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HCAL 441/2026
[2026] HKCFI 3050
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 441 OF 2026
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BETWEEN
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Singgon Rahima Manzala |
Applicant |
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and |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board |
Putative |
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Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative |
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Interested Party |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the name of the putative interested party be amended to “Director of Immigration”.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 23 February 2026, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 16 July 2025 (“the Board’s Decision”). The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2026/HCAL000441_2026_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Accordingly, the Board confirmed the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 14 February 2025, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
Amendments
3. The applicant named the Board as both the putative respondent and the putative interested party in Form 86 and spelt the Board’s name wrong.
4. In fact, the Board should only be named as the putative respondent and the Director should be named as the putative interested party.
5. Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the name of the putative interested party to “Director of Immigration”.
Late application
6. By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, the applicant had to make the Leave Application within 3 months when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when the Board’s Decision was made.
7. However, the applicant filed her Form 86 on 23 February 2026, which was more than 7 months after the Board’s Decision (made on 16 July 2025). The applicant was hence late for more than 4 months in making the Leave Application.
8. This court has to consider whether the time for the applicant to make the Leave Application should be extended taking into account of the criteria laid down in AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393, which are:
(i) the length of the delay;
(ii) the reason for the delay;
(iii) the merits of the intended application; and
(iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public administration.
9. The applicant did not make any application for extension of time and provided no explanation for the delay in making the Leave Application.
10. A delay of more than 4 months is substantial, and there is simply no reason for this court to grant an extension of time for the applicant to file the Leave Application when no explanation was given. More importantly, there is no merits in the Leave Application at all as discussed below.
11. Having considered the above criteria, this court is not prepared to grant any extension of time to the applicant to file the Leave Application, even if an application for extension of time was made. The Leave Application can therefore be dismissed on the ground of being made out of time alone.
12. However, for the sake of completeness, this court will consider the merits of the Leave Application as discussed below.
The applicant’s case
13. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
14. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to the Philippines, she would be at risk of being harmed or killed by her partner Mr WILFREDO DELA CRUZ JR. (“the Partner”), as she had a boyfriend in Hong Kong.
Disposal on paper
15. The applicant did not request for an oral hearing of the Leave Application. This court is also satisfied that the Leave Application can be disposed of based on the written materials before this court. Thus, the Leave Application is dealt with on paper.
Grounds for judicial review
16. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
17. The applicant did not advance any ground for her intended judicial review in Form 86, nor in her supporting affidavit dated 23 February 2026. She merely stated in her affidavit that she did not want to go back to her country because her life was still in danger, she would go back soon if her life was safe.
Discussion
18. First of all, the applicant’s alleged danger in her country had already been assessed but rejected by the Board. If she intends to challenge the Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an application for judicial review.
19. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness, or irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).
20. Thus, despite the fact that the applicant did not advance any valid ground for the intended judicial review, this court will scrutinize the Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness, or irrationality as aforesaid.
21. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an oral hearing on 8 May 2025. The applicant was thus given the chance to present her case to the Board in person.
22. The Board had laid out its findings on the credibility of the applicant and her claims in paragraphs 34 to 38 of the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary to repeat the same here.
23. In gist, the Board found that the applicant had not provided any evidence to support her claim. It was not suggested that the Partner intended to kill the applicant. The Partner no longer exerted any domestic violence on the applicant since mid-2018. Regarding the threats by the Partner on the applicant’s love relationship in Hong Kong, the Partner only verbally threatened the applicant once in March 2022, and they had maintained no contact afterwards. The applicant had never reported the domestic violence or the verbal threats by the Partner to the police in the Philippines. The harm by the Partner was not as real and imminent as the applicant had asserted, and the Board noted that the frequency and intensity had been low.
24. The Board found that the Partner was a non-state actor and he had not harmed or threatened the applicant to the requisite severity to warrant international protection. There was no evidence of state acquiescence in the applicant’s private dispute with the Partner. There was also no evidence that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution for one or more of the Convention reasons.
25. Moreover, the Board found from reliable country of origin information (“COI”) that reasonable state protection would be available to the applicant.
26. The Board also discussed in paragraphs 87 to 93 of the Board’s Decision the viability of internal relocation for the applicant. The Board found that the applicant would be able to re-establish herself in her home state or elsewhere in the Philippines to avoid any perceived harm from the Partner, and it would be highly unlikely for the Partner to locate the applicant in such a vast country, in case he would.
27. Thus, the Board found that the applicant was not at a real risk of being tortured, ill-treated, persecuted or arbitrarily deprived of his life upon refoulement. The Board found that the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all the applicable grounds under the USM.
28. The finding of facts relating to a non-refoulement claim, including the assessment of evidence, COI and risk of harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board in dealing with the applicant’s appeal/petition. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way the Board reached its decision.
29. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof. The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its decision.
30. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence leave must be refused.
Conclusion
31. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed for being made out of time and also for lack of merits.
Dated the 27th day of May 2026
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( Gladys LEE )
for Registrar, High Court
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Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
Notes for the applicant:
If leave has been granted, the applicant or the applicant’s solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent/Handed to the applicant/the applicant’s solicitors on: 27/05/2026
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil |
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Sent/Handed to the putative respondent / the putative respondent’s solicitors / such putative interested parties as may be directed by the Court / the putative interested parties’ solicitors on: 27/05/2026
Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 25720
Director of Immigration
Putative interested party’s ref. no.:
QA T/C 2350/24 (Formerly RBCZ 5001866/24)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
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