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SHAFIQUL ISLAM AND OTHERS v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
SHAFIQUL ISLAM AND OTHERS v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 4713 · HCAL 586/2026
Court of First Instance
HCAL 586/2026
[2026] HKCFI 4713
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 586 of 2026
BETWEEN
| |Shafiqul Islam |1st Applicant |
| | | |
| |Yuyuk Yulika |2nd Applicant |
| | | |
| |Shafiqul Wilson Islam Donawon, a minor, |3rd Applicant |
| |by his next friend Yuyuk Yulika | |
| | | |
| |Shafiqul Zikra Zunaira Akbar Fatihah, a minor, |4th Applicant |
| |by his next friend Yuyuk Yulika | |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Putative |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |Applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
1. The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.
2. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and the 4th applicants’ application for leave
to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the
prescribed Form 86 filed on 17 March 2026, a family of 4 applicants applied
for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The intended
judicial review was against the decision of the Director of Immigration
(“Director”) dated 25 February 2026 (“Director’s Subsequent Decision”)
refusing the applicants’ request (“Request”) for making a subsequent claim
for non-refoulement under s.37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance. The 1stand
2nd applicants are father and mother of the 3rd applicant (a boy born in
Hong Kong on 28 August 2012) and the 4th applicant (a girl born in Hong
Kong on 12 October 2020). When the 3rd and 4th applicants were born, the
1st and 2nd applicants were not yet married. They later married in Hong
Kong on 28 February 2025. Shortly after the 1st and 2nd applicants got
married, the 1st applicant, and the 2nd applicant for herself and on behalf
of the 3rd and 4th applicants made the Request on 28 March 2025.
For the 1st applicant, the Director on 29 August 2018 (“Director’s Decision
on A1”) rejected the 1st applicant’s non-refoulement claim under all
applicable grounds[1] except on the ground of torture which the Director
rejected on 15 November 2011. The basis of the 1st applicant’s claim was
then if refouled to Bangladesh, he would be harmed or killed by the people
of the Alwami League (“AL”) as he was a member of the opposite party, the
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”). On 11 June 2019, the Torture Claims
Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”)
dismissed the 1st applicant’s appeal against the Director’s Decision on A1.
On 22 October 2024, a Deputy High Court Judge refused [2]to grant leave to
the 1st applicant to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. On
5 March 2025, the Court of Appeal[3] dismissed the applicant’s appeal. On
9 May 2025, the Court of Appeal refused [4]to grant leave to the 1st
applicant to further appeal.
For the 2nd and 3rd applicants, the Director on 28 September 2017
(“Director’s Decision on A2 & A3”) rejected their non-refoulement claims
under all applicable grounds except on the ground of torture which ground
the Director rejected on 6 March 2013. The basis of their claims was that,
if refouled to Indonesia, she would be harmed or killed by the 2nd
applicant’s father as the 2nd applicant refused the latter’s request to
marry his creditor to pay off his debts as well as by the creditor. The
3rd applicant would not be accepted by the Muslim society as he was born
out of wedlock. On 16 April 2019, the Board dismissed their appeals
against the Director’s Decision on A2 & A3. On 3 April 2024, a Deputy High
Court Judge refused [5]to grant leave to them to apply for judicial review
of the Board’s Decision. On 30 October 2024, the Court of Appeal[6]
dismissed the applicants’ appeal. On 11 February 2025, the Court of Appeal
refused [7] to grant leave to them to further appeal.
For the 4th applicant, the Director on 30 March 2021 (“Director’s Decision
on A4”) rejected her non-refoulement claims under all applicable grounds.
The basis of her claim was that, if refouled to Indonesia, she would be
harmed or killed by the 2nd applicant’s father as the 2nd applicant refused
the latter’s request to marry his creditor to pay off his debts and also
having given birth to the 4th applicant out of wedlock. On 11 October
2019, the Board dismissed her appeal against the Director’s Decision on A4.
The 3rd and 4th applicants are minors, and sue through the 2nd applicant
as their next friend. An application for judicial review by a child
claimant should only proceed in accordance with the regime under O.80 r 2
of the Rules of the High Court with the appointment of next friend and
acting by a solicitor (unless the Official Solicitor is appointed as next
friend): see Fabio Arlyn Timogan v Evan Ruth [2020] HKCA 971 at [57]. The
3rd and 4th applicants’ applications for legal aid were not successful.
At the hearing on 4 August 2026, all the applicants attended in person.
Despite the non-compliance with the requirement stated in the preceding
paragraph, this court would treat the non-compliance with the rule as a
mere irregularity, and proceed with the hearing: see Fabio (supra).
In the Form 86, the applicants named both the Director and the Board as the
proposed respondents. As the Director should have been the proper putative
respondent, the Form 86 shall be amended according by deleting the name of
the Board from the proceedings.
Background
The background can be viewed at the reported decisions set out in [2] and
[3] above as well as the Board Decision of the 4th applicant, which can be
viewed at the following hyperlink:
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2026/HCAL00
0586_2026_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
In the Request, the applicants were represented by the Duty Lawyer Service.
The duty lawyer representing the applicant submitted further information
on their behalf in support of the Request.
The basis of the applicants’ subsequent claim was that, if refouled to
either Indonesia or Bangladesh, they would face significant and real risk
of harm, violence or even death due to their personal circumstances and the
hostile socio-cultural and religious environments in Indonesia as well as
the political situation in Bangladesh.
The statutory provisions on subsequent claims
Subsequent non-refoulement claims are regulated by s 37ZO of the
Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115), which provides:
Section 37ZO. “Limitation on subsequent claim
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person who has
previously made a torture claim must not subsequently make
another torture claim.
(2) A person may make a subsequent claim if the person
provides sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an
immigration officer that—
(a) there has been a significant change of circumstances
since the previous claim was finally determined or
withdrawn; and
(b) he change, when taken together with the material
previously submitted in support of the previous
claim, would give the subsequent claim a realistic
prospect of success.
(3) In deciding whether or not a person may make a subsequent
claim under subsection (2), an immigration officer may take
into account any finding of credibility or fact made by an
immigration officer or the Appeal Board in relation to a
torture claim previously made by the person.”
Discussion
A leave application operates as a ‘filtering’ process. Hence, there is no
requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision[8].
It is therefore sufficient to state my observations after considering the
Director’s Decision and the applicant’s materials adduced.
In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds of
judicial review clearly and succinctly[9], and further to make full and
frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit. In
the Form 86, the applicants averred that the Director’s Subsequent Decision
was procedurally unfair, unreasonable and irrational. The other averments
were directed against the Board. In the 1st applicant’s supporting
affirmation, he repeated the same averments contained in the Form 86. The
averments stated in the 2nd applicant’s affirmation were substantially
directed against the Board.
At the hearing, the 1st applicant submitted that he could not go back to
Bangladesh as the 3rd applicant is already a teenager having grown up in
Hong Kong. He wanted his family to be together. When he was asked to
elaborate the allegations stated in the Form 86, the 1st applicant stated
that he did not raise those allegations.
As for the 2nd applicant, she said she had nothing to say for her own case,
and all that she wanted was to have the entire family together. In the
submissions, the 2nd applicant made on behalf of the 3rd and 4th
applicants, she stated that it would be difficult for her children to
return to Indonesia as they only speak English and Cantonese. It would
therefore be difficult for their education in Indonesia. They also need
their father. She therefore asked to be allowed to stay in Hong Kong as a
family. The 3rd applicant requested to speak to court directly. In view
of his maturity, I allowed him to supplement the 2nd applicant’s
submissions made on his behalf. The 3rd applicant stated that he would
like to stay in Hong Kong as all his friends were here. He would have no
friends in Indonesia.
In the Director’s Subsequent Decision, after the Director had taken into
account the facts and findings he made in the Director’s Decisions and the
decisions of the Board referred to in [2] to [4] above, and all the
available information the applicants submitted, the Director found:
Regarding the 1st applicant
The nature of his claim regarding the fear from the AL remained the same.
The new information the 1st applicant submitted regarding the fall of the
Hasina government was not directly related to his claim. The updated COI
also showed that the situation in Bangladesh had gradually stabilized since
August 2024. The Director found that there was no significant change of
circumstances.
Regarding the 2nd applicant
The Director found that the 2nd applicant repeated the same fear of being
harmed or killed by her father for refusing to marry his creditor as well
as for having given birth to the children out of wedlock. The Director did
not accept that there had been a significant change of circumstances since
her previous non-refoulement claim.
Regarding the 3rd and 4th applicants
The Director found that the child-specific risks in Indonesia had been
considered in the previous claims, and the basis of the subsequent claim
did not constitute any significant change of circumstances. The Director
further found that the illegitimate status of the children had been
resolved with the recent marriage of the 1st and 2nd applicants.
The Director had considered the education condition in Bangladesh, and was
satisfied that the country condition of Indonesia and Bangladesh would
provide reasonable state protection and internal relocation in either
country to the children and as a family as a whole.
The Director concluded that the Request was largely based on the same
source of fear, and that there was no sufficient evidence to show that
there was a significant change of circumstances since their claims were
finally determined previously. The Director found that there was no
realistic prospect of success and refused the Request. These are findings
of fact, which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with
subject to there being any public law errors.
Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in
scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the
Director correctly applied the law and observed a high standard of
fairness. The grounds put forth by either the 1st or 2nd applicants had
either been disavowed or were vague and lacked particulars. The
submissions they made at the hearing, expressing their desire to stay in
Hong Kong and to enable the 3rd and the 4th applicants to continue their
education in Hong Kong could not constitute as valid grounds. The Director
had considered the claims of the 1st and 2nd applicants as well as the 3rd
and 4th applicants separately. In the Director’s Decision on A3 and the
Director’s Decision on A4, the situation in Indonesia and the relevant COI
had been considered. In the Director’s Subsequent Decision, the Director
further considered the situation in Bangladesh and the relevant COI as they
could possibly also return to Bangladesh. I am satisfied that the Director
has correctly applied the law under s. 37ZO.
The applicants have not shown any errors of law or procedural unfairness or
irrationality in the Director’s Subsequent Decision. The applicants’
intended challenge to Director’s Subsequent Decision is not reasonably
arguable with realistic prospects of success such that would enable this
court to grant leave[10].
Orders
The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.
The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and the 4th applicants’ application for leave to apply
for judicial review be dismissed.
Dated the 4th day of September 2026
| |( Alfred CHAN ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the Applicant:| | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the Applicant|Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such |on 4/9/2026 |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as | |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the |Shafiqul Islam, |solicitors / such |
|Court the order granting|Yuyuk Yulika, |Putative Interested |
|leave and any directions|Shafiqul Wilson Islam|Parties as may be |
|given within 14 days |Donawon, a minor, by |directed by the Court / |
|after the leave was |his next friend Yuyuk|the Putative Interested |
|granted (Order 53, rule |Yulika. |Parties’ solicitors on |
|4A); |Shafiqul Zikra |4/9/2026 |
| |Zunaira Akbar | |
|b) issue the originating|Fatihah, a minor, by |Torture Claims Appeal |
|summons within 14 days |his next friend Yuyuk|Board/Non-refoulement |
|after the grant of leave|Yulika |Claims Petition Office |
|and serve it in | |Putative Respondent’s |
|accordance with Order |Applicant’s ref. no: |ref. no.: USM |
|53, rule 5; and |Nil. |17808/21/4/11/I1954 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every other| |Director of Immigration |
|party copies of every | |Putative Interested |
|affidavit which the | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C|
|Applicant proposes to | |145/21 (Formerly RBCZ |
|use at the hearing, | |10054/21, L/M |
|including the affidavit | |(33613-33616) in ImmD RA|
|in support of | |7/37/C (formerly |
|the application for | |RBCZ/1536/09 & |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |RBCZ/2000644/14; |
|6(5)). | |formerly RBCZ/1415/10 & |
| | |RBCZ/2000634/14; |
| | |formerly RBCZ/16/13 & |
| | |RBCZ/2000635/14; |
| | |formerly RBCZ/10054/21) |
| | | |
| | |Department of Justice, |
| | |Senior Assistant Law |
| | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the
Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the
risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong
Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to
the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of
persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33
of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified
Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process
claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the
USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3
HKC 293.
[2] [2024] HKCFI 2953.
[3] [2025] HKCA 411.
[4] [2025] HKCA 208.
[5] [2024] HKCFI 748.
[6] [2024] HKCA 991.
[7] [2025] HKCA 105.
[8] Re Zenarae [2018] HKCA 14 at [23].
[9]
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& Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015, 22 December
2016 at [142].
[11] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676