BILAL AHMAD v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 520/2020

[2025] HKCFI 2199

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 520 of 2020

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following;

	consideration of documents only;          or
	consideration of documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.  By Form 86 filed on 7 April 2020 (the “Form”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (the “Leave Application”) against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non‑refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 26 March 2020 (the “Board’s Decision”).

2.  The Applicant requested an oral hearing for the application. The hearing took place on 6 May 2025 and the Applicant attended in person. At the hearing, the Applicant alleged that he has changed his name to “Bilal Ahmed”, and had already informed the Immigration Department. The Applicant however had not submitted any document to the court in support of such change of name. I note that the Applicant’s name as written on the Form and in the supporting Affirmation remains “Bilal Ahmad”. In any event, nothing turns on the alleged change of name and I had told the Applicant to make the necessary application to the Immigration Department if necessary.

3.  Apart from the alleged change of name, the Applicant said at the hearing that he has problem with his leg and cannot stand for long. He further indicated that he has scars over his body, and he easily forgot what he said. Save as aforesaid, the Applicant had nothing further to say in respect of the Leave Application.

Background

4.  The Applicant’s background, the basis of his claim and the arguments he advanced had been set out in details in the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary for me to repeat the same here. The hyperlink to the Board’s Decision is included below[1] for reference.

Discussion

5.  The applicable legal principles relating to application of this sort are well established. The role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. The primary decision makers are the Director of Immigration (the “Director”) and the Board. Though in non-refoulement cases, the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the Court should not usurp the role of the Board. Assessment of evidence, country of origin information (COI) materials, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board. (See Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, at §14)

6.  In the Form and in the supporting Affirmation, the Applicant did not provide any grounds in support of the Leave Application. In the supporting Affirmation, the Applicant indicated that he wanted to apply for judicial review against both the Board’s Decision and the decision of the Director below.

7.  The Director’s decision dated 24 September 2018 had been superseded by the Board’s Decision. The Director’s decision is not a decision susceptible to judicial review once an appeal to the Board had been pursued (see Re: Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549, at §§31-45). Accordingly, in so far as the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review against the Director’s decision, such application fails in limine and is dismissed.

8.  I have considered the Board’s Decision in details. I do not find any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. Neither has the Applicant been able to demonstrate any of the same. There is nothing to indicate that the Board had failed to take into account any relevant matters. The Board’s Decision was comprehensive with adequate reasons provided. In particular, the Board had thoroughly considered the Applicant’s claims and the evidence, and was entitled to reject his claims (§§14-24, 29-40, 47-62, 66-86, 88-90 of the Board’s Decision). The Board’s Decision satisfies the enhanced Wednesbury test and is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational. I am not satisfied that the Applicant’s intended challenge of the Board’s Decision is reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success.

9.  I also do not regard the Applicant’s alleged problems or conditions as mentioned at the hearing on 6 May 2025 to be relevant to the Leave Application.

10.  Accordingly, I refuse to grant leave for judicial review.

11.  Leave application of this sort is meant to be a filtering process and I am not expected to give elaborated reasons for my decision (see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, at §23). Suffice for me to state that in reaching the decision, I have considered all the relevant documents before me.

Conclusion

12.  In light of the reasons provided above, I make an order that the Leave Application be dismissed.

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1