PHAM HUU TUE v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5263 · HCAL 1046/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1046/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5263
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1046 OF 2023
BETWEEN
| |Pham Huu Tue |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and “Director of
Immigration” be added as the putative interested party.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 29 June 2023, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 21 June 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”). The
Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL00
1046_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement
protection failed on all the applicable grounds under the Unified
Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the Board dismissed the
applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of
Immigration (“the Director”) dated 8 July 2021 (“the Director’s
Decision”) and confirmed the same, which rejected the applicant’s
claim for non-refoulement protection.
Amendments
3. The applicant named the Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
and the Director as the putative respondents and did not name any
putative interested party in Form 86.
4. In fact, only the Board should be named as the putative respondent,
and the Director should be named as the putative interested party.
5. The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office providing
administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the
Board and should not be named as a putative respondent at all.
6. Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of
the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and to add
“Director of Immigration” as the putative interested party.
The applicant’s case
7. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
8. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Vietnam, he would be at risk of being harmed or killed
by his creditors named Pham Thi Mo, Nguyen Thi Luong and Duong Van
Vinh (collectively the “Moneylenders”) to whom he was indebted in
Vietnam and he had defaulted in repayment of his debt.
Oral hearing
9. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application
and his case was heard on 10 September 2026.
10. When this court asked the applicant to elaborate on the grounds of his
intended judicial review, which were stated in a document annexed to
his Form 86 with the title “Grounds on which relief is sought”, he
first said that the document was prepared by his friend and he could
not recall the details contained in it.
11. After the said document was interpreted to the applicant, the
applicant confirmed that he would rely on the contents stated therein,
and added that he wanted to stay in Hong Kong as his debt was still
outstanding.
Grounds for judicial review
12. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
13. The contents of the said document with the title “Grounds on which
relief is sought” were all very general and were in fact used by many
applicants in similar applications as their grounds for applying leave
to judicially review the Board’s decisions. It is like a template for
such applicants and they just used the grounds stated therein without
any regard to their own situations. Nevertheless, as the applicant is
relying on the said grounds to make the Leave Application, this court
will still deal with the grounds as discussed below.
14. As aforesaid, the applicant did not elaborate on any of the grounds
stated in the said document at the oral hearing. He only mentioned
that his debt was still outstanding, and he wanted to stay here.
Discussion
15. First of all, the applicant’s danger arising from his debt had been
duly assessed but rejected by the Board. If he intends to challenge
the Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an application
for judicial review.
16. As mentioned, all the grounds contained in the document with the title
“Grounds on which relief is sought” are very general. Some of the
grounds therein were directed at the Director. As the Director’s
Decision was superseded by the Board’s Decision, it is no longer
susceptible to judicial review (see Re Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549).
This court will therefore consider only those grounds directed at the
Board in respect of the Board’s Decision.
17. There are a total of 6 paragraphs under the heading “Grounds” in the
applicant’s said document. Paragraphs 2 and 5 of the applicant’s
grounds were directed at the Director. Hence, they could not be used
to challenge the Board’s Decision and can be simply ignored. Thus,
only paragraphs 1, 3, 4 and 6 of the grounds are relevant to the Leave
Application.
18. In paragraph 1 of the grounds, the applicant alleged that the
adjudicator of the Board reached the Board’s Decision wrongly and it
was not reasonable and fair as required by the Wednesbury test.
However, the applicant did not state how or why the Board’s Decision
was wrong, unfair and unreasonable. It does not help the applicant to
establish any ground by just mentioning the right to life in paragraph
1 either.
19. In any event, the Board did assess the applicant’s risk of right to
life but it did not consider that the applicant faced risk of life
danger contemplated under BOR 2[1] if refouled to Vietnam (see
paragraphs 87 and 88 of the Board’s Decision).
20. In paragraph 3 of the grounds, the applicant alleged that the
adjudicator acted unreasonably and was procedurally unfair by placing
too much reliance on country of origin information (“COI”) but failed
to take his personal background and experience into account. However,
the applicant did not state which aspects of his personal background
and experience had not been taken into account by the Board.
21. In paragraph 4 of the grounds, the applicant alleged that the
adjudicator was procedurally improper and unfair when assessing
whether to accept or not to accept explanations provided by him, and
unreasonably required him to respond to questions. This accusation
lacks any particulars in support. The applicant did not state which
explanations he provided were not accepted by the Board and which
questions he was unreasonably required to answer.
22. There was in fact nothing wrong for the Board to question the
applicant extensively to try to understand his claims better and to
assess his credibility and his accounts of the events leading to his
claim for non-refoulement protection. The questions were necessary
for the Board to fulfil its duty of finding of facts in relation to
the applicant’s claim. This court finds no fault or unfairness in the
Board’s questioning of the applicant at all.
