CHINA EVERGRANDE GROUP (IN LIQUIDATION) v. HUI KA YAN AND OTHERS

HCA 551/2024 and HCMP 1080/2024

[2026] HKCFI 5079

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 551 OF 2024 AND

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 1080 OF 2024

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DECISION

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A.   BACKGROUND

1.  By a Decision dated 16 September 2025 ([2025] HKCFI 4327) (“the Receivership Decision”), this Court ordered the 1^st defendant (“Hui”) to bear the plaintiff’s costs of a summons which was subsequently assessed as HK$1,200,000 (“the Assessed Costs”).  As a result of Hui’s failure to pay the same, by virtue of another Decision dated 3 February 2026 ([2026] HKCFI 739) (“the Unless Order Decision”), this Court made an unless order against Hui, pursuant to which Hui would be debarred from defending this consolidated action (“this Action”) if he failed to pay the Assessed Costs by 4pm on 20 February 2026 (“the Unless Order”).  At the end of the day, Hui did not pay the Assessed Costs by the deadline imposed by the Unless Order.

B.   THE APPLICATIONS

2.  Before the Unless Order Decision was handed down, a summons was filed on 9 January 2026 (“the Variation Summons”) by Hui’s solicitors (“Chow de Bedin LLP”), pursuant to which an application was made to vary an Injunction Order against Hui which was re-filed on 22 September 2025 (“the Injunction Order”)[1], so that:

(1)  the Assessed Costs of HK$1.2 million may be paid out of the costs on account held by Messrs. Baker & McKenzie for Hui (“the Costs on Account”); and

(2)  Hui may be permitted to spend a “reasonable sum of money” for his legal fees to be drawn from the Costs on Account rather than being capped at HK$50,000 per month.

3.  On 20 February 2026, Chow de Bedin LLP filed another summons (“the Relief Summons”) for 2 purposes:

(1)  to amend the Variation Summons which was rendered necessary because the Costs on Account originally held by Messrs. Baker & McKenzie has been paid to Hui’s Receivers who were appointed by this Court pursuant to the Receivership Decision (“the Amendment Application”); and

(2)  to apply for relief from the sanction imposed by the Unless Order (“the Relief Application”).

4.  On 9 March 2026, the plaintiff took out a summons (“the Authority Summons”), by which the plaintiff asked, inter alia, for:

(1)  dismissal of both the Variation Summons and the Relief Summons on the ground that Chow de Bedin LLP did not have authority to take out the same;

(2)  a wasted costs order against Chow de Bedin LLP in the event they are found to have no authority to take out the Variation Summons and the Relief Summons.

5.  I will deal with the Authority Summons first as a matter of logic.

C.   THE AUTHORITY SUMMONS

C1.  Chow de Bedin LLP’s authority

6.  For the purpose of the Authority Summons, the plaintiff does not dispute that Chow de Bedin LLP have been validly instructed by Hui to defend this Action generally.  However, it was argued that, according to the evidence of Mr Chow Justin Ting Fun (“Mr Chow”) and other representations made by Mr Chow’s firm (i.e. Chow de Bedin LLP), they simply did not have the necessary authority to take out the Variation Summons and the Relief Summons.  The following evidence was relied on by the plaintiff:

(1)  When Chow de Bedin LLP came on record on 8 October 2024, they filed an acknowledgment of service only in HCA 551/2024, but did not file any Notice to Act in HCMP 1080/2024 (the proceedings under which the Injunction Order was granted).  On 16 October 2024, in response to the plaintiff’s enquiry, Chow de Bedin LLP confirmed in writing that they did not have instruction to act for Hui in HCMP 1080/2024;

(2)  Mr Chow admitted that he had never had any knowledge on the identity of Hui’s new PRC lawyer who replaced the original one in around late 2024 or early 2025, and that since then he had not been able to get any instruction from Hui through the said PRC lawyer or anybody else;

(3)  In paragraph 17 of Mr Chow’s 1^st Affirmation filed on 13 May 2025, he stated that:

“[…] I have been informed by Mr Hui’s PRC lawyer and verily believe that:

(1)  […]

(2) In the circumstances, Mr Hui was only able to instruct generally that the proceedings commenced by the Liquidators be defended.

