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BISWAS SREE POLASH KUMAR v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
BISWAS SREE POLASH KUMAR v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 6136 · HCAL 660/2022
Court of First Instance
HCAL 660/2022
[2026] HKCFI 6136
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 660 of 2022
BETWEEN
| |Biswas Sree Polash Kumar |Applicant |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board/ |Putative |
| |Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following;
|( |consideration of documents only; or |
|( |consideration of the documents and the Applicant being absent in open |
| |court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Bonnie Cheng:
1. Form 86 be amended, naming the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-
Refoulement Claims Petition Office as the Putative Respondent and the
Director of Immigration as the Putative Interested Party.
2. Extension of time for application for leave to apply for judicial
review be refused.
3. The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. By Form 86 dated 25 July 2022 (“Form 86”), the Applicant seeks leave
to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”) against the
Decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims
Petition Office (“Board”) dated 27 January 2022 (“Board’s Decision”),
which affirmed the Decision of the Director of Immigration
(“Director”) dated 23 July 2019.
2. The Form 86 incorrectly named multiple entities as both putative
respondent and putative interested party. I therefore amend the Form
86 on my own motion to name the Board as the putative respondent and
the Director as the putative interested party.
3. An oral hearing, which was requested by the Applicant, took place
before me on 26 February 2026. The Applicant was however absent.
Leave Application Out of Time
4. Pursuant to O.53, r.4(1) of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A), an
application for leave to apply for judicial review shall be made
promptly and in any event within three months from the date when
grounds for the application first arose unless the Court considers
that there is good reason for extending the period within which the
application shall be made.
5. Here, the Applicant should have made the Leave Application by 27 April
2022, i.e. within three months from the date when the Board’s Decision
was made. However, the Leave Application was only made on 25 July 2022
and hence out of time for almost 3 months.
6. s.21K(6) of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4) provides that:
“Where the Court of First Instance considers that there has been undue
delay in making an application for judicial review, the Court may
refuse to grant –
a) leave for the making of the application; or
b) any relief sought on the application,
if it considers that the granting of the relief sought would be likely
to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice the
rights of, any person or would be detrimental to good administration.”
7. As the Court of Appeal explained in AW v Director of Immigration &
Anor [2016] 2 HKC 393 at §§23-36, the following (non-exhaustive)
factors are relevant to whether an applicant has a good reason to
extend time: (1) length of the delay; (2) explanation for the delay;
(3) merits of the substantive application; (4) prejudice to the
applicant (if time is not extended) and to the respondent and public
administration (if a challenge is allowed to proceed out of time); and
(5) questions of general public importance. The court is to consider
the matter flexibly, always with regard to the particular
circumstances of each case.
8. A delay of 3 months is not short, and the Applicant has not provided
any explanation for the delay.
9. In any case, I shall proceed to review the substantive merits of the
Leave Application, being another relevant factor for consideration.
Background
10. The Applicant is from Bangladesh. His background and the basis of his
application for non-refoulement were set out in detail in the Board’s
Decision at this hyperlink.[1] I will not repeat them here. Unless
otherwise specified, I adopt the abbreviations in the Board’s
Decision.
11. In short, the Applicant claimed to be in fear of being harmed by one
Mr M (being a Mayor and an AL member) and his men, due to the
Applicant’s refusal to make a donation.
Discussion
12. Leave application is meant to be a filtering process and the court is
not expected to give elaborate reasons for its decision: Re Zunariyah
[2018] HKCA 14 at §23. I therefore set out below brief reasons for my
decision, which I have reached upon considering all the materials
before me.
13. The court’s role in judicial review is not to provide a further avenue
of appeal. The primary decision makers are the Director and the
Board. While the court adopts in non-refoulement cases an enhanced
standard in scrutinising the decision of the Board due to the
seriousness of the issue at hand, it should not usurp the role of the
Board. Assessment of evidence and COI materials and risk of harm,
state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily
within the province of the Board (and the Director). The court will
not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law
or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the
Board: Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at §14(1).
There must be a reasonably arguable case, namely one which enjoys a
realistic prospect of success, before leave for judicial review will
be granted: Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676 at
§§14-17.
14. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to state the grounds of
judicial review clearly and succinctly: Ho Loy v Director of
Environmental Protection (HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016) at §142. He
or she is also under a duty to make full and frank disclosure of
material facts: Kan Hung Cheung v The Director of Immigration [2008]
HKC 323 at §§14-17.
15. The Applicant’s Form 86 does not contain any ground of judicial
review. In his affirmation, he stated that the Board’s Decision or
that of the Director was unreasonable in failing to consider all the
matters raised in his claims and/or give adequate reasons.
16. I have reviewed the Board’s Decision and I do not detect the alleged
errors or any other error of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality. In particular:
a. The Board considered that the Applicant’s ability to hide and move
from one place to another without the need of other’s care
suggested that his injuries were not serious (§53).
b. In any event, the Board, having considered the COI, found that
there were channels and procedure available to the Applicant to
lodge complaints Mr M and his men for extortion of money and the
misconduct of the local police officer who failed to perform his
duties to look into the matter of his complaint (§70).
c. Further still, the Board, having considered the Applicant’s
personal background, regarded Dhaka and Chittagong as viable places
for his internal relocation (§80).
17. In the premises, I conclude that the Applicant’s intended challenge
against the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable.
Conclusion
18. For the above reasons, I make an order that the Form 86 be amended in
the manner set out above and that the Leave Application be dismissed
for being out of time.
Dated the 10th day of November 2026
| |(Annson Cheung) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|Applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant| | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the |Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such |Applicant |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as |on 10/11/2026 |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the| |solicitors / such |
|Court the order |Biswas Sree Polash |Putative Interested |
|granting leave and any|Kumar |Parties as may be |
|directions given | |directed by the Court / |
|within 14 days after |Applicant’s ref. no:|the Putative Interested |
|the leave was granted | |Parties’ solicitors on |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | |10/11/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|originating summons | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|within 14 days after | |Claims Petition Office |
|the grant of leave and| |Putative Respondent’s |
|serve it in accordance| |ref. no.: |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |USM 16146/19/8/8/B2068 |
|and | | |
| | |Director of Immigration |
|c) supply to every | |Putative Interested |
|other party copies of | |Party’s ref. no.: |
|every affidavit which | |QA T/C 386/19 (Formerly |
|the Applicant proposes| |BBCZ 10273/19) |
|to use at the hearing,| | |
|including the | |Department of Justice, |
|affidavit in support | |Senior Assistant Law |
|of the application for| |Officer |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |(Civil Law) |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1]
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2022/HCAL000660_
2022_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf