LATIF MOHAMMAD ABDUL v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

CACV 246/2018

[2019] HKCA 1171

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 246 OF 2018

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 1003/2017)

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JUDGMENT

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Hon Lam VP (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 28 June 2019, the Court (Lam VP and Barma JA) handed down a judgment ([2019] HKCA 701) dismissing the applicant’s summons for relief in respect of an unless order. One of the reasons for refusal of relief was that the appeal was brought in respect of the refusal to extend time to apply for judicial review which is an interlocutory order. By reason of Section 14AA of the High Court Ordinance, leave to appeal should be sought before the appeal can be entertained. Given the obvious abuse of process (this being a second application for judicial review in respect of the same decision), leave would not be granted: see paragraph 10(d) of the judgment.

2.  By a notice of motion filed on 2 July 2019, the applicant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the judgment.

3.  It was stated in his notice of motion that the Court was wrong in holding that there was no substance in his claim.   The applicant also mentioned the poor performance of his legal representative and reiterated his complaint about the insufficient time for him to prepare for the hearing before the Torture Claims Appeal Board.

4.  In his affirmation dated 2 July 2019, the applicant deposed that the Court was wrong in holding that there was no state acquiescence or involvement and that it failed to find out the details of the current situation in Bangladesh. 

5.  In his written submission lodged on 2 August 2019, the applicant set out the background of his case, and cited authorities for the propositions that high standards of fairness were required in the determination of a torture claim and that there were minimum standards of procedural fairness at common law.

6.  The Department of Justice, acting for the Director of Immigration, lodged a written submission on 15 August 2019 opposing this application.

7.  Since the appeal could not be brought without Section 14AA leave and the leave was not obtained, there could not be further appeal by reason of Section 14AB of the High Court Ordinance which provides that the refusal of Section 14AA leave by the Court of Appeal is final.

8.  Further, by reason of the duplication of proceedings, the present set of proceedings is obviously an abuse of process, see para 10(c) of the judgment.  The applicant does not advance any argument in this respect.

9.  Accordingly, we dismiss the application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.