TAMANG DHIRENDRA v. TOKO CONSTRUCTION & MACHINERY LTD AND ANOTHER

HCPI 285/2024

[2025] HKCFI 2037

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO 285 OF 2024

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BETWEEN

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DECISION

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1.  The parties disagree on whether to obtain medical expert evidence on quantum by way of a single joint expert or joint medical examination by their separate experts.

Background

2.  As pleaded, the accident happened at the construction site in question (“the Site”) on 15 August 2022 when the then 36-year-old plaintiff was working as a reinforcement bar (or rebar) fixer. The defendants were respectively his employer and head contractor for the work at the time. In the course of transporting a metal rebar manually, the plaintiff allegedly felt sharp pain on his back.

3.  The plaintiff commenced the present action in October 2024 claiming damages for his injuries. Liability and quantum are in dispute. The parties are ad idem on the necessity for orthopaedic expert evidence on quantum. They disagree on whether such evidence should be obtained from a single joint expert or their separate experts.

Obtaining medical expert evidence

4.  That legal practitioners are duty bound to address the issue of obtaining medical expert evidence in a personal injury case at an early stage of the proceedings needs no introduction. This has been the case since the introduction of the current Practice Direction (“PD”) 18.1.

5.  The pre-action protocol under Section B of PD 18.1 provides that, amongst other matters, the claimant’s proposal to the proposed defendant before action may, where appropriate, consist of that for obtaining medical expert evidence (§15). The claimant must consider whether there should be medical examination either by a single joint expert or the parties’ respective experts jointly (§22). Constructive exchange between the parties in respect of the necessity and mode for obtaining medical expert evidence is expected or else either or both may be met with costs sanction eventually.

6.  The rationale was explained by the court in Siu Fook Cheong v Siu Kwok Fai & Anor HCPI 768/2009 (2 February 2010). The protocol will enable the parties to have early access to medical expert opinion to facilitate negotiations for settlement and/or provide material for constructive consideration of the other dispute resolution option. In any event, time will be saved even if litigation cannot be avoided.

7.  The court in Siu Fook Cheong (above) noted the possibility that the parties may be unable to commit on the approach to obtain medical expert evidence at the pre-action stage for good reason. She also made clear that where effort to achieve consensus was not feasible or successful at the pre-action stage, either party shall as soon as possible after the commencement of legal proceedings apply by summons to the master to seek directions in this respect. Where appropriate, this does not have to await the first checklist review hearing.

8.  The approach explained in Siu Fook Cheong (above) was echoed by the court in Fung Chun Man v Hospital Authority & Anor HCPI 1113/2006 (24 June 2011). This was applied on the District Court level as recently explained in Pies, John David v Siu Shiu Keung [2022] HKDC 276.

9.  The parties herein took the opportunity of the first checklist review hearing to seek directions in view of their disagreement as to whether this should be a case for medical examination by a single joint expert or jointly by their respective experts. Where the earliest opportunity of doing so could not practicably be before the first checklist review hearing after the commencement of action, the parties have proceeded properly in the circumstances of the case.

10.  What §22 of PD 18.1 (mentioned above) says are true options, though legal practitioners are aware of the expectation of the court that serious consideration should be had to the option of single joint expert. In Pies, John David (above), the District Court repeated (at §45) the same encouragement to the parties to seriously consider such direction.

11.  A year later, the District Court decided to go further. In Rai Chandra Kala v La Creperie 8 Limited & Anor [2023] HKDC 671, the District Court pronounced the protocol that the parties shall jointly report to the court their single joint medical expert to be appointed; and in the event that the parties fail to agree on such appointment, the parties shall nominate candidates for the court’s selection as the single joint expert (“the DC Protocol”).

12.  Whilst the DC Protocol expressly sought to achieve was to secure the wider use of SJE on the District Court level, impression may arise that the practice in respect of medical expert evidence has since become different between the two levels of court, and seemingly explicably so according to Rai Chandra Kala. If such impression exists, the same perhaps should not remain.

13.  The obtaining of medical expert evidence, amongst other things, is case managed in accordance with the rules of the court and PD. The rules of court governing cases on the Personal Injury List are in the same terms for both levels of court. So are the PDs. Whilst the amount of claim determines the court in which the claim should be lodged, the rules of court and practice in the same terms are applied according to the circumstances of the case, be it before the District Court or the High Court.

