香港特別行政區 對 秦錦釗

HCAL 13/2017

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

憲法及行政訴訟2017年第13號

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判案書

1.  申請人被控與其他人「串謀輸出未列艙單貨物」罪，違反香港法例第 60 章《進出口條例》第 18(1)(b) 條及第 200 章《刑事罪行條例》第 159A 條，當中涉及10 個貨櫃箱內的貨物、及「串謀處理已知道或合理相信為代表可從公訴罪行的得益的財產」罪，違反香港法例第455章《有組織及嚴重罪行條例》第 25(1)及(3)條和第 200 章《刑事罪行條例》第 159A 條。他和其他人在區域法院郭偉健法官席前申請永久擱置該案的法律程序，郭法官拒絕申請。申請人就郭法官的裁決申請司法覆核許可，尋求：

（1）宣告郭法官的裁決錯誤及推翻該裁決的移審令；

（2）損害和損失；和

（3）是次申請及司法覆核所引申之訟費。

案件背景

2.  控方指申請人是一跨境走私和洗黑錢的主腦，與其他人士利用內河商船以未列艙單貨物的形式走私高價貨物到內地，在大陸海關清關之前運走有關貨物並換上如實反映在艙單上的貨物，並利用由該集團擁有或控制的公司銀行戶口清洗走私的得益。

3.  2012 年1 月，香港海關執行了16 張搜查令。申請人及其他人就其中13 張搜查令的申請和執行提出司法覆核。原訟法庭(麥偉德法官)其中之一的裁定，是該13 張搜查令因是在裁判官或區域法院法官簽發後2 至4 個月才執行，沒有在合理的時間內執行，故已失效，根據該些搜查令檢取的物品或資料因而屬非法檢取，須把它們歸還。上訴法庭認同該項裁決。

4.  其後，海關人員獲得由李家齊裁判官和杜大衞法官發出的搜查令和搜查令的授權，重新檢取該些物品和資料，即該些物品和資料仍在海關管有中。

就郭法官的裁決而擬提出的司法覆核的理據

5.  擬提出的司法覆核的理據總括如下：

（1）法官沒有充分考慮海關人員以欺詐手段取得該13 張搜查令，錯誤地引用麥偉德法官在司法覆核案中裁定申請人未能證明海關申請這16 張搜查令的行為是非法或不正當；

（2）法官錯誤地拒絕裁定10 個貨櫃箱是非法檢取的；

（3）法官曲解了麥偉德法官的判詞，在海關藐視高等法院原訟法庭及上訴法庭命令未有歸還非法檢取的貨物的情況下，漠視海關人員濫用權力重新檢取，錯誤地肯定海關人員可以重新檢取該些貨物；

（4）法官錯誤裁定《基本法》第 29 條和香港法例第 383 章《香港人權法案》第 14 條所保障的權利並非絕對的權利；

（5）法官沒有充分考慮控方透過《請求書》向內地證人取證的做法限制了區域法院行使獨立進行審訊權、限制辯方享有憲法權利，錯誤裁定有關論點不構成永久擱置本案法律程序的有效理由；及

（6）控方以執行《請求書》為名，無故稽延為實，令申請人及其他人在審前無故被關押達16 個月；遠超於走私大量貨物可獲之恰當刑期，加上上述理由，法官錯誤裁定繼續刑事審訊不會對辯方造成不公。

建議答辯人的初步回應

6.  建議答辯人反對批出司法覆核許可：

（1）法庭一般只會在申請人用盡了其他尋求濟助的方法後才考慮司法覆核，本案涉刑事審訊，與訟人不應透過中期上訴(interlocutory appeals)或並行的挑戰(collateral challenges)去拖延審訊的進度。申請人提出司法覆核的理由中涉及大量的事實爭議，應在刑事審訊中而非司法覆核解決，申請人可以在上訴階段提出是次申請的觀點；及

（2）申請司法覆核的理由沒有合理爭論性：

（a）郭法官已裁定海關已根據法庭的命令盡最大的努力歸還上次檢取的證物，只是申請人一方未有配合，海關人員是根據新簽發的搜查令重新檢取有關證物，故不構成藐視麥偉德法官和上訴法庭的命令；

（b）郭法官正確指出《基本法》第 29 條及《香港人權法案》第 14 條所保障私穩的權利並不是絕對的，有關條文禁止的是「任意」/「無理」或「非法」搜查和侵入，海關根據新簽發的搜查令檢取證物，不屬上述情況；

（c）透過《請求書》向內地證人取證，乃按《基法法》第 95 條進行，本身並沒違憲，根據《請求書》獲取的證供是否可以在香港的刑事審訊中呈堂，香港法例第 8 章《證據條例》第 77F 條的要求已充分保障受審人士的權益，透過《請求書》向內地證人取證並沒有對申請人造成不公；

