SANDHU AMANDEEP OTHERS v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 6109 · HCAL 1238/2021
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1238/2021
[2026] HKCFI 6109
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1238 OF 2021
BETWEEN
| |Sandhu Amandeep |1st Applicant |
| |Kaur Samreet (a minor) |2nd Applicant |
| |by Sandhu Amandeep, her next friend | |
| |Rajwinder Singh Manraj Kaur (a minor) |3rd Applicant |
| |by Sandhu Amandeep, her next friend | |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicants in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the 2nd applicant be
amended to “Kaur Samreet (a minor) by Sandhu Amandeep, her next
friend”, the name of the 3rd applicant be amended to “Rajwinder
Singh Manraj Kaur (a minor) by Sandhu Amandeep, her next friend”,
and the name of the putative interested party be amended to
“Director of Immigration”.
2. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd applicants’ application for leave to apply for
judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the applicants:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 2 September 2021, the 1st
applicant, the 2nd applicant (the 1st applicant’s elder daughter) and
the 3rd applicant (the 1st applicant’s younger daughter) applied for
leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in
respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the
Board”) dated 18 August 2021 (“the Board’s Decision”). The Board’s
Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2021/HCAL00
1238_2021_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board rejected all the applicants’ claims for non-refoulement
protection on all the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening
Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the Board dismissed their
appeals/petitions against the decision of the Director of Immigration
(“the Director”) dated 27 November 2020 (“the Director’s Decision”)
and confirmed the same, which rejected their non-refoulement claims.
Amendments
3. The 2nd and 3rd applicants are minors and represented by their mother,
ie the 1st applicant, as their next friend. Thus, the 2nd and 3rd
applicants’ names in Form 86 should be stated as “Kaur Samreet (a
minor) by Sandhu Amandeep, her next friend” and “Rajwinder Singh
Manraj Kaur (a minor) by Sandhu Amandeep, her next friend”
respectively. On this court’s own motion, their names are so amended
accordingly.
4. The applicants named the Board as both the putative respondent and the
putative interested party in Form 86, when the Board should only be
the putative respondent and the Director should be the putative
interested party.
5. Thus, on this court’s own motion, the name of the putative interested
party is amended to “Director of Immigration”.
The applicants’ case
6. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicants’ case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
7. In sum, the 1st applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection on
behalf of herself and the 2nd and 3rd applicants because if refouled
to India, the three of them would be harmed or killed by the 1st
applicant’s father as well as the family of her boyfriend, Rajwinder
Singh (“RS”) due to her relationship with RS and that the 2nd and 3rd
applicants were born out of wedlock. The 1st applicant also feared
that the 2nd and 3rd applicants would face discrimination in India.
Oral hearing
8. The applicants requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application
and their case was heard on 22 October 2026.
9. All three applicants had applied for legal aid. However, their
applications were refused by the Director of Legal Aid on 27 August
2026. At the hearing before this court, the 1st applicant confirmed
that she would not engage any private lawyer to represent the 2nd and
3rd applicants. Thus, the 2nd and 3rd applicants were only
represented by the 1st applicant in the Leave Application.
10. The applicants annexed a document with the title “Grounds on which
relief is sought” to their Form 86. The 1st applicant confirmed on
behalf of herself and the 2nd and 3rd applicants that they would rely
on the grounds stated therein as their grounds for judicial review.
However, the 1st applicant did not elaborate on any of the grounds.
11. When this court asked the 1st applicant if there was anything she
wanted to say on behalf of 2nd and 3rd applicants, she only asked that
they be granted stay in Hong Kong, as they were studying here and she
could not afford anything for them.
12. When this court asked about the father of the 2nd and 3rd applicants,
the 1st applicant said that their father is also an Indian and a non-
refoulement claimant in Hong Kong. However, the 1st applicant and the
father of the 2nd and 3rd applicants were not married and they are no
longer together. The 1st applicant is now with another boyfriend who
is a Hong Kong resident and she has another baby with this new
boyfriend.
13. The 1st applicant said that if she had to return to India, she would
bring the 2nd and 3rd applicants with her, but she could not be sure
if their biological father would bring them with him if he was to
return to India.
14. The 1st applicant also said that she was not sure if the 2nd and 3rd
applicants could obtain Indian nationality, as they were both born in
Hong Kong.
15. When this court asked the 1st applicant if there were any foreseeable
risks that the 2nd and 3rd applicants might face upon their return to
India, the 1st applicant said that she could not trust anybody and
that children are not safe there. She added that many incidents about
children appeared in the news, and children might be adducted,
kidnapped or raped in India.