14.  O38, r4A of the rules on both levels of court provides:

“(1) In any action in which any question for an expert witness arises, the Court may, at or before the trial of the action, order 2 or more parties to the action to appoint a single joint expert witness to give evidence on that question.

(2) Where the parties cannot agree on who should be the joint expert witness, the Court may–

(a) select the expert witness from a list prepared or identified by the parties; or

(b) direct that the expert witness be selected in such manner as the Court may direct.

(3) Where an order is made under paragraph (1), the Court may give such directions as it thinks fit with respect to the terms and conditions of the appointment of the joint expert witness, including but not limited to the scope of instructions to be given to the expert witness and the payment of the expert witness’s fees and expenses.

(4) Notwithstanding that a party to the action disagrees with the appointment of a single joint expert witness to give evidence, the Court may, subject to paragraph (6), make an order under paragraph (1) if it is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to do so after taking into account all the circumstances of the case.

(5) The circumstances that the Court may take into account include but are not limited to–

(a) whether the issues requiring expert evidence can readily be identified in advance;

(b) the nature of those issues and the likely degree of controversy attaching to the expert evidence in question;

(c) the value of the claim and the importance of the issue on which expert evidence is sought, as compared with the cost of employing separate expert witnesses to give evidence;

(d) whether any party has already incurred expenses for instructing an expert who may be asked to give evidence as an expert witness in the case; and

(e) whether any significant difficulties are likely to arise in relation to–

(i) the choosing of the joint expert witness;

(ii) the drawing up of his instructions; or

(iii) the provision to him of the information and other facilities needed to perform his duties.

(6) Where a party to the action disagrees with the appointment of a single joint expert witness to give evidence, the Court shall not make an order under paragraph (1) unless the party has been given a reasonable opportunity to appear before the Court and to show cause why the order should not be made.

(7) Where the Court is satisfied that an order made under paragraph (1) is inappropriate, it may set aside the order and allow the parties concerned to appoint their own expert witnesses to give evidence.”

15.  §§89-90 of PD 18.1 echo that:

“(4) Single Joint Expert

89. In appropriate cases, the Court may give directions for the appointment of a single joint expert (see RHC, Order 38, rule 4A).

90. If it is anticipated that a single joint expert is appropriate in the light of the considerations identified in RHC, Order 38, rule 4A(5), the direction of the PI Judge or PI Master should be sought as soon as possible and preferably not later than the first Check List Review Hearing.”

16.  O38, r4A and PD 18.1 make clear several pre-requisites.

17.  First, where medical expert evidence is necessary, it is the discretion of the court to direct such evidence to be obtained from a single joint expert.

18.  Second, directions for the appointment of a single joint expert will be given in appropriate cases. Pursuant to O38, r4A(4), this is when the court is satisfied that it is interests of justice to do so after taking into account all the circumstances of the case. Such circumstances shall include but not be limited to those set out under O38, r4A(5).

19.  Third, where a party opposes the appointment of a single joint expert, the court pursuant to O38, r4A(6) shall not give such direction unless the party has been given a reasonable opportunity to be heard on why the direction should not be given.

20.  These rules of court and provisions in PD 18.1 prescribe how the court approaches any disagreement before exercising discretion to direct for medical expert evidence to be obtained from a single joint expert. They apply to both levels of court.

21.  The DC Protocol was introduced in the form of specific standard directions. Albeit said to be proposed, the standard directions, this court understands, have since been applied across the board in personal injury cases on the District Court level. The standard directions came in numerous paragraphs, which start by directing the parties to jointly report to the court the name of the single joint expert agreed by the parties; failing which they shall submit candidates amongst which the court will select and appoint as the single joint expert. Directions consequential upon such appointment, be that agreed by the parties or made by the court, follow.

22.  As such, impression may be had that the DC Protocol marks the default position, that is where medical expert evidence is necessary, the parties would have to proceed on the basis of a single joint expert, and the court would be prepared to address only the choice of such expert or the terms of the instruction to such expert. Insofar as any impression legal practitioners may possess to such effect in handling their cases and advising their clients in the District Court, this stands to be clarified. This does not sit well with the rules of court and provisions in PD 18.1 set out above. Nor does this sit well with the reasoning explained by the court when introducing the DC Protocol.

