TSOI PING HUNG AND ANOTHER v. CHEUNG CHOW LAN AND OTHERS

CACV 126/2014

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 126 OF 2014

(ON APPEAL FROM DCMP NO. 1884 OF 2012)

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DECISION
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Hon Cheung JA (giving Decision of the Court) :

1.  The plaintiffs apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against our judgment of 22 April 2015. The defendants oppose the application. We will deal with the application on paper.

2.  The plaintiffs rely on both limbs of section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap. 484).  In respect of the great, general or public importance ground, the following questions are identified :

‘ (1) Whether and to what extent can an appellate court depart from the general principle of not disturbing the primary factual findings of a trial judge except where they are plainly wrong, but substitute the trial judge’s findings by the appellate court’s own determinations on facts based on disputed testimony of witnesses;

(2) In proving adverse possession, whether the requirements of (1) “clear and affirmative evidence” of the squatter excluding the world at large (Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452 at 472), and (2) “the actions of the occupier make it clear that he is using the land in the way in which a full owner would ...” (Pye (JA) (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 at 447F per Lord Hope), are abrogated, when ground laying work is done on the land?

(3) Is ground laying work on the land in preparation for future occupation use sufficient by itself, before the .occupation commences, and in the absence of any manifestation of excluding anyone from the land, to constitute exclusive possession with the necessary animus possidendi so that the limitation period commences before the intended occupation?’

3.  In support of these three questions, the plaintiffs devoted seven pages of a ten-page written submission on this topic. This is followed by another five-page written submission in reply.

4.  We do not consider it appropriate or even necessary in a leave application for this Court to provide a detailed response to the submissions made by the plaintiffs.  It is sufficient for us to state that our judgment was fact-specific and based on the totality of the evidence.

5.  The three questions, although skilfully dressed up by the plaintiffs as questions of law, are in essence nothing more than factual challenges to our judgment.  Principles concerning how an appellate court can reverse a lower court’s finding of fact and also adverse possession are so well-established that they hardly need a revisit by the highest Court of the land.

6.  What the plaintiffs really wanted is to have a further round of appeal on facts and, with respect, they cannot achieve it under the guise of the great, general or public importance ground.  The only plank in which the plaintiffs can seek to achieve their goal is really under the ‘or otherwise’ ground.  As to that they have not demonstrated that justice requires the factual issues to be reconsidered by the Court of Final Appeal afresh.  In any event, the usual practice of this Court is to let the Court of Final Appeal to decide whether leave should be granted on the ‘or otherwise’ ground.

7.  Accordingly the application is refused with costs to the defendants which we assessed at $210,000 of which $160,000 is for two counsel and $50,000 for solicitors.