YU HEUNG YUK v. HO MAN AND OTHERS

HCPI 57/98

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO. 57 OF 1998

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J U D G M E N T

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1. The Plaintiff, Madam Yu Heung Yuk, brings these proceedings through her husband Ng Ming Wo for damages for assault and battery against the Defendants. Mr. Ho Sau Mui, D2, is the husband of Madam Ng Mui Ying, D3. Ho Man, D1, is their son.

2. The Plaintiff, now aged 44, was a colleague of Madam Ng Mui Ying, D3, at Philips HK Ltd. In the past, they had been on friendly terms, being fellow clansmen in China, but ill feeling had arisen between them. In particular, there had been an incident at work on 5th May 1995 involving a hand cart pushed by the Plaintiff.

3. The Plaintiff's case is that while returning home from work late in the evening of 8th May 1995 with her husband, she had been approached by the three Defendants and two unknown men on a footbridge at Wo Yip Hop Road. The Defendants and one of those men had assaulted her. The assault had included blows to the head. While the immediate physical effects of the injury, amongst which was perforation of her left eardrum, had not appeared particularly serious, the eventual psychological effects have been devastating.

4. This incident has already been the subject of a criminal prosecution against the Defendants in Tsuen Wan Magistracy. It resulted in the acquittal of D2 and D3 but the conviction of D1 of assaulting the Plaintiff occasioning her actual bodily harm.

Liability

5. The principal evidence from the Plaintiff on the question of liability came from her husband, Ng Ming Wo. There was medical evidence from Dr. Singer that the Plaintiff herself was no longer fit to testify at trial and as a result Suffiad J. made an order on 2nd July 1999 that she act through her husband as next friend. In her witness statement dated 4th September 1998, the Plaintiff said that she could no longer remember details of how she had been assaulted. She had, however, given a statement to the police shortly after the incident and given evidence in the Magistrates Court in December 1995.

6. The evidence of Ng Ming Wo was that his wife had returned from work on the evening of 5th May 1995 and informed him of an incident involving D3. He had seen a bruise on her ankle. Later on that evening, he had received a very abusive telephone call from D2 who had alleged that the Plaintiff had assaulted D3. D2 had threatened to assault the Plaintiff and demanded that Ng Ming Wo come down to the street. Ng Ming Wo had not done so. D1 and his sister, Ho Ngar, had also spoken to Mr. Ng on the telephone in similarly abusive terms.

7. Fearing for his wife's safety, Ng had gone to meet his wife from work on the following evenings.

8. In the late evening of 8th May 1995, having met the Plaintiff, Mr. Ng walked with her up onto the footbridge at Wo Yi Hop Road. Two young men were standing on either side of the footbridge near the top of the stairs, one of whom accosted them asking if they knew who he was and saying that the Plaintiff had embarrassed D3 whom he described as his "sworn mother". Mr. Ng had held his wife's hand and pulled her forward in order to cross the bridge. The two men followed them. As they walked forward, D3 who had been following them from the work place, ran past them and called to her son and husband to come up. D1 and D2 had then come up onto the footbridge at the far end, D2 by means of the staircase and D1 by means of the sloping ramp.

9. Mr. Ng and the Plaintiff were therefore cut off to the front and to the rear. D1 and D2 had used foul language to swear at the Plaintiff. D2 had said that she would be beaten and then had attempted to strike her. Mr. Ng had grabbed hold of his hands in order to restrain him.

10. At this point, D1 and the man who had spoken to them earlier on, had twisted the Plaintiff's arms behind her. D1 struck the first blow to the Plaintiff's head. D3 had grabbed the Plaintiff's hair and struck her at her head with her fists. D1 and the other man who was holding the Plaintiff joined in assaulting the Plaintiff. D2 had pushed Ng aside and also joined in the attack on the Plaintiff.

11. Mr. Ng saw his wife collapsed against the railing. He went over and supported her head. Even though, D2, told them to go, D3 had continued to hit the Plaintiff. D1 and the man in black had kicked the Plaintiff before leaving.

