KHATUN MST LIMA v. HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT
[2026] HKCFI 6328 · HCAL 1637/2026
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1637/2026
[2026] HKCFI 6328
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST
NO 1637 OF 2026
______________
BETWEEN
| |KHATUN MST LIMA |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |HONG KONG SAR GOVERNMENT |Respondent |
______________
Before: Deputy High Court Judge Grace Chow in Court
Date of Hearing: 13 November 2026
Date of Decision: 13 November 2026
|DECISION |
A. Introduction
1. I have before me an application for writ of habeas corpus
filed by the Applicant on 22 September 2026 seeking her
release from detention (“the Application”). The
Applicant is currently being detained at Nei Kwu
Correctional Institution. She has been detained since
3 March 2026 making the period of detention to date is
256 days (“the Detention”).
2. On 25 September 2026, I directed the named respondent to
the Application inter alia to lodge and serve a response
to the Application and the Affirmation filed in support
of the Application. A Response/Skeleton Submissions for
the Respondent dated 4 November 2026 (“the Response”) has
been lodged pursuant to an extension of time granted on
2 November 2026.
3. At today’s hearing, the Applicant has appeared in person
with the assistance of an interpreter. She has also
confirmed that she has been served the Response and a
bundle of documents prepared by the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) acting on behalf of the Respondent.
4. This is my Decision having heard the oral submissions of
the Applicant and Mr Tong, Acting Senior Government
Counsel, appearing for the Respondent.
B. Background
1. Immigration status and stay in HK
1. The Applicant is a Bangladeshi national born on
13 January 1997.
2. On 6 August 2023, the Applicant arrived in Hong Kong on
the strength of her Bangladeshi passport and was
permitted to remain as a domestic helper until 6 August
2025 or two weeks after termination of contract whichever
was earlier. Her contract was prematurely terminated on
19 March 2025 and she overstayed in Hong Kong since 3
April 2025.
3. On 24 May 2025, the Applicant was arrested by the
Immigration Department (“ImmD”).
4. On 27 May 2025, the Applicant was convicted of: (a)
breach of condition of stay; and (b) taking employment
whilst remaining in Hong Kong in breach of the limit of
stay; and was sentenced to a total imprisonment of 14
months.
5. On 3 March 2026, upon discharge from prison, the
Applicant was detained at Tseung Kwan O Immigration
Detention Center and was detained since.
6. On 14 April 2026, a removal order (“RO”) was issued
against the Applicant under s.19(1)(b) of the Immigration
Ordinance, Cap. 115 (“IO”).
7. On 26 June 2026, a deportation order (“DO”) was issued
against the Applicant under s.20(1)(a) of IO.
2. The Applicant’s Non-refoulement claim (“NRC”) and related legal
proceedings
1. On 8 January 2026, the Applicant lodged a NRC which was
rejected by the Director of Immigration (“the Director”)
on 10 March 2026 (“the Director’s Decision”).
2. On 8 April 2026, the Applicant lodged an appeal/petition
against the Director’s Decision but was dismissed by the
Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims
Petition Office on 22 May 2026 (“the Board’s Decision”).
3. On 8 July 2026, the Applicant filed an application for
leave to apply for judicial review (“JR Leave
Application”) against the Board’s Decision but this was
dismissed by the Court of First Instance on 13 October
2026.
3. Steps towards the removal of the Applicant
1. During the Detention, the Applicant was interviewed by
ImmD (on 3 March 2026, 27 March 2026, 30 March 2026, 19
May 2026, 1 June 2026, 6 July 2026, 18 August 2026, 28
September 2026 and 21 October 2026) but she consistently
expressed her unwillingness to return to Bangladesh and
refused to cooperate with the re-entry application. She
had been informed that under s.32(4A) of IO her detention
would not be unlawful if she prevented or delayed the
removal.
2. A repatriation flight has been scheduled for the
Applicant’s removal on 20 November 2026.
4. Reviews of Detention
1. The last reviews of detention were conducted by the
Secretary for Security (“the Secretary”) on 27 October
2026 and the Director on 2 November 2026. Essentially,
it was decided that the release of the Applicant on
recognizance was not warranted having considered and
balanced the following factors:
1) The JR Leave Application was dismissed on 13 October 2026, and
if the Applicant cooperates, with a valid passport, her removal
is going to be possible within a reasonable time;
2) Given her expressed unwillingness to return to her home country,
refusal to cooperate with the removal, and lack of close
connection in Hong Kong, it is considered that there is a risk
of absconding if she was released on recognizance;
3) Given her previous conviction of a serious crime, which is the
basis on which the DO has been made against her, there is a risk
that she will re-offend if released; and
4) Having considered all the relevant factors including the length
of detention, her release was not warranted.
C. The Applicant’s Submissions
1. In the Applicant’s Affirmation, in gist, the following
submissions were made:
1) She had completed her sentence on 3 March 2026 but she is still
being detained for more than 6 months;
2) The JR Leave Application is ongoing;
3) If released, she will not re-offend;
4) She has a Hong Kong permanent resident friend and the name and
contacts are provided;
5) She is not a threat to the community;
6) She will not abscond and has a guarantor and will be easily
located;
7) She is still seeking asylum in Hong Kong, her life is in danger
in her home country and she does not want to go back;
8) She will follow the rules of recognizance if released; and
9) She is getting sick physically and emotionally thinking about
her situation and she cannot contact her family.
2. At the hearing, the Applicant confirmed the preceding
paragraph represents an accurate summary of her
submissions in support of the Application.
3. I will take into account these submissions and give them
such weight in the balancing exercise as seems to me to
be appropriate.
D. Applicable Principles
1. The applicable principles to be applied in an application
for habeas corpus are well-established. They were set
out by the Court of Appeal in Harjang Singh v Secretary
for Security [2022] 4 HKLRD 99. See, in particular, the
summary of the principles at §164.
2. I also remind myself that the burden is on the respondent
to an application for writ of habeas corpus to justify
the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention.
3. Under s.32(4A) of IO, the detention of a person under
s.32 shall not be unlawful by reason of the period of the
detention if that period is reasonable having regard to
all the circumstances that justify its length, including:
1) Whether the person’s removal is directly or indirectly prevented
or delayed by any action or lack of action of the person,
including the person not obtaining, or not providing assistance
to obtain, any authorization from the relevant authorities of a
place outside Hong Kong that is required for the person’s entry
to that place;
2) The time required for the issue of the authorization referred to
in (1);
3) Whether the person poses, or is likely to pose, a threat or
security risk to the community; and
4) Factors that directly or indirectly prevent or delay the
person’s removal that are not within the control of the
Director.
4. Moreover, the Court of Appeal provided guidance in
Johnson Benjamin v Director of Immigration [2024] 1 HKLRD
582 on how the court ought to approach a detainee’s own
unreasonable conduct and acts which caused, necessitated
or prolonged any period of detention. See at §29:
“(1) It is plain that the relevant relatively lengthy period of
immigration detention is substantially caused and
necessitated by the applicant’s own unreasonable conduct and
acts in significantly delaying the disposal of his NRC. In
other words, had he pursued his NRC reasonably diligently, as
he ought to have, he would most likely have been ready to be
removed expeditiously upon his release from prison. As
stated by the Judge at [31] of the Written Judgment, the
Liberian Embassy would be able to issue the applicant the
replacement passport in 2 weeks once all the formalities have
been completed, and in fact, it was the applicant’s own case
that he would be able to obtain the replacement passport even
quicker. In the premises, the applicant’s further
frustration of the replacement of his passport has therefore
further compounded the delaying effect caused by his
unreasonable conduct in his pursuit of the NRC.
(2) In the circumstances, the Judge’s emphasis on the
relatively long period of the detention in the present case
as the starting and in effect the tipping point to show that
the detention had become unreasonably excessive simply cannot
be right.
(3) In our view, in general, any period of a detention which
is caused, necessitated or prolonged by a detainee’s own
unreasonable behaviour or conduct should not be counted or
regarded as an unreasonable period of detention for the
purpose of determining whether an originally lawful detention
has become unlawful, unless there are other circumstances to
show otherwise. This is so, as if otherwise, it would result
in an absurd situation where the more unreasonably or
uncooperatively a detainee behaves in seeking to frustrate or
delay the procedures or process necessary to prepare for his
removal, the more likely he is to be released. That cannot
be the intention of the Hardial Singh principles.”
5. Furthermore, at §37, it was held that even if there is
ongoing NRC, there is no reason in principle why it is
not reasonable to expect an applicant to cooperate with
the relevant authorities to obtain the necessary travel
document to facilitate his removal once the NRC is
disposed of.
E. Analysis
1. With the above principles in mind, I consider whether the
Detention is lawful.
