NORMAN GUY DONALD, ONE OF THE JOINT AND SEVERAL ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF LI SING KUI, DECEASED v. LAI KAR YAN (DEREK), ONE OF THE JOINT AND SEVERAL ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF LI SING KUI, DECEASED AND OTHERS

HCMP 1575/2025

[2026] HKCFI 4065

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1575 OF 2025

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DECISION

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Introduction

1.  These proceedings concern the estate of the late Mr Li Sing Kui.  The plaintiff, Mr Guy Norman, is one of the two joint and several administrators of the estate.  The other administrator is Mr Derek Lai, the 1^st defendant here.  At the time of their appointment in July 2019 and until early December 2024, the plaintiff and the 1^st defendant were partners of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, a well-known audit firm. The 1^st defendant resigned from the firm in early December 2024.

2.  This is the first hearing of the originating summons issued on 12 September 2025.  The plaintiff asks for an order that the 1^st defendant be removed as administrator and Mr Ivan Chan be appointed in his place and seeks consequential orders.  Chan is a partner of Deloitte.

3.  Notwithstanding that the 1^st defendant indicated in his acknowledgment of service that he would contest these proceedings, he has now confirmed in writing that he would not oppose the application.

4.  A majority of beneficiaries have indicated that they either consent, or have no objection, to the application.  The only objecting beneficiary is Mr Li Pak Huen, who is named the 2^nd defendant here as beneficiary of the estate of Li Pak Wing, and the 3^rd defendant in his personal capacity. 

5.  The 4^th, 5^th and 6^th defendants are beneficiaries who do not object to the application but have not provided their written consent to the plaintiff.  For that reason, they have been joined as defendants here.

6.  With prior leave of the court, the 1^st, 4^th, 5^th and 6^th defendants were excused from attending the first hearing.

7.  On 29 June 2026, the parties applied by way of consent summons for leave to Pak Huen to file a further affidavit to respond to certain matters raised in the plaintiff’s 2^nd affidavit filed on 12 February 2026.  They also asked for the originating summons to be adjourned for substantive argument and the first hearing to be vacated. 

8.  On 2 July 2026, by letter to the parties, the court expressed the view that the filing of further affidavit would seem disproportionate as the subject matter of the application is not complicated.  The court directed that the first hearing do stand and the parties should lodge submissions if substantive reliefs were to be sought at the hearing. 

9.  Pursuant to these directions, the plaintiff lodged written submissions indicating that he would seek substantive reliefs at the hearing. Pak Huen lodged his submissions maintaining his position that leave should be given to him to file further evidence pursuant to what had been agreed in the consent summons.  Alternatively, if that is not accepted, he asks the court to dismiss the originating summons.

10.  At the hearing, the plaintiff was represented by Ms Bonnie Cheng, SC and Mr Keith Chan.  Pak Huen was represented by Mr Samson Hung and Ms Virginia Leung. 

Background

11.  The deceased passed away in 1955.  Despite the very long time since his demise, the administration of the estate has not yet been completed.

12.  The estate has been the subject of various litigation, one of which led to the appointment of the plaintiff and the 1^st defendant as administrators. 

13.  In 2017, three beneficiaries of the estate commenced proceedings in HCMP 1836/2017 seeking the removal of the then executrix.  By a judgment handed down on 26 April 2019 ([2019] HKCFI 1086), B Chu J granted the application.  She further directed that the executrix should be replaced by “another independent professional administrator”.  She gave the parties 28 days to agree on “such independent professional administrator”: see paras 153 and 154. 

14.  Notwithstanding that her Ladyship appeared to have in mind a single professional administrator, on 12 July 2019, she made an order by consent that the plaintiff and the 1^st defendant be appointed as joint and several administrators of the estate.

15.  It is not disputed that since their appointment, the administrators’ modus operandi is that the plaintiff has the primary conduct of administering the estate and is responsible for its day-to-day management.  The 1^st defendant had played a limited role and had only charged an immaterial amount of time for discrete tasks, such as swearing affidavits. 

16.  On 2 December 2024, the 1^st defendant resigned from Deloitte.  He has since joined Ernst & Young, a competitor firm.  There are ongoing legal proceedings between him and Deloitte in relation to his resignation in HCCL 7/2024.  