12. Mr. Ng had carried his wife home and then told his son to make a report to the police. An ambulance had then arrived and taken his wife to Princess Margaret Hospital.

13. All three Defendants gave evidence. Their account of these events was quite different. They maintained that the Plaintiff had only been struck once but not by them. Their evidence was that there had been two earlier incidents in February when the Plaintiff had assaulted D3. On the first occasion, bruising had been caused to D3's arm by the Plaintiff grabbing hold of it first in the factory and later as she was leaving work. On the second occasion, 5th May 1995, the Plaintiff had pushed a cart into the leg of D3 and later when going home, the Plaintiff had assaulted D3 by slapping her face three times and clutching her under the jaw with clinched fists.

14. When told about this second incident on 5th May 1995, D1 and D2 were very angry. D1 described himself as being "furious". That evening, D2 had telephoned the Plaintiff's husband, Ng Ming Wo, about this assault. A heated conversation had ensued during which D2 had sworn at Ng. D1 said that he too had spoken to Mr. Ng who had claimed that the incident with the cart was an accident. As a result, he too had used foul language to Mr. Ng. The daughter of D2 and D3 had also spoken to Mr. Ng.

15. The following day at work, two of his colleagues whom he only knew by nickname (Ah Lung and Ah Keung) offered to accompany D1 to talk to the Plaintiff and her family. D1 told his parents about the plan.

16. On the evening of 8th May, sometime after 11pm, D1 and his two colleagues went to the footbridge in question where they happened to meet D2 under the footbridge. According to D1, his object was to reason with the Plaintiff and warn her not to attack his mother in future.

17. The Plaintiff and her husband had walked onto the footbridge and D2 followed by D1 had gone up onto the bridge and asked the Plaintiff why she had assaulted and injured his wife. Ng had replied that it was unintentional. The Plaintiff who was very agitated had joined in and said that D3 had said that she had affairs with other men, so that D3 deserved to be assaulted.

18. A quarrel had ensued in which foul language was exchanged.

19. D3 had asked D2 to go home whereupon the Plaintiff had grabbed D3's clothing, demanding to know with whom D3 alleged she had affairs. D1 had tried to separate them but the Plaintiff had pushed D3 causing her almost to fall to the ground.

20. At this point, the man known as Ah Lung, had come and slapped the Plaintiff once across the face. No one else had assaulted the Plaintiff.

21. The parties had then left but before doing so, the Plaintiff had said she would call the police.

22. As they walked towards the Defendants' home, Ah Lung and Ah Keung had said to D1 that he was not to reveal to the police that they were involved. If he did, they would cause trouble to the members of his family. D1 had told his parents of this threat. As a result of this threat and a later threat, the three Defendants had either omitted to mention or denied the presence of the other two men when they later made statements to the police and given evidence in the Magistrates Court.

Assessment of the Evidence

23. Having heard the evidence of the parties and read their statements, I have no hesitation in preferring the evidence of Mr. Ng Ming Wo and the Plaintiff to that of the three Defendants. While not excluding the possibility that his account may contain an element of elaboration, I find that the essential features of Mr. Ng Ming Wo's account are probably accurate, namely that four of the five people present directly physically assaulted the Plaintiff. In reaching this conclusion, I bore in mind in particular the differences in the statements made by the Plaintiff and her husband to the police and the evidence of her husband in court. In particular Mr. Ng's police statement only contained reference to blows being struck by D3 and by the man in the black and white shirt. In her statement, the Plaintiff had only referred to blows by D1, D3 and the other man. But as Mr. Ng explained, the statements were being made shortly after a traumatic incident. Furthermore, Cantonese was not his native dialect and I have no reason to doubt his evidence that his son-in-law who was present was only in fact there to assist in case of difficulty. It is significant in my view that prior to any statement being taken by the police, the Plaintiff and/or her husband had given a history to the A&E Department that she had been assaulted by four people using fists. Bearing in mind that there were five people in the Defendants' party, the reference to four people using fists must be a reference to the persons who actually physically participated in the assault.

24. I found the Defendants unconvincing witnesses. I could attach no weight to their evidence. They had given completely different accounts to the police when first questioned - accounts which different from each other as well as from the evidence they subsequently gave in the Magistrates Court. These differences were not confined to omitting to mention or denying the presence of the other two men. In the statements signed by him at the police station, D1 had admitted slapping the left side of the Plaintiff's face. I did not believe D1's explanation for this admission being in the statement. I do not believe this admission would have been in the statement unless he had said it.

25. I formed the strong impression that the Defendants were telling me a further concocted version in court. Even in this version, there were inconsistencies between their evidence and their witness statements prepared for these proceedings. In court, D2 and D3 maintained that they had failed to mention the presence of the other two men earlier because of the threats that these men had uttered to their son. In their witness statements, they had maintained that it was because they did not want to cause trouble to the two men.

26. The physical injuries found on the Plaintiff included bruising on the back of the neck and on the left hip. These were not consistent with there being just one slap to her face as the Defendants alleged.

27. I did not find the Defendants' account that this just was an attempt to reason with and warn the Defendants probable. D2 emphasized the importance of the Plaintiff's husband, Ng Ming Wo's involvement in attempts to settle the matters between the two families. If the Defendants had wished to settle this matter without resort to violence, I believe, bearing in mind that previous relationship between the families, that D2 would have contacted Ng Ming Wo at home or at his working place while the Plaintiff was at work. The fact he chose to confront the Plaintiff and Ng on a footbridge at around 11:30 pm having brought along two strangers, coupled with the severity of the assaults that D1 was alleging the Plaintiff had committed on her and their failure to secure any redress for Mr. Ng Ming Wo when they spoke to him on the telephone suggests that this was rather an attempt to teach the Defendants a lesson. The relative position of the two men at one end of the bridge and D1 and D2 of the other described by Mr. Ng Ming Wo suggests an ambush.

28. The evidence also suggests that this was a pre-arranged plan involving all the Defendants. Notwithstanding their acquittal in the Magistrates Court where a higher standard of proof applied, I consider that on the balance of probability, D2 and D3 did join in with D1, who was convicted in the Magistrates Court in physically assaulting the Plaintiff.

29. I therefore find that all three Defendants are liable for any damage sustained by the Plaintiff.

30. I turn now to the issue of damages. There are claimed by the Plaintiff under a number of heads.

Pain Suffering and Loss of Amenity

31. The Plaintiff was admitted to Princess Margaret Hospital in the early hours of 9th May 1995 complaining of dizziness and decreased hearing in her left ear. She had swelling and redness over left side of the face. She was referred to Yan Chai Hospital where she was found to have sustained a traumatic rupture of the left eardrum. When she was assessed by the ENT Outpatient Clinic the same day, it was noticed that there was bruising over the back of her left neck, left hip anteriorly and left elbow anteriorly. An abrasion was noticed over her left hip region. She was admitted to Yan Chai Hospital between 11th May and 2nd June for her dizziness and decreased hearing in her left ear. She complained that she had had a transient loss of consciousness at home. On 6th June 1995 at a follow up visit to the ENT Department of Yan Chai Hospital, the perforation of her eardrum was noted to have healed but she was still complaining of severe dizziness. On 9th June 1995, she was seen at the Department of Surgery of Princess Margaret Hospital in a state of depression and complaining of poor hearing on her left side. She was diagnosed as suffering from post concussion syndrome.

32. Eventually she was referred to South Kwai Chung Psychiatric Centre on 11th June 1991. She complained of dizziness, headache, vomiting and numbness over her body and limbs as well as depression, anxiety, irritability, fatigue, poor concentration, loss of sleep and weight loss. She was diagnosed as suffering from a depressive disorder.

33. There is no dispute between the parties that the Plaintiff is genuinely suffering from psychiatric disorder as a result of the incident on 8th May 1995. What had been in dispute in this trial is the extent of that disorder and to what extent, if any, she is exaggerating her complaints. Her present complaints fall into two categories, physical complaints and psychiatric complaints. Her physical complaints are of numbness of the whole body, weakness on the left side of her body, difficulty in walking because of weakness and dizziness, deafness in her left ear and vomiting several times a day. Her current psychiatric complaints are multiple and include irritability, depression, loss of interest in daily activities, loss of confidence, sleep impairment, poor mental acuity, thoughts of suicide, fatigue, agitation, intrusive thoughts and nightmares of being assaulted, panic attacks, headache and dizziness.

34. As a result of these complaints, she complains she is unable to work. She spends her time at home much of it in bed and is looked after full time by her daughter who has to bath her.

35. Members of her family gave evidence of the change in her personality as a result of the accident and her attempts of suicide.

36. I heard evidence from two psychiatrists, Dr. Karam Singer who was called by the Plaintiff and Dr. Chung See Yuen who was called by the defence, although he was originally instructed by the Plaintiff's solicitors to examine the Plaintiff.

37. Dr. Singer is of the view that the Plaintiff is suffering from four psychiatric conditions as a result of the accident

(1) depressive disorder,

(2) conversion disorder,

(3) post traumatic stress disorder,

(4) post concussional syndrome

He believes that the symptoms described by the Plaintiff are genuine and severe and are as a result of the incident. Although he concedes that her physical complaints have no organic basis, he believes that they do have a psychiatric basis and are likely to be as a result of conversion disorder. He believes that since the Plaintiff's condition has not improved despite treatment at South Kwai Chung Psychiatric Centre, she needs intense psychotherapy which he believes she is not getting at the South Kwai Chung Psychiatric Centre. With such a course of psychotherapy over a period of three years, her present loss of earning capacity is likely to change from 100% to around 60% and her impairment of the whole person from 70% to around 30%.

38. Dr. Chung on the other hand says that the Plaintiff's complaints are compatible with two mental disorders.

(1) post concussional disorder which results in headache, dizziness, vomiting, tiredness, depression, anxiety, difficulty in attention, forgetfulness, disordered sleep and apathy; and

(2) Dysthymic disorder which is characterized by chronic depression of mood, diminished interest in activities, tiredness, decreased appetite, feelings of worthlessness, insomnia and thoughts of suicide.

He believes that the Plaintiff is suffering from these two illnesses but is likely to be exaggerating the symptoms. He gives evidence of what he said were inconsistent findings suggestive of probable exaggeration. He does not believe that the Plaintiff's physical complaints are genuine and are as a result of conversion disorder. He believes that treatment that the Plaintiff has been and can expect to receive South Kwai Chung Centre is adequate. While he does not expect further treatment to change her condition significantly, he believes her disability is only in the mild to moderate category and that she is capable of resuming her pre-accident employment albeit with a lower ability to cope with stress and the difficulty in retaining jobs. He puts a loss of earning capacity at around 20%.

39. I have carefully considered the reasons put forward by Dr. Chung for concluding that the Plaintiff is probably exaggerating her condition, and Dr. Singer's views as to why he considers Dr. Chung mistaken, i.e. primarily because he suggests that Dr. Chung has overlooked the fact that the conditions complained of by the Plaintiff probably have a psychiatric rather than an organic basis and are as a result of conversion disorder. While I cannot exclude the possibility that Dr. Singer is right about these matters, I was impressed by the reasons given by Dr. Chung for considering the conversion disorder to be improbable in this case. These are that it is unusual for a patient with conversion disorder to present their stress in psychiatric terms as well as in physical terms as the Plaintiff does. Patients with conversion disorder do not usually complain of their physical symptoms as the Plaintiff does and it is unusual for a patient to convert their stress into more than one physical disorder. If Dr. Singer is right the Plaintiff has converted her stress into a number of physical disorders which have no organic basis.

40. I therefore conclude that the Plaintiff is probably not suffering from conversion disorder and is probably exaggerating her symptoms.

41. As Dr Chung points out it is difficult to make an accurate assessment of her psychiatric condition if her history is unreliable. But equally as both doctors acknowledge, there is a connection between depressive disorder and a tendency to exaggerate. Exaggeration in such circumstances is not usually done with intention to deceive. It is not uncommon for people suffering from depressive disorders to be preoccupied with their illness and exaggerate their symptoms. It is part of the psychiatric disorder. I believe that is probably what has happened in the case of the Plaintiff. The fact that it is continued for so long makes it all the more unlikely that the Plaintiff's condition can be improved.

42. I accept the evidence of the Plaintiff's family that she has changed from being a cheerful and very energetic person into someone who is depressed, anxious, impatient and demanding. I accept the evidence of the Plaintiff's family that she has as far as they are concerned made apparent attempts at suicide. I accept also, as indeed, does Dr. Chung that her ability to concentrate and deal with stress is impaired. While the conclusion of this litigation may alleviate her sense of grievance and result in some improvement to her condition, I consider it is likely that this change in personality which has expressed itself from the past four years is a result of psychosomatic illness and will be permanent.

43. Even though Dr. Chung may well be right in classifying her disability as in the mild to moderate range from a medical point of view, I am satisfied that the change in personality occasioned by the accident has and will have a significant effect on the quality of her life. I consider it appropriate to place her injury at the lower end of the serious injury category in Lee Ting Lam v. Leung Kam Ming 1980 HKLR 657. I award her $440,000.00 under this head. (see Lee Ping Foon v. Li Hoi trading as Hoi Tak Construction and Decoration Engineering)

Loss of Earnings

44. At the time of the accident the Plaintiff's basis salary with Philips HK Ltd. was $4,765.00 per month. In addition, she received fixed allowances totalling $1,430.00 per month and overtime. Her average take home pay for the four months prior to the accident was $9,601.00 and her average overtime was $3,631.00 per month during these months. It is interesting to note that the months to which these wages related (January-April) were not particularly high earning months for the two comparable workers whose total wages for the years 1996, 1997 and 1998 were provided by Philips.

45. The Plaintiff's wages bear out the evidence that she was a particularly industrious worker who worked a considerable period of overtime. Her overtime pay accounted for almost 38% of her take home pay.

46. Her basic pay was raised to $4,910.00 after the accident.

47. The Plaintiff never resumed her employment with Philips HK Ltd. and on 12th March 1996 her employment was terminated. She has not worked since.

Pre Trial Loss of Earnings

48. I prefer the evidence of Dr. Chung that the Plaintiff was capable of returning to work. I find that she should have been capable of returning to work by the end of the year. I am satisfied that if she had returned to Philips HK Ltd., she would not, due to her mental disorder, have had had the capacity to work overtime and would have been restricted to her basic pay and fixed allowances.

49. For the reasons given by Dr. Chung, namely impairment of her concentration and ability to cope with stress, I consider it probable that after a further two years, she would have found it difficult to cope and would have had to leave.

50. I find therefore that a loss of wages for the year 1995 would have been

$9,601 x 7.7 = $73,927.00

51. For the Year 1996 and 1997, I quantify her loss as a loss of her probable overtime

(24 x $3,631.00) = $87,144.00

52. By 1998 her basic wages at Philips would have amounted to $5,658.00 per month plus allowance of $1,430.00 per month (i.e. $7,088.00 per month). I have assumed that due to economic conditions there would have been some down turn in the amount of overtime available and that it would only have amounted to $3,000.00 per month, meaning that her take home pay would have been approximately $10,000.00 per month. No pay increase was given by Philips in 1999 (see letter of Watson Wyatt HK Ltd.) meaning that if the assault had not occurred, her take home pay from the beginning of 1998 to present would have been in the region of $10,000.00 per month. I consider bearing in mind her ability to cope with stress that she would not have been able to earn more than $6,500.00 per month in alternative employment available to her and therefore I quantify a monthly loss from 1st January 1998 to the present at $3,500.00 ($10,000.00 - $6,500.00) (19 months x $3,500.00 = $66,500.00).

