WESTON MARK BAINES v. LAI YUK LAN

HCB 2600/2020

[2026] HKCFI 4692

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS NO 2600 OF 2020

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BETWEEN

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DECISION

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Introduction

1.  This is an application by Mr WESTON Mark Baines (“Applicant”) to suspend the automatic discharge of the bankruptcy order of his ex-wife, Madam LAI Yuk Lan.

Background

2.  On 12 May 2020 Madam LAI applied to this Court for her own bankruptcy. She deposed, inter alia, that she was unemployed. Although she earned no income but her monthly expenditure amounted to $26,770, including maintenance to her daughter at $3,000. She further owed to 5 creditors, including 2 banks, for over $1.25 million.

3.  On 11 August 2020, the Court allowed her application and made her a bankrupt (hereinafter called “Bankrupt”).

4.  The Officer Receiver later became the trustee (hereafter called “OR/T”) of the Bankrupt.

5.  On 24 June 2024, OR/T applied to suspend the automatic discharge of bankruptcy on 10 August 2024 (ie 4 years from the making of bankruptcy order) due to the unsatisfactory conduct of the Bankrupt, including failure to provide information and failure to attend interview, as requested by OR/T.

6.  On 24 July 2024, after hearing from OR/T and in the absence of the Bankrupt, Master Yip allowed the application and suspend the automatic discharge of bankruptcy for 2 years from 10 August 2024. In other words, the bankruptcy period for the Bankrupt was ordered to be extended until 10 August 2026.

7.  On both 21 and 22 April 2026, the Applicant wrote to the Court. He explained that he was the major creditor (70% of proven debt) of the Bankrupt. The Bankrupt failed to disclose her assets and property. Her conduct was unsatisfactory and there was lack of cooperation on her part. She induced him to rely on her promise to return funds to her when she was clearly insolvent and moving to a bankruptcy petition.

8.  On 28 April 2026, the Court replied him that:

“1. As the relevant period of 4 years under sections 30A (1) and 30A (2) (a) of Cap. 6 has already ceased to run for 2 years commencing from 10 August 2024, please obtain views of the Official Receiver regarding this application.

2. If necessary, the applicant shall seek independent legal advice.

3. Subject to the above,

(a) the Notice of Intention to Object Bankrupt’s Discharge under Section 30A (4) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance should be filed at the High court Registry instead of being attached to a letter.

(b) The Notice was unsigned.

Thank you for your attention.”

9.  On 28 May 2026, the Applicant filed a Form 82 (Notice of Intention to Object to the Bankrupt’s Discharge). He relied on 3 grounds, namely, failure of cooperation, unsatisfactory conduct and bankruptcy offence committed by the Bankrupt under section(s) 129 or 131 - 136 of Cap 6.

10.  Further, on 28 May 2026, the Applicant issued the present application asking the Court to suspend the automatic discharge.

11.  He filed 3 supporting affidavits on 28 May 2026, 12 June 2026 and 9 July 2026 herein respectively, enclosing a number of exhibits, including copy documents of (i) divorce proceedings in FCMC 5844 of 2021, (ii) his application for legal aid, and (iii) his own medical record.

12.  On 13 July 2026, OR/T wrote to the Court informing a legal point that:

“ … the Court of Appeal took the view that there is no jurisdiction to make a further postponement of bankruptcy order after the first postponement order, China Merchants Banks Co Ltd and Another v. Cheng Chao Ming (15/06/2010, CACV 136/2009) [2010] 3 HKLRD 495, and explained in para. 22

“The provision for postponement of bankruptcy period is found in section 30A (3) which has been already set out earlier. It did not refer to multiple applications. The wording chosen was “the application” instead of ‘an application’ or ‘the applications’. Further it provided that the Court may order the relevant period shall cease to run for ‘such period’ instead of ‘such periods’. Even if, for the purpose of argument, applying section 7 of Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap.1) that the words in singular include the plural, a more fundamental problem with a pluralistic construction is that words restricting the total period to a maximum of eight years despite multiple applications and orders are missing from section 30A (3). Such words must be ‘imported’ into section 30A (3) if multiple postponements are allowed. Otherwise the Court cannot have regard to the eight year maximum period each time it is being asked to exercise its powers under section 30A (3). This may result in overall maximum bankruptcy period being extended beyond eight years which is not permissible. These are important words and are too material to be supplanted by the Court. In my view the omission of these words and the structure of section 30A (3) clearly indicate that section 30A (3) does not envisage multiple postponements.”

OR/T also said, inter alia, that she would leave the matter for the Applicant to seek independent legal advice and ask to be excused from the hearing.

13.  On 28 July 2026, the Bankrupt filed her affirmation in opposition and opposed the application. She said that she did not owe money to her ex-husband, the Applicant. She further produced a copy Order in FCMC 5844/2021, showing that they had settled the money matters by consent therein.

14.  On 31 July 2026, parties appeared before me. Upon hearing from them, I reserved my decision to be handed down or sent to parties. Here is it.

Ruling and reasons

15.  Upon consideration, I have decided to dismiss the application with no order as to costs.

16.  The fatal point as against the Applicant is a legal one, namely, under our bankruptcy regime, postponement of bankruptcy period can only be applied ONCE. In the present case, as OR/T did so on 24 June 2024 and the same was allowed by the Court on 24 July 2024. Any subsequent postponement application is bound to fail because our bankruptcy law simply does not allow it to happen.

17.  When I raised this legal point with the Applicant at the hearing, he referred me to paragraph 12 of his Speaking Notes, namely:

“12. While her ordinary debts will be erased when her bankruptcy automatically concludes, this trust liability is statutorily barred from discharge and attaches to her HKID card for the rest of natural life. I respectfully request for an Order declaring this fund a Section 43(3) trust assets, an Order that this liability is non-dischargeable for life under Section 32(3)(b), and a formal Production Order under Section 21 of Cap.8 directing HSBC to produce all account ledger logs based on the pension provider cheque copy inside my bundle, including the IP access logs, to locate the dissipated asset trial.”

I am unable to accept the submission. This does not offer any legal answer to the authority raised by OR/T. It appears to me that the Applicant is unable to answer it and only hopes to move to reliefs fitting his case and purpose, but apparently outside the ambit of his application before the Court.

18.  The above suffices for me to dispose of the application. However, to complete the picture, I will also spell out the followings.

(a) By paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Speaking Notes of the Applicant, he complained[1] that the Bankrupt had been late in serving her notice/affirmation in opposition under rule 88 (5) of Cap 6A. However, the dismissal of his application is a legal one, as aforesaid and hence, the “lateness” on the part of the Bankrupt is neither here nor there. It does not cause any prejudice to him. In other words, without the affirmation in opposition, the application is still bound to fail.

(b) One does not also forget that only the trustee or a creditor can take out postponement application under section 30A of Cap 6. The Applicant called himself a (proven) creditor in the Form 82 and the summons. However, it is noted that:

(i) he was not a named creditor in the Statement of Affairs when the Bankrupt applied for her own bankruptcy on 12 May 2020, and

(ii) he was also not a named proving creditor in the Notice given by OR/T on 9 April 2024 of her application for postponement of bankruptcy herein.

19.  At the end of the hearing, I briefly discussed with parties the question of costs. Among them, the Bankrupt informed me that she would not be asking for costs in the event that the application was dismissed by the Court.

Orders

20.  To conclude, I will make the following orders.

(1) The application is dismissed.

(2) No order as to costs.