DO THI TINH v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5267 · HCAL 1081/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1081/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5267
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1081 OF 2023
BETWEEN
| |Do Thi Tinh |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and the applicant being absent in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and “Director of
Immigration” be added as the putative interested party.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 4 July 2023, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 8 June 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”). The
Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL00
1081_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant’s appeal/petition against the
decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 18 July
2022 (“the Director’s Decision”) failed on all the applicable grounds
under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the Board
dismissed the applicant’s appeal/petition and confirmed the Director’s
Decision, which rejected the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement
protection.
Amendments
3. The applicant named the Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
and the Director as the putative respondents and did not name any
putative interested party in Form 86.
4. In fact, only the Board should be named as the putative respondent,
and the Director should be named as the putative interested party.
5. The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office providing
administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the
Board and should not be named as a putative respondent at all.
6. Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of
the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and to add
“Director of Immigration” as the putative interested party.
The applicant’s case
7. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
8. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Vietnam, she would be harmed or killed by her creditor
NGUYEN THI THOA due to her inability to repay a loan of 800 million
Vietnamese Dong co-borrowed with her husband.
Oral hearing
9. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application.
However, the applicant was absent at the hearing on 10 September 2026.
10. As held in Re Abdus Salam [2019] HKCA 1091, an application for leave
to bring judicial review should not be dismissed for want of
prosecution merely because the applicant failed to attend the oral
hearing of the leave application. The correct approach is to treat
the applicant as having withdrawn the request for a hearing by reason
of the absence at the hearing, and to proceed to determine the leave
application on its merits.
11. Thus, this court will proceed to consider the merits of the Leave
Application based on the written materials before this court.
Grounds for judicial review
12. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
13. The applicant annexed a document with the title “Grounds on which
relief is sought” to her Form 86. The contents of the said document
were in fact used by many applicants in similar applications as their
grounds for applying leave to judicially review the Board’s decisions.
It is like a template for such applicants and they just used the
grounds stated therein without any regard to their own situations.
Nevertheless, as the applicant is relying on the said grounds to make
the Leave Application, this court will still deal with the grounds as
discussed below.
Discussion
14. As mentioned, all the grounds contained in the document with the title
“Grounds on which relief is sought” are very general. Some of the
grounds therein were directed at the Director. As the Director’s
Decision was superseded by the Board’s Decision, it is no longer
susceptible to judicial review (see Re Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549).
This court will therefore consider only those grounds directed at the
Board in respect of the Board’s Decision.
15. There are a total of 6 paragraphs under the heading “Grounds” in the
applicant’s said document. Paragraphs 2 and 5 of the applicant’s
grounds were directed at the Director. Hence, they could not be used
to challenge the Board’s Decision and can be simply ignored. Thus,
only paragraphs 1, 3, 4 and 6 of the grounds are relevant to the Leave
Application.
16. In paragraph 1 of the grounds, the applicant alleged that the
adjudicator of the Board reached the Board’s Decision wrongly and it
was not reasonable and fair as required by the Wednesbury test.
However, the applicant did not state how or why the Board’s Decision
was wrong, unfair and unreasonable. It does not help the applicant to
establish any ground by just mentioning the right to life in paragraph
1 either.
17. In any event, the Board did assess the applicant’s risk of right to
life but concluded that the applicant’s case on the ground of BOR 2
Risk[1] was not substantiated (see paragraphs 51 and 52 of the Board’s
Decision).
18. In paragraph 3 of the grounds, the applicant alleged that the
adjudicator acted unreasonably and was procedurally unfair by placing
too much reliance on country of origin information (“COI”) but failed
to take her personal background and experience into account. However,
the applicant did not state which aspects of her personal background
and experience had not been taken into account by the Board.
19. In paragraph 4 of the grounds, the applicant alleged that the
adjudicator was procedurally improper and unfair when assessing
whether to accept or not to accept explanations provided by her, and
unreasonably required her to respond to questions. This accusation
lacks any particulars in support. The applicant did not state which
explanations she provided were not accepted by the Board and which
questions she was unreasonably required to answer.
