RE SAHID ABDUL

CACV 866/2025, [2026] HKCA 678

On appeal from [2025] HKCFI 4417

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 866 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 2202/2020)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Levy (“the Judge”)  given on 30 September 2025[1] (“the Leave Decision”)  refusing to grant leave for the applicant to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”)  dated 23 October 2020 (“the Board’s Decision”)  dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 9 November 2018 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds except for the risk of torture[2].

2.  The applicant’s background, the basis of his claim and the Board’s reasons in reaching the Board’s Decision have been set out therein[3] as well as by the Judge in the Leave Decision at [1]-[2], which will not be repeated.

3.  After considering the documents filed by the applicant as well as his oral submissions made at the hearing of the leave application, the Judge dismissed the application for the reasons stated at [4]-[9] of the Leave Decision.

Appeal to this court

4.  By a Notice of Appeal dated 13 October 2025, the applicant, without elaboration or particulars, contended that “the decisions are unlawful”, “the decisions failed to take into account many things and issues”, and that his life was in danger in his “home country Indonesia” (notwithstanding that he was/is in fact a national of India).  In his supporting affirmation dated the same, the applicant essentially repeated the matters stated in his Notice of Appeal.

5.  By written submissions dated 2 March 2026, the applicant repeated the background to his claim. As regards his complaints against the Board, the applicant submitted that it failed to make sufficient enquiries (without elaborating on what such enquiries might be or to what issues they might relate)  before reaching the Board’s Decision.  He claims that the Board failed to allow him an opportunity to “arrange relevant evidence” (again without specifying what such evidence might be)  in support of his claim.  

6.  We heard the appeal on 1 April 2026, at which the applicant appeared in person.  At the hearing, the applicant stated that he would be in danger should he return to his home country, and that his family (his two daughters and his wife)  are currently in Hong Kong.   

Discussion

7.  As this court has often stated, an appeal to the Court of Appeal is not a fresh application for judicial review.  It is necessary to identify some error on the part of the judge that would justify this court in intervening: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14].  The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board.  An appeal is not the occasion for regurgitating arguments advanced and rejected by the judge or for running arguments which could and should have been raised but were not raised before the judge.  In the determination of an appeal, the Court of Appeal focuses on the decision of the judge and the court will only reverse that decision if an appellant could demonstrate that the judge made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before the court or was otherwise plainly wrong.

8.  The applicant has failed to identify any error on the part of the Judge and thus failed to raise any viable ground of appeal. The points advanced by the applicant were bare assertions unsupported by particulars or evidence.  General assertions of fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].

9.  In the present case, the applicant claimed that if refouled, he would be harmed or ill-treated by a woman named Minu Begum (“Minu”)  due to a relationship/marital dispute, and by a man named Faryaz Ahmed (“Faryaz”)  due to a monetary/loan repayment dispute.  While the Board accepted some of the applicant’s claims concerning Minu, namely that Minu had caused disturbances to the applicant’s family by reason of their intended marriage which fell through, there was no evidence before the Board which was suggestive of Minu posing a risk of harm that is serious enough for the grant of non-refoulement protection (Board’s Decision, [113]-[114]).  As regards the perceived threats from Faryaz, the Board was prepared to accept that the applicant borrowed “some” money from Faryaz, but found that he was unable to establish his claims that Faryaz had threatened him because of his default in repayments and that he was taken to a police station and questioned for this reason (Board’s Decision, [119]-[120]). The risk of harm upon refoulement if any, was therefore assessed by the Board to be low. 

10.  In any event, the Board was of the view that there was adequate state protection and suitable options of internal relocation available to the applicant, which would minimise the risk of harm, if any.  These were factual findings open to the Board on the evidence, and were sufficiently canvassed and considered by the Judge in the Leave Decision at [4]-[9].  We see no basis to interfere.  

11.  The applicant has failed to demonstrate how the Board had acted unlawfully or procedurally unfairly in reaching its Decision, or how such Decision could be said to be Wednesbury unreasonable.

12.  As we have noted, the applicant advanced no viable grounds of appeal against the Judge’s decision.  There is therefore no merit in the appeal and we dismiss the appeal accordingly.