（d）郭法官正確指出案件的預審和排期實取決於透過《請求書》取證的進度和成果，不能被說成是無故拖延審訊；及

（e）假如申請人提出的事項是真的或可能是真的，他在審訊完結後將被還以清白，刑事審訊就是確保有罪的人被繩之於法，無罪的人洗脫罪名的基石。

討論

7.  司法覆核許可的門檻，根據終審法院在Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676，為申請必須具合理的可爭辯的理據。

8.  本案源自一宗尚未審理的區域法院刑事案件，申請人提出申請永久擱置案件的法律程序，遭郭法官拒絕，由於涉及內地取證事宜，案件未安排審前覆核和排期審訊。

9.  上訴法庭在D v Secretary for Justice [2013] 3 HKLRD 373一案中引用了Kebilene原則：

“13. Under common law, absent dishonesty or mala fides or some other wholly exceptional circumstances, as a matter of discretion, the court will not entertain judicial review proceedings which would interfere with the criminal process including the decisions of the Director of Public Prosecutions to prosecute or the decision of a judge to refuse to stay the criminal proceedings: see R v DPP, ex P Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326; Yeung Chun Pong v Secretary for Justice [2008] 3 HKLRD 1; Chik Wen Fei v Secretary for Justice CACV 141 of 2008, 29 July 2008; Re Ko Kit [2008] 4 HKC 323; Chiang Lily v Secretary for Justice [2009] 6 HKC 234 at [51].

. . .

15. . . . at p 372D-E:

‘. . . the connection put in the forefront was based on the undesirability of satellite litigation attending cases to be tried on indictment. It was said that the present criminal proceedings should not be interfered with by way of judicial review: that the trial, and if necessary, appeal processes should provide adequate remedies for the applicants if their human rights are violated. A risk or imminent violation could no doubt be dealt with similarly at the trial or on appeal.’

16. His Lordship then said at p 372F:

‘. . . the courts should be very slow to allow review of a consent to be used as a device for resolving points which would otherwise be dealt with in the ordinary course of the criminal proceedings. As a general rule, proceedings on indictment should not be delayed by collateral challenges.’

17. In Hong Kong, what Stock JA (as he then was) had said at [67] of the judgment in Yeung Chun Pong v Secretary for Justice [2008] 3 HKLRD 1 is, with respect, a sound reminder as to why the discretion should be exercised with great care:

‘There is a clear public interest in ensuring that charges, once before a court, must be tried.  There is built into the system a host of safeguards to secure for an accused a fair, and an appropriately speedy, determination.  If those safeguards are not afforded in a particular instance, there is provided by the Legislature a prescribed appeal mechanism.  That mechanism does not envisage interlocutory appeals or collateral challenges. That is for very good reason, namely, that in practice most trials would constantly be interrupted to the disadvantage of effective decision-making and the disruption of the system as a whole.  Sometimes disruption to and delay of a particular trial caused by a judicial review application — or even by repeated applications in the one case — may derail a prosecution properly brought by the effect of that delay upon witnesses or their availability.  This disruption may find aggravated form as in the present case, where there is an ex parte application made for leave; leave is granted without hearing the prosecutor respondent; an application is then made to set aside leave; that is refused; there is an appeal from that refusal, an appeal that may find its way to the Court of Final Appeal and, if the leave is not disturbed, there is a judicial review and renewed appeals from whatever decision emerges therefrom; and whilst all this is going on, hearing dates for trial are repeatedly vacated.  The outcome is that unwarranted applications to stay proceedings combined with collateral challenges themselves run the risk of abusing the court’s process.’”

10.  在Chiang Lily v Secretary for Justice [2009] 6 HKC 234 at para 51, 馬道立首席法官說：

“In the context of criminal charges and criminal trials, much has been said in recent times by the courts deprecating the trend of what are known as collateral challenges which delay or fragment the progress and timely disposal of criminal proceedings: see the comments of Sir Anthony Mason NPJ in Yeung Chun Pong v Secretary for Justice (2006) 9 HKCFAR 836 at 849C-D. It goes without saying that the public interest is clearly in the efficient and expeditious disposal of criminal charges, and that unnecessary delays ought not be permitted.”

11.  從申請人向法庭存檔的大量文件(合共181 項，存放在4 個A4紙盒內及兩個文件夾)可見，本案涉及事實、證物、證人供詞的可採納性的爭議，當中包括了依據《請求書》取得的證供及由海關人員行使新的搜查令檢取的證物是否可以被接納為呈堂證物，這些爭議應該及將會由主審法官作出裁決。

12.  本席看不到本案有任何不尋常或非常不尋常的情況，致使法庭須行使司法覆核所賦予的權力，介入刑事審訊。郭法官拒絕擱置案件的法律程序的裁決實屬司法裁決(judicial decision)，申請不服裁決，是有其他尋求濟助的渠道的，申請人不應以司法覆核的申請窒礙刑事審訊程序，刑事審訊應該繼續進行至審結為止，申請人一旦被定罪，將可就所有的裁決提出上訴。

結論

13.  申請人要求的濟助，不應以申請司法覆核來處理，本席撤銷許可申請，此外，本席亦不認為本司法覆核具合理的可爭辯的理據；Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung [2008] 1 HKLRD 319。