RE JYOTI GURUNG

CACV 161/2022, [2024] HKCA 646

On appeal from [2022] HKCFI 1139

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 161 OF 2022

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 407 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 30 December 2022, this court (Barma JA and Au JA) handed down a judgment dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of DHCJ Bruno Chan given on 21 April 2022 refusing leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The applicant had sought to review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dismissing her appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration rejecting her non‑refoulement claim, as well as the Director’s decision itself.

2.  The facts and issues in the applicant’s appeal, as well as the court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in our judgment.[1]  We will not repeat them here.  

3.  The applicant subsequently applied, by a Notice of Motion filed on 18 January 2023, for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  In the Notice of Motion, the applicant stated:

“… there is some error in law in my decision. Decision maker just relied on COL information and my previous facts which were in favor while rejecting my claim. Acual (sic) life occur different situation then what is mentioned in COL Information. The Officer and cours (sic) prefers to ignore the overwhelming of the evidence of this violence towards minorities searching for unrealistic silver lining. The Decision is betray a bias and formula approach unlikely fairly access the danger of my life and clearly not reasonable.”

4.  In her written submissions lodged on 31 January 2023, the applicant referred to the well-established principles in ST v Director of Immigration (sic)[2] [2014] 4 HKLRD 277, Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar [2005] 1 HKLRD 289, R v Home Secretary, ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531 and R v Home Secretary, ex parte Bugdaycay [1987] 1 AC 514.

5.  Having considered the applicant’s Notice of Motion and written submissions, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining an application of this kind on the papers.  We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents filed.

6.  The matters stated by the applicant do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484.  Nor is any such question apparent to us from the matters she has raised.

7.  Neither the Notice of Motion nor the written submissions identify any supposed error in our judgment and they raise no ground that is reasonably arguable before the Court of Final Appeal.

8.  Further, there was no attempt by the applicant to elaborate on whether and, if so, how the trite principles referred to in her written submissions had not been applied in the consideration of her appeal by this court or in processing of her non-refoulement claim.

9.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).

10.  For these reasons, the Notice of Motion dated 18 January 2023 is dismissed.