23.  When introducing the DC Protocol, the court in Rai Chandra Kala actually referred to O38, r4A and PD 18.1 discussed above. On such basis, he continued with the question of what the appropriate cases of a single joint expert are, and commented that most of the cases on the Personal Injury List on the District Court, in terms of the value of the claim, seriousness of the injuries and complexity of the case, fall within such category. Empirically this observation is understandable. However this should not be taken to suggest that personal injury cases being within the District Court jurisdiction are therefore appropriate cases for the purpose of O38, r4A. The same may also be said in respect of the personal injury cases in the High Court, which per se do not negate their appropriateness for single joint expert. All depends on the circumstances of the case including those set out under O38, r4A(5).

24.  As such, consideration of the appropriateness of appointing a single joint expert does not embark with a default position as a matter of case management. Impression or mindset may be had that the court favours the appointment of a single joint expert whenever it is appropriate to do so. For that the case management directions may also be coached in terms of requiring the parties to show why such appointment is not appropriate in the case. Yet these do not suggest a preset outcome due to predisposition on the part of the court.

25.  The parties in genuine disagreement on obtaining medical expert evidence from a single joint expert are entitled to expect to be heard pursuant to O38, r4A(6). Whether or not the opposing party(ies) would be able to show why single joint expert is not appropriate in the case begins as a matter of assessment of the merit. The court will hear before exercising discretion in this respect. It goes without saying that wholly unmeritorious argument, albeit as a matter of case management, may entail adverse costs consequence. Judgment call is therefore still required.

26.  There is a possible exception. This is where it is a true low value claim, ie far below the upper limit of the monetary jurisdiction of the District Court (such as a claim below HK$1 million) involving claim for general damages for pain and suffering and special damages but none for loss of earnings. This may happen in case of a person returning to his pre-accident job after sick leave or a retiree of advanced age with no realistic income prospect, for instance. Even if the claim is not settled and thus avoiding costs escalating out of proportion, there will be serious doubt about the necessity or, if necessary, justification for separate medical experts for the case to continue its course. Subject to the other circumstances, there is probably no reason why such a case may not be case managed on a fast track to trial or, even more preferably, to other dispute resolution option. What shape this fast track should take should perhaps be discussed at another opportunity.

27.  With the above sorted out, I proceed to consider the circumstances of the present case.

Circumstances of the present case

28.  The plaintiff argues that this is not an appropriate case for obtaining the necessary orthopaedic expert evidence from a single joint expert for the following reasons:

(1) The issue requiring expert evidence is a complex one, and opting for a joint medical examination is beneficial to the outcome of the case.

(2) A joint medical examination does not incur unreasonable extra cost, and the expected fees involved in the exercise is proportionate to the expected damages recoverable by the plaintiff.

(3) The present case is still in an early case management stage. A joint medical examination will not affect any milestone date or prolong any trial.

29.  The plaintiff argues that his injuries are complicated and likely controversial so that appointing a single joint expert may result in the need for further medical expert opinion in the future. Instructing separate experts for joint examination, it is argued, would avoid such additional future costs.

30.  I am skeptical about the validity of the argument.

31.  Statement of damages has been filed, with the treatment records and reports disclosed.

32.  The plaintiff went to the Accident & Emergency Department (“AED”) Department of a government hospital for treatment after the accident on the same day. At the AED, the plaintiff mainly complained about low back pain. He was able to walk unaided with a steady gait. Bilateral lower limbs had full power without sensation deficit. No deformity of the lumbar spine was detected. L4-5 and paraspinal muscle showed midline tenderness. X-ray of the lumbosacral spine showed no active bony lesion. Bone alignment was intact, and disc spaces were satisfactory. There was neither vertebral collapse nor bony fracture. For his back sprain, analgesic was prescribed, and the plaintiff was discharged with sick leave.

33.  The plaintiff visited another general outpatient clinic 4 days later, complaining about low back pain with radiating numbness to the right leg. Examination showed similar tenderness locality and spasm, but range of back movement was satisfactory without limb neurology. Stronger analgesics was prescribed with extension of sick leave.

34.  Private MRI was done in early September 2022, which showed lumbar spondylosis with desiccated L3/4 and L4/5 discs as well as diffuse disc bulging at L4/5 with central spinal stenosis and narrowing of bilateral neural foramina. Bone edema was noted at the right L4 and bilateral L5 pedicles. Midline subcutaneous edema was also noted at L2 to L5.

35.  The plaintiff started physiotherapy first in the private and then the public sector in September 2022. Orthopaedic follow-up and physiotherapy continued. By the end of 2022, the plaintiff rated his improvement at 20% with degree of pain at 6/10 and walking tolerance of up to 15 minutes.