(3) Since Mr Hui has been detained, he has not been able to deal with any of his assets or assets under his control and is prohibited[2] by the Mainland authorities from discussing with anyone about the same at all.  As such, he did not instruct our firm to apply for an order to discharge the Injunction Order in HCMP 1080/2024. […]

[…]”

(4)  In a letter dated 27 January 2026 issued by Chow de Bedin LLP, they reiterated that Hui “was only able to instruct generally that the proceedings commenced by the Liquidators be defended […]”;

(5)  When the plaintiff applied to vary the Injunction Order to permit a third party to sell one of Hui’s properties, Chow de Bedin LLP, by a letter dated 2 February 2026, drew the Court’s attention to paragraph 17(2) of Mr Chow’s Affirmation (as quoted above) and informed the Court that they had no instruction to act for Hui in relation to the plaintiff’s variation application;

(6)  In paragraph 17 of Mr Chow’s 8^th Affirmation filed on 22 May 2026, he confirmed that it is an accurate description to say that “Hui was only able to instruct generally that the proceedings commenced by the plaintiff be defended”;

(7)  In paragraph 30.2 of his 8^th Affirmation, Mr Chow said his firm considered that it was outside their authority to oppose or consent to the plaintiff’s earlier application to vary the Injunction Order to permit the sale of one of Hui’s properties.

7.  It is noted that the Receivership Decision, the assessment of the costs thereof, and the Unless Order were all made in/after September 2025, that is, after Mr Chow had lost his only indirect contact with Hui.  Therefore, there is no doubt (Ms Ha also fairly accepted) that there was no way that Hui could give any specific instruction to Mr Chow for the taking out of the Variation Summons and the Relief Summons.

8.  In these circumstances, the only issue on authority is whether Hui’s initial authority to “defend these proceedings generally” could encompass Mr Chow (and Chow de Bedin LLP)’s specific authority to issue the Variation Summons and the Relief Summons.  In this regard, it is undisputed that the burden is on Chow de Bedin LLP to establish that they have been properly authorised: Shing Hai Dong & Others v Shing Ho Yung [1961] HKLR 331 at 338.

9.  In my view, the answer on the said issue is clearly “No”.

10.  When considering the aforesaid issue, it is important to bear in mind that Hui had, at all material times, not been able to deal with any of his assets or assets under his control and been prohibited from discussing with anyone about the same by the Mainland authority.  This is a restriction which has all along been recognized by Mr Chow and Chow de Bedin LLP.

11.  By virtue of the Variation Summons, what Chow de Bedin LLP is seeking to do is to make use of the Costs on Account which is an asset of Hui.  If Hui cannot deal with his own assets and is prohibited from talking to others on his own assets, I am at a loss as to how Mr Chow and his firm may say that they have the necessary authority to apply for permission to use the Costs on Account, which in effect amounts to usage and disposal of Hui’s asset.  Adopting the phraseology of Mr Abraham Chan SC who acts for the plaintiff, there is an express carve-out from Chow de Bedin LLP’s authority to take any steps in respect of the Injunction Order or Hui’s assets.

12.  Indeed, if Hui cannot give instruction on a matter expressly, it is futile to argue that he is able to give the same instruction impliedly.

13.  It was said that the taking out of the Variation Summons and the Relief Summons are necessary and incidental to Hui’s instructions to defend this Action, in the sense that if the Injunction Order is left unvaried, it would be impossible for Hui to fund his defence or avoid being debarred from mounting such a defence at all.

