HKSAR v. ABDUL SAMEER AND ANOTHER

DCCC 141/2023

[2023] HKDC 1416

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CRIMINAL CASE NO 141 OF 2023

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REASONS FOR SENTENCE

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1.  D1 pleaded guilty to 7 counts of obtaining property by deception (2^nd to 8^th Charges), contrary to section 17(1)  of the Theft Ordinance, Cap 210.

2.  D2 pleaded guilty to one count of robbery (1^st Charge), contrary to section 10 of the Theft Ordinance, and 5 counts of obtaining property by deception (4^th to 8^th Charges).

FACTS

2^nd Charge

3.  Around 5:37 am on 26 August 2017, D1 entered the 7-Eleven Convenience Store at Ground Floor, No 3 Lan Kwai Fong, Central and bought 4 packets of cigarettes for $228 with an HSBC credit card numbered xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-4758 in the name of Flament Antonin Guy Gerard (the Credit Card).

3^rd Charge

4.  Around 5:40 am on the same day, D1 entered the same convenience store at Lan Kwai Fong and bought a packet of cigarettes and a lighter for $68 with the Credit Card.

4^th Charge

5.  Around 6:47 am on the same day, D1 and D2 entered the 7-Eleven Convenience Store at Ground Floor, No 23 Lock Road, Tsim Sha Tsui and bought 2 cans of drink for $53.  D1 used the Credit Card to pay for the drinks.

5^th Charge

6.  Around 7 am on the same day, D1 went into the same convenience store at Lock Road and bought a can of drink for $11 with the Credit Card while D2 waited outside.

6^th Charge

7.  Around 7:37 am on the same day, D1 entered the 7-Eleven Convenience Store at Ground floor, No 6 Ichang Street, Tsim Sha Tsui and bought a packet of cigarettes and 2 cans of drink for $110 with the Credit Card while D2 waited outside.

7^th Charge

8.  Around 10:07 am on the same day, D1 and D2 entered the 7-Eleven Convenience Store at Shop No S18, Sham Shui Po MTR Station and bought a bottle of water and a mask for $11.  D1 used the Credit Card to pay for these items.

8^th Charge

9.  Around 10:19 am on the same day, D1 and D2 entered a shop called Xin Hui at Ground Floor, No 232A Apliu Street, Sham Shui Po and bought 3 iPhones for $19,570.  D2 used the Credit Card to pay for the phones.

D1’S ARREST AND ADMISSION

10.  D1 was arrested on 23 October 2017.  Under caution, he said the Credit Card had been acquired by D2 during a fight.  D2 then gave him the Credit Card and told him that he could use it to buy things.  He admitted using the Credit Card to make the purchases at the abovementioned convenience stores.  It was D2 who used the Credit Card to pay for the iPhones at Xin Hui.

D2’S ARREST AND ADMISSIONS

11.  D2 was arrested on 30 October 2017.  Under caution, he admitted that:-

(i)  Between 3:45 am and 4:15 am on 26 August 2017, the holder of the Credit Card Flament (the Victim)  had a dispute and a fight with his friends D1, Michael, Nathaniel and Soda. After the fight broke up, Soda found her mobile phone missing. His friends discovered that the phone had been taken by the Victim, who demanded payment for the return of the phone. D2 and his friends were able to locate the Victim in Wing Lok Street. When the Victim refused to return the phone, they started attacking him until he handed over the phone. During this attack, D2 kicked the Victim’s thigh a few times.

(ii)  Just as they were leaving after the attack, someone suggested taking the Victim’s wallet. As a result, their group approached the Victim and beat him again. During the process, D2 lifted up the Victim’s legs. He saw D1 taking the Victim’s wallet from his pocket. They then left the scene. D2 and his friends took the $200 cash and the Credit Card out of the wallet and threw away the wallet and its contents.