36.  Occupational therapy started in early 2023. The plaintiff complained about persistent pain on his low back, which would be aggravated by back movements in all directions, standing for over 2-3 minutes and walking for 15-20 minutes. He was considered to be not fit to resume working. Medical improvement was believed to have reached its maximum, and prognosis was poor.

37.  Another private MRI was done in February 2023, which showed moderate lumbar spondylosis with mild lumbar scoliosis, minimal retrolisthesis of L5 on S1, severe bilateral lateral recess narrowing at L4/5 compressing the bilateral descending L5 nerve roots, severe bilateral L4/5 exit foraminal narrowing compressing the bilateral exiting L4 nerve roots and mild subcutaneous edema at the posterior aspect of lumbar spine.

38.  While the plaintiff made arrangement for further physiotherapy, he also consulted private orthopaedic surgeon in April 2023. Only mild improvement was reported after pain treatment. The complaint about similar back symptoms was recorded by the government hospital later in the year.

39.  The plaintiff’s subjective complaints about persistent low back pain and radiating impact on his lower limb were documented in the above medical records and reports of the treating AED, physiotherapist and occupational therapist. The findings were most notably set out in the MRI report in September 2022, and were brought up to date by the MRI in February 2023. Whether and, if yes, how these MRI findings correlate with the clinical findings of the treating doctors and the medical expert to be instructed in explanation of the complaints of the plaintiff will be a matter for the expert.

40.  Those acting for the plaintiff essentially repeat the above circumstances as if they connote complexity. They do not. Those acting for the plaintiff are expected to be able to articulate their basis with reference to specific concern or issue already discernable from the known personal history of the plaintiff, the treatment medical records and reports as well as the examination findings. The concern or issue, for instance, may have to do with medical causation or seriousness of impairment or residual disabilities or debatable assessment methodologies. The concern or issue must be such that the court would probably feel assisted by the presentation of opinion in respect of it from different medical experts or even debate between them. There is also on this basis the likelihood of such debate being directed to be tested by cross examination of the experts at trial.

41.  Those acting for the plaintiff point to a high likelihood of controversy, again without actually articulating the basis for such projection. That either party or even both parties turn out to be dissatisfied with the single joint expert opinion is no more than perception or speculation before the opinion has been rendered. Subjective dissatisfaction with the expert assessment rendered could come fairly easily. Yet neither such possibility nor reality suffices in preferring separate experts. Experience tells that even in the case of separate experts, a plaintiff could turn out to disagree with the opinion of the expert engaged on his behalf.

42.  That different experts, if instructed from the outset, may come up with different opinion does not suffice. As discussed, it is the complexity which justifies the value of opinion obtained from, and debate between, separate medical experts. The reality that separate specialists, if consulted, may come up with different assessment and opinion regarding the situation of a patient is not necessarily surprising. However what must be guarded against is any assumption or understanding, even subconsciously, that some kind of attention or skepticism on the mind of the expert is expected in view of which side of the litigation his brief comes from. It should by now be registered on the mind of litigants that expert is there to provide his opinion to assist the court instead of securing and maximizing or avoiding and minimizing a claim. The court should expect no occasion for reservation about whether the experts equally possess such proper mindset. With that as his sole purpose in the litigation, the expert is expected to discharge his duty to the court professionally and impartially, and his opinion trusted by both sides to be non-partisan. Hence value of such opinion to the court.

43.  It is argued that instructing separate experts for joint examination and report would reduce the likelihood of requiring further or additional expert opinion in the future.

44.  The discussion above refers. Further, the principles governing the change of expert have been explained in detail by the court: see Law Chung Fai by his next friend Luk Siu Mui v Lam Ming Kuen HCPI 96/2008 (13 September 2010) at §9 (applied in Ho Yat Wah v Chung Hang Him, the sole executrix named in the will of Madam Chan Yuk Mui, deceased, HCA 731/2014 (7 June 2018) at §2). Normally, the court expects to see fundamental problems in the expert’s methodology, objectiveness or professionalism in rendering his opinion evidence before concluding in favour of the change sought.

