the Judgment.

No post-Judgment non-compliance by Ps to contribute government rent as D contends

66.  Mr Chiu further submits that Ps have hitherto indicated a blanket refusal to comply with D's demand in contributing to the expenses of the RoW by referencing to Ps' solicitors' letter dated 4 August 2025[18] in response to D's solicitors' letter dated 31 July 2025[19].

67.  With respect, Mr Chiu's submission is misconceived and D has mischaracterised the situation.

68.  D's solicitors' letter dated 31 July 2025 only set out D's own calculation of proportion of government rent for Lot 3326 (at 19.04%) that Ps ought to contribute (by referencing to the area of RoW zone in proportion to the total site area of Lot 3326), but it never demanded Ps to pay for any specified sum, nor enclosed any government demand note.

69.  In their letter of reply dated 4 August 2025[20], in this Court's view, Ps' solicitors did not indicate any refusal of Ps to pay for their contribution to their government rent as required under the Deed of Grant. The overall tenor of their reply was to object to D's proposal to install remote-control at the vehicular gate providing access to Ps for their one vehicle only. In a subsequent letter dated 23 October 2025[21], they made it clear that Ps "have all along agreed to pay their proportions of the Government Rent in respect of the pathway [i.e. referring to the RoW]."

70.  In the letter dated 31 July 2025, D also proposed that the costs (HK$4,800) to install the remote control at the existing vehicular gate be shared equally by Ps. Such requirement was repeated as part of D's proposal sent for the Court's consideration under their solicitors' letter dated 6 August 2025[22]. But in this Court's view, there is no obligation on Ps' part to share such installation costs.

71.  This is because the 2019 Metal Gate was installed and locked against the Ps, and that constituted unlawful interference of Ps' RoW (as found by this Court), the expenses for the proposed remote-control system would have been unnecessary had D not wrongfully removed the 2015 Metal Gate in the way she had done. In any event, the sharing of these installation costs form part and parcel of the D's broader proposal for operating the vehicular gate (as contained in her solicitors' post-Judgment correspondences until before their letter of 28 October 2025[23]). As this Court has already explained, that proposal would contravene the Deed of Grant and perpetuate the unlawful infringement of Ps' RoW. Therefore, such proposal (including the installation costs as proposed) cannot be forced upon Ps.

72.  In any event, by failing to demand any specific sum for payment (nor to disclose therein the government rent involved so that Ps could calculate it themselves), D's solicitors' letter of 31 July 2025 cannot constitute a valid demand for a due proportion of government rent under clause 2(c) of the Deed of Grant, and thus failed to trigger any payment obligation on P's part. Clause 2(c) states that:-

“2. The parties hereto and their respective successors in title and assigns hereby jointly and severally covenant with each other that they will at all times hereinafter:-

...

(c) pay a due proportion of all Crown rent, costs charges and expenses in connection therewith (if any)” (emphasis supplied)

73.  D's solicitors in their subsequent letter dated 17 October 2025[24] supplied for the first time two demand notes for payment of two quarters of government rent, namely, 1/7/2025 - 30/9/2025 ("the 1st relevant quarter") and 1/10/2025 - 31/12/2025 ("the 2nd relevant quarter") each for the sum of HK$531, and demanded a contribution of HK$202.20 from Ps (i.e. HK$531 x 2 x 19.04%).

74.  However, Ps disputed the appropriateness of the demanded figure in their solicitors' letter of reply dated 23 October 2025[25] by contending that Ps ought not be held solely responsible for the 19.04% government rent as apportioned to the RoW zone, but the government rent should be divided among three parties instead (ie D, Ps and the registered owner of Lot 3319RP[26]), and hence Ps ought to pay for one-third only.

75.  In my judgment, this point is indeed arguable, particularly in light of this Court’s earlier observation that the RoW easement granted to the predecessor-in-title of the 2/F of Lot 3319RP may not have been effectively extinguished[27]. In the absence of hearing any or any effective submissions from Mr Chiu on this specific point to counter Ps' contention in this regard, I find that D has failed to satisfy this Court that a proper demand for Ps' due proportion of government rent was properly made out on the available evidence before this Court, even on this independent ground alone.

76.  D through her solicitor sent yet another letter dated 28 October 2025[28] to P's solicitors stating that she now prepared to allow Ps to contribute to half share of 19.04% of government rents instead of fully pay for the same, but insisted that it should not be divided among three parties, because "the registered owner" of Lot 3319RP had already indicated that "he" would no longer use the RoW. That letter further indicated that if Ps comply with such demand of payment of government rent and agree to the multiple-user remote control system to be installed, then D would be prepared to provide Ps with "1 remote" to the vehicular gate. In their solicitors' letter of reply dated 7 November 2025[29], Ps refused such proposal.

77.  In this Court's view, Ps' refusal did not amount to non-compliance with clause 2(d) of the Deed of Grant either. There remains no evidence produced before this Court that the current owner of 2/F of Lot 3319RP agreed to the release of the right of way easement, to resolve the doubts of this Court as indicated in para 149 of the Judgment. The pronoun "he" as referred to in D's solicitors' letter of 28 October 2025 is apparently referring to Mr Li Kiu Cheung[30] only, who together with wife Jim Man Chu only represent themselves as the G/F owner. Prima facie, there is no evidence that they can speak on behalf the 2/F owner of Lot 3319RP for the purpose of cancellation of RoW.

78.  Most importantly, by the time of the issuance of D's solicitors' letter on 28 October 2025 (and in fact up till Nov 2025 hearing), Ps had still been wrongfully deprived by D of vehicular access over the RoW for the whole 1st relevant quarter, and part of the 2nd relevant quarter (which began on 1 October 2025 and ended on 31 December 2025). In this Court's view, Ps (without any fault on their part) are not required to contribute to any government rent during such periods when they were being wrongfully deprived by D of vehicular access over the RoW upon reasonable construction of the Deed of Grant.

79.  If the Deed of Grant were construed otherwise, it would lead to wholly unreasonable and even absurd consequences that D could unlawfully and completely deprive Ps of their vehicular access on the one hand, while continuously demanding their contribution to the government rent for the RoW on the other, but for all practical purposes during those wrongful access deprivation period, the RoW was used exclusively for the benefit of D and her vehicles. And notably, pedestrian access to Lot 3325 has always been readily available via the adjacent government pathway, extending from the entrance of Lot 3326 all the way to Lot 3325, even without using the RoW[31].

80.  In light of the aforesaid, this Court also finds the demands made in D's solicitors' letters of 17 October 2025 and 28 October 2025 upon Ps to contribute for the purported proportion of government rent were likewise invalid to trigger Ps' payment obligation under the Deed of Grant.

81.  In these circumstances, having carefully reviewed the overall circumstances of this case and fully considered both parties' submissions, this Court is of the clear view that D's post-Judgment conduct has objectively demonstrated a clear intention on her part to deprive Ps' legitimate use and enjoyment of the vehicular access over the RoW.

82.  It is also salient to note that D appears to have withheld the government demand note for the 1st relevant quarter when her solicitors issued the purported demand letter on 31 July 2025. The Court has discerned no explanation as to why this demand note was not or could not be produced to Ps' solicitors at the time the contribution to government rent was demanded in such letter, despite D had already settled the bill by then.

83.  In this connection, as shown by the government demand note later enclosed in her solicitors' letter dated 17 October 2025, the handwriting thereon indicates the government rent was paid on 6 July 2025[32], well before the issuance of D's solicitors' first demand letter of 31 July 2025.

84.  Without prejudice to anything aforesaid, for completeness sake, this Court should also mention that despite D's solicitors' letter of 28 October 2025[33] withdrew D's earlier request upon Ps to contribute to the costs of installation of the remote-control locking system on the vehicular gate, D still wrongfully demanded for Ps' contribution to the government rent even at the figure of $101.10 (purportedly for the two relevant quarter periods) in this letter. But this Court has explained why Ps are not required to pay for the 1st relevant quarter because they were wholly and wrongfully deprived of vehicular access over the RoW during that period when their payment obligation had not yet arisen. Neither are they required to pay for the 2nd relevant quarter, because D has continued to wrongfully deprive their vehicular access over the RoW up till Nov 2025 hearing as found by this Court.

85.  In light of the foregoing and after carefully reviewing the materials before it, the Court finds that Ps had not committed any breach of the Deed of Grant (as D contends) after the Judgment up to Nov 2025 hearing. Therefore, neither was D entitled to suspend Ps' exercise of the RoW after the Judgment, and the deprivation of their access during that whole period was wrongful and constituted fresh actionable nuisance in further unlawfully and substantially infringing Ps' RoW.

86.  In these circumstances, this Court is entitled to take D's post-Judgment conduct into account and give due consideration to such matter when exercising its judicial discretion to determine the appropriate terms of injunctive reliefs to be ordered. In this Court's view, to do otherwise would be in way condoning D's ongoing post-Judgment wrong in blocking Ps' vehicular access over the RoW, whether she did so intentionally or as a matter of miscalculated risk.

Substantial interference created by D's proposed undertaking terms (if implemented)?

87.  Lastly, after carefully both parties' submissions and surveying the overall circumstances of this case, this Court would have no hesitation to find that such terms set out in D's proposed undertaking, if implemented, would likewise render the continual erection of the auto-gate substantial interference to Ps use and enjoyment of the vehicular access over the RoW. This Court's discussion over the matters mentioned in paragraphs 36 to 48 above would apply mutatis mutandis in the discussion of this topic here.

88.  The other authorities on the doctrine of "substantial interference" as cited in Mr Chiu’s Skeleton Submission simply cannot salvage D’s case.

89.  The first case is West v Sharp (2000) 79 P&CR 327 (CA). Mr Chiu elicited a general proposition from Mummery LJ’s judgment (at p 332) that there could be no actionable interference with a right of way if it can be substantially and practically exercised as conveniently after as before the alleged obstruction. But that can be of no avail to D.

90.  The analysis in paragraphs 36 to 48 above clearly demonstrates that D’s proposed terms would prevent Ps and their authorized visitors from exercising the vehicular access over RoW as conveniently as they did before the demolition of the 2015 Metal Gate.

91.  Specifically, under the proposed system, the two owners (of the dominant land) in this case left without a remote control access device would be practically and substantially inconvenienced, as they would lack the means to deactivate the automated lock and gain vehicular access or allow their visitors to gain vehicular access at will (such as in the scenario as discussed in paragraph 43 above in contrast with the situation before the demolition of the 2015 Metal Gate). Also, all three of Ps would be facing the constant burden of sharing the sole remote-control device among themselves. Once the device is taken away by another family member, the original holder would be left empty-handed when a need arises.

92.  For similar reason, in relation to the remaining three authorities: (1) Mantec Thoroughbreds Pty Ltd v Batur [2009] VSC 351; (2) Dawes v Adela Estates Ltd (1970) 216 EG 1405; and (3) Kingsgate Development Projects Ltd v Jordan [2017] EWHC 343 (TCC) as cited by Mr Chiu, the legal principles as discussed in those authorities are essentially flowing from the general principles on easements as discussed above, and they can certainly not advance D’s contention any further, let alone their facts are also wholly different from the present case.

D's security concern?

93.  Mr Chiu also submits that there was security concern over D's land (Lot 3326) given the previous incident of criminal damage done to 1995 Metal Gate by an outsider in April 2015 who had dispute with the then 2/F owner of Lot 3319RP[34] and D and her husband were subject to harassment from one Mr Wong of Lot 3320 and Cheung Wah Nin of some neighouring lots.

94.  Be that as it may, D herself could not (nor be allowed by this Court to) improve the security of her land at the expense of the dominant land by such acts done on servient land which would derogate Ps' right of way easement as granted under the Deed of Grant, unlawfully and substantially interfering their use and enjoyment of the vehicular access over the RoW in such ways as explained above.