(iii)  He did go to the convenience stores mentioned in the 4^th, 5^th, 6^th and 7^th Charges with D1 and was either in the store with D1 or waiting outside. He was aware that D1 made the purchases at those stores with the Credit Card.

(iv)  He went with D1 to Xin Hui and bought 3 iPhone and accessories with the Credit Card. It was he who signed the credit card receipt. He and D1 later sold the iPhones for HK$14,000 and shared the proceeds.

12.  The Loss Prevention Officer of 7-Eleven and the salesperson of Xin Hui confirmed that they will not accept payment if the buyer presenting a credit card for payment is not the genuine cardholder.

THE DEFENDANTS’ BACKGROUND

13.  D1 is 22 years old.  He was born in Hong Kong on 4 January 2001 and was educated here up to Form 6 and was studying HKU Space Community College before his arrest for the dangerous drugs case.  His family consists of his parents who are both 52 years old, a 30-year-old elder sister who is married and living in Pakistan, a 25-year-old elder brother and an 18-year-old younger sister.

14.  He has 4 previous convictions, all drug-related and all were committed after the present offences.  He is currently serving a 49-month sentence imposed on 5 October 2022 for drug trafficking and possession of Part I poison.

15.  D2 is 22 years old.  He was born in Kolkata, India on 8 December 2000.  He came to Hong Kong when he was 1 or 2 years old.  He was educated in Hong Kong and finished his secondary schooling in 2019.  His family consists of his parents and an elder sister.  He had been working in the food and beverage business since his graduation until his re-arrest in December 2022.

16.  He has a previous conviction for possession of a dangerous drug and was fined $2,000 on 2 July 2019.

MITIGATION

17.  D1 was only 16 years old and a Form 4 student when he committed the present offences.  At that time, he had a clear record.

18.  D1’s counsel Mr Hingorani pointed out that the items purchased by D1 with the use of the Credit Card were small items.  He was young and stupid, and easily influenced by others.  Nonetheless, he is remorseful for having committed those offences.

19.  In prison, he is trying to be a better person, follow a better path and become a law-abiding citizen with the hope of integrating in the community.

20.  Mr. Hingorani referred to two District Court[1] cases not only for the actual sentence imposed in those cases but also for the starting points adopted by the courts with regard to “small credit card fraud”.  I shall deal with those cases later.

21.  In his supplemental mitigation submission, Mr Hingorani, having had sight of the mitigation submissions advanced by D2’s counsel Mr Delaney, expressed his agreement with the views expressed therein and submitted that s 109A of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (s 109A)  would have applied to D1 had he been timely prosecuted and sentenced between the ages of 16 and 21, and that he would have been an ideal candidate for a Community Service Order (CSO)  given his age, his clear record, the circumstances of the offences, his admission and cooperation with the police, and his admission of guilt.

22.  However, by reason of the inexcusable delay in the prosecution of this case, D1 is now over 21 and is serving a prison sentence, having been deprived of the chance to benefit from the rehabilitative effect of a CSO.  While acknowledging that sentencing options such as Probation and CSO may not be available to D1 now that he is already serving a term of imprisonment, nevertheless Mr Hingorani submitted that the fact that they would have been suitable calls for a sentence that is not more serious than the ones such Orders represent.

23.  In his letter to the court, D1 said he is truly sorry for having broken the law.  He was young and stupid and was easily influenced by his friends.  In prison, he is trying to be a smarter and better person, and is studying a course by the Hong Kong Metropolitan University, in the hope that he will be able to integrate into the community and become a law-abiding and civilised person upon his release.

24.  As for D2, regarding the circumstances of the offence, Mr Delaney submitted that the clashes with the Victim which eventually led to his being robbed had been instigated by the Victim himself.  According to D2, the Victim had approached him and his friends to offer them drugs and he continued to harass them when they ignored his offer.  The Victim then got into a fight with his friends, during which he snatched Soda’s phone.  Subsequently when he refused to return the phone unless money was given to him, D2 and his friends sought him out and, in the midst of this encounter, the 1^st Charge of robbery was committed.  D2 claimed that he was slightly drunk and was acting under the influence of D1 and Michael, both of whom he wanted to befriend.  D2 only joined in the robbery after the others had started assaulting the Victim.  He himself had kicked the Victim’s thigh a few times.

25.  As for the 4^th to 7^th Charges, it was D1 who used the Credit Card for the purchases while he was either standing around in the store or waiting outside.  As for the 8^th Charge, D1 was nearby overseeing D2 who was persuaded to sign for the illicit purchase.  All the purchases were made in one day.

26.  Mr Delaney pointed out that, apart from D2’s remorse as evidenced by his frank admissions to the police and his present pleas of guilty, there are exceptional circumstances in this case.  D2 was 16 years old when he committed these offences.  As a result of unreasonable and inordinate delay in prosecution, he is facing sentencing by the court 6 years after the offence.  During these 6 years, he has rehabilitated himself.  He had been in steady and continuous employment since leaving school up to the time of his re-arrest in December 2012.

27.  Given those exceptional circumstances, D2 should be considered as possibly suitable for a CSO or at least a Detention Centre Order.  However, if the court is minded to impose a custodial sentence, the sentence for individual charges should be made concurrent or partly concurrent.

28.  In his letter to the court, D2 recounts the hardship he faces by reason of his being re-arrested and charged some 5 years after the offences were committed.  The re-opening of the case against him after such a long time through no fault of his has affected his career, his personal life, his confidence and his mental health.  He asks for the court’s understanding of his situation and due consideration of the question of delay.

29.  The authorities relied on by Mr Delaney will be dealt with in due course.

SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS

Effect of s 109A

30.  As both defence counsel pointed out, the two defendants were both 16 years old at the time they committed these offences, which was slightly over 6 years ago.  Leaving aside the question of delay in prosecution, which will be dealt with later, had the defendants been timeously brought to court and dealt with, it is likely that they would be dealt with before they turned 21, and s 109A, which stipulates that “No court shall sentence a person of or over 16 and under 21 years of age to imprisonment unless the court is of opinion that no other method of dealing with such person is appropriate…” would have applied.

31.  Counsel submitted that the fact that a defendant has turned 21 years old between the date of the offence and the date of sentence is a powerful factor in sentencing and the defendant should be treated as if s  109A still applied.

32.  The Court of Final Appeal in HKSAR v Leung Hiu Yeung (2018)  HKCFAR 43 pointed out that:-

“…in practical terms, this will mean that a young offender who has turned 21 by the time of sentencing should only be sent to prison as a matter of last resort and, for that purpose, the court will have to be alive to the possibility it may need to obtain reports on the young person in question…”

33.  Since D1 is already in prison serving a sentence of 49 months, the application of s 109A to the charges of obtaining property by deception to which he pleaded guilty is more academic than real.  In practical terms, prison sentence is the only viable alternative for this defendant.  In light of his present situation, to use the wordings of s 109A, this court “is of opinion that no other method of dealing with such person is appropriate”.

34.  Regarding D2, Mr Delaney concedes that while s 109A applies to the charges of obtaining property by deception, it does not apply to the 1^st Charge of robbery as it is an excepted offence.

35.  The court might add that of s 109A, the Court of Final Appeal said in Secretary for Justice v Wong Chee Fung [2018] 21 HKCFAR 35, at [86]:-

“It is clear that the purpose of the provision is to ensure that, save in respect of certain offences, the imprisonment of young persons between the ages of 16 and 21 is a sentencing measure of last resort.”

36.  Nevertheless, Mr Delaney asked the court to give due consideration to D2’s age when he committed the offences and to the provisions of s 109A enjoining the courts to consider sentence of imprisonment as a last resort for such a young person.

37.  Mr Delaney then pointed out that there are most exceptional circumstances in the case of D2.  Such circumstances have arisen principally from the fact that he was 16 when he committed the present offences and is 22 now when he is being sentenced by the court.  Due to inactivity by the prosecuting authorities, he fully expected that the case had been closed.  To sentence him to prison now would be, in Mr Delaney words, “excessive and/or too remote” and would serve little purpose given the circumstances.

38.  A CSO, on the other hand, would strike the right balance, since such orders serve the dual purpose of “both punishment and deterrence”, as pointed out by the court in HKSAR v Ogawa Shuichi HCMA 174/1999, and should be considered as a sentencing option where there are very “exceptional circumstances”, even for serious offences involving bribery and corruption, as the Court of Appeal pointed out in the case of HKSAR v Li Cheuk Ming CAAR 2/1998; [1990] 1 HKLRD 63.

39.  Having regard to the fact that one of the offences D2 pleaded guilty to was robbery, which was excepted from the operation of s 109A and is a serious offence not only by reason of its nature but also because of the way it was committed in this case, this court does not agree that CSO would be an appropriate sentence for this offence, even given what Mr Delaney called “the exceptional circumstances” of this case.

DELAY IN PROSECUTION

40.  There has been a delay of over 5 years between the commission of the offences and the charging of the defendants.  Both defence counsel submitted that through no fault of either of the defendants, there has been unreasonable and inexcusable delay in prosecution, and the delay is primarily the result of the Department of Justice’s (DOJ)  slow response in providing legal advice to the police.

41.  Paragraph 32 of Mr Delaney’s Mitigation Submissions says:-

“According to the Pol 155 reports:

(a)  Police had already stopped conducting further investigations on this case after 4^th January 2018 and were awaiting legal advice from the Department of Justice [DPC 9161 Pol. 155]

(b)  As at 6 August 2019, 18 months later, the Department of Justice had not even started preparing the legal advice [DPC 19632 Pol.155]. This is approximately 1 year and 6 months after police stopped investigating the case and passed it on to the Department of Justice for legal advice.

(c)  It was approximately 5 years, between 4^th January 2018 and 16^th December 2022 (when police re-arrested the second Defendant and laid charges against him). Over the period, the police contacted the Department of Justice approximately 69 times to enquire about the progress of the legal advice.

(d)  With regard to these 69 police enquiries, the Department of Justice, among other responses:-

(i)  Did not answer the phone and did not call back on over 38 occasions.

(ii)  Stated that the legal advice would be done within the month on 5 occasions.

(iii)  Stated that they are still in the midst of preparing the legal advice on 25 occasions.

(iv)  Stated that the legal advice was pending approval on one occasion.”

42.  Mr Delaney submitted that this is a relatively simple case and the police had already obtained sufficient evidence by 30 October 2017 from interviews with the victims and other relevant personnel, the various CCTV footage capturing the commission of the offences, and admissions from the defendants.  The police ceased to conduct further investigation by 4 January 2018.

43.  Reference was made to the case of HKSAR v Chan Chun Ming HCCC 221/2020, where DHCJ Bruce, SC referred to various authorities dealing with the question of inordinate or unreasonable delay and the rationale for reduction of sentence on account of such delay.  One of the cases referred to was HKSAR v Lau Kin Yu HCMA 391/2002 where DHCJ Barnes (as Barnes J then was)  said, “In my view, significant and unexplained delay, per se, is a ground to pass a more lenient sentence on a defendant than what would otherwise have been a proper sentence.”  Another case referred to is HKSAR v Chan Chun Chuen CACC 233/2015 where Stuart-Moore VP held that the delay must be unreasonable and through no fault of the defendant.

44.  In light of those circumstances and legal principles, it was submitted that there had been inordinate and inexcusable delay in the prosecution of the defendants.

45.  A Chronology of Events was submitted to assist the court in assessing the question of prosecutorial delay.  This chronology consists of 13 pages, with a timeline starting from 26 August 2017 when the offences were committed to 22 December 2022 when D2 was granted police bail after his second arrest.

46.  It is not clear from this chronology when the police sought legal advice from the DOJ.  The first entry about legal advice is one dated 26 August 2018 which says, “DOJ faxed memo to police stating that the legal advice will be provided as soon as possible.”  The entry immediately preceding this one is dated 4 January 2018 which says, “Police interviewed the victim.”  The prosecution informed the court that the case file was submitted to DOJ for advice on 13 April 2018.

47.  It is most unfortunate and regrettable that the DOJ had failed to live up to their promise of providing their advice as soon as possible.  The last entry about such advice is dated 7 September 2022 which says “Police contacted DOJ.  DOJ informed the police that legal advice was complete but pending approval.”

48.  It has thus taken the DOJ close to 4½ years to furnish their legal advice to the police.  In the meantime, the police had been untiringly chasing the DOJ for progress regarding the legal advice.  The police had contacted the DOJ for this purpose close to 70 times.  For about half of those 70 times, their phone calls to the DOJ were unanswered.  The Police were told over 20 times that the DOJ were preparing the advice.  What is more shocking is that despite the DOJ’s assurances that the advice would be ready within a month, as evidenced by the two entries dated 12 and 28 November 2018 and an entry dated 4 February 2019, they told the Police on 30 June 2019, 16 July 2019 and 6 August 2019 that “they have not started on the legal advice yet”.

49.  This is a simple case involving just a handful of witnesses[2] and probably very few documentary exhibits.  The factual and the legal issues are relatively straight forward.  Taking 4 years to advice on this case is undoubtedly unreasonable and unjustifiable.  The Chronology of Events shows that DOJ had been procrastinating and was dilatory in the provision of legal advice to the police, who had been acting with due diligence in both their investigation and their pursuit of such advice.

50.  I hold that there has been unreasonable and inordinate delay in prosecution.

IMPACT OF DELAY ON SENTENCING

51.  Reference was made Mr Delaney to HKSAR v Chu On Chi CACC 484/2006, where the Court of Appeal said, at paragraph 10 if its judgment:-

“Where there has been a delay in prosecution, the sentencing court must take it into account. In particular, where the defendant rehabilitated, resumed work or repaid debts during the period of delay, the court will consider reducing the term of imprisonment, passing a suspended sentence or imposing a punishment other than an immediate custodial sentence such as community service order.”

52.  It was submitted that D2 had been rehabilitated and reformed during the delay.  Since his graduation from secondary school in 2019, he had been gainfully and continuously employed up until his re-arrest in December 2022.  Mr Delaney urged the court to consider CSO, as punishment in the form of imprisonment now would be “excessive and/or too remote” and would serve little purpose.

53.  The court does not agree that imprisonment would serve little purpose, at least insofar as the robbery charge is concerned.  In HKSAR v Wu Yee Ki CACC 513/2005, the Court of Appeal, in paragraph 26 of its judgment, said:-

“[26] One starts from the principle that no young person should be sentenced to imprisonment if he or she can suitably be dealt with in another way: section 11 Juvenile Offenders Ordinance, Cap. 226. But as this Court pointed out in HKSAR v Law Ka-kit [2003] 2 HKC 178, the nature or prevalence of an offence may be such as to demand an immediate custodial sentence despite the youth of the offender. Robbery has for long been recognised as an offence within that category. It is within a band of cases where youth is not a strong mitigating factor…”

54.  This is a serious case of robbery involving more than a single culprit beating up and robbing the Victim shortly after he suffered another beating by them.  D2 admitted to kicking the Victim a few times on his thigh after the others had initiated the assault.  He may not have suggested robbing the Victim, or started the assault on him, but he certainly made matters worse for the Victim by joining in the attack and taking away the Victim’s wallet.

55.  This court takes the view that the need for deterrence and retribution outweighs the need for the defendant’s reformation, and the only appropriate method of dealing with D2 which fits the crime of robbery is by way of imprisonment.

56.  Since robbery is an excepted offence for which a prison sentence cannot be suspended, the court will reduce the term of imprisonment on account of the undue delay in prosecution.

ROBBERY

57.  The robbery in this case did not involve the use of weapons.  In HKSAR v Ting Chiu [2003] 3 HKLRD 378, 4 years’ imprisonment was considered appropriate for an unarmed robbery committed on a hiking couple by 4 culprits with the use of little physical violence and involved relatively minor loss of property.

58.  The Court of Appeal in HKSAR v Tam Ping Wo Angus [2020] HKCA 1012 said:-

“[16] For unarmed robbery the starting point will generally be no more than 4 years’ imprisonment. However, 4 years is not to be regarded as the ‘normal’ sentence for an unarmed robbery. In HKSAR v Thapa Min Bahadur the Court of Appeal said:

‘…We do take issue with the Judge when he said ‘the normal sentence for offences of this kind where no weapon is used is a sentence of 4 years’ imprisonment… There is a range of sentence within which the sentence appropriate to the particular circumstances of the individual case is to be chosen…’”

59.  In HKSAR v Yeung Chi Wai [2019] HKDC 1046, the judge adopted a starting point of 3 years and 3 months for an unarmed robbery involving a lone robber preying on a lone lady walking in the street at night and injuring the victim who suffered abrasions from being dragged on the ground for 5 metres.

60.  According to D2’s admission to the police, the robbery in this case involved some 4 or 5 culprits including himself assaulting the Victim and robbing him of his wallet after the Victim had just been beaten up by them for refusing to hand over the mobile phone that he had taken from one of the defendants’ friends.

61.  One thing for certain is that, despite what the Victim is alleged to have done to D2 and his friends and his friend Soda’s mobile phone, it was wrong for D2 and his friends to have taking the law into their own hands by beating the Victim up in order to get the phone back.  It was an even greater wrong that shortly after the Victim had been subjected to their beating and was in all probabilities in a weak and defenceless state that D2 and his friends saw it fit to exploit the Victim’s vulnerability by giving the Victim another beating and robbing him.

62.  The circumstances of the offence are more serious than those in the Yeung Chi Wai case.  D2 was not acting alone in the commission of the robbery.  The Victim was subjected to a deliberate beating and not just a simple push or shove.

63.  Given the gravity of the offence, an appropriate starting point would be 3 years and 8 months’ imprisonment.

OBTAINING PROPERTY BY DECEPTION/CREDIT CARD FRAUD

64.  This is a simple case of credit card fraud.  With the exception of the purchase of the iPhones for $19,570, the card was used to pay for consumable items ranging from $11 to $228 in various convenience stores.  The Credit Card had been used in 7 fraudulent purchases, all made in one day, resulting in a total value of $20,051 for all the items purchased.  The prosecution informed the court that the credit limit of the Credit Card was $180,000.

65.  The frauds were perpetuated in a simple, straight-forward manner involving one of the defendants using the Credit Card for the purchase and the other defendant staying close by.  The frauds did not involve any elaborate planning or operation.  Although there existed a huge potential for loss by reason of the card’s credit limit, Mr. Delaney informed the court that the Credit Card was discarded shortly after the purchase of the iPhones.  The potential for loss was therefore curtailed by the defendant’s own act.  The court is prepared to accept this submission. There are no other aggravating features.

66.  Various Court of Appeal decisions were referred to in Mr Hingorani’s submissions.  One was the case of R v Chan Sui To & Another [1996] 2 HKCLR 128 where it was held that in ascertaining the sentence for credit card fraud, a sentencing judge will need to consider various factors including (a)  the size of the operation, eg whether it involved large sums of money, whether it concerned a large number of persons or forged credit cards; (b)  the planning that had gone into in perpetuating the fraud, whether it was elaborate or simple, whether technical skills were used, and to what extent; (c)  whether there was an international dimension; (d)  whether the accused played a major role, eg running a syndicate, engaging in actual manufacture, organising the use of forged credit cards, or whether he was a mere “cog in the wheel” as a courier or a custodian or keeper; and (e)  whether there was a plea of guilty.  These factors are, however, not intended to be exhaustive.

