NAHAR SAYELA v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5141 · HCAL 1269/2026
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1269/2026
[2026] HKCFI 5141
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1269 OF 2026
BETWEEN
| |Nahar Sayela |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and the name of the
putative interested party be amended to “Director of Immigration”.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 14 July 2026, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 8 May 2026 (“the Board’s Decision”). The
Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2026/HCAL00
1269_2026_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant was unable to make out her claims
for non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong on any of the applicable
grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”).
Accordingly, the Board rejected the applicant’s appeal/petition against
the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 8
January 2026 and confirmed the same, which rejected the applicant’s non-
refoulement claim.
Amendments
3. In Form 86, the applicant named “Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-
reFoulement Claims Petition OFFice” as the putative respondent, when
only the Board should be so named.
4. The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office providing
administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the Board
and should not be named as a putative respondent at all.
5. The applicant named the Director as the putative interested party but
spelt the name wrongly as “Director oF Immgration”.
6. Thus, on this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent
is amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and the name of the
putative interested party is amended to “Director of Immigration”.
The applicant’s case
7. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s Decision,
which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
8. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if
refouled to Bangladesh, she would be harmed or killed by her cousins
named Akhlasur Rahaman, Ataur Rahaman and Ahadur Rahaman, who are the
sons of the applicant’s paternal auntie named Meena Bibi (the cousins
and the auntie were collectively referred to as “the Enemies”) due to a
land dispute.
Oral hearing
9. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application
and her case was heard on 3 September 2026.
10. When this court asked the applicant for the grounds of her intended
judicial review, the applicant told this court that she could not
accept the Board’s Decision, as the Board did not consider her case
properly. The applicant said that she mentioned her problems in her
screening interview and at the Board’s hearing, but the Board found
that since her family remained safe in Bangladesh, the Board assumed
that she would be safe there too. The applicant then said that the
Board blamed her for not being able to produce evidence, but it was not
possible for her to prove the torture she suffered.
11. The applicant said that she had mentioned 7 incidents in her case to
the Board, but the Board made wrong decision on these 7 incidents.
However, she would only rely on 2 of these incidents. The applicant
confirmed that the first incident was the one mentioned in paragraphs
19 to 21 of the Board’s Decision.
12. The applicant at first mentioned that she was tortured during this
first incident. However, when this court pointed out to her that in
paragraph 19 of the Board’s Decision, there was no mentioning of her
being tortured, and what happened were just that her house window was
hit and her main gate was broken, the applicant then said that the
torture on her did not occur in this incident but on 4 November 2012.
13. The incident on 4 November 2012 was mentioned in paragraphs 28 to 30 of
the Board’s Decision. The applicant confirmed that the only torture
she suffered was the rape on her by Ahadur as mentioned in paragraph 28
of the Board’s Decision.
14. The applicant also said that her brother was kidnapped and murdered on
18 October 2012. The applicant’s mother went to her uncle’s house and
complained about the brother’s death. However, the uncle’s family
assaulted the applicant and her mother. The applicant confirmed that
this incident was mentioned in the Board’s Decision (see paragraph 27
of the Board’s Decision), but the Board did not believe it.
15. The applicant then told this court that she had mentioned to the Board
that her youngest sister was also raped (which was mentioned in
paragraph 34 of the Board’s Decision), but again the Board did not
properly consider this aspect of her claim.
16. The applicant went on to reiterate the land dispute between the two
families which occurred in 2002.
17. Finally, the applicant said that she was put in jail since January 2026
and she did not know what happened since then. She said that she would
be in danger if refouled to Bangladesh, and she requested to stay in
Hong Kong to save her life.
Grounds for judicial review
18. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
19. The applicant did not advance any grounds for the intended judicial
review in Form 86, nor in her supporting affirmation dated 14 July
2026.
20. As aforementioned, at the oral hearing before this court, the applicant
said the Board did not properly assess her case and the 7 incidents she
presented for assessment. She reiterated the basis of her claim,
namely that there was a land dispute between her family and her
Enemies’ family, she and her sister were raped, her brother was
kidnapped and murdered, and her mother was assaulted during the
incident when she went to the uncle’s home to complain about the death
of the applicant’s brother.
21. The applicant further said that she would be in danger if refouled to
Bangladesh, and she requested to stay in Hong Kong to save her life.
Discussion
22. First of all, the applicant’s danger in her country had been duly
assessed but rejected by the Board. If she intends to challenge the
Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an application for
judicial review.
23. Contrary to the applicant’s accusations at the oral hearing before this
court that the Board had not properly assessed her case and all the
incidents she presented, this court finds that all the incidents
mentioned by the applicant had been considered by the Board, save that
the applicant told the Board that the purpose of visit by herself and
her mother to her auntie’s home on 4 November 2012 was to ask her if
she had done anything to the applicant’s brother, which was different
from what the applicant told this court, namely that they went to the
uncle’s home to complain about the death of the applicant’s brother.
24. Thus, what the applicant said at the oral hearing could not amount to
any valid grounds for judicial review at all.
25. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way of
judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
26. Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for
any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite the
lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the
intended judicial review.
27. In assessing the applicant’s appeal/petition, the Board held two oral
hearings on 16 and 31 March 2026 and the applicant was present. Thus,
the applicant was given the opportunity to present her case to the
Board in person.
28. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board had extensively
questioned the applicant at the Board’s hearing in order to try to
understand her case better. What transpired at the Board’s hearings
were laid out in paragraphs 52 to 79 of the Board’s Decision, where the
Board discussed all the incidents that the applicant described and
relied on as the basis of her non-refoulement claim.
29. The Board had presented its consideration of the evidence, including
its assessment on the credibility of the applicant and whether the
applicant had shown a real risk of harm, in paragraphs 82 to 92 of the
Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary to repeat the same here.
30. In gist, the Board found multiple material inconsistencies in the
applicant’s claims that rendered the Board to conclude that it was
unwilling to attach any credence to the applicant’s evidence that she
faced risks from the Enemies. The Board found the applicant not
credible and the Board did not accept her evidence regarding the
threats she allegedly faced.
31. In the circumstances, the Board found that the applicant had not shown
that she faced a real risk of harm if refouled to Bangladesh. In any
event, the applicant herself said that her concern was that the risk
that she feared was a risk to her quality of life, as opposed to a risk
of harm to her life. The Board found that this was especially so since
the applicant’s evidence at the Board’s hearing was that despite the
Enemies’ threat that if the applicant’s family did not accept the price
offered, they would forcefully occupy the land, and there was no
acceptance of the offered price, no forceful occupation of the land had
occurred or was even attempted, even though the Enemies lived in a
different portion of the same house, with the two portions separated by
a mere 7 foot wall.
32. Thus, the Board found that the applicant was unable to make out her
claims for non-refoulement on all the applicable grounds under the USM.
33. Although the Board did not consider state protection and internal
relocation, it was unnecessary to make findings on the availability of
state protection as the Board found that the applicant did not face any
real risk of harm.
34. As to internal relocation, it is a well-recognised principle that the
decision-maker only needs to consider internal relocation if the
applicant has established that she qualifies as a refugee pursuant to
Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention (see Robinson v SSHD & Anor
[1997] EWCA Civ 3090, dated 11.7.1997). In other words, internal
relocation only arises if the applicant has established a real risk of
persecution in her home area (see Gardi v SSHD [2002] 1 WLR 2755).
35. As it is the Board’s finding that the applicant had no real risk of any
of the proscribed forms of harm upon her return to Bangladesh, it is
not necessary for the Board to consider internal relocation.
36. The finding of facts, including the assessment of evidence and risk of
harm, was primarily within the realm of the Board in dealing with her
appeal/petition. The Board was entitled to come to its own conclusion.
This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way the Board
reached its conclusion. The applicant’s assertion that the Board did
not consider her case properly has no merit at all.
37. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very high
standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
38. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence leave
must be refused.
Conclusion
39. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 16th day of September 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant | | |
|or his solicitors must:| | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s solicitors|the putative |
|may be directed by the |on: 16/09/2026 |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order | |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any |Applicant’s ref. no: |interested parties as |
|directions given within|Nil |may be directed by the |
|14 days after the leave| |Court / the putative |
|was granted (Order 53, | |interested parties’ |
|rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |16/09/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and | |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance | |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 27964 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the Applicant proposes | |QA T/C 2392/25 (formerly|
|to use at the hearing, | |RBCZ 5002289/25) |
|including the affidavit| | |
|in support of the | |Department of Justice, |
|application for leave | |Senior Assistant Law |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1