17.  On the same day, the 1^st defendant signed a notice indicating that he wished to resign as administrator of the estate, and that he would consent to an application for an order to give effect to his resignation. 

Legal principles

18.  Section 33(3) of the Probate and Administration Ordinance, Cap 10, provides:

“The court may, if satisfied that the due and proper administration of the estate and the interests of the persons beneficially entitled thereto so require, suspend or remove an executor or administrator (other than the Official Administrator) and provide for the succession of another person in place of such executor or administrator and for the vesting in that other person of any property belonging to the estate.”

19.  For the applicable principles, see, eg, the summary in para 36 of B Chu J’s removal judgment, which I reproduce below:

(1)     When deciding whether to remove an administrator, the proper question to ask is whether the removal is necessary for the due and proper administration of the estate and whether it is in the interests of the beneficiaries for the administrator to be removed.

(2)     It is not necessary to establish specific wrongdoing, misconduct or fault on the part of an administrator before he can be removed, although obviously wrongdoing, misconduct or fault would be relevant considerations.

(3)     The court should also have regard to the size of the estate, the nature of the assets to be administered, and the background, education, training and experience of the remaining personal representatives (if any).

Discussion

20.  In my view, it is a clear case where the proposed removal and substitution should be granted as it is necessary for the due and proper administration of the estate and is in the interests of the beneficiaries.  I have come to this view for the following reasons.

21.  First, the justification for the removal and substitution is the resignation of the 1^st defendant from Deloitte. That justification is self-evidently sound. 

22.  In July 2019, the plaintiff and the 1^st defendant were appointed by the court by reason of their professional qualifications and experiences in administration of estates.  As remarked above, while the judge initially appeared to have in mind the appointment of a single administrator, two joint and several administrators were appointed in the end.  This would seem to be in line with the observation made in Re Estate of Lam Kam Wai[2023] 1 HKLRD 277, [2022] HKCFI 3653 that it is a common practice for the big audit firms to put forward two persons to act as joint administrators when they are engaged to act as administrator, and the two administrators will be considered as one professional administrator: see para 16. 

23.  It was in these circumstances that the plaintiff and the 1^st defendant were appointed.  Now that the 1^st defendant has resigned from the firm, it seems to me to be amply reasonable for the plaintiff to put forward another person from the same firm as a replacement such that the status quo of having two professionals from the same firm acting as the administrators would continue.

24.  Second, it is in the interests of the administration of the estate to retain the above status quo of having two administrators, as opposed to just one. 

25.  As will be seen below, one of the objections raised by Pak Huen is that even if (which is not accepted by him) the 1^st defendant should be removed, it is wholly unnecessary for a substitute administrator to be appointed, given that the plaintiff has been having primary conduct of the administration. 

26.  I do not agree with that.  In this regard, the court should take into account the size and nature of the estate and the specific works that are required to be undertaken, and consider what would work best from the perspective of properly administering it.  The estate is a large one.  It is worth over HK$500 million.  Its most valuable asset is the mansion house at 15 Robinson Road, Hong Kong.  The estate is the subject of a number of contentious legal proceedings, including:

(1)     an application by the administrators for the sale of the mansion house in HCMP 1836/2017, which was opposed by Pak Huen, and the decision was appealed against by him all the way up to the Court of Final Appeal, where his application for leave to appeal was dismissed;

(2)     an application by the administrators in HCMP 610/2021 for the court’s determination on whether the clause providing for “Ching Sheung” (蒸嘗) purposes of ancestral worship in the will was void, which decision was also appealed against by Pak Huen, with the Court of Appeal dismissing his appeal and his application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal; and

(3)     more recently, an action brought by Pak Huen in HCA 124/2025 claiming adverse possession of some parts of the mansion house, which is currently the subject matter of a striking out application.