53. I therefore quantify the Plaintiff's pre trial loss of earnings as follows:

1995 :	$73,927.00
1996 and 1997 :	$87,144.00
1st January 1998 - 31st July 1999 :	$66,500.00
Less sick leave pay :	($17,157.58)
Less payment from employer on dismissal :	($20,470.55)
Total :	$189,942.87

Post Trial Loss of Earnings

54. I consider the figure of $3,500 per month is also a reasonable multiplicand to reflect her post trial loss of earnings. In arriving at this figure, I have balanced out a possible further drop in overtime work available against the likelihood that the Plaintiff will have periods of unemployment.

55. The Plaintiff would have been able to work at Philips HK Ltd. until her normal retirement at age 60 in 151/2 years time. In such circumstances, I regard an appropriate multiplier as 11. I quantify her post trial loss of earnings at $462,000.00 ($3,500.00 x 12 x 11).

Loss of Pension

56. The Plaintiff would have benefited from a non-contributory pension scheme had she remained with Philips HK Ltd. It is common ground that the contributions of Philips to this fund was 5% of the employees' basis salary.

57. On the assumption that the basic salary of the Plaintiff throughout 1998 and to date would have been $5,658.00, Philips monthly contribution would be $282.90.

58. The Plaintiff would therefore have lost pension contributions from Philips at $282.90 per month from 1st January 1998 to the date of trial i.e. 19 months. In other words $5,375.10.

59. Thereafter, she would have lost contributions at $282.90 per month. Applying a multiplier of 11, her future loss of contributions would have amounted to $37,342.80 (i.e. $282.90 x 12 x 11 = $37,342.80).

60. I quantify her total loss of pension at $42,717.90.

Special Damages

61. There was no issue as to the following expenditure incurred by the Plaintiff

Hospital Expenses :	$4,681.00
Follow Up Treatment :	$4,130.00
Travelling Expenses :	$7,137.00

Loss of Income of the Plaintiff's Daughters

62. I consider it was reasonable for the Plaintiff's daughter, Ng Yee Ying, to resign from her job in order to look after her mother until her mother was fit enough to return to work at the end of the year. Although she might have resigned later in any event because she was to give birth to a baby early in the following year, I believe that she would not have resigned at the time she did had it not been for her mother's accident. She was obliged to pay half a month salary in lieu of notice. Her loss for this period was therefore $72,250.00 (8.5 months x $8,500.00). I find this sum is reasonable and recoverable. Any further loss of wages of Ng Yee Ying, the wages of the Indonesian domestic help and the loss of wages of the Plaintiff's younger daughter, Ng Yee Kuen, I find are not recoverable.

Nourishing Food

63. No receipts were produced but I accept the evidence of Ng Ming Wo that the Plaintiff was given birds nest, western ginseng and "winter worms and summer grass" during her convalescent in the belief that it would benefit her recovery and that it was particularly beneficial if the patient was prone to vomiting. I award $6,000.00 under his head.

Future Needs

64. Dr. Singer came to the conclusion that the Plaintiff's conditions was very severe and required intensive treatment. He inferred that the treatment that the Plaintiff was currently receiving at South Kwai Chung Psychiatric Centre was inadequate. As I understood his evidence, he drew this inference not from direct knowledge of the treatment the Plaintiff was receiving but from his experience of the Government psychiatric services and from the fact the Plaintiff had made no progress. He believed that the Plaintiff was only receiving drug treatment and not psychotherapeutic treatment, at least not from a psychiatrist. He recommended an intensive three year course of psychotherapy by a private psychiatrist. He quantified the cost of this treatment and also the cost of further maintenance treatment and future hospitalization in the private sector.

65. Dr. Chung's evidence of the sort of care available to the patient through the Hospital Authority at the South Kwai Chung Psychiatric Centre and elsewhere was in direct conflict with that of Dr. Singer. He was of the view that adequate psychotherapy for the Plaintiff's needs was available through the Hospital Authority and had probably been supplied. There would therefore be no need for the Plaintiff to seek treatment by private practitioners or private hospital treatment.

66. The difficulty facing the court was that there was no direct evidence of the treatment the Plaintiff had been receiving at South Kwai Chung Psychiatric Centre.

67. In the absence of that evidence and on the evidence of Dr. Chung as to his recent and current connections