14.  I reject this submission for 2 reasons.

15.  Firstly, if Hui himself cannot give instruction on the disposal of his own assets (because, as confirmed by Mr Chow, Hui has been prohibited by the Mainland authority from discussing about his assets with others), I cannot see how this argument can salvage Hui’s case (or Chow de Bedin LLP’s case rather), because any authority granted to Chow de Bedin LLP must be subject to the said overriding restriction.

16.  Ms Ha emphasised that the authority to defend this Action given by Hui was general in nature and that there was no positive exclusion to deal with his assets, and therefore what is now lacking is lack of instructions but not lack of authority.  With greatest respect, I do not agree.  As discussed, the authority which had been conferred by Hui to Chow de Bedin LLP must have been limited in the sense that it would not involve the disposal of any of Hui’s properties.

17.  Secondly, on the facts, Hui (or Chow de Bedin LLP) simply cannot satisfy this Court that the Costs on Account is the only possible source of fund from which the Assessed Costs can be paid and Hui’s defence be funded.  In other words, he has failed to establish on the balance of probabilities that if the Injunction Order is left unvaried, it would be impossible for Hui to fund his defence or avoid being debarred from defending this Action.

18.  On this matter, the following pieces of evidence have been placed before this Court:

(1)  According to the Affidavit of Andrew Ping Cheung Lam:

(a)  He has known Hui for many years and they were friends;

(b)  Upon the request of Hui’s ex-wife (Ms Ding – the 5^th defendant herein), Mr Lam has acted for her in the present case;

(c)  In around August 2024, after his firm has started to act for Ms Ding, a family member of Hui (“the Family Member”) informed him that Hui would like him to represent Hui in this Action;

(d)  While the Family Member did not allow him to disclose her[3] identity, Mr Lam stated that he would disclose the identity of the Family Member if so ordered by this Court;

(e)  He declined to represent Hui herein because he was not comfortable in doing so, given he was already Ms Ding’s legal representative in this case;

(f)  He therefore referred Chow de Bedin LLP to the Family Member;

(g)  Mr Chow of Chow de Bedin LLP agreed to act for Hui on the condition that the legal fees incurred would be secured even if such fees could not be settled by using the Costs on Account;

(h)  Believing that there were costs on account in the region of HK$20 million and that Hui should be given a fair chance to defend himself in this Action (“the Main Purpose”), Mr Lam agreed to provide an undertaking in his personal capacity (presumably to Mr Chow) to bear the legal costs that might be incurred by Chow de Bedin LLP in the event such costs could not be paid by the funds in the Costs on Account.  This undertaking was premised on him being reimbursed once the funds in the Costs on Account would become available for meeting Hui’s legal costs.  Mr Lam was also assured by the Family Member that in the event the said legal costs could not be met by the Costs on Account, he would be indemnified in full;

(i)  As a result, Mr Lam had paid for Hui’s legal costs to be incurred by Chow de Bedin LLP, in the total sum of HK$2.5 million.

(2)  According to Mr Chow[4]:

(a)  As far as Hui’s legal cost is concerned, Chow de Bedin LLP had only received funds from Mr Lam;

(b)  He has never received any assets or funds from Hui and/or his companies;

(c)  Apart from the Costs on Account, he had never had any knowledge of any information about Hui’s assets/funds;

(d)  Mr Lam has informed him that he (i.e. Mr Lam) “specifically refuses that his money be used for the payment” of the Assessed Costs, and that he will not fund Hui’s defence any further.

19.  In my view, the evidence adduced is insufficient to establish even on the balance of probabilities that the Costs on Account is the only possible source of fund from which the Assessed Costs can be paid and Hui’s defence be funded:

(1)  Mr Lam must know well that without settling the Assessed Costs, his purpose of ensuring that Hui would be given a fair chance to defend himself in this Action cannot be achieved[5]. However, it was alleged by Mr Chow that Mr Lam has specifically instructed that his money must not be used for paying the Assessed Costs.  Such a stance is inconsistent with the Main Purpose of Mr Lam.  Curiously, there was no direct evidence from Mr Lam on the said “specific instruction”, despite the fact that he had made an Affidavit himself in support of the Variation Summons;

(2)  Ms Ha has drawn this Court’s attention to Mr Lam’s Affidavit in which he stated that he agreed to provide an undertaking to “bear the legal costs that might be incurred by Mr Justin Chow’s firm in the event that the costs could not be secured or paid by the funds in [the Costs on Account]”, and argued that this supports the “specific instructions” given by Mr Lam not to use his money to pay the Assessed Costs.  With respect, this does not assist Mr Chow, because when the undertaking was made, the Unless Order was yet to be made;

(3)  While it is Mr Lam’s sworn evidence that he has undertaken to bear the legal costs that might be incurred by Chow de Bedin LLP in the event such costs could not be secured or funded by the Costs on Account, Mr Chow has now told this Court (again, without any direct evidence from Mr Lam himself) that Mr Lam has now refused to fund Hui’s defence herein any further.  Although it is true that there was no legal obligation on the part of Mr Lam to finance Hui’s defence in the first place, it is still a breach of Mr Lam’s undertaking given to Mr Chow.  However, there is no clear explanation from Mr Chow as to why Mr Hui has changed his mind (it was only said that to be due to “the Plaintiff’s positions so far”[6] which is very vague as to what exactly it means); 

(4)  Neither is there any evidence from the Family Member to the effect that she would refuse to pay the Assessed Costs nor to fund Hui’s defence in this Action.  Surprisingly, Mr Chow has not disclosed whether he has ever requested the Family Member to pay the Assessed Costs and/or to fund Hui’s defence, and if no such request has been made, why he did not do so;

(5)  By reasons of the above, I would not give weight to Mr Chow’s 8^th Affirmation as far as the availability of alternative funding is concerned.

20.  I therefore conclude that Chow de Bedin LLP had no authority to take out the Variation Summons and the Relief Summons on behalf of Hui.

21.  For such a reason alone, the Variation Summons and the Relief Summons should be dismissed.

C2.  Wasted costs order

22.  Section 52A(4) of the High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4, Laws of Hong Kong) and Order 62 rule 8 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap.4A, Laws of Hong Kong) confer on the Court a power to make a wasted costs order and require the legal representative concerned to meet the whole or any part of any wasted costs.

23.  It is undisputed by Ms Ha that Mr Chan SC has accurately set out the legal principles and procedures in his skeleton submissions as follows:

“24. The Court must first be satisfied that a prima facie case has been made out for a wasted costs order, and that the wasted costs order proceedings are justified notwithstanding the likely costs involved.  If so satisfied, the application will proceed to the second stage of requiring the solicitor to show cause why an order should not be made: Ma So So v Chin Yuk Lun & Anor [2004] 3 HKLRD 294.

25. There must be a prima facie case that the solicitors’ conduct amounted to a serious dereliction of duty (Ma So So at [93]; Que Jocelyn Co v Broadair Express Ltd [1999] 3 HKLRD 104 at 108D).  That requires there to have been inexcusable conduct to merit reproof (J v C [1995] 1 HKLR 19 at p.22 (line 35); K.B. Chau & Co. v China Finance Trust and Investment Corporation & Anor [1995] 2 HKLR 567 at p.573).

26.  A solicitor acting beyond the scope of his authority is a paradigm case for the granting of a wasted costs order (Grand Field at [12]).”

