RENI WAHYUNINGSIH v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5552 · HCAL 1055/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1055/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5552
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1055 OF 2023
BETWEEN
| |Reni Wahyuningsih |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |1st Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |2nd Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and the applicant being absent in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the 1st putative respondent
be amended to “Director of Immigration”, the name of the 2nd
putative respondent be amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”,
“Director of Immigration” be added as the putative interested
party, the 1st decision in respect of which relief is sought be
amended to “Director of Immigration’s decision dated 31 August
2022” and the 2nd decision in respect of which relief is sought be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board’s decision dated 23 June
2023”.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
in respect of Director of Immigration’s decision dated 31 August
2022 be dismissed.
3. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
in respect of Torture Claims Appeal Board’s decision dated 23 June
2023 be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 29 June 2023, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of two decisions which were described as
follows:-
“The decision of The immigration made on 15 March 2023. They reject
My NON refoulement. The torture claim appeal board refused my
Petition 23 June 2023.”
2. However, no decision regarding the applicant’s claim for non-
refoulement protection was made on 15 March 2023.
3. The Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) made a decision dated 23
June 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”) in respect of the applicant’s
appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration
(“the Director”) dated 31 August 2022 (“the Director’s Decision”).
The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL00
1055_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
4. The Board found that the applicant’s appeal/petition against the
Director’s Decision failed on all the applicable grounds under the
Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the Board confirmed
the Director’s Decision, which rejected the applicant’s non-
refoulement claim.
5. The date of 15 March 2023 referred to by the applicant in Form 86 as
mentioned above was the date of the Notice of Hearing issued to the
applicant inviting her to appear before the Board for the Board’s
hearing on 2 May 2023 (see paragraph 18 of the Board’s Decision). It
is clear that the applicant made a mistake in respect of the date of
the Director’s Decision.
Amendments
6. In Form 86, the applicant named “immigration department” as the 1st
putative respondent and the Board as the 2nd putative respondent, but
spelt its name wrong. In fact, the Director, instead of “immigration
department”, should be named as the 1st putative respondent.
7. The applicant did not name any putative interested party in Form 86,
when the Director should be so named.
8. Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of
the 1st putative respondent to “Director of Immigration” and the name
of the 2nd putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and
to add “Director of Immigration” as the putative interested party.
9. As aforesaid, the 1st decision in respect of which relief is sought in
the Leave Application should be the Director’s Decision and the 2nd
decision in respect of which relief is sought in the Leave Application
should be the Board’s Decision. Thus, they are so amended accordingly
on this court’s own motion.
The applicant’s case
10. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
11. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Indonesia, she would be harmed or killed by her ex-
husband as revenge for divorcing him.
Oral hearing
12. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application.
However, the applicant was absent at the hearing on 24 September 2026.
13. As held in Re Abdus Salam [2019] HKCA 1091, an application for leave
to bring judicial review should not be dismissed for want of
prosecution merely because the applicant failed to attend the oral
hearing of the leave application. The correct approach is to treat
the applicant as having withdrawn the request for a hearing by reason
of the absence at the hearing, and to proceed to determine the leave
application on its merits.
14. Thus, this court will proceed to consider the merits of the Leave
Application based on the written materials before this court.
Grounds for judicial review
15. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
16. The applicant did not identify any ground for the intended judicial
review in Form 86. She only mentioned in Form 86 that she did not
agree with the decisions made by the Immigration Department and the
Board.
17. In her supporting affirmation dated 29 June 2023, the applicant
mentioned that she did not agree with the Board’s Decision, and she
needed sometime to provide some documents from her country Indonesia.
18. By way of a letter dated 13 June 2025 addressed to the registrar of
this court, the applicant submitted the grounds for her intended
judicial review in respect of both the Director’s Decision and the
Board’s Decision.
Discussion
19. First of all, the Director’s Decision was superseded by the Board’s
Decision and is no longer susceptible to judicial review (see Re
Moshsin Ali, [2018] HKCA 549). Thus, there is simply no merit to
apply for leave to have judicial review in respect of the Director’s
Decision. It is clear that the Leave Application in respect of the
Director’s Decision should be dismissed.