95.  D had the full knowledge of the circumstantial conditions of the RoW and the terms of the Deed of Grant when she purchased Lot 3326. If the reality behind the erection of the auto-gate (and now with one remote control device proposed to be given to only one of the Ps as user) was out of D's fear or concern of any extra key might fall into the hands of any third party neighour(s) in her mind, what D has done would, regrettably, have crossed the boundary into over-protecting herself by improper and illegitimate means.

96.  Even assuming purely for the sake of argument but not the otherwise that, a third party had really committed an actionable wrong of harassment against her, she is not without redress. She could have sought an injunction against that third party, or against anyone using the RoW without authorisation. She remains at liberty to take appropriate action if the usage of the RoW exceeds what is permitted under the Deed of Grant, when the circumstances warrant.

97.  It is however noted that D never pleaded that Ps acted as nominal plaintiffs for any third party(ies). In fact, all these matters of harassment or illegitimate use of the RoW by third party(ies) from neighbouring lots, were not pleaded by D in her Defence for this Court's adjudication at the trial either.

Point 3

98.  Regarding the second part of relief (b) in the ASOC, which seeks to compel D to restore the RoW to its original state, the real difficulty for Court to grant such order lies in that a small portion of the 2015 Metal Gate's western end already encroached onto the adjacent government footpath. This also holds true for the existing vehicular gate.

99.  In this regard, two photos from the Hearing Bundle showing the entrance of Lot 3326 in 2009 and 2019[35] respectively illustrate this issue. In both instances, a pedestrian gate was erected on the government footpath immediately adjacent to the vehicular gate. The pedestrian gates in the respective photos appear to be of similar width, with their western ends attached to the boundary wall of Lot 3319. This photographic evidence demonstrates that the western end of the 1995 Metal Gate (and likewise the 2015 Metal Gate) sat in a location nearly identical to that of the existing vehicular gate (i.e. the 2019 Metal Gate), meaning that the vehicular gate at the entrance of Lot 3326 all along had encroached onto government land.

100.  This view is reinforced by the Survey Report prepared by Land Marker (1980) HK Co Ltd (D’s expert) which was unchallenged at trial. Para 4.3 of the report states that:-

“At the date of the survey, a vehicular gate and a freestanding wall was erected on the Pathway. This wall was generally erected near the boundary of Lot3326 but has encroached onto Government Land. According to Aerial Photo of year 1994 (Ref. Annex 4A-1), the gate was already existed at least since year 1994, before the grant of the Right of Way. By comparing the Aerial Photos, our surveyed features and the Screen Capture of Google Map Street View, the gate has been in similar location since year 1994 and this gate should comprise of a man gate and a vehicular gate. The man gate shown in April 2009 Google Map appeared to be the same gate as in September 2019 Google Map. It was believed that the man gate has not been replaced during the construction of new walls at Lot3326 and the existing vehicular gate, newly erected next to the man gate, should also be at similar location as that in year 1994.” (emphasis supplied)

101.  In any event, the burden rests on the one who alleges. Apart from the mere assertion made on Ps’ side that the size of 2015 Metal Gate is smaller than the existing vehicular gate, there is no evidence to suggest that the western end of 2015 Metal Gate was not encroaching onto the government path before its demolition.

102.  In other words, by seeking a reinstatement order requiring D to build a new manual metal gate that would encroach onto government land, Ps are prima facie inviting the Court to direct D to commit a trespass, though incidentally. The Court will not grant injunctive relief of this nature under the circumstances of this case, for to do so would put the judicial process into misuse by directing a party to commit a new tort against an innocent third party in purported compliance with an order meant to redress an existing tort.

103.  In these circumstances, the second part of relief (b) cannot be granted. Consequently, in the absence of that order (albeit for reasons other than those as submitted by Mr Chiu), Point 3 does not arise for consideration. For avoidance of doubts, in any event, this Court does not think that the submissions made under Point 3 can prevent this Court from making an order directing the existing vehicular gate be removed so that no part of such gate shall remain on or over any part of the RoW zone, to restrain the unlawful interference with the RoW.

104.  There is a slender receiver post[36] (apparently forming part of the sliding vehicular gate system installed by D in 2019[37]) planted immediately adjacent to the eastern cement post of the pedestrian gate. According to the Appendix 2 plan attached to the ASOC[38] and the two RoW plans annexed to the Judgment (under Annex 2), this receiver post appears to have fallen fully within the government land and outside the RoW zone. While its unauthorized presence may constitute trespass against government land, Ps however lack the locus standi to seek its demolition since it does not obstruct the RoW. Neither did I hear any submissions from Mr Siu that would make this Court think otherwise.

105.  I have not lost sight of the fact that the injunctive reliefs hereby granted by this Court would leave the entrance to the RoW without any vehicular gate, not even a manual one like that existing at the time of the Deed of Grant. However, this is an unavoidable consequence of the dynamic before this Court: Ps have legitimately sought for the removal of the unlawful automated gate (but with no workable terms proposed for reinstatement with a new substitute gate that avoids encroaching onto government land) while D has sought to retain the vehicular gate under conditions that would continue to constitute unlawful and substantial interference with Ps' RoW, which has to be restrained.

106.  The Court sees no security issue that would prevent the injunctive reliefs from being granted either. On the undisputed evidence (and as accepted by this Court), neither the 1995 Metal Gate (which existed at the time of the Deed of Grant) nor the 2015 Metal Gate, were locked at any time, both remained accessible by anyone.[39]

107.  Regarding the costs of installation of the vehicular gate (in 2019), there is no evidence of such costs put forward by D. In any event, it is not a factor that can tilt the balance against making the injunctive reliefs hereby granted, after this Court has further carefully considered the overall circumstances of this case in light of the above analysis.

108.  In these circumstances, this Court sees it just and necessary to grant mandatory injunction ordering D to remove forthwith the existing vehicular gate from the entrance to (at the north-west of) Lot 3326.

109.  Since Mr. Chiu confirmed at the hearing that the automated vehicular gate is a sliding gate that can retract fully into the eastern side of Lot 3326 (as supported by a photograph in the Hearing Bundle[40]), the Court does not see the need to order its immediate demolition in such circumstances after careful consideration over such matter.

110.  D remains at liberty to demolish the vehicular gate (her own property) if she chooses, but that has to be done at her own costs for reasons as explained above. However, the mandatory injunction made by this Court is clear: irrespective of any circumstance, the vehicular gate must be completely removed from the RoW zone at the entrance to Lot 3326, so that no part of such gate shall remain on or over the RoW zone as declared in para 169(1) of the Judgment. On the evidence before this Court, such removal can be and has to be done forthwith.

111.  Furthermore, after carefully considering D's post-judgment conduct, particularly her persistent and unlawful interference with Ps' RoW as found above, this Court is satisfied that a real threat of further infringement remains. In other words, unless restrained by an appropriate prohibitory order, in this Court's view, D will likely continue to obstruct Ps' reasonable use and enjoyment of the RoW.

112.  Although this Court previously indicated in the Judgment that it was not appropriate to make prohibitory injunction against D on the materials then available[41], that does not deprive this Court's jurisdiction to address a fundamental change of circumstances arising post-Judgment.

113.  Importantly, at the Nov 2025 hearing D herself invoked this Court's jurisdiction to consider alleged post-Judgment breaches of the Deed of Grant by Ps (namely, their failure to contribute to government rent) which she relied upon to purportedly suspend their exercise of the RoW. Having brought these post-Judgment dynamics before the Court, and this Court having ruled against D for reasons explained above, the Court must be vested with the judicial power to take into account D's post-Judgment conduct (which constitute fresh actionable torts not previously adjudicated upon) to grant appropriate injunctive remedies, including ancillary prohibitory order, as necessary to protect the integrity of the Court's primary mandatory order and to ensure its effective implementation in the interests of the overall justice of this case.