67.  Another decision referred to is HKSAR v Lam See Chung Stephen [2013] 5 HKLRD 242 where the Court of Appeal held that the 3-year starting point for simple cases of counterfeit credit card fraud also applied to the fraudulent use of stolen genuine credit cards. Many of the aggravating features of using counterfeit credit cards were peculiar to syndicated fraud, and were absent in the simple small-scale use of forged credit cards for which a sentence of 3 years’ imprisonment or less was appropriate.  The same sentencing principles, of which the most important consideration was the potential for loss which often exceeded the actual loss, applied to both types of offences.

68.  Both Mr Hingorani and Mr Delaney referred to HKSAR v Li Chi Yat [2019] HKCA 458, where the Court of Appeal held that a starting point of 2 years was appropriate in the case, pointing out that while such offences “require deterrent sentences in order to protect the integrity of the credit card system and to punish the offender for the loss and inconvenience to the credit card company and the cardholder”, the case before the court was “a case of credit card fraud at the lower end of the scale of criminality and this was clearly apparent by the fact that it involved the appellant acting alone in stealing opportunistically a single genuine credit card which he subsequently used or attempted to use on three occasions where the actual loss was a little under $8,000 and the potential loss, as represented by the credit card limit, was $20,000.  There was no planning or elaborate operation, or any other aggravating factors that would elevate the criminality to a higher level of seriousness.”[3]

69.  Mr Delaney also referred to a District Court sentencing case of HKSAR v Ho Hing Pan [2021] HKDC 1367 where a starting point of 2 years was considered appropriate where the defendant had used a credit card he had stolen to make 3 unauthorised transactions of $8,000 each at a shopping centre within one day.

70.  Having considered the facts of our case and the sentencing cases referred to above, a starting point of 2 years’ imprisonment would be appropriate for each of the credit card fraud charges.

71.  In view of this court concluding that imprisonment is the suitable sentence for the robbery charge, it would serve no useful purpose for a CSO report to be called for just in respect of the credit card fraud charges, if that was possible at all.

72.  For the obtaining property by deception charges, I would adopt a starting point of 2 years’ imprisonment on each charge for both defendants.

REDUCTION IN SENTENCE

73.  For their pleas of guilty, there will be a one-third discount in sentence for both defendants on all the charges.

74.  For the stress and the uncertain suspense that the defendants must have suffered during the delay, the sentences will be further reduced on top of the one-third discount, so that combined with the discount for their pleas, the sentence on each charge will be discounted by a total of 50%.

75.  The discounted sentence will be 22 months’ imprisonment for the robbery charge, and 12 months’ imprisonment for each of the credit card fraud charges.

TOTALITY

D1’s sentence

76.  Treating each fraudulent purchase as part and parcel of a single transaction, the sentences on all the obtaining property by deception charges are to run concurrently with each other, giving rise to a combined total sentence of 12 months for all the charges that D1 admitted.

77.  5 months of this combined total are to run consecutively to the term of 49 months that D1 is currently serving.

78.  This court is satisfied that the total of 54 months justly reflects D1’s overall criminality in both the present case and the case for which he is serving sentence.

D2’s sentence

79.  Similarly, I order that the sentences on all the obtaining property by deception charges that D2 admitted are to run concurrently with each other, giving rise to a combined total sentence of 12 months for these charges.

80.  This combined total of 12 months is to run concurrently with the sentence of 22 months for the robbery charge, giving rise to a final sentence of 22 months’ imprisonment for all the charges that D2 admitted.