MOHAMMED RAHIS v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 606/2021

[2026] HKCFI 3305

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 606 OF 2021

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  On 31 December 2025 I refused to grant leave to the Applicant to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) in refusing to allow his request to re-open his non-refoulement claim after he failed to submit his Supplementary Claim Form (“SCF”) within the required period and without valid explanation upon finding that he had failed to first lodge any appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) against the Director’s decision as stipulated by Section 37ZR(a) of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115, that none of the grounds put forward by him reasonably arguable for his intended challenge, and that there was no reasonable prospect of success in his intended application.

2.  The Applicant now by a summons issued on 16 January 2026 (of which was only recently brought to the court’s attention) seeks leave to appeal against that decision out of time, as the 14-day period for him to file his appeal under Order 53 rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4A ended on 14 January 2026, and hence he was 2 days late with his intended appeal.

3.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing against a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the Court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (iv) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted: see Re MK HCMP 2609/2016, 10 January 2017; Chu On Fong Winter v The Appeal Panel (Housing) HCMP 982/2017, 20 July 2017; Islam Raja Rais v Director of Immigration HCMP 881/2017, 26 June 2017; Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226; and Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346.

4.  In the Applicant’s case, a delay of 2 days cannot on any view be regarded as significant, for which he explained in his affirmation that he received the decision late which caused his present delay for the filing of his intended appeal.

5.  The court record shows that the decision was sent on the same day of 31 December 2025 to the Applicant’s then reported address without being returned through undelivered post, and while there is no documentary evidence such as the envelope which contained the decision to show the date of the postage to corroborate his barest of assertion, given the relative insignificance of his delay, I propose to focus on the prospect of success of his intended appeal.

6.  However, the Applicant has failed to put forward any proper or valid draft or proposed grounds of appeal, or any particulars of any error in the decision or why it may be reasonably arguable that the decision was unfair or unreasonable either in his summons or in his affirmation, and given his clear failure to comply with the statutory requirement to bring any challenge of the Director’s decision by first lodging an appeal to the Board as stipulated under Section 37ZR(a) of the Immigration Ordinance as noted above, I do not find any prospect of success in his intended appeal.

7.  In the premises, and for the reasons given, it would be futile to extend time for what appears to be a hopeless appeal. Accordingly, I refuse his application for leave to appeal out of time, and dismiss the Applicant’s summons.