24.  In the present case, Ms Ha argued that even if this Court finds that Chow de Bedin LLP lacked the authority to issue the Variation Summons and the Relief Summons, the plaintiff did not rely on (or was not induced by) Chow de Bedin LLP’s authority because:

(1)  The limited nature of Hui’s communication of instructions to Chow de Bedin LLP has been disclosed in as early as 13 May 2025, when the 1^st Affirmation of Mr Chow was filed;

(2)  Chow de Bedin LLP’s own representations as to its limited instructions from Hui had also been referred to in the plaintiff’s skeleton submissions;

(3)  The Variation Summons and the Relief Summons were taken out by Chow de Bedin LLP on behalf of Hui on 9 January 2026 and 20 February 2026 respectively;

(4)  Immediately upon receiving the Variation Summons (on 15 January 2026), the plaintiff’s solicitors raised their challenge against Chow de Bedin LLP’s authority to issue the same.  Chow de Bedin LLP then responded on 27 January 2026 in writing and reiterated that “Hui was only able to instruct generally that the proceedings commenced by the Liquidators be defended and that the Variation Summons is a continuation of [their] instructions to defend the case generally.”

(5)  The plaintiff was never “misled” by Chow de Bedin LLP’s implied warranty of authority.

25.  It was therefore submitted that, in the absence of the plaintiff having relied on the warranty of authority, the costs were caused by the issue of the process, not by the breach of the warranty: Zoya Ltd v Ahmed [2017] 2 Costs LO 133 at [64] and Grand Field Group Holdings Ltd. v Tsang Wai Lun Wayland (No. 2) [2010] 4 HKLRD 487 at [14].

26.  In Grand Field Group Holdings Ltd. (supra), it was explained by Poon J (as he then was) that:

“12. When a solicitor purported to act for a client in an action, he impliedly warranted that he had the authority to represent the client.  When it later transpired that in fact he did not have such authority, he had acted in breach of the implied warranty.  The court would normally order him to personally pay the costs needlessly incurred by the opposing party.  It matters not whether the solicitor had acted bona fide and in reasonable reliance of the instructions; or that he had been deceived into believing that he had the authority to act for the client; or that quite innocently he did not know that there was no authority or the authority once existed had ceased to exist.  See Yonge v Toynbee [1910] 1 KB 215, per Buckley LJ at pp.224-225, Swinfen Eady J at pp.233-234; Babury Limited v London Industrial PLC & Another, The Times, 20 October 1989.

13. The rationale behind the rule, as explained by Swinfen Eady J, ibid, is this :

‘The manner in which business is ordinarily conducted requires that each party should be able to rely upon the solicitor of the other party having obtained a proper authority before assuming to act.  It is always open to a solicitor to communicate as best he can with his own client, and obtain from time to time such authority and instructions as may be necessary.  But the solicitor on the other side does not communicate with his opponent’s client, and, speaking generally, it is not proper for him to do so… It is in my opinion essential to the proper conduct of legal business that a solicitor should be held to warrant the authority which he claims of representing his client; if it were not so, no one would be safe in assuming that his opponent’s solicitor was duly authorized in what he said or did, and it would be impossible to conduct legal business upon the footing now existing; and, whatever the legal liability may be, the Court, in exercising the authority which it possesses over its own officers, ought to proceed upon the footing that a solicitor assuming to act, in an action, for one of the parties to the action warrants his authority.’

14.  This is, however, not an inflexible rule.  It may sometimes have to yield to special circumstances.  For example, in a case where the opposing party’s solicitor is informed that there is a doubt about the solicitor’s authority, there may be no unequivocal representation of authority.  Or the facts of the case are such that it may be right to leave the aggrieved party to his remedy in an action in damages for breach of warranty of authority against the solicitor.  That said, when a solicitor who clearly acted without authority, causing by his representation of authority the opposing party to incur wasted costs, must usually expect to be ordered to pay his costs.  See Babury Limited v London Industrial PLC & Another, supra, per Steyn J.”

27.  In the present case, while Chow de Bedin LLP had indeed informed the plaintiff about Hui’s inability to deal with his own assets and the prohibition for Hui from discussing with others on his assets, Mr Chow had never represented that he was doubtful as to whether his firm had the authority to take out the Variation Summons and the Relief Summons.  To the contrary, even after the Authority Summons had been taken out, Mr Chow still made his 8^th Affirmation and confirmed that the taking out of both the Variation Summons and the Relief Summons fell within his firm’s general authority to defend this Action.  Apparently, he was not only advancing his client’s case but his own case on authority.