45.  In the specific context of change of expert after obtaining single joint expert evidence, the circumstances pertinent to the exercise of the discretion to direct for a single joint expert in the first place remain relevant. The court must consider all the circumstances including the value of the case, the nature and importance of the issues for expert opinion, the effect of granting leave, now for change of expert, on the conduct of the legal proceedings and delay as well as any other special circumstances. At the end, overall justice of the case is the key: see for instance Daniels v Walker [2000] 1 WLR 1382; Cosgrove v Pattinson [2001] CP Rep 68; Bulic v Hardwoods [2012] EWHC 3657 QB; Hinson v Hare Realizations Ltd [2020] EWHC 2386 QB for reference, albeit in the English context.

46.  It is therefore not merely the likelihood of the need but also justification for further or new expert opinion after a single joint expert report which matter. The burden of substantiating that is not expected to be light. Therefore, an alternative, if not an attempt invariably expected of the parties, will be to first consider applying for leave to seek clarification from the single joint expert in respect of his opinion in his report or draft report. This is similar to the step permitted under the Civil Procedure Rules 35.6 in the English jurisdiction.

47.  Those acting for the plaintiff do not come close to demonstrating any basis for the alleged likelihood of need for further expert opinion or change of expert, let alone the difficulty if such likelihood materializes, in the future.

48.  Reference is made to the cost and time involved in obtaining opinion from separate experts. Essentially it is said that there should be no real concern about proportionality in view of the value of the claim and the early stage of the proceedings in the present case.

49.  Costs and time may not factor as serious concern in weighing the proportionality at the present stage. However they do not therefore feature as favouring separate experts, when the court must take into account all the circumstances including those set out under O38, r4A(5) in exercising the discretion. The question pursuant to O38, r4A(4) is whether it is in the interests of justice to direct for the appointment of a single joint expert after taking into account all the circumstances of the case. It is not whether the parties should be given the liberty to instruct separate experts, as that is affordable in terms of cost and time.

Conclusion

50.  All the circumstances considered, I do not agree that it is inappropriate to direct for the appointment of a single joint expert on quantum in the present case.

Choice of single joint expert

51.  The parties have respectively proposed 2 candidates for appointment. The candidates are seen to have been frequently instructed as orthopaedic experts in personal injury litigation, and their charges are relatively close. Notably those acting for the defendants indicated during the hearing their willingness to accept, subject to the court, one of the 2 candidates proposed by the plaintiff. I see no reason why selecting this expert whom both sides are prepared to instruct should not be appropriate.

Directions in respect of medical expert evidence

52.  The court in Chen Muchao v Eagle Sun Engineering Limited & Anor [2025] HKCFI 2688 handed down 2 days ago advocated that the court and the legal practitioners should now seriously consider appointing single joint experts instead of separate experts at an early stage of proceedings in personal injuries in the High Court. By the time of this decision, legal practitioners may have noticed that both levels of court in case managing personal injury cases have in fact already started giving directions in respect of medical expert evidence along the terms set out below since late March this year. A key feature is to ensure due process in the case management and exercise of discretion in this respect in line with the statutory framework explained above. The directions serve as template, which the case managing court may adjust to suit the requirements of the circumstances of the case in hands.

“1. On or before __________ / Within _____ days from the date hereof, the parties do jointly write to the Court in respect of the following:

(1) state whether medical expert evidence is necessary[1] and, if yes, the relevant discipline(s);

(2) state whether it is appropriate to obtain medical expert evidence of the relevant discipline from a single joint expert (SJE) and, if not, why not;

(3) where the parties fail to agree in respect of (1) and/or (2) above, state the parties’ respective stances with succinct submissions;

(4) for the above purpose:

(a) identify the SJE, if agreed;

(b) if the parties disagree on the choice of SJE, nominate __ candidate(s) each for selection together with their respective (i) curriculum vitae; (ii) fees; (iii) earliest dates for the examination; (iv) time when the SJE report is expected to be ready; or alternatively propose any other manner in which the SJE may be selected;

(c) insofar as it is practicable, in any event identify the experts proposed by the parties respectively on the basis that the Court, if so decides, may direct for joint medical examination by their respective experts.

2. Unless otherwise directed, the Court will determine on paper without oral hearing:

(1) whether medical expert evidence is necessary; and

(2) if yes, whether to grant leave to adduce medical expert evidence from the SJE agreed by the parties or selected by the Court (as the case may be) or alternatively from the separate experts proposed by the parties respectively for joint medical examination;

3. Upon determination pursuant to §2 above, and within ______ days thereafter, the parties shall issue joint letter of instruction to the medical expert(s), in which case:

(1) PD18.1 §§76; 79-80; 85 shall be complied with.