2. There is clear prima facie authority for the detention of
the Applicant throughout the Detention: (a) on 3 March
2026 under s.32(2A)(a) of IO; (b) between 3 March 2026 to
26 March 2026 under s.37ZK of IO; (c) between 26 March
2026 to 13 April 2026 under s.32(2A)(a) of IO;
(d) between 14 April 2026 to 15 April 2026 under s.32(3A)
of IO; (e) between 15 April 2026 and 22 May 2026 under
s.37ZK of IO; (f) between 22 May 2026 to 3 June 2026
under s.32(3A) of IO; (g) between 4 June 2026 to 25 June
2026 under s.29 of IO; and (h) from 26 June 2026 to
present under s.32(3) of IO. There can be no dispute
that the RO and DO made against the Applicant are valid
and extant.
3. The question which then falls for determination is
whether the detention has become unreasonable in all the
circumstances and hence unlawful. That question requires
an assessment in accordance with the Hardial Singh
principles, namely that:
1) The Secretary/Director must intend to deport the person and can
only use the power to detain for that purpose (“HS1”);
2) The deportee may only be detained for a period that is
reasonable in all the circumstances (“HS2”);
3) If, before the expiry of the reasonable period, it becomes
apparent that the Secretary/Director will not be able to effect
deportation within that reasonable period, he should not seek to
exercise the power of detention (“HS3”); and
4) The Secretary/Director should act with reasonable diligence and
expedition to effect removal (“HS4”).
See Harjang Singh at §164(8).
4. The starting point is that the period of detention to
date is 256 days, against which the other factors must be
weighed and balanced.
5. I accept that the Applicant has been detained for the
purpose of removal, and that the power of detention is
being used only for that purpose. I also accept that the
Director has acted with reasonable diligence and
expedition to effect the Applicant’s removal. This is
evident from the frequent interviews to ascertain
Applicant’s willingness to return to her home country,
ImmD writing to seek to accord priority to the
Applicant’s appeal/petition against the Director’s
Decision and DOJ’s writing to the Court on 27 July 2026
to request priority to be accorded to JR Leave
Application. I am of the view that both HS1 and HS4 are
satisfied.
6. Given the JR Leave Application has been dismissed, with a
valid passport and if the Applicant cooperates with the
repatriation scheduled for 20 November 2026, the
Applicant can be removed within a reasonable period of
time. In so far as the Applicant had not pursued the NRC
promptly and diligently, and refused to cooperate with
her removal, the prolonged period of detention as a
result of her unreasonable conduct should not be regarded
as unreasonable or turn an otherwise lawful detention
into an unlawful one. Otherwise, the more unreasonably
and uncooperatively she behaves in seeking to frustrate
or delay her removal, the more likely she is to be
released which the Court of Appeal in Johnson Benjamin
held cannot be the intention of the Hardial Singh
principles.
7. I also accept the Director’s and the Secretary’s
assessments given the Applicant’s expressed unwillingness
to return to her home country and lack of cooperation,
coupled with her lack of connection to Hong Kong, and
bearing in mind that she is an overstayer, there is a
real risk of the Applicant absconding. If she was to
abscond that would defeat the primary purpose for which
the power to detain has been conferred and the intended
effect of the RO and DO. The risk of absconding is of
critical and paramount importance in the assessment of
the lawfulness of the detention. See Harjang Singh at
§164(14).
8. Although the Applicant says that her life is in danger in
Bangladesh, as has been stated and repeated in many
previous decisions, an application for habeas corpus is
not an opportunity for the applicant to continue to
assert the concerns underpinning her NRC and the court in
her application for habeas corpus will not look at the
merits of such claim.
9. In relation to the Applicant’s claimed physical and
mental conditions, in view of previous decided cases,
there is no reason to believe that the Applicant would
not receive proper medical treatment whilst in detention,
if required. There is no evidence to suggest that the
Applicant is medically unfit for continued detention: see
Mansuri, Intekhab Alam and Anor v Hong Kong SAR
Government (Unrep) HCAL 2428/2018, 6 November 2018, per
Chow J (as he then was) at §27 and Ngo Quang Duy v
Director of Immigration [2022] HKCFI 177 at §30 per
Coleman J.
10. I do not believe that the other submissions made by the
Applicant can have the effect of outweighing the matters
identified in the preceding paragraphs to justify her
release.
11. Overall, weighing the period of detention against all
other factors, HS2 and HS3 are also satisfied.
F. Conclusion
1. By reasons of the above, I dismiss the Application with
no order as to costs.
( Grace Chow )
Deputy High Court Judge
The Applicant, appeared in person
Mr Andrew Tong, Acting Senior Government Counsel of Department of Justice,
for the Respondent
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