28.  In such circumstances, the plaintiff had no other choice but to incur costs so as to deal with Mr Chow’s arguments. It would be utterly unfair if Chow de Bedin LLP would be able to escape liability under such circumstances, particularly when, unlike the case of Zoya Ltd (supra), the plaintiff could not look to anybody else for payment of the legal costs incurred.

29.  Insofar as it is necessary, I also take the view that it was improper and unreasonable for Chow de Bedin LLP to take out the Variation Summons and the Relief Summons despite Mr Chow’s clear knowledge of Hui’s restriction in dealing with and giving instruction regarding his own assets.  Apparently, part of the reason for the taking out of the Variation Summons was for his firm to recoup legal fees which Chow de Bedin LLP had incurred and in respect of which Hui had never settled. 

30.  To conclude, I am satisfied that the criteria set out in Order 62 rule 8B(1)(a)[7] have been met.  I will therefore give further directions to ensure that Chow de Bedin LLP is afforded a reasonable opportunity to show cause why a wasted costs order should not be made.

D.   THE VARIATION SUMMONS

31.  Strictly speaking, given my conclusion under section C1 above, there is no need for this Court to consider the merits of the Variation Summons.  However, I would deal with the same briefly for the sake of completeness.

32.  In the event Chow de Bedin LLP has the authority to take out the Variation Summons, I do not think there is any objection from the plaintiff for the said summons to be amended, so as to reflect the fact that the Costs on Account which Hui would like to use is now already in the hands of the Receivers.  In other words, the Amendment Application would have been allowed.  For the avoidance of doubt, the discussion below on the Variation Summons concerns the Variation Summons as amended.

33.  To recap, by the Variation Summons, it is now sought to allow Hui to spend a reasonable amount on legal costs rather than being limited to a monthly cap of HK$50,000, and an order that the same be drawn from the Costs on Account.

34.  The relevant legal principles have been set out in Wharf Ltd & Others v Lau Yuen How & Others [2010] 1 HKLRD 783 at [14] as follows:

“In the case of an ‘ordinary’ Mareva injunction, where there is no proprietary claim asserted against the enjoined assets, in the exercise of the Court’s discretion faced with an application to release the funds, the Court should consider whether the defendant has shown by sufficient evidence that (a) he does not have other assets available to meet the payment, and (b) the purpose of the application is not an attempt to dissipate the assets (which prima facie are the defendant’s) to frustrate the enforcement of judgment by the plaintiff […]”

35.  Hence, the question here is whether Hui has shown by sufficient evidence that he does not have other assets available to meet the payment of legal costs.

36.  Ms Ha has emphasized in her submissions the fundamental principle that a defendant should not be deprived of professional legal representation, as enshrined in Article 35 of the Basic Law.  Having said that, she also frankly accepted that, if Hui has other available assets to fund his legal representation, then he would arguably not be deprived of this basic right.

37.  In this regard, I have already mentioned under Section C1 above that Hui has failed to establish on the balance of probabilities that the Costs on Account is the only possible source of fund from which the Assessed Costs can be paid and his defence be funded.  The same reasoning should be applicable herein. 

38.  In particular, there is no evidence at all to show that the Family Member is unwilling to fund Hui’s defence in this Action.

39.  More importantly, in breach of the obligations imposed by the Injunction Order, Hui has given no disclosure whatsoever of his assets.  As Mr Chan SC pointed out:

(1)  in respect of Financial Years 2017 to 2020 alone, Hui, indirectly through his wholly-owned company and the 4^th defendant herein, received dividends from the plaintiff in the total amount of HK$33.5 billion;

(2)  the Order of Judge KK Pang dated 23 December 2021 in FCMC 7405/2021 for the divorce of Hui from his former spouse, Ms Ding (who is the 5^th defendant herein), indicates that Hui held approximately HK$88.3 billion in assets at that time;

(3)  To date, the Receivers have identified assets of only around HK$64 million that are owned by Hui, of which HK$21 million are the Costs on Account.