27.  It is therefore apparent that the administration of the estate is a complex one.  It is true that the plaintiff has been responsible for the day-to-day conduct, with the 1^st defendant playing a very limited role.  And this fact has led Pak Huen to argue that there is no need to replace the 1^st defendant in the circumstances.  On this, the plaintiff explained why there is such a need in his affidavit:

“The fact that I am the person primarily responsible for the management of the Estate or that tasks previously undertaken by Mr Lai could have been conducted by me does not support Pak Huen’s position. The purpose of having two administrators is to ensure continuity in the administration of the Estate to the benefit of the Estate and its beneficiaries; if I become unavailable to administer the Estate for any reason, the second administrator (Mr Lai and thereafter Mr Chan) can readily step in and ensure that the administration of the Estate is not disrupted. This is sensible and prudent especially in a case such as the present, where the Estate is complex and its administration is highly contentious with various ongoing contentious proceedings all of which contain time-sensitive Court deadlines.”

28.  I accept that explanation.  It is self-evident that the arrangement to continue to have two administrators with the plaintiff taking a primary role and the other being in a position to step in when needed is a sensible and prudent course to take.

29.  Third, once it is recognised that two administrators should remain in place, it is clear to me that the court should accede to the plaintiff’s request that another individual from Deloitte should be appointed.  It would not be in the best interests of the administration of the estate to keep the 1^st defendant as administrator after he joined another firm.

30.  As will be seen below, Pak Huen takes the view that the 1^st defendant can remain as a co-administrator notwithstanding his resignation.

31.  In principle, it is a possible option.  The appointment of administrator is a personal one.  It is the individual, not the firm, who is appointed.  As such, as a matter of law, there is no restriction on the appointment of co-administrators from two different firms.  The material question here is whether such an appointment would better serve the interests of the beneficiaries and the administration of the estate than an appointment of two individuals from the same firm.

32.  In my view, it is plain and obvious that the latter course is much more preferable in the present case.  I accept the plaintiff’s submission that retaining the 1^st defendant as administrator would likely result in higher costs because the plaintiff and the 1^st defendant will not have the benefit of sharing resources of the same firm.  Also relevant is the ongoing litigation between the 1^st defendant and Deloitte, which seems likely to become very contentious: see, eg, a decision recently handed down in Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (A firm) v Lai Derek Kar Yan [2026] HKCFI 43.  While both the plaintiff and the 1^st defendant (if not removed) are expected to continue to discharge their duty as administrators professionally notwithstanding such litigation, on a practical level, to require them to work together may result in inconvenience and more time and costs.

33.  Fourth, according to his resume, Chan is a suitable candidate to replace the 1^st defendant.  His qualifications, expertise and experiences are not subject to any challenge by Pak Huen. 

34.  Fifth, it has been confirmed that Chan will not charge any read-in time for the appointment and he will charge the same hourly rate as the 1^st defendant, and the arrangement that the plaintiff is responsible for the day-to-day management of the estate with Chan playing only a limited role and stepping in only when the plaintiff is unavailable or absent will continue.  Therefore, if Chan is appointed, there is not going to be any impact on the estate from a costs perspective. 

35.  Sixth, a majority of beneficiaries (both in number and value) have consented to, or expressed no objection, to the application.

36.  Pak Huen opposes the application on a number of grounds. None of them has any merit. 

37.  First, it is submitted that the fundamental problem with the application is that the need for removing the 1^st defendant is “entirely unexplained”.  It is further submitted that the 1^st defendant’s resignation is not a sufficient reason in itself in the absence of any explanation as to why he is unable or unfit to continue personally.  The submission goes on to say that absent proper explanation, the application “effectively places the wishes and welfare of P, Deloitte (in seeking to appoint Mr. Chan) and D1 over and above the due and proper administration of the Estate and the welfare of the beneficiaries” and that the application “is not in any one’s interests apart from P and Deloitte”.

38.  This submission has no merit at all.  The justification for replacing the 1^st defendant by Chan has been repeatedly explained through correspondence and the plaintiff’s two affidavits.  I have dealt with such justification above.  The submissions quoted in the preceding paragraph have no basis and are wholly unwarranted.

39.  Second, Pak Huen says that the substitution of Chan is unnecessary because the administration is primarily conducted by the plaintiff, and that that the plaintiff has never been unavailable since his appointment in 2019, and if ever he becomes unavailable, that contingency can be dealt with when the time comes.

40.  This argument should be rejected for the reasons which I have set out in paras 27 and 28 above.  Given the complexity involved in the administration of the estate, as a matter of common sense, it is undesirable to deal with any contingency in the ad hoc manner suggested by Pak Huen.

41.  Third, Pak Huen says that it is not in the estate’s interest to appoint Chan because the estate is in a dire financial state and the appointment of Chan would lead to a duplication of work and costs insofar as he intends to participate in the administration. 

42.  This is not a valid objection for the reasons set out in para 34 above.  Given the unequivocal confirmation by the plaintiff on the charging arrangement regarding Chan, the appointment of Chan would not worsen the financial situation of the estate.  This is an argument which should not have been raised in the first place.

43.  Fourth, Pak Huen says he has a combined 40% interest in the estate and his views should be given proper weight.  There can be no dispute that Pak Huen should be listened to as a beneficiary.  The papers before me show that the plaintiff has engaged in communication with him in a professional manner and that he has had the opportunity to express his views, which have been considered.  However, none of the reasons that he has put forward for opposing the application are valid.  They should not therefore be given any weight.

44.  In conclusion, the proposed removal and substitution is well justified.  None of the opposing grounds put up by Pak Huen has any merit.  The plaintiff’s application should be allowed for the proper administration of the estate.

Further evidence

45.  I should now explain why I did not grant leave in accordance with the consent summons. 

46.  By that summons, the parties agreed that Pak Huen should be allowed to file further evidence in reply to two groups of allegations, which are contained in paras 20 to 21 and paras 27 to 29 of the plaintiff’s 2^nd affidavit, respectively. 

47.  At the hearing, Ms Cheng confirmed that the plaintiff would not rely on the second group of allegations at all.  There is therefore no need for any reply evidence.  Further, Ms Cheng confirmed that the plaintiff would rely on the first group of allegations but would do so only in relation to the issue of costs.  As will become clear below, when considering costs, there is no need for me to take into account what was said under the first group of allegations.  There is therefore no need for any reply evidence.

48.  I should reiterate the point which I made in the requisition on the consent summons.  The subject matter of the application is straightforward.  It would be disproportionate to allow a further round of evidence on matters which have no direct relevance to, or impact on, the application.

Orders

49.  For the above reasons, I allow the plaintiff’s application and make an order in terms of paras 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the originating summons. The consent summons is dismissed.

50.  Parties have had an opportunity to make submissions on costs. 

51.  In line with what has been repeatedly stated by the plaintiff in correspondence that any costs arising out of the 1^st defendant’s resignation will be borne by Deloitte and will not impact the estate, Ms Cheng confirmed at the hearing that, subject to one exception, the costs of the defendants incurred in this application would be borne by the plaintiff personally and the plaintiff’s own costs would also be borne by him personally.  The exception is that the plaintiff will ask that those parts of his costs which are occasioned by Pak Huen’s opposition to the application be borne by him in his capacity as the 2^nd and 3^rd defendants on an indemnity basis.

52.  I accept that the above reflects the correct costs position.  It means that no costs are recoverable from the estate.  The arguments put forward by Pak Huen to oppose the application are without any merit at all.  I find that the raising of these unmeritorious arguments in the context of a straightforward application to be unreasonable.  I reject Mr Hung’s submission that they were raised for the purpose of the proper administration of the estate.  Pak Huen should be held responsible for those costs incurred in opposing the application, including those incurred by him and those incurred by the plaintiff.  Indemnity costs would be appropriate to mark the court’s disapproval of his unreasonable conduct. 

53.  I therefore make the following orders on costs (which, for the avoidance of doubt, are absolute orders):

(1)     The plaintiff be granted costs occasioned by the 2^nd and 3^rd defendants’ opposition to the originating summons, such costs (including all reserved costs) to be paid by the 2^nd and 3^rd defendants and taxed on an indemnity basis if not agreed, with a certificate for two counsel.  The 2^nd and 3^rd defendants’ costs in opposing the originating summons be borne by themselves.

(2)     Subject to (1) above, the plaintiff do pay the costs of the 1^st to 6^th defendants of the originating summons (including all reserved costs), such costs to be taxed on a party and party basis if not agreed.

(3)     Subject to (1) above, the plaintiff do personally bear his own costs of the originating summons.

(4)     The costs of the consent summons be in the cause of the originating summons.

54.  I should make clear that in awarding indemnity costs in sub-para (1) above, I have not taken into account the two groups of allegations made in the plaintiff’s 2^nd affidavit, to which Pak Huen was not allowed to reply.