(2) without prejudice to PD 18.1 §§86-87, where pre-existing condition is involved, the medical expert(s) should be instructed to advise:

(a) which of the 3 scenarios the case falls into, namely:

(i) the plaintiff would have gone through life unaffected by the pre-existing condition;

(ii) there is a strong possibility that some other event or natural progression of the condition would have brought about the present condition; and

(iii) this would have certainly occurred at some stage in any event; and

(b) in the event of (a)(ii) and (iii) above, when this would have occurred, and how the expert(s) would apportion the impact of the pre-existing condition and that of the accident complained of on the plaintiff’s current condition.

4. Where the parties fail to agree on the terms of the joint letter of instruction, they shall within the time under §3 above jointly write to seek direction or approval by the Court, and for such purpose, identify their disagreement. Unless otherwise directed, the Court will determine and give direction on paper without oral hearing.

5. Within _____ days from the issuance of the joint letter of instruction to the medical expert(s), the parties shall jointly report to the Court in writing:

(1) the date of the examination by the SJE and the date when the SJE report will be ready, which, unless otherwise directed, shall conform to the information provided pursuant to §1(4)(b) above;

(2) in the case of joint medical examination by the parties’ respective medical experts, the date of the examination and the expected date when the joint medical expert report will be ready, which, unless otherwise directed, shall not exceed 56 days from the date of joint examination;

(3) the date when the SJE report or joint medical expert report will be lodged, which, unless otherwise directed, shall be no later than ___ days after the report has been received.

6. There shall be no unilateral communication between any party and the medical expert(s).

7. Without prejudice to PD 18.1 §77, the court shall be informed immediately (and in any event no later than 5 days) of non-compliance with any of the above directions.

8. No further or additional medical expert report shall be obtained or adduced without leave of the Court.

9. For the avoidance of doubt, whether the medical expert report obtained as aforesaid shall be adduced without oral evidence is reserved and, where appropriate, be determined at the adjourned Checklist Review Hearing.”

Order

53.  In the present case, the following directions are given:

(1) There be leave to the parties to obtain and to adduce medical expert evidence from a single joint orthopaedic expert, namely Dr Terence Chan (“the Expert”).

(2) Within 14 days from the date hereof, the parties shall issue joint letter of instruction to the Expert, and:

(a) PD18.1 §§76; 79-80; 85 shall be complied with;

(b) without prejudice to PD 18.1 §§86-87, where pre-existing condition is involved, the Expert should be instructed to advise:

(i) which of the 3 scenarios the case falls into, namely:

a. the plaintiff would have gone through life unaffected by the pre-existing condition;

b. there is a strong possibility that some other event or natural progression of the condition would have brought about the present condition; and

c. this would have certainly occurred at some stage in any event; and

(ii) in the event of (i)b or (i)c above, when this would have occurred, and how the Expert would apportion the impact of the pre-existing condition and that of the accident complained of on the plaintiff’s current condition.

(3) Where the parties fail to agree on the terms of the joint letter of instruction, they shall within the time under (2) above jointly write to seek direction or approval by the court, and for such purpose, identify their disagreement. Unless otherwise directed, the court will determine and give direction on paper without oral hearing.

(4) Within 7 days from the issuance of the joint letter of instruction to the medical expert(s), the parties shall jointly report to the Court in writing:

(a) the date of the examination by the Expert and the date when the Expert report will be ready, which, unless otherwise directed, shall not exceed 56 days from the date of examination;

(b) the date when the Expert’s report will be lodged, which, unless otherwise directed, shall be no later than 28 days after the report has been received.

(5) Time shall run during court vacation.

(6) There shall be no unilateral communication between any party and the Expert.

(7) Without prejudice to PD 18.1 §77, the court shall be informed immediately (and in any event no later than 5 days) of non-compliance with any of the above directions.

(8) No further or additional medical expert report shall be obtained or adduced without leave of the court.

(9) For the avoidance of doubt, whether the Expert report obtained as aforesaid shall be adduced without oral evidence is reserved.

(10) Liberty to apply in respect of the above.

Costs

54.  As mentioned, the parties rightly took the first opportunity to bring their disagreement in respect of the appointment of medical expert to the court, which this court seizes as the opportunity for the above discussion. In the circumstances, costs of and occasioned by the checklist review hearing and the present argument should be in the cause. So I order.