23. In paragraph 6 of the grounds, the applicant simply alleged that the
adjudicator ought to allow the appeal/petition and the Board’s
Decision was irrational. There was no particulars or reasons given to
say how or why the Board’s Decision was irrational.
24. The Board had in fact provided a detailed analysis of the applicant’s
claim and the reasons why the Board concluded that the applicant
failed on all applicable grounds under the USM to claim non-
refoulement protection. The Board’s rejection of his non-refoulement
claim was a decision made after due consideration of the law and the
evidence placed before it.
25. The Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that general assertions
without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial
review (see Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20; Re Aziz Nasir [2019] HKCA
578; and Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626). Further, as held by the
Court of Appeal in Re Salim Ahmed alias MD Salim [2020] HKCA 244,
“general assertions or propositions of law cannot assist an appellant
when he fails to condescend to the requisite particulars related to
the facts of his case”.
26. Thus, none of the grounds that were contained in the applicant’s said
document could establish any valid ground to challenge the Board’s
Decision when they are so vague and general without any requisite
particulars related to the applicant’s case.
27. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
28. Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for
any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite
the lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the
intended judicial review.
29. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an
oral hearing on 25 October 2022 and the applicant was present. Thus,
the applicant was given the opportunity to present his case to the
Board in person.
30. The Board laid out its assessment of the applicant’s evidence in
paragraphs 70 to 83 of the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary
to repeat the same here.
31. In gist, the Board found that the applicant provided inconsistent and
contradictory evidence in relation to the circumstances surrounding
his loans. Cumulatively, those inconsistencies between the different
accounts led the Board to conclude that the evidence in relation to
the loans was untrue. The Board further found that beyond the
applicant’s basic personal and family details, almost all aspects of
his evidence were marked by mobility, irreconcilable inconsistencies,
and at times, implausibility. The Board was not satisfied that the
applicant’s core account of being indebted to the Moneylenders and
fearing harm from them for not having repaid the loans was credible.
The Board rejected his evidence in this regard.
32. Moreover, the Board found that even if the applicant’s case was
accepted, the Board found that the Moneylenders had not seriously
intended to harm or kill the applicant. The Moneylenders had taken no
action for 12 years since the applicant’s default on repayment. The
Board considered that the only reasonable conclusion was that they did
not in fact seriously intend to harm the applicant, and that their aim
was simply to frighten him into finding the money by any means
possible so as to repay the loan.
33. The Board therefore concluded that the harm and risk the applicant was
likely to face on his return to Vietnam was low.
34. In its assessment of the applicant’s claims on all the applicable
grounds under the USM, the Board found that the applicant’s fear only
arose from his inability to repay a loan, which was a private matter.
Even on the basis of the applicant’s account, the threat administered
by the Moneylenders did not attain the minimum level of severity
required. There was no element of state acquiescence in the alleged
ill-treatment of the applicant. His fear of ill-treatment did not
fall within any of the Convention categories.
35. Moreover, the Board found from COI that despite setbacks of the
Vietnamese government, state protection of an adequate standard was
available to the applicant to prevent or negate the risk and harm from
the Moneylenders. The Board was satisfied that the Vietnamese
government had taken steps to combat corruption, improve police
efficiency and effectiveness, and protect its citizens.
36. Given its findings as summarised above, the Board found that the
question of internal relocation did not arise. Despite that, the
Board had given reasons in paragraphs 96 to 97 of the Board’s Decision
for its view that the applicant could relocate without undue hardship
in Vietnam.
37. Thus, the Board concluded that the applicant had failed to establish a
case for non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong on any of the
applicable grounds under the USM.
38. The finding of facts, including the assessment of evidence, COI and
risk of harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board in dealing with
the applicant’s appeal/petition. The Board was entitled to make its
own decision. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the
way the Board reached its conclusion.
39. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
40. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
41. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 16th day of September 2026
| | |
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or the applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s |the putative |
|may be directed by the|solicitors on: |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order |16/09/2026 |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any| |interested parties as |
|directions given |Applicant’s ref. no: |may be directed by the |
|within 14 days after |Nil |Court / the putative |
|the leave was granted | |interested parties’ |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |16/09/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and| |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance| |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 18328 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the applicant proposes| |QA T/C 872/21(Formerly |
|to use at the hearing,| |RBCZ 10827/21) (T2I118) |
|including the | | |
|affidavit in support | |Department of Justice, |
|of the application for| |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
| | | |
| | | |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] Article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap
383.