TRAN NGO HOANG v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5421 · HCAL 565/2024
Court of First Instance
HCAL 565/2024
[2026] HKCFI 5421
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 565 OF 2024
BETWEEN
| |Tran Ngo Hoang |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
|Π|consideration of the documents only; or |
| |consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant or |
| |counsel in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and “Director of
Immigration” be added as the putative interested party.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 8 April 2024, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 7 March 2024 (“the Board’s Decision”). The
Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2024/HCAL000565_
2024_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that he
was entitled to non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong on any of the
applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”).
Accordingly, the Board dismissed his appeal/petition against decision
of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 29 November 2023
(“the Director’s Decision”) and confirmed the same, which rejected the
applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
Amendments
3. In Form 86, the applicant named “thE TO RTURE CLAiMS APPEAL BOARD
DIRETOR OF IMMi GRATiON” as the putative respondent and did not name
any putative interested party.
4. In fact, only the Board should be named as the putative respondent,
and the Director should be named as the putative interested party.
5. This court therefore makes an order on its own motion to amend the
name of the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and
to add “Director of Immigration” as the putative interested party.
The applicant’s case
6. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
7. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Vietnam, he would be harmed or killed by a moneylender
named Vu Xuan Tuan (“the moneylender”), as he was unable to repay a
loan of 1,000 million Vietnamese Dong to the moneylender.
Disposal on paper
8. The applicant did not request for an oral hearing of the Leave
Application. This court is also satisfied that the Leave Application
can be disposed of based on the written materials before this court.
Hence, the Leave Application is dealt with on paper.
Grounds for judicial review
9. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
10. The applicant did not advance any ground for his intended judicial
review in Form 86, nor in his supporting affirmation dated 8 April
2024.
11. In the said affirmation, the applicant merely stated that he was
applying for judicial review against the decision of the Director.
Discussion
12. First of all, only the Board’s Decision is reviewable by judicial
process and not the Director’s Decision. There are established
statutory procedures of appeal from the Director to the Board and the
applicant had invoked those procedures. The Director’s Decision was
superseded by the Board’s Decision and is no longer susceptible to
judicial review (see Re Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549). This court will
therefore deal with the Leave Application in respect of the Board’s
Decision only.
13. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness, or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
14. Thus, despite the fact that the applicant failed to advance any valid
ground for the intended judicial review, this court will scrutinize
the Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness, or
irrationality as aforesaid.
15. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an
oral hearing on 5 February 2024. The applicant was present and was
thus given the chance to present his case to the Board in person.
16. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board gave full and
detailed reasoning in rejecting the applicant’s claims. Its detailed
consideration of the applicant’s claims was laid out in paragraphs 52
to 135 of the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary to repeat the
same here.
17. In gist, the Board found that there were numerous material
inconsistencies and implausibility in the applicant’s core account.
The discrepancies and implausibility were fatal and the centerpiece of
his story could not stand. The Board found that the applicant was not
a credible witness. The Board found that the applicant’s claim
relating to his borrowing money for his business was entirely lacking
in even the most basic levels of coherence, detail or fundamental
credibility. The Board had no doubt that this aspect of the claim was
simply a fabrication and that no credence whatsoever could be given to
it.
18. Despite its findings as summarised above, the Board went on to assess
the applicant’s risks on all the applicable grounds under the USM.
The Board found that even on the applicant’s account, the moneylender
was acting in his personal and private capacity. There was no
evidence of state acquiescence in the alleged ill-treatment of the
applicant. The applicant’s dispute with the moneylender was purely a
private and personal dispute and had nothing to do with any of the
Convention reasons. The Board did not accept that there were ill-
treatments from the moneylender.
19. Moreover, the Board considered extensive country of origin information
(“COI”) to assess the availability of state protection to the
applicant in paragraphs 143 to 149 of the Board’s Decision. The Board
considered that despite setbacks, the Vietnamese government was able
and willing to provide reasonable protection. The applicant had not
discharged his onus why he could not obtain and seek state protection.
20. Furthermore, the Board had explored the viability of internal
relocation for the applicant as a matter of caution and had given full
reasons in paragraphs 175 to 184 of the Board’s Decision for its
conclusion that it would not be unduly harsh or unreasonable for the
applicant to relocate internally to a place of his choice in Vietnam
to lower or negate any perceived risk of ill-treatment from the
moneylender.
21. Thus, the Board concluded that the applicant’s claim for non-
refoulement protection failed on all the applicable grounds under the
USM.
22. The finding of facts relating to a non-refoulement claim, including
the assessment of evidence, COI and risk of harm, was solely within
the ambit of the Board in dealing with the applicant’s
appeal/petition. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in
the way the Board reached its decision.
23. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
24. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
25. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 23rd day of September 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or his solicitors | | |
|must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / the|
|interested parties as |applicant’s |putative respondent’s |
|may be directed by the|solicitors |solicitors / such |
|Court the order |on: 23/09/2026 |putative interested |
|granting leave and any| |parties as may be |
|directions given | |directed by the Court / |
|within 14 days after | |the putative interested |
|the leave was granted | |parties’ solicitors on: |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); |Applicant’s ref. no: |23/09/2026 |
| |Nil | |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | | |
|within 14 days after | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|the grant of leave and| |Board/Non-refoulement |
|serve it in accordance| |Claims Petition Office |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |Putative respondent’s |
|and | |ref. no.: |
| | |USM 22572 |
|c) supply to every | | |
|other party copies of | |Director of Immigration |
|every affidavit which | |Putative interested |
|the Applicant proposes| |party’s ref. no.: |
|to use at the hearing,| |QA T/C 1128/23 (formerly |
|including the | |RBCZ 5001040/23) |
|affidavit in support | | |
|of the application for| |Department of Justice, |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Senior Assistant Law |
|6(5)). | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit 2)|
Form CALL-1