Legal representation for the 2nd and 3rd applicants
16. Since the 2nd and 3rd applicants are minors, the 1st applicant, in her
capacity as the 2nd and 3rd applicants’ next friend, must act by a
solicitor according to Order 80, rule 2 of the Rules of the High
Court.
17. However, as aforesaid, the 1st applicant would not engage private
lawyer for the 2nd and 3rd applicants and their legal aid applications
had been refused. This court is of the view that the lack of legal
representation will not prejudice the interest of the 2nd and 3rd
applicants in the Leave Application.
18. Thus, this court will treat the lack of legal representation for the
2nd and 3rd applicants as a mere irregularity and it will not nullify
the proceedings herein (see Order 2, rule 1(1) of the Rules of the
High Court).
Grounds for judicial review
19. The applicants are required to identify clearly the grounds for their
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
20. In a document with the title “Grounds on which relief is sought”,
which was annexed to the applicants’ Form 86, the 1st applicant stated
that the Board was in breach of procedural fairness in six paragraphs,
which are summarised as follows:-
1) The Board had unlawfully fettered its discretion by refusing the
applicant’s appeal on the grounds that they did not satisfy the
requirements;
2) The Board failed to meet the greater care and duty owed to a self-
represented claimant;
3) The Board’s decision to refuse the applicant’s appeal were
unreasonable or irrational in the public law sense, or are a result of
procedural errors or unfairness;
4) It must be kept in mind that the life and limb are in jeopardy and the
applicant’s fundamental human rights not to be subjected to torture is
involved;
5) The adjudicator acted in a procedurally unfair manner; and
6) The applicant will face hardship if returned, and that the Board has
significantly relied on the source of news which is not officially
recognized, or it is simply hearsay.
21. As aforesaid, the 1st applicants did not elaborate on any of the above
grounds at the oral hearing before this court.
22. In relation to the specific risks of the 2nd and 3rd applicants, the
1st applicant said that she could not trust anybody, children are not
safe and might be adducted, kidnapped or raped in India.
Discussion
23. This court will first deal with the 1st applicant’s case and examine
the grounds put forward by her as summarized above, which are in fact
just general assertions without any particulars.
24. The Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that general assertions
without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial
review (see Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20; Re Aziz Nasir [2019] HKCA
578; and Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626). Further, as held by the
Court of Appeal in Re Salim Ahmed alias MD Salim [2020] HKCA 244,
“general assertions or propositions of law cannot assist an appellant
when he fails to condescend to the requisite particulars related to
the facts of his case”.
25. Thus, the general assertions put forward by the 1st applicant in
Grounds (1), (2), (3) and (5), which merely contained “key words” such
as the Board had “unlawfully fettered his/her discretion”, the Board
“failed to meet the greater care and duty owed to a self-represented
claimant”, the Board’s Decision was “unreasonable or irrational”, and
“The Adjudicator acted in a procedurally unfair manner”, cannot help
the 1st applicant at all.
26. Likewise, in relation to Ground (6), the 1st applicant failed to
identify which pieces of the news that the Board relied on were not
officially recognized or were hearsay. Thus, this is also a general
assertion without any particulars and cannot help the 1st applicant
either.
27. In Ground (4), the 1st applicant is essentially challenging the
Board’s finding of facts in relation to whether she would be subjected
to torture if returned to India.
28. However, as can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board found
that the 1st applicant was not telling the truth and that her case was
unreasonable, devoid of particulars, vague and unbelievable in both
her oral evidence and her written case. The 1st applicant’s alleged
threats and all the other matters relating thereto including her
father’s relationship with the police were not accepted. The alleged
threats and all the other matters relating thereto were confined to
her family and that of RS in their local area. There was nothing to
substantiate the suggestion that the Bharatiya Janata Party, the
Indian police or the government, whether through the alleged
nationwide network or otherwise, would help to track her down so as to
harm her.
29. The Board had provided a full assessment of the 1st applicant’s
credibility in paragraphs 30 to 39 of the Board’s Decision, and its
reasons for rejecting the applicant’s claim regarding Torture Risk[1]
in paragraphs 46 to 48 of the Board’s Decision. The Board had also
assessed the 1st applicant’s BOR 3 Risk[2] in paragraphs 53 to 54 of
the Board’s Decision and concluded that the 1st applicant was not at a
real risk of torture or ill-treatment.
