DINH THI TIEP v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 2149/2020

[2026] HKCFI 2014

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 2149 OF 2020

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons filed on 13 January 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 11 November 2025, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 14 March 2019.

2.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.  As my order was made on 11 November 2025, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 25 November 2025. The time for appealing against my order has therefore expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.  In the Summons and her supporting affirmation dated 13 January 2026, apart from applying for leave to appeal, the applicant also applied for extension of time to stay in Hong Kong to take care of her son. However, it is not for this court to deal with her application for extension of time to stay in Hong Kong. Thus, I will not deal with such an application.

8.  The applicant did not give any reason in the Summons and her supporting affirmation as to why she was late in making the appeal. She only explained that she was late in attending the last hearing because there were too many letters and she did not see the letter from the court. There was also no ground given for her intended appeal.

9.  At the hearing of the Summons on 26 March 2026, the applicant said that she did not receive the court’s decision, but she also said that she could not read or understand English and hence she did not know whether the letter was sent by the court. When I asked the applicant whether she in fact received the decision or not, she then said that she received a letter from the court in November and she went to the court in Admiralty. She was told that she could write in to explain why she did not receive the decision from the judge. Afterward, she brought the documents back to Admiralty and she was asked to make an affirmation and an application. She did not know what application she was making. She then received a letter to inform her to come to court on 26 March 2026, ie the date of the hearing of the Summons.

10.  It is clear that the applicant did not give a coherent or satisfactory explanation as to why she was late in lodging the appeal. Thus, there is no reasonable excuse for her lateness in lodging the appeal.

11.  The applicant also failed to give any valid grounds of appeal at the hearing of the Summons on 26 March 2026. When the applicant was asked for the grounds of appeal, she merely explained that she needed to take care of her 10 years old son here, as he could not live independently and did not have a father to take care of him. She was not sure if she could leave her son to the welfare department here. She was aware that her coming here was contravening the Hong Kong law but she urged this court to allow her to take care of her son.

12.  It is clear that the applicant did not provide any valid ground of appeal at all, as none of the matters she raised was concerning my decision.

13.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

14.  The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above. Hence, there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.

15.  In the circumstances, there is no proper excuse for the applicant’s delay in lodging the appeal and there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review. I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

16.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.