114.  Nevertheless, since clause 4(d) of the Deed of Grant does permit D to suspend the RoW during any breach of the covenants in clauses 2 and 3 thereof (but on other hand it must not be wrongfully invoked by D to obstruct Ps' legitimate exercise of their easement right to reasonably use and enjoy the RoW as in the present case), a proper balance has to be struck.

115.  Accordingly, this Court would make it clear that the prohibitory orders made herein are without prejudice to D's right to apply to vary such order should any future breaches by Ps truly arise and justify invoking clause 4(d). For the avoidance of doubt, the prohibitory orders are also made without prejudice to D's right to seek a variation in the event the parties may reach an agreement to erect a vehicular gate in accordance with the Deed of Grant in future.

116.  For avoidance of doubts, any such application of variation as mentioned in paragraph 115 above however cannot be made through the term of 'liberty to apply", and it has to be taken out by D by separate originating process should the circumstances arise. For, the Court cannot take up the role of constantly monitoring and supervising the performance of the respective parties' covenants under the Deed of Grant.

117.  Lastly, I have also considered all the other contentions by D, as well as the other authorities and submissions from Mr. Chiu. Those authorities cannot advance D's case any farther, and such other contentions and submissions are either unsupported by effective evidence, neither here nor there, or are otherwise effectively addressed by way of the foregoing analysis. It is therefore unnecessary for this Court to list out and deal with each of them separately, so as to avoid unduly lengthening this Decision.

Disposition

118.  Due to the above reasons, this Court considers it just, necessary, and appropriate to make the following injunctive orders against D, and hereby orders thus:-

(1) a mandatory injunction be granted against D that, she shall remove forthwith the existing vehicular gate from the (north-west) entrance to Lot 3326 so that no part of such gate shall remain on or over any part of the RoW zone ("the RoW zone") as demarcated on the two RoW plans annexed to D’s export report dated 20/10/2021 under “Annex 1A” and “Annex 1A-1” thereto, which are reproduced in the Judgment as Annex 2 ("the RoW plans").

(2) To facilitate the effective implementation of (1) above,

(a) D shall be restrained forthwith from causing permitting or suffering the existing vehicular gate or any part thereof to obstruct or cause any obstruction at or upon or over the RoW (as declared under para 169(1) of the Judgment) whether directly or indirectly, whether by herself or by her agents, workers, employees, or representatives;

(b) D shall be restrained from installing or erecting or permitting or suffering to be installed or erected any new vehicular gate or other erection, fitting, or structure at the current vehicular gate location (as shown on the RoW plans) within the RoW zone, after the removal of the existing vehicular gate as ordered under (1) above, which would obstruct or cause any obstruction at or upon or over the RoW (as declared under para 169(1) of the Judgment) whether directly or indirectly, whether by herself or by her agents, workers, employees, or representatives.

(3) the prohibitory orders mentioned in (2) above are made without prejudice to D's right to apply to vary such orders:

(a) for the purpose of taking enforcement action in relation to clause 4(e) of the Deed of Grant should the need arise and justified by the circumstances arisen in future;

(b) in the event the parties may reach agreement in future for the erection of vehicular gate on the RoW in accordance with the Deed of Grant.

(4) There be liberty to apply in connection with the implementation of the mandatory injunction ordered under (1) above.

Costs

119.  Costs should normally follow the event. Having considered the overall circumstances of this case, this Court see it just and appropriate and hereby make a costs order nisi that D shall pay Ps the costs of and incidental to the Nov 2025 hearing (in relation to the present injunction matter) since the handing down of the Judgment on 15 July 2025 up to 19 November 2025, with certificate to counsel, to be taxed if not agreed.

120.  The aforesaid costs order nisi shall become absolute in the absence of any application within 14 days to vary the same.

121.  Lastly, it remains for me to thank counsel for their assistance rendered to the Court.