RE GALANG JOAN SIGUA

CACV 206/2024, [2025] HKCA 239

On Appeal From [2024] HKCA 912

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 206 OF 2024

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 1502 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 18 October 2024, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this court’s judgment of 4 October 2024 (“the Judgment”) ([2024] HKCA 912).  In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge KW Lung (“the Deputy Judge”) dated 22 May 2024, by which the Deputy Judge dismissed his application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2024] HKCFI 1253).

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

3.  Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484 (“the HKCFAO”) provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

4.  In his Notice of Motion, the applicant stated:

“THE HIGH COURT’S JUDGEMENT HAS UNDERESTIMATED MY POSSIBILITY OF HARMED SHOULD I RETURN. I WOULD LIKE TO APPEAL FOR THE DECISION MADE BY THE COURT. THE COURT IGNORES THE EARLY DECISION MADE BY THE TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD WHICH IS A DECISION MADE DESREGARDING THE CULTURAL CONTEXT AND THE HIGH POSSIBILITY OF DEATH THREAT I AM FACING.” (sic)

5.  Pursuant to Practice Direction 2.1, the applicant lodged his written submissions on 1 November 2024.  In those submissions, he claimed that “even the judge in the Court of the First Instance had stated that [his] evidence is credible and it is believable that [he] will be facing serious harm”.  He reiterated that the Philippines “had bad human rights record” and that his life would be threatened upon refoulement.  He further stated that there were cases of extrajudicial killings and that the Director failed to understand the problem in the Philippines.  He claimed that he would be facing serious threats and would be killed upon return to his home country.

6.  In our view, the applicant’s application is plainly devoid of merit.  At the outset, it is factually erroneous for the applicant to assert that the Deputy Judge accepted his evidence as credible.  It is clear from the Leave Decision that the Deputy Judge found no error in the Board’s finding that it “did not consider the applicant a credible witness or that aspects of his claims were credible”: see [14] and [23] of the Leave Decision. In any event, the applicant’s assertions are all vague, bare and unsupported by any specific particular or evidence. General assertions of his fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  His allegations are essentially a mere regurgitation of those submissions he had previously made before this court in his appeal, which we had already considered and rejected in full: see [8] ‑ [14] of the Judgment.  More importantly, his allegations are mainly directed at the Director and the Board’s Decision and he fails to identify any specific error in the Judgment.  It is well established that the Court of Appeal will not allow an application of this nature to be deployed as an occasion for re-arguing points which had already been canvassed at the appeal: Ho Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling & Another (unreported, CACV 221/2013, 14 November 2014) at [2] and [3]. His assertions do not constitute proper grounds of appeal.

7.  Further and in any event, even taking his case at its highest, his allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

8.  Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.

9.  Accordingly, the Notice of Motion filed on 18 October 2024 is dismissed.