RE ISLAM MOHAMMAD SHAHIDUL

CAMP 190/2019

[2020] HKCA 772

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 190 OF 2019

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 1047 OF 2017)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Yeung VP (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  By a judgment dated 21 May 2020 ([2020] HKCA 326), this Court (Yeung VP and Pang JA) refused to grant an extension of time to the applicant to apply for leave to appeal against the decision of Campbell - Moffat J (“the Judge”) given on 30 April 2019 in HCAL 1047/2017 refusing to grant him leave to apply for judicial review. The applicant sought to review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) given on 14 November 2017 dismissing his petition/appeal from the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) given on 4 July 2016 and 31 March 2017 rejecting his non - refoulement claim.

2.  By a notice of motion dated 17 July 2020, the applicant now seeks leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on the grounds that:

“On 21 May 2020 The Honourable Judges of the CAMP cancel my claim. My problem is not finish and will never finish. I do not want to die. So I want to go to the Court of Final Appeal.”

3.  Pursuant to the directions made by the Registrar of Civil Appeals on 20 July 2020, the applicant should lodge his written submissions on or before 31 July 2020.  He failed to do so.

4.  The Registrar further directed that unless the court otherwise directs, the notice of motion shall be determined on the papers only without an oral hearing.  As it is appropriate to do so, this application is processed on papers without an oral hearing.

5.  Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap. 484) provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of the Court of Appeal or the Court of Final Appeal, from any judgment of the Court of Appeal in any civil cause or matter, whether final or interlocutory, if, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal or the Court of Final Appeal, as the case may be, the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

6.  In our judgment, nothing set out in the notice of motion can constitute as viable ground of appeal as they did not pinpoint any error of law or raise any discernible or arguable ground for disturbing our judgment.  As stated at [8] and [18] of our judgment, the Board had rightly found that the applicant had exaggerated his case to enhance his claim for non - refoulement protection and the land dispute with his enemies was private in nature with no state involvement.  The Board further found that the applicant’s brothers who co-own the family land in dispute with the applicant have been living in Bangladesh unharmed since 2014 and therefore the risk of harm was minimal upon his return to Bangladesh.  The Board’s findings were endorsed by the Judge and we found no flaw from the Judge’s decision.  The applicant’s complaint as stated in the notice of motion has no merit and cannot stand.

7.  For the aforesaid reasons and the reasons on the merit of the applicant’s appeal that we gave in our judgment of 21 May 2020, we do not see any prospect of success in the applicant’s intended appeal against the Judge’s decision and order.  None of the questions raised by the applicant in the notice of motion involves an arguable point or a question of great general or public importance.  We do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b) either.  The statutory criteria for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal is not met.

8.  Accordingly, we refuse to give the applicant leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal and dismiss his notice of motion.