ANTHONY THERESIA OLWI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 786/2020

[2026] HKCFI 4263

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 786 OF 2020

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons filed on 27 May 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 25 November 2025, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 17 April 2020.

2.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.  As my order was made on 25 November 2025, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 9 December 2025. Thus, the time for appealing against my order has expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.  In the Summons and the applicant’s supporting affirmation dated 27 May 2026, she did not explain her delay in lodging the appeal at all.

8.  At the hearing of the Summons on 14 July 2026, the applicant gave the explanation for her delay by saying that she was in jail from January 2025 to May 2026, she could not understand the letter as she could not read English, and after she was released, her friend helped her to read the letter.

9.  However, the applicant confirmed that she received the court’s letter enclosing the court’s decision while she was in Lo Wu Correctional Institution. When I asked the applicant why she could not have the letter interpreted to her while she was in detention there, she said that she had other issues, namely that she was very ill and had surgery for her swollen stomach, and that she had heart disease all along.

10.  The applicant’s explanations at the oral hearing are clearly not satisfactory, as the delay was for more than 5 months and there was no reason why she could not have the letter interpreted to her while in custody. The surgery for the stomach and the heart disease could not have prevented her from getting interpretation and lodging the appeal while in custody for such a long period of time.

11.  Moreover, the applicant did not give any valid ground for her intended appeal at all. She only stated in the Summons that my judgment was unreasonable without giving any particulars. At the oral hearing, when I asked the applicant for her grounds of appeal, she simply said that she was not sure if she was safe to return home, as she was not sure if the person who wanted to hurt her still wanted to hurt her, and hence she requested this court to give her more time to stay here. These clearly cannot be grounds for her intended appeal.

12.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

13.  The applicant has failed to demonstrate any of the above, and hence there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal.

14.  As there is no satisfactory explanation for the applicant’s delay in lodging the intended appeal, and there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended appeal, I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

15.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.