20. Since she filed the Leave Application, the applicant did not submit
any further documents from her country Indonesia as suggested in her
supporting affirmation dated 29 June 2023, apart from the said letter
dated 13 June 2025. In any event, the applicant cannot submit new
evidence to this court in support of her non-refoulement claim.
21. The Court of Appeal has held in Trinh Thuy Huyen v Torture Claims
Appeal Board [2024] HKCA 1090 that the Board had no duty to make
investigation into any matter without the applicant raising it and it
should not be considered by this court at this stage.
22. Moreover, her danger in her home country had been duly assessed but
rejected by the Board. If the applicant intends to challenge the
Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an application for
judicial review.
23. Thus, all the matters raised by the applicant in Form 86 and her
supporting affirmation cannot amount to any valid ground to challenge
the Board’s Decision.
24. In the said letter dated 13 June 2025, the applicant first mentioned
the reasons why she was scared to return to her country and that the
Board’s assessment on her fear was too low and not acceptable. As
aforesaid, the applicant’s risks had been assessed by the Board and
her challenge on the Board’s finding of facts is not permissible in an
application for judicial review.
25. Then, the applicant set out some general grounds under 8 paragraphs,
which were numbered from 1 to 8 as follows:-
“1.. Procedural Impropriety) Failure to properly apply para national
UN committee against Torture General Comment No.2 whereby satisfaction
of a National states obligations to conduct sufficient due diligence
requires that reforms and means of relief introduced must be effective
in any event, cf, the TCAB and the Director Decision which focused on
whether such reliefs showed merely signs of positive improvement (see
also JFK CACV 103/ 2014).
2 Procedural Impropriety) Failure to conduct sufficient inquiry into
the relevant country of origin conditions. The TCAB Failure to
consider that I would face serious risk from my enemies who will harm
me because of my political and statistical view which consider a
serious matter for which he would harm me upon refoulement. The TCAB
completely failed to materialize my fear in my claims.
3. Procedural Impropriety/ Irrationality) Failure to reasons for
assessment of Lack of BOR 2risk and / or sufficient basis to support
conclusion of lack of BOR 2risk. I would like to review my decision
under BOR 2 that my life is still at risk upon refoulement to my
country of origin for which I would seek protection for my life.
4. Error/ Misdirection in law) Failing to consider the considerations
of psychological strain and threats to me personally or threats to me
directly to kill me. My enemies are still looking for me, my risk of
my life continues so in this circumstance I would not dare to return
to my country. It’s only because of fear for my life.
5. Procedural Impropriety) The TCAB Failure to consider our fear that
my enemies still fear for me, I could not return to my country in this
circumstance, therefore there are genuine risks waiting for me, and I
could not relocate other places because they could easily trace me
wherever I hide in my country.
6. Misdirection in law) The TCAB failure to assess my fear and my
country-of-origin conditions that whereas I would return I would not
face a terrible risk upon refoulement, my life is under risk from my
enemies so that I would not agree to the decision of the Director so
that I would review my decision.
7. No sufficient basis to conclude that my family members would not to
be at risk of being subjected to torture and or / CIDTP upon
refoulment. Although my non-refoulement claim assessed under Torture
risk, BOR 2 & 3 risk and risk of persecution.
8. Against the Director decision) Procedural Impropriety) Insufficient
inquiry into the country-of-origin conditions and / or failure to
appropriately examine purportedly objective country of origin
information materials.”
26. In paragraphs 1 and 2 of the grounds as quoted above, the applicant
challenged the Board’s consideration of “UN committee against Torture
General Comment No. 2” and “the relevant country of origin
conditions”. However, the applicant did not give any particulars of
such challenges which were relevant to her case. The applicant also
mentioned in paragraph 2 that her enemies would harm her because of
her political and statistical view. However, her case was only
concerning her ex-husband taking revenge on her for divorcing him. It
had nothing to do with her political and statistical view.
27. Paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of the grounds concern the applicant’s risk of
life, but they have no merits at all. The Board had considered the
law about BOR 2 Risk (as mentioned in paragraph 14 of Appendix A
attached to the Board’s Decision) and all the materials contained in
the hearing bundle and the responses and evidence provided by the
applicant at the hearing (see paragraph 15 of Appendix A attached to
the Board’s Decision). As can be seen from paragraph 89 of the
Board’s Decision, the Board in fact gave the applicant the benefit of
the doubt and proceeded on the basis that on two occasions her ex-
husband pointed a small knife at the applicant and threatened to kill
her after hearing that she wanted a divorce. However, the Board found
that this was nothing more than menacing threat without a serious
intention. In fact, the applicant’s own evidence was that her ex-
husband eventually did not harm her. Thus, the Board did consider the
applicant’s risk of life and give sufficient reasons for its
conclusion that BOR 2 Risk was not substantiated.
28. Paragraph 5 of the grounds concerns internal relocation. However, the
Board did not consider the question of internal relocation at all, as
it was not necessary for it to do so when it had found that the
applicant did not face a real risk of harm of any serious kind if she
returned to her home area (see paragraph 105 of the Board’s Decision).
Thus, paragraph 5 is simply irrelevant.
29. Paragraph 7 of the grounds is also irrelevant as the Board did not
conclude that the applicant’s family members would not be at risk of
being subjected to torture and or / CIDTP upon the applicant’s
refoulment. In fact, it was the applicant herself who confirmed that
her ex-husband had not harmed her parents or her child (see paragraph
63 of the Board’s Decision), and the Board just considered the
applicant’s claim that her ex-husband did not harm anyone from her
family (see paragraph 90 of the Board’s Decision).
30. Paragraph 8 of the grounds is directed at the Director. As aforesaid,
the Director’s Decision was superseded by the Board’s Decision and is
no longer susceptible to judicial review. Thus, it is unnecessary to
consider whether there was any failure on the part of the Director.
31. Moreover, the Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that general
assertions without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support
a judicial review (see Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20; Re Aziz
Nasir [2019] HKCA 578; and Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626). Further,
as held by the Court of Appeal in Re Salim Ahmed alias MD Salim [2020]
HKCA 244, “general assertions or propositions of law cannot assist an
appellant when he fails to condescend to the requisite particulars
related to the facts of his case”. Thus, the general allegations
contained in the aforesaid grounds cannot amount to any valid grounds
for the intended judicial review in respect of the Board’s Decision.
32. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
33. Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for
any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite
the lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the
intended judicial review.
34. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an
oral hearing on 2 May 2023 and the applicant was present. Thus, the
applicant was given the opportunity to present her case to the Board
in person.
35. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board had given a
detailed analysis of all the aspects of the applicant’s claims and its
reasoning in rejecting the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement
protection.
36. The Board had laid out its assessment of the applicant’s claims in
paragraphs 80 to 97 of the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary
to repeat the same here.
37. In gist, the Board accepted significant parts of the applicant’s
claims, including that her ex-husband had slapped and mistreated her
in the past, her husband had taken out a loan and that he opposed to
the applicant’s request for divorce. However, the Board also found
that the applicant had inflated and exaggerated important aspects of
her claims in relation to her claimed risk of harm. The Board found
that the applicant’s conduct had been significantly inconsistent with
the conduct of a person who claimed to have a genuine and grave fear
of being seriously harmed or killed when faced with the prospect of
being returned to her home country. In particular, the applicant’s
failure to report her claimed mistreatment by her ex-husband to the
police or to her parents, and her delay and failure to seek protection
after arriving in Hong Kong, was inconsistent with the conduct of a
person who held a genuine fear of serious or fatal harm.
38. While accepting that the applicant wanted to distant herself from her
ex-husband, the Board did not accept that the applicant wanted to
avoid him for fear of facing a real risk of serious or fatal harm at
his hands. The Board also accepted that the applicant’s ex-husband
had mistreated her in the past. Nevertheless, the Board found that
such mistreatment by him was not serious or life-threatening.
39. In relation to the applicant’s claim that her ex-husband refused
whenever she requested for a divorce, the Board accepted that he had
his reasons for opposing the divorce, and the continuation of the
remittances from the applicant’s overseas employment could very likely
be one of those reasons. However, the Board did not find it
suggesting that the applicant’s ex-husband would now, or in the
reasonably foreseeable future, target the applicant for serious or
fatal harm.
40. Despite that applicant’s claim that her ex-husband had on two
occasions pointed a small knife at her and threatened to kill her, the
Board accepted the applicant’s evidence that he eventually did not
harm her. The applicant’s ex-husband had also never harmed anyone
from the applicant’s family, notwithstanding that he went to visit the
applicant’s family periodically to ask for her whereabouts.
41. Based on all the evidence before it, including the totality of the
evidence on the conduct of the applicant’s ex-husband, the Board
rejected the proposition that there was a real risk of harm facing the
applicant on that basis. The Board found that although the
applicant’s ex-husband might have opposed to the divorce initially,
there was no credible evidence to suggest that he had not accepted the
reality that the divorce had been granted. The Board did not find
that the evidence suggested that any residual grudge which the
applicant suggested her ex-husband might feel was such that it would
motivate him to seriously harm or to kill the applicant.
42. With regards to the assessment of the availability of state protection
to the applicant, the Board found that there was nothing more than the
applicant’s speculation that the police would not intervene if she
needed their protection. Having carefully considered all the country
of origin information (“COI”) available, the Board considered that the
applicant did have access to adequate police protection in the remote
circumstance that she should require it in relation to the conduct of
her ex-husband if she returned to Indonesia (see paragraphs 98 to 104
of the Board’s Decision).
43. Thus, the Board found that the applicant had no real risk of any of
the proscribed forms of harm upon her return to Indonesia.
44. Although the Board did not make findings as to internal relocation, it
is a well-recognised principle that the decision-maker only needs to
consider internal relocation if the applicant has established that she
qualifies as a refugee pursuant to Article 1A(2) of the Refugee
Convention (see Robinson v SSHD & Anor [1997] EWCA Civ 3090, dated
11.7.1997). In other words, internal relocation only arises if the
applicant has established a real risk of persecution in her home area
(see Gardi v SSHD [2002] 1 WLR 2755).
45. As it is the Board’s finding that the applicant had no real risk of
any of the proscribed forms of harm, it is not necessary for the Board
to consider internal relocation.
46. The finding of facts, including the assessment of evidence, COI and
risk of harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board in dealing with
the applicant’s appeal/petition. The Board was entitled to make its
own decision. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the
way the Board reached its conclusion.
47. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no error of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
48. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
49. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 30th day of September 2026
| |(Gladys LEE) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant | | |
|or his solicitors must:| | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s solicitors|the putative |
|may be directed by the |on: 30/09/2026 |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order | |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any | |interested parties as |
|directions given within| |may be directed by the |
|14 days after the leave| |Court / the putative |
|was granted (Order 53, |Applicant’s ref. no: |interested parties’ |
|rule 4A); |Nil |solicitors on: |
| | |30/09/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | | |
|within 14 days after | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|the grant of leave and | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|serve it in accordance | |Claims Petition Office |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | |2nd Putative |
|and | |respondent’s ref. no.: |
| | |USM 20914 |
|c) supply to every | | |
|other party copies of | |Director of Immigration |
|every affidavit which | |1st Putative respondent |
|the Applicant proposes | |and Putative interested |
|to use at the hearing, | |party’s ref. no.: |
|including the affidavit| |QA T/C 777/22 (Formerly |
|in support of the | |RBCZ/5000663/22) |
|application for leave | | |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | |Department of Justice, |
| | |Senior Assistant Law |
| | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1