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KARTIKA v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
KARTIKA v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5783 · HCAL 1231/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1231/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5783
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1231 of 2023
BETWEEN
| |Kartika |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board/ |Putative |
| |Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| |Application for Leave to Apply for | |
| |Judicial Review | |
| |NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord.| |
| |53 r. 3) | |
Following:
|( |consideration of documents only; or |
| | |
|( |consideration of documents and the Applicant being absent in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Keith Lam:
1. Form 86 be amended, naming the Director of Immigration as the putative
interested party.
2. The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. By Form 86 filed on 20 July 2023 (“Form 86”), the Applicant seeks
leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture
Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”) dated 11 July 2023 (“TCAB Decision”),
which affirmed the decision of the Director of Immigration (“DOI”)
dated 30 August 2022 (“DOI Decision”).
2. The Form 86 incorrectly named the TCAB as the putative interested
party. I therefore amend the Form 86 on my own motion to name the DOI
as the putative interested party.
3. The Applicant requested for a hearing of this application, which was
held on 14 September 2026. She was absent from the hearing. I see no
irregularity in the notification process.
Background
4. The Applicant is a national of Indonesia. In gist, she fears that she
will be harmed or killed by a creditor because she failed to repay her
deceased mother’s loan. The Applicant’s personal background, the
relevant facts and relevant procedural history have been sufficiently
set out in the TCAB Decision, which can be viewed through a
hyperlink.[1] There is no need for me to repeat the same. Unless
otherwise specified, the abbreviations and descriptions used in the
TCAB Decision are adopted herein.
Discussion
5. The leave application operates as a filtering process and there is no
requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision:
Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at §23. I therefore set out below brief
reasons for my decision, which I have reached upon considering all the
materials before me.
6. In a judicial review, this court does not provide a further avenue of
appeal. While I remind myself that in non-refoulement cases, I would
adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinising the decision of the TCAB
given the seriousness of the issue at hand, this court would not usurp
the role of the TCAB, which together with the DOI are the primary
decision-makers. A finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of
the TCAB, and this court will not intervene by way of judicial review
unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or
irrationality in the decision of the TCAB: Nupur Mst v Director of
Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at §14(1). There must be a reasonably
arguable case with a realistic prospect of success before leave for
judicial review will be granted: Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676 at §§14-17.
7. An applicant is required to clearly and succinctly identify the
grounds of judicial review relied upon in the Form 86 and the
supporting affirmation: Ho Loy v Director of Environment Protection,
HCAL 21/2015 (unrep.) 22.12.2016 at §142. He or she is also under a
duty to make full and frank disclosure of material facts: Kan Hung
Cheung v The Director of Immigration [2008] HKC 323 at §§14-17.
8. The Applicant’s Form 86 contained sections called “Relief sought” and
“Grounds on which relief is sought”. The latter section contained the
following grounds: -
1) “It is trite law that a hearing before the Appeal Board is a
rehearing, and the Adjudicator is required to consider afresh the
original decision and arrive at his own determination in respect of
the claims.” (“Ground 1”)
2) “The respondent’s decision to refuse the applicant’s appeal were
unreasonable or irrational in the public law sense, or are a result
of procedural errors or unfairness.” (“Ground 2”)
3) “The respondent had unlawfully fattered (sic) his discretion by
refusing the applicant’s appeal on the grounds that they didn’t
satisfy with the requirements.” (“Ground 3”)
4) “The respondent failed to meet the greater care and duty owned (sic)
to a self-represented claimant.” (“Ground 4”)
5) “The Adjudicator acted in a procedurally unfair manner in dealing
with the applicant’s appeal.” (“Ground 5”)
6) “It must be keep in mind that the life and limb are in jeopardy and
the applicant’s fundamental human rights not to be subjected to
torture in (sic) involved.” (“Ground 6”)
7) “In dismissing the applicant’s appeal/petition, there is no
indication that the Adjudicator interacted with the facts of
applicant’s claim, conducted any analysis of the supporting documents
or turned his mind to the ground under consideration being the risk
of violation of the applicant’s right to life under BOR 2.” (“Ground
7”)
8) “The applicant will face hardship if he is to return back to his home
country and that the Torture Claims Appeal Board has significantly
relied on source of news which is not officially recognized, or it is
simply hearsay.” (“Ground 8”)
9) “The characterization of the appeal process is grounded in the
consistent practice of the Appeal Board in treating each
appeal/petition as a de novo hearing, whereby the appeal Board is not
confined to any grounds of appeal put forward, but considers all the
facts of the claim afresh to come to its own findings. The
established practice of the appeal Board in this regard is either
grounded and illustrative of its relevant obligations; and/or in any
case has induced a procedural expectation that a claim would be
considered afresh under applicable grounds.” (“Ground 9”)
10) “The Adjudicator has relied on some cases which are outdated
considering the dramatic changes. The lack of credible source of
information has resulted in them making groundless speculation.”
(“Ground 10”)
11) “In spite of the applicant’s problems in his home country are very
severe and he had already submitted the documents on behalf of the
applicant’s claim, the Adjudicator of the Torture Claims Appeal Board
may not be greater caring and made the claimant disappointed.”
(“Ground 11”)
9. However, each of the above grounds merely consists of generic, vague
and/or unparticularised assertions without reference to any underlying
facts or matters establishing why, how and where each of those
complaints arise in relation to the TCAB Decision. They are therefore
not effective grounds and cannot assist the Applicant: Re Haider
Khalil [2021] HKCA 223 at §16.
10. Nevertheless, given the seriousness of the issues at hand, I have
scrutinised the TCAB Decision carefully. I have come to the view that
none of the above Grounds can be established or considered as valid or
effective public law grounds, nor do I find any error of law or
procedural unfairness or irrationality on the part of the TCAB
Decision.
11. As can be seen from the TCAB Decision, the TCAB took into account all
the evidence available and found that on the basis of the same,
applying the correct legal principles in respect of all applicable
grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism, the Applicant’s
allegations were insufficient to make out any of the applicable
grounds: §§25-51. It is clear that the TCAB considered the evidence
available thoroughly and in detail. In particular, the TCAB found
that:
1) It was not satisfied that any of her claims in relation to the loan
shark were truthful, as the Applicant was unable to recall even the
basic aspects of her claims during the hearing and this was because
they had been manufactured: §§27-29.
2) Even on the Applicant’s own evidence, it was not established that the
loan shark had any interest in pursuing the Applicant, or that they
would even know if she had returned to another part of Indonesia,
given that the loan sharks only went to find her once in 2020 and
never contacted her again: §30.
3) In any event, based on country of origin information, it was open to
the Applicant to relocate to other areas within Indonesia, and it
would not be unduly harsh or unreasonable for the Applicant to do so:
§30.
12. In particular, having regard to the Grounds set out by the Applicant
in the Form 86:
1) Contrary to Grounds 1 and 9, it is evident that the TCAB considered
the Applicant’s claim afresh, and did not simply adopt, or give
improper weight to, the DOI’s decision. As recorded in the TCAB
Decision §§18-24 and §§27-51, the TCAB asked the Applicant about her
claim in detail, and has assessed them afresh.
2) Grounds 2, 4 and 5 are unparticularised and there was no attempt to
identify the particular instance where these alleged errors were made
in the TCAB Decision. They cannot amount to proper grounds for
judicial review.
3) Ground 3 cannot be correct. Refusing the Applicant’s appeal on the
ground that it did not satisfy the requirements for the individual
grounds for non-refoulement is precisely the correct thing to do.
4) Grounds 6 and 7 are not correct. It is clear from the TCAB Decision
that the TCAB had borne in mind the Applicant’s claim that she is in
risk of harm and torture and that her life is at risk (§§4, 32-45),
and had clearly conducted a factual assessment of the Applicant’s
claim (§§25-31).
5) As to Grounds 8 and 10, it is entirely legitimate for the TCAB to
rely on country of origin information, and the TCAB had clearly
identified the source of all such information that it referred to in
the TCAB Decision. The Applicant has not identified what are the
alleged “outdated” cases and “dramatic changes”, or the impermissible
“source of news”.
6) As to Ground 11, it is not a valid ground for judicial review to say
that the TCAB ought to be more “caring” or ought not to disappoint the
Applicant. In any event, the TCAB had found the Applicant’s alleged
fears to be incredible.
Conclusion
13. Therefore, I conclude that the Applicant’s intended challenge against
the TCAB Decision is not reasonably arguable, and accordingly the
application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.
Dated the 23rd day of October 2026
| |(Joyce Ooi) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|Applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the |Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such |Applicant |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as |on 23/10/2026 |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the | |solicitors / such |
|Court the order |Kartika |Putative Interested |
|granting leave and any | |Parties as may be |
|directions given within|Applicant’s ref. no:|directed by the Court / |
|14 days after the leave|Nil. |the Putative Interested |
|was granted (Order 53, | |Parties’ solicitors on |
|rule 4A); | |23/10/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|originating summons | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|within 14 days after | |Claims Petition Office |
|the grant of leave and | |Putative Respondent’s |
|serve it in accordance | |ref. no.: USM 20948 |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | | |
|and | |Director of Immigration |
| | |Putative Interested |
|c) supply to every | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C|
|other party copies of | |768/22 (formerly RBCZ |
|every affidavit which | |5000648/22) (T1I104) |
|the Applicant proposes | | |
|to use at the hearing, | |Department of Justice, |
|including the affidavit| |Senior Assistant Law |
|in support of the | |Officer |
|application for leave | |(Civil Law) |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
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[1]https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL0012
31_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf