香港特別行政區 訴 朱家樂

DCCC 1037/2021

[2023] HKDC 393

香港特別行政區

區域法院

刑事案件2021年第1037號

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裁決理由書

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1.  被告人被控兩項盜竊罪，違反香港法例第210章《盜竊罪條例》第9條，被告人否認控罪，故須進行審訊。

2.  控罪一的控罪詳情如下：

「朱家樂於2018年5月29日至2018年9月20日期間（包括首尾兩日）在香港，偷竊據法權產，即中國銀行（香港）有限公司在號碼012-874-1-109315-1帳戶欠該朱家樂總額港幣323,314.4元債項，而該等據法權產為屬於Search Trading Limited的財產。」

3.  控罪二的控罪詳情，除了日期、銀碼和銀行名稱有別外，基本上是一樣的，在此不贅。

控方案情

4.  控方的案情不被爭議，控辯雙方根據香港法例第221章《刑事訴訟程序條例》第65C條簽訂了承認事實（證物P8及P9），現梳理如下。

5.  被告是GigaSports Nike店（“該Nike店”）的銷售員。

6.  楊后冲先生（“PW1”）是經營運動鞋店Search Trading Limited（“該公司”）的股東，董事及營運人。

7.  PW1在2018年2月，在該Nike店購物時認識了被告。PW1開始代表該公司，通過被告向該Nike店購買運動鞋。每當有新貨，被告會通知PW1。PW1會向被告下訂單，並首先將貨款，存入被告的中國銀行（香港）有限公司帳戶，其帳戶編號為012-874-1-109315-1（“中銀帳戶”）和被告的香港上海匯豐銀行帳戶，其帳戶號碼為004-124-383753-833（“匯豐帳戶”）。

8.  被告隨後根據PW1的指令購買了運動鞋。有時，運動鞋的實際供應量無法滿足PW1的訂單。在這種情況下，PW1多付的金額，將由被告保留在銀行帳戶內，用於支付以後的訂單。這種交易模式起初進行得相當順利。

9.  大約在2018年年中，被告開始推遲交付訂購的運動鞋。

10.  被告尚未交付PW1的運動鞋總價值為港幣623,851.6元。其中，在中銀帳戶的未交付PW1的運動鞋價值為港幣323,314.4元，在匯豐帳戶的未交付PW1的運動鞋價值為港幣300,537.2元；詳見控方證物P2附表。

11.  2018年9月20日，被告通知PW1他已從該Nike店辭職。

12.  被告曾於2018年5月29日，從中銀帳戶提款。該帳戶餘額在2018年9月20日變成零元。

13.  被告曾在2018年8月25日從匯豐帳戶提款。該帳戶餘額在2018年9月26日變成零元。

14.  女偵緝警員21643（“PW2”）於2018年11月16日以「不誠實手段取得財產」罪拘捕被告。在警誡下，被告說：「係我一時貪心，我偷咗啲錢拎去賭。」

15.  PW2於2018年11月16日向被告進行錄影會面紀錄，被告是在自願情況下錄取的。被告在錄影會面紀錄表示：

(a)  PW1通常通過WhatsApp向他下訂單。PW1會問他是否有特定型號的運動鞋，以及是否有員工折扣[1]；

(b)  他根據PW1的訂單，用他的員工折扣幫助PW1購買運動鞋，在PW1將錢存入他的銀行帳戶後，他根據PW1的指令用他的員工折扣購買運動鞋。運動鞋通常會分批購買。之後他會通知PW1來取走購買的運動鞋[2]；

(c)  在PW1下訂單之前，他將檢查相關運動鞋的供貨情況。但部分運動鞋可能由於各種原因而無法購買[3]；

(d)  如果一張訂單有未完成的運動鞋，剩餘的錢將用於隨後的訂單[4]；及

(e)  他出於貪婪，將PW1存入的錢用於賭博[5]。

16.  香港高等法院於2018年11月27日，在破產案件編號2018年第6037號，對被告發出了破產令。

17.  被告在香港沒有任何刑事定罪記錄。

18.  辯方對於控方整個案情基本上並無太大爭議。雖然控方傳召了PW1及PW2作供，但他們的證供已經被承認事實所涵蓋，因此對本案的關鍵議題沒有太大關係。

19.  PW1在盤問下承認被告人曾於2018年10月22日轉賬5,000元到該公司的戶口（見證物D1和D2），除此以外，被告人便再沒有償還了。

20.  本席裁定控方兩項控罪的表面證據成立。

辯方案情

21.  辯方並沒有中斷陳詞。被告人選擇不作供，也不傳召任何辯方證人。

本案的爭議點

22.  根據《盜竊罪條例》第2條，盜竊罪的必要元素是涉案財產必須是屬於另一人的財產。

23.  本案的關鍵是究竟該兩筆據法權產是否屬於該公司。

法律指引

24.  本席謹記，舉證的責任在控方，量證標準是必須達至毫無合理疑點的程度。換言之，除非控方能夠提出毫無合理疑點的證供來證明控罪的每一個元素，否則本席不得將被告人定罪。

25.  被告人面對兩項控罪，本席會分開獨立地考慮、衡量及評估每一項控罪的案情和證據。

26.  被告人沒有刑事定罪紀錄。基於這項良好品格證供，本席在評核證供時必須謹記，相對於有定罪紀錄或品格不良好的人而言，被告人干犯本案控罪的傾向性較低；在考慮其口頭和錄影會面時，可信性較高。

27.  被告人選擇不作供，這是他的權利，本席不會因此對他作出不利的推斷。他是毋須證明自己是清白的，亦沒有責任對控罪提出疑點。在所有審訊議題上，他是毋須履行任何形式的舉證責任。

28.  法庭在考慮盜竊時，是需顧及被告人是否不誠實。按照 R v Ghosh一案的指引考慮相關的情況，「不誠實」須從兩方面作出考慮，即法庭須先決定按一般合理及誠實人士的標準而言，有關作為是否不誠實。若然以該標準衡量，有關作為並非不誠實，則控罪不能成立。然而，縱使有關作為以該標準衡量屬不誠實，法庭仍須繼而考慮被告人究竟是否明知根據該標準，其作為屬不誠實的作為。

考慮及裁斷

29.  何謂「屬於另一人」，《盜竊罪條例》第 6條已經列明，如下：

「(2)  凡財產受到信託的規限，則該財產所屬的人，須視為包括任何有權利強制執行該信託的人，而意圖破壞該信託，則須據此視為意圖剝奪任何擁有該權利的人的財產。」

30.  控方的立場在被告兩個戶口內的結餘是“trust money”，並援引Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd [1970] AC 567，控方陳詞Quistclose信託類似擁有權保留條款（儘管目標不盡相同），其允許收款人為特定目標而使用付款人的資金，同時盡可能減低對付款人的擁有權的影響。有關資金仍是屬於付款人的財產，直至其按照付款人的指示被使用的那一刻為止。若其未被使用，就必須歸還予付款人。

31.  辯方力陳在本案中，沒有證據支持PW1與被告人之間訂立了明確的信託安排，Quistclose信託不適用於本案。

32.  辯方指，就銀行帳戶內的結餘作為據法權產而言，在法律上，該據法權產是銀行欠下帳戶持有人的債項，銀行需要在帳戶持有人要求時歸還該債項。在HKSAR v Goh Swee Yan [2000] 3 HKLRD 324 (340A-G)，上訴庭引用R v Preddy [1996] AC 815，確認據法權產不能被視為屬於另一人的財產。

33.  辯方援引Goh Swee Yan一案中判決提要（見第326頁）指出：

“5. When D paid Y’s cheque into her bank account, a new chose in action came into existence. That chose in action was the increased credit balance in D’s account which amounted to a debt which D’s bank owed to D and which it had undertaken to repay on demand. Hence, if D had been guilty of theft, what she had stolen was not the money, but the new chose in action, at least one ingredient of the offence of theft, namely that what D had stolen belonged to another, had not been established ( R v Preddy [1996] AC 815 applied)(See pp381I-339G).”

34.  就本案的控罪，控方指稱在兩個帳戶內，兩間銀行欠下被告人的債項作為據法權產屬該公司的財產，這已經有違Goh Swee Yan及Preddy所確立的法律原則。因此，辯方力陳控方未能證明控罪詳情所指的財產屬於該公司的財產。

35.  辯方補充，當該公司存錢入被告的銀行賬戶時，即該公司在銀行的據法權產減少，而被告的銀行欠被告的據法權產增加，換言之，當被告從自己銀行戶口提取金錢自己使用，即使賭博也好，在提取金錢一刻，涉及的金錢是屬於被告人自己的，這是屬於滙豐銀行或者中國銀行欠被告的據法權產。辯方力陳被告人提取自己戶口的金錢是無罪的。辯方指被告當然對該公司有責任， 但這只屬於合約法上違約，該公司可向民事法庭追討其損失 。

36.  本案中，本席認為根本不需運用到民事法中Quistclose信託的法律原則。

37.  毫無疑問，被告人與該公司之間已存有信託關係，原因是在關鍵時刻他們已達成了協議，即該公司向被告購買運動鞋，被告人對該公司的法律責任是提供所要求的運動鞋，被告人接收該公司的款項是不爭議的事實，款項只可專用於購買運動鞋，倘若某些原因令運動鞋缺貨，被告人不能交付足夠數量的運動鞋予該公司，餘下的貨款也需退還給該公司，被告人不得自行處置，現他將款項用於賭博，明顯是違反信託。第 6(2)  條在本案是適用的，換言之，控方已證明兩筆據法權產屬於該公司。

38.  此外，《盜竊罪條例》第 6(3)條列明：

「凡任何人從另一人接收到財產，或為另一人而接收到財產，並對該另一人有義務以特定的方式保有及處理該財產或其收益，則該財產或其收益相對他而言須視為屬於該另一人。」

39.  在HKSAR v Li Ting Kit [2000] 2 HKLRD 129一案中，上訴人是區議員，房屋署在區內將設立公眾街市，上訴人對該區十多名小販指出，會向房屋署投標作為街市的營運者，成功的話，到時會將檔口租給他們。因上訴人需要向房屋署證明自己有財政能力營運街市，於是要求小販向上訴人發出支票或本票，上訴人把之存入自己的銀行私人戶口，上訴人承諾若申請不成功的話，會將款項歸還小販；最終上訴人營運申請被房屋署拒絕，但他卻沒有將款項按照協議歸還給小販。上訴人被裁定12項盜竊罪名成立。上訴時，辯方同樣倚賴Preddy案中所指據法權產是屬於上訴人的，因此控方未能證明該些款項屬於另一人，上訴庭駁回上訴，並指出：

“10. …Mr. McWalters for the Respondent submitted that the present appeal was not a deception case dressed up as theft in that the prosecution did not present its case on the basis that the thefts occurred when the Applicant persuaded the hawkers to part with their money. The case against the Applicant was his misapplication of monies which he had lawfully obtained and which he knew he was under an obligation to retain and deal with in a certain way. Although by the time the Applicant misapplied the hawkers' monies they were no longer in the form of a debt owed by each hawker's bank to each depositor; rather they were debts owed by the Applicant's bank to himself. Mr. McWalters argued that notwithstanding that the chose was a debt owed by the Applicant's bank to himself, it was the property of the hawker by virtue of the operation of s.6(3)  of the Theft Ordinance, Cap. 210 which provides :

"Where a person receives property from or on account of another, and is under an obligation to the other to retain and deal with that property or its proceeds in a particular way, the property or its proceeds shall be regarded (as against him)  as belonging to the other".

11. Mr. McWalters submitted that it is clear that the judge found as a fact that the monies were received by the Applicant for a specific and limited purpose, thereby creating an obligation (implicitly, if not explicitly)  to retain and deal with them in a particular way (pp. 25 C-T, 26 I-K, 32 E-S, 33 A-D)  and that the Applicant misapplied the monies to a purpose outside of that authorized by the hawkers (pp. 26 L-P, 28 C-29P, 31 C-E.)

12. Mr. McWalters also drew our attention to two post Preddy decisions of the English Court of Appeal in R v Arnold [1997] 4 All ER 1 and R v Klineberg [1999] 1 Cr.App.R 427. Both cases bore many resemblances to the present case and were decided on s.5(3)  of the English Theft Act 1968, which is the equivalent of our s.6(3). The case of Klineberg is particularly useful. The facts as stated in the headnote are as follows:

"A company entered into an agreement to buy a timeshare development in Lanzarote and to market the timeshares. Under the agreement, money paid by intending purchasers to the company was to be transmitted to shareholders to protect the purchasers until the apartments were ready for occupation. The appellant M was a director of the company, a solicitor was another director and the appellant K was in charge of its London office. Some of the intending purchasers were informed that the independent trusteeship would be via a stakeholding trust company, but others were told that it would be via the solicitor's firm. Some ￡500,000 was paid by intending purchasers to the company but only ￡223 was transmitted to the trust company. The appellants were convicted on 10 sample counts of theft. It was contended on appeal, inter alia, that once the money had been paid into the company's bank account, whether by way of cash, cheque or bank transfer, it ceased to be property belonging to the intending purchasers: see Preddy [1996] 2 Cr.App.R.524."

It was held, allowing the appeal in part and quashing the convictions on four counts:

"that section 5(3)  of the Theft Act 1968 applied to overcome the problem arising from Preddy in these circumstances. A legal obligation within the meaning of section 5(3)  clearly arose where people were induced to contract or did contract (whether by implied terms or otherwise)  on the basis that their money would be safeguarded by trusteeship. Section 5(3)  was a deeming provision by which property or its proceeds were to be regarded as belonging to another, even though that was not the case according to civil law. Further, where a section 5(3)  obligation existed, in relation to the "appropriation" element of theft it was necessary for the prosecution to prove a breach of that obligation. In this regard the prosecution had not been able to prove their case on four counts and, consequently, the conviction on those counts were quashed."

At p. 433A-B, Maurice Kay J who delivered the judgment of the Court said:

"In our judgment the trial judge was right to conclude that section 5(3)  could overcome the Preddy problem in the present case, provided it was established that PCL and the appellants (no point about corporate 1egal personality arising)  were under an obligation to purchasers to retain and deal with "the property or its proceeds" in a particular way and that what occurred was a breach of that obligation. The obligation must be a legal one and not merely a social or moral one."

13. In Preddy, the charges against the appellants were obtaining or attempting to obtain property by deception contrary to s. 15 of the Theft Act 1968 (the equivalent of our s.18B). They were not charged with theft. Section 5(3)  of the Act (the equivalent of s. 6(3)  of our Ordinance)  clearly has no application to the offence of obtaining property by deception because the element of a legal obligation to deal with the property or its proceeds in a particular way is not present. In our view, the present appeal does not fall within the parameters of Preddy and should be decided under s.6(3)  of the Theft Ordinance, having regard to the decisions in R v Arnold and R v Klineberg. For this reason, the arguments advanced on behalf of the Applicant on the first ground cannot be sustained.” ( 間線作強調)

40.  本席認為，Li Ting Kit一案的爭拗，與本案是同出一轍的。可見，在盜竊罪中，Preddy的規範需以第 6(3)條來一併考慮。

41.  該公司就買運動鞋的款項，均是支付到被告人的中銀戶口及/或匯豐戶口，雖然PW1從來沒有要求被告人要另開帳戶儲存該些貨款，但他們之問的交易形式，均是以WhatsApp下單，再由被告人安排運動鞋給予該公司。本席認為該公司與被告人是顧客和銷售員的關係，他們關係的建立也是基於買賣運動鞋，該公司付錢給被告人有什麼目的？唯一的目的當然是要求被告人給該公司買運動鞋，金錢不可用於別的用途。被告人絕對有義務以特定的方式保有及處理該財產，不能將款項用於賭博上。

42.  本席裁定該財產，即該公司向被告人的銀行存款，已完全滿足第6(3)  條的要求。即使辯方力陳該據法權產是銀行欠下被告人的債項，但根據第6(3)條，相對被告人而言，該據法權產須視為屬於該公司。

43.  被告人的作為，將該公司存入他銀行的款項用來賭博，他更屢次在錄影會面中以貪心形容自己拿錢去賭博的決定，其作為必定是不誠實的。

44.  基於上述原因，本席裁定控方已於毫無合理的疑點下，證明兩項控罪的所有元素，裁定上訴人兩項盜竊罪罪成。