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HCAL 611/2026
[2026] HKCFI 3048
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 611 OF 2026
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BETWEEN
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Hisoel Safatri |
Applicant |
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and |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board |
Putative |
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Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative |
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Interested Party |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 23 March 2026, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 30 December 2025 (“the Board’s Decision”). The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2026/HCAL000611_2026_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant had not made out any of the grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Accordingly, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 20 November 2025 and confirmed the same, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
Amendment
3. The applicant named herself and “TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD NON-REFOULMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE” as the putative respondents in Form 86.
4. In fact, only the Board should only be named as the putative respondent.
5. The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office providing administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the Board and should not be named as a putative respondent at all.
6. Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”.
The applicant’s case
7. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
8. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to Indonesia, she would be killed by Fausen, the moneylender from whom the applicant’s father borrowed 500 million Indonesian Rupiah. The applicant was the guarantor and agreed to be the only responsible person to pay the interest. She learnt from her father that Fausen threatened to kill her if she could not repay the loan and its related interest.
Disposal on paper
9. The applicant did not request for an oral hearing of the Leave Application. This court is also satisfied that the Leave Application can be disposed of based on the written materials before this court. Thus, the Leave Application is dealt with on paper.
Grounds for judicial review
10. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
11. The applicant did not advance any ground for her intended judicial review in Form 86, nor in her supporting affidavit/affirmation dated 23 March 2026. She merely stated in her affidavit/affirmation that she did not want to go back to her country because her life and her soul were still in danger, and she asked to be granted permission to continue living in Hong Kong until her life would be safe.
Discussion
12. First of all, the applicant’s alleged danger in her country had already been assessed but rejected by the Board. If she intends to challenge the Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an application for judicial review.
13. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness, or irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).
14. Thus, despite the fact that the applicant did not advance any valid ground for the intended judicial review, this court will scrutinize the Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness, or irrationality as aforesaid.
15. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an oral hearing on 24 December 2025. The applicant was thus given the chance to present her case to the Board in person.
16. The Board had laid out its findings on the credibility of the applicant and her claims in paragraphs 56 to 62 of the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary to repeat the same here.
17. In gist, the Board found that the applicant was an incredible witness who had fabricated or exaggerated the alleged loan and threats from the moneylender in order to substantiate her claim for non-refoulment protection. The Board found multiple aspects of the applicant’s case remained unsatisfactory, despite opportunity being given to her to address such matters at the Board’s hearing. The Board did not accept: (1) the applicant’s account as to the circumstances leading up to and surrounding her loan with the moneylender; (2) the applicant was the only one responsible for repaying the moneylender; and (3) the purported threat made by the moneylender in August 2024.
18. Moreover, the Board found that, even if it had accepted the applicant’s case, the applicant’s appeal/petition still fell to be dismissed. The Board was not satisfied that the applicant’s fear was substantiated. Neither the applicant nor her family had ever been physically harmed. The moneylender had not received any repayment on the interest despite a three-year extension was granted, and still did not physically harm the applicant’s family.
19. The applicant’s dispute with the moneylender was only a personal financial dispute which did not involve the state. There was no suggestion of state acquiescence in the alleged ill-treatment by the creditor. The applicant’s fear of the moneylender was not for a Convention reason.
20. The Board also found that any perceived risk from the moneylender could be weakened by internal relocation. The applicant’s assertion that the moneylender could locate her anywhere in Indonesia was only her own speculation. The Board considered that it would not be unduly harsh for the applicant to relocate to another area of the country and to start afresh by earning a living there.
21. Further, the Board found that reasonable state protection was available to the applicant to protect her from the alleged threat.
22. Thus, the Board found that the applicant was not at a real risk of being tortured, ill-treated, persecuted or arbitrarily deprived of his life upon refoulement. The Board found that the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all the applicable grounds under the USM.
23. The finding of facts relating to a non-refoulement claim, including the assessment of evidence, country of origin information and risk of harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board in dealing with the applicant’s appeal/petition. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way the Board reached its decision.
24. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof. The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its decision.
25. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence leave must be refused.
Conclusion
26. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 27th day of May 2026
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( Gladys LEE )
for Registrar, High Court
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Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
Notes for the applicant:
If leave has been granted, the applicant or the applicant’s solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent/Handed to the applicant/the applicant’s solicitors on: 27/05/2026
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil |
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Sent/Handed to the putative respondent / the putative respondent’s solicitors / such putative interested parties as may be directed by the Court / the putative interested parties’ solicitors on: 27/05/2026
Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 27675
Director of Immigration
Putative interested party’s ref. no.:
QA T/C 2014/25 (Formerly INCZ 5001896/25)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
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