30. This court finds no flaw in the Board’s assessment of the 1st
applicant’s Torture Risk and BOR 3 Risk. Thus, Ground (4) has no
merit at all.
31. In the premises, none of the grounds mentioned in the document with
the title “Grounds on which relief is sought” could amount to any
valid ground for the 1st applicant’s intended judicial review.
32. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness, or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
33. Thus, it is not for this court to re-assess the 1st applicant’s case
for non-refoulement protection. This court will only scrutinize the
Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality, despite the lack of any valid ground being advanced by
the 1st applicant.
34. As aforesaid, the Board found that the 1st applicant was not telling
the truth when she presented her case to the Board. More importantly,
the Board found that even assuming the claimed threats were true, the
1st applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection would still fail
(see paragraphs 43 to 45 of the Board’s Decision).
35. In gist, the Board found that given there was no follow-up or repeated
threats from the 1st applicant’s own family and the fact that RS’s
family only made one verbal threat against her, the 1st applicant’s
belief that such threats would materialize could hardly be justified.
Further, state acquiescence was not involved in her case. The Board
also found that the alleged threats and risk of harm did not attain a
minimum level of severity. The Board did not accept that the 1st
applicant would not be accorded appropriate state protection if there
was a genuine need for her to seek protection after her return to
India.
36. As to internal relocation, it is a well-recognised principle that the
decision-maker only needs to consider internal relocation if the
applicant has established that he/she qualifies as a refugee pursuant
to Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention (see Robinson v SSHD & Anor
[1997] EWCA Civ 3090, dated 11.7.1997). In other words, internal
relocation only arises if the 1st applicant has established a real
risk of persecution in her home area (see Gardi v SSHD [2002] 1 WLR
2755).
37. As it is the Board’s finding that the 1st applicant had no real risk
of any of the proscribed forms of harm upon her return to India, it is
not necessary for the Board to consider internal relocation. It is
therefore correct for the Board to state in paragraph 59 of the
Board’s Decision that it did not see that the question of internal
relocation arose.
38. Nevertheless, based on the elaboration in paragraph 19 of the
Director’s Decision, the Board found that the 1st applicant, being
young at the age of 30 and with working experience, could relocate
with the 2nd and 3rd applicants to other places in India (see
paragraph 60 of the Board’s Decision).
39. In this regard, this court notes that in paragraph 31(l) of the
Board’s Decision, the Board addressed the 1st applicant’s concern that
she could not go out to work as she had to take care of the 2nd and
3rd applicants by saying that the applicants could return to India
with the biological father of the 2nd and 3rd applicants. This court
finds that the Board was making an assumption that the biological
father of the 2nd and 3rd applicants would return to India with the
applicants.
40. In fact, the 1st applicant mentioned at the oral hearing before this
court that she is now with another boyfriend who is a Hong Kong
resident and she is no longer with the biological father of the 2nd
and 3rd applicants. Thus, the Board’s assumption that the applicants
could return to India with the father of the 2nd and 3rd applicant, in
order that the 1st applicant could go out to work to support the 2nd
and 3rd applicants, was speculative and not well-founded.
41. However, as aforesaid, it was in fact not necessary for the Board to
assess internal relocation at all. Thus, the Board’s error in making
this assumption would not nullify its rejection of the 1st applicant
claim for non-refoulement protection on all the applicable grounds
under the USM. This court finds no errors of law, procedural
unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s assessment of the 1st
applicant’s claim apart from making the aforesaid assumption.
42. This court will now deal with the 2nd and 3rd applicants’ cases.
43. The 2nd and 3rd applicants’ non-refoulement claims were based on the
same circumstances of the 1st applicant, except that they might also
face discrimination as alleged by the 1st applicant.
44. The Board was well aware of the requirements in the assessment of the
2nd and 3rd applicants’ cases as young minors (see paragraphs 21(b)
and (c) of the Board’s Decision). The Board found that both the 2nd
and 3rd applicants did not face any real chance of harm upon finding
that the 1st applicant was not at a real risk of harm from her own
father/family and the family of the 2nd and 3rd applicants’ biological
father.
45. The Board also dealt with the alleged discrimination regarding the 2nd
and 3rd applicants in paragraphs 37 to 39 of the Board’s Decision.
The Board found that the 1st applicant’s perceived fear for the 2nd
and 3rd applicants was based on her bare assertion instead of real and
personal experience. The Board found nothing to suggest that the 2nd
and 3rd applicants’ rights, such as that of education and civil
relations with the the 1st applicant, would be deprived of for any
reasons.
46. Although children of unmarried mothers are labelled as illegitimate,
the Board found no evidence or COI[3] to substantiate the bare
allegation that they would be at risk of discrimination, mental or
physical harm if they returned to India. There was no information
suggesting that the 1st applicant had ever been threatened or ill-
treated by anyone in India for giving birth to babies out of wedlock,
nor was there any claim of hostility shown towards the 2nd and 3rd
applicants by anyone in India.
47. The Board found that it was the 1st applicant’s bare assertion that
the 2nd and 3rd applicants would be discriminated and would suffer
from hostility if they returned to India, and even if they would face
some kind of discrimination, such discrimination, without more, would
not in the present situations constitute torture or persecution.
Thus, the Board did not accept, and found no evidence to suggest, that
the 2nd and 3rd applicants would be subject to any child-specific risk
of harm which might give rise or amount to a situation of torture
claim or persecution of any form or might constitute any of the
grounds under the USM.
48. The 2nd and 3rd applicants are not of mixed race as their parents are
both Indians. Thus, there was no need for the Board to consider mixed
race discrimination as required in Re Shahul Hameed Beer Mohamed and
Others, 08/04/2026, CACV 77/2024, [2026] HKCA 632 and Re Bantigue
Susan Banes and Another, 29/09/2025, CACV 234/2024, [2025] HKCA 853.
49. It is therefore this court’s view that the Board had given adequate
consideration to the 2nd and 3rd applicants’ claims and their child-
specific risks.
50. The 1st applicant raised some other child-specific risks at the oral
hearing before this court, namely that she could not trust anybody,
children might be adducted, kidnapped and raped in India, and she also
mentioned that she was not sure if the 2nd and 3rd applicants could
obtain Indian nationality, as they were both born in Hong Kong.
51. However, these matters were not specifically raised before the Board
and hence they could not be considered as valid grounds to challenge
the Board’s Decision. As held by the Court of Appeal in Trinh Thuy
Huyen v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2024] HKCA 1090, the Board had no
duty to make investigation into any matter without the applicant
raising it and it should not be considered by this court at this
stage.
52. Moreover, even if children might be adducted, kidnapped and raped in
India, these were just the general situation in India, and they could
not amount to any valid ground for the 2nd and 3rd applicants to make
their non-refoulement claim. It has to be shown that they would be
personally at risk (see Re RS, CACV 206/2012, para 59).
53. As to whether the 2nd and 3rd applicants could obtain Indian
nationality, there was no reason for the Board to consider this issue
when their parents are both Indians. It was hardly a foreseeable risk
simply because they were both born in Hong Kong.
54. The 1st applicant indicated that the 2nd and 3rd applicants also
relied on the grounds of judicial review as stated in the document
with the title “Grounds on which relief is sought” annexed to their
Form 86. This court has already discussed the grounds above and it is
not necessary to repeat the same again. In sum, these grounds cannot
be valid grounds for the 2nd and 3rd applicants’ intended judicial
review either.
55. Likewise, this court finds no errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality in the Board’s assessment of the 2nd and 3rd applicants’
claim apart from the Board making the aforesaid assumption in relation
to internal relocation, which does not affect the overall assessment.
56. In Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, the Court of
Final Appeal held that for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that all three applicants had failed to establish such a claim and
hence leave must be refused for them to apply for judicial review.
Conclusion
57. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application in respect of all three
applicants is dismissed.
Dated the 4th day of November 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or his solicitors | | |
|must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicants/the |putative respondent / the |
|interested parties as |applicants’ |putative respondent’s |
|may be directed by the|solicitors |solicitors / such putative|
|Court the order |on: 04/11/2026 |interested parties as may |
|granting leave and any| |be directed by the Court /|
|directions given | |the putative interested |
|within 14 days after |Applicants’ ref. no: |parties’ solicitors on: |
|the leave was granted |Nil |04/11/2026 |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | | |
| | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|b) issue the | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|originating summons | |Claims Petition Office |
|within 14 days after | |Putative respondent’s ref.|
|the grant of leave and| |no.: |
|serve it in accordance| |USM 17471/20/12/30/IN3216 |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |USM 17472/20/12/31/IN3217 |
|and | |USM 17473/20/12/32/IN3218 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the Applicant proposes| |ImmD/CR T/C 673-675/20 |
|to use at the hearing,| |(formerly RBCZ 123-125/20)|
|including the | | |
|affidavit in support | |Department of Justice, |
|of the application for| |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] Risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.
[2] Risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap
383.
[3] COI denotes country of origin information