20. There was in fact nothing wrong for the Board to question the
applicant extensively to try to understand her claims better and to
assess her credibility and her accounts of the events leading to her
claim for non-refoulement protection. The questions were necessary
for the Board to fulfil its duty of finding of facts in relation to
the applicant’s claim. This court finds no fault or unfairness in the
Board’s questioning of the applicant at all.
21. In paragraph 6 of the grounds, the applicant simply alleged that the
adjudicator ought to allow the appeal/petition and the Board’s
Decision was irrational. There was no particulars or reasons given to
say how or why the Board’s Decision was irrational.
22. The Board had in fact provided a detailed analysis of the applicant’s
claim and the reasons why the Board concluded that the applicant
failed on all applicable grounds under the USM to claim non-
refoulement protection. The Board’s rejection of her non-refoulement
claim was a decision made after due consideration of the law and the
evidence placed before it. If the applicant intends to challenge the
finding of facts by the Board, it is not permissible in an application
for judicial review.
23. The Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that general assertions
without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial
review (see Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20; Re Aziz Nasir [2019] HKCA
578; and Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626). Further, as held by the
Court of Appeal in Re Salim Ahmed alias MD Salim [2020] HKCA 244,
“general assertions or propositions of law cannot assist an appellant
when he fails to condescend to the requisite particulars related to
the facts of his case”.
24. Thus, none of the grounds that were contained in the applicant’s said
document could establish any valid ground to challenge the Board’s
Decision when they are so vague and general without any requisite
particulars related to the applicant’s case.
25. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
26. Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for
any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite
the lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the
intended judicial review.
27. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an
oral hearing on 25 April 2023 and the applicant was present. Thus,
the applicant was given the opportunity to present her case to the
Board in person.
28. The Board laid out its assessment of the applicant’s evidence in
paragraphs 30 to 36 of the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary
to repeat the same here.
29. In gist, the Board found that the applicant was not a truthful and
reliable witness. The Board found multiple inconsistencies between
her written claims and her evidence at the Board’s hearing. The Board
did not believe that the applicant had borrowed money from the
creditor or she had been chased for repayment as she alleged.
30. Further, the Board found that even if the applicant’s account was
accepted, she would still fail in her claim for non-refoulement
protection on all the applicable grounds under the USM.
31. The Board found that the applicant’s fear only arose from a financial
dispute with her creditor, which was private in nature. The Board
considered that the injuries the applicant sustained from the assaults
by the creditor were not so serious as to amount to torture or attain
a minimum level of severity. There was no evidence that the creditor
was a state actor, and there was no element of state acquiescence in
the alleged ill-treatment of the applicant. Her fear of ill-treatment
did not fall within any of the Convention categories.
32. Moreover, the Board found from COI that despite setbacks, the
Vietnamese government had taken actions to combat corruption and
improve the effectiveness of the police. COI also showed that the
Vietnamese government was determined to curb illegal moneylending.
The applicant had never sought assistance from the police or
authorities in relation to her problem when she was in Vietnam. There
was no evidence to show that the applicant would not be afforded the
requisite level of state protection if she was to return to Vietnam.
33. Furthermore, the Board had also given its reasons in paragraph 44 of
the Board’s Decision for the finding that the applicant could relocate
in Vietnam in order to avoid any perceived risk from the creditor.
34. Thus, the Board concluded that the applicant had failed to establish a
case for non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong on any of the
applicable grounds under the USM.
35. The finding of facts, including the assessment of evidence, COI and
risk of harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board in dealing with
the applicant’s appeal/petition. The Board was entitled to make its
own decision. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the
way the Board reached its conclusion.
36. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
37. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
38. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 16th day of September 2026
| | |
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or the applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s |the putative |
|may be directed by the|solicitors on: |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order |16/09/2026 |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any| |interested parties as |
|directions given |Applicant’s ref. no: |may be directed by the |
|within 14 days after |Nil |Court / the putative |
|the leave was granted | |interested parties’ |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |16/09/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and| |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance| |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 20669 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the applicant proposes| |QA T/C 458/22 (Formerly |
|to use at the hearing,| |RBCZ 5000328/22) |
|including the | | |
|affidavit in support | |Department of Justice, |
|of the application for| |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
| | | |
| | | |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] Risk of violation of right to life under Article 2 of section 8 of the
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.