40.  Looking at the above in the round, there is simply a great doubt on the assertion that Hui does not have alternative assets available to him for the purpose of funding the defence of this Action.

41.  The alleged inability on the part of Hui to give instruction to Chow de Bedin LLP on his assets would not change the situation.  The fact remains that a large part of his wealth has not been disclosed.  In this regard, I must express my disapproval of Mr Chow’s evidence that “[Hui] does not have alternative undisclosed assets available to him to pay the [Assessed Costs]”[8]. Given Mr Chow’s confirmation[9] that he has never had any other information or documents concerning the affairs and assets of Hui and/or his companies, he simply is not in a position to give the aforesaid evidence on alternative means to pay the Assessed Costs.

42.  Ms Ha also laid emphasis on the so-called “disproportionate outcome”, and submitted that the Court should not let Hui be held liable for the judgment sum of RMB 43.318 billion by reason of a procedural order notwithstanding any substantive merits of the claim.  I do not think this argument is open to her, since Hui has not appealed against the Unless Order.  In any event, I do not think the Court should be lenient to Hui who has been in breach of various court orders.

43.  All in all, I hold that Hui has failed to persuade this Court that it should exercise its discretion in varying the Injunction Order. 

44.  The Variation Summons should therefore be dismissed anyway even if Chow de Bedin LLP had the authority to take it out in the first place.

E.   THE RELIEF SUMMONS

45.  Ms Ha accepted that the Relief Summons would only be granted upon the substantive determination of the Variation Summons in Hui’s favour.

46.  It follows that the Relief Summons should also be dismissed in any event.

F.   THE ORDER

47.  For the above reasons, I make the followings orders:

(1)  A declaration that in filing each of the Variation Summons and the Relief Summons, Chow de Bedin LLP acted in excess of their authority to act for Hui.

(2)  The Variation Summons and the Relief Summons be dismissed.

(3)  Chow de Bedin LLP do show cause as to why a wasted costs order should not be made against them for the plaintiff’s costs of and occasioned by the Variation Summons and the Relief Summons.

(4)  For the above purpose:

(a)  Leave be granted for Chow de Bedin LLP to file affirmation(s) on or before 30 September 2026 explaining why wasted costs shall not be made against it;

(b)  Leave be granted to the plaintiff to file affirmation(s) in reply on or before 14 October 2026;

(c)  No further affirmations may be filed without leave of the Court;

(d)  A substantive hearing be held on a date to be fixed (with 3 hours reserved).

G.   COSTS

48.  Costs be reserved. 

[1]  The Injunction Order was first made in HCMP 1080/2024 by Coleman J on 24 June 2024 against Hui, which prohibited him from disposing of, inter alia, his assets worldwide up to the sum of US$7.7 billion

[2]  Mr Chow’s own bold and underline

[3]  Mr Lam has disclosed the gender of the Family Member in his Affidavit

[4]  Mr Chow’s 6^th and 8^th Affirmations

[5]  Mr Lam has made express reference to the Unless Order in his Affidavit. 

[6]  Paragraph 50 of Mr Chow’s 8^th Affirmation

[7]  Order 62 rule 8B(1) provides that: “The Court shall consider whether to make a wasted costs order in 2 stages – (a) in the first stage, the Court must be satisfied that – (i) it has before it evidence or other material which, if unanswered, would be likely to lead to a wasted costs order being made; and the wasted costs proceedings are justified notwithstanding the likely costs involved […]”

[8]  Paragraph 14.2 of Mr Chow’s 6^th Affirmation

[9]  Paragraph 6 of Mr Chow’s 6^th Affirmation