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REGULACION LENY ROSE AGUSTIN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
REGULACION LENY ROSE AGUSTIN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 6151 · HCAL 1629/2026
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1629/2026
[2026] HKCFI 6151
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 1629 of 2026
BETWEEN
| |Regulacion Leny Rose Agustin |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Putative |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
|Π|consideration of the documents only; or |
| |consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |Applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Background
1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in
the prescribed Form 86 filed on 21 September 2026, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”).
The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture
Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office
(“Board”) dated 1 September 2026 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the
applicant’s appeal against a decision of the Director of Immigration
(“Director”) dated 22 June 2026 rejecting the applicant’s non-
refoulement claim based on all applicable grounds[1]. The Board’s
Decision is set out in the following hyperlink: -
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2026/HCAL001629_
2026_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Philippines,
she would be harmed or killed by her ex-partner after she confronted with
about his drug use. The reasoning and findings were set out in detail in
the Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them. Unless
otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s abbreviations and
descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision.
2. On 14 October 2026, the Removal Assessment and Litigation (Removal and
Deportation) Section (3) of the Immigration Department faxed a letter
to the court, informing the court that the applicant would like to
withdraw her judicial review application. Enclosed with the said
letter was the applicant’s signed “Detainee Submission Sheet” of the
Nei Kwu Correctional Institution dated 13 October 2026 written in
English. In the letter, the applicant stated that she would like to
withdraw the Leave Application as it was safe for her to go home. In
the circumstances, this court will dispose of the Leave Application on
paper.
Discussion
3. A leave application operates as a ‘filtering’ process. Hence, there is
no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my
decision.[2] It is therefore sufficient to state my observations
after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials
adduced.
4. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds
of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full
and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an
affidavit. In her Form 86, the applicant averred that the Board was
wrong in having failed to properly consider the various aspects of her
claims. The supporting affirmation provided no such grounds.
5. As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively
within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will
not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law,
procedural unfairness, or irrationality.[4] In the present case, the
Board accepted the applicant’s evidence as credible. However, it found
that there was no evidence to suggest that the applicant’s ex-partner
maintained a genuine intention to kill or harm the applicant. The past
ill-treatment also did not meet the requisite level of severity. The
Board therefore concluded that the applicant would not face any risk
of harm if refouled. The Board further found that both state
protection and internal relocation would be reasonably available.
These are findings of fact, which the court in a judicial review will
not interfere with subject to there being any public law errors.
6. Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in
scrutinizing the decision of the Board, this court is satisfied that
the Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and
observed a very high standard of fairness. The grounds provided in
the Form 86 were vague and general. I am not satisfied that the
applicant has provided any grounds in support of the Leave
Application. The applicant has not shown any errors of law or
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not
reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success such that
would enable this court to grant leave[5].
Withdrawal application
7. Apart from the application to withdraw the Leave Application referred
to above, there is nothing outstanding in this action. In the
circumstances, I make an order to dismiss the Leave Application, and
hereby order the dismissal of the Leave Application: see Re Manik Md
Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471; Ngo Xuan Tuyen v Torture Claims Appeal
Board [2024] HKCA 1140.
Order
8. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be
dismissed.
Dated the 10th day of November 2026.
| |(Alfred Chan) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the Applicant:| | |
| | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the Applicant|Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such | |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as |on 10/11/2026 |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the | |solicitors / such |
|Court the order granting|Regulacion Leny Rose |Putative Interested |
|leave and any directions|Agustin |Parties as may be |
|given within 14 days | |directed by the Court / |
|after the leave was |Applicant’s ref. no: |the Putative Interested |
|granted (Order 53, rule |Nil. |Parties’ solicitors on |
|4A); | |10/11/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the originating| |Torture Claims Appeal |
|summons within 14 days | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|after the grant of leave| |Claims Petition Office |
|and serve it in | |Putative Respondent’s |
|accordance with Order | |ref. no.: |
|53, rule 5; and | |USM 28796 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every other| |Director of Immigration |
|party copies of every | |Putative Interested |
|affidavit which the | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C|
|Applicant proposes to | |519/26 (formerly |
|use at the hearing, | |RBCZ/5000417/26) |
|including the affidavit | | |
|in support of | |Department of Justice, |
|the application for | |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the
Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the
risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong
Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers
to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the
risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under
Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s
Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to
process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description
of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor
[2015] 3 HKC 293.
[2] Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at §23.
[3] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL
21/2015, 22 December 2016 at §142.
[4] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328;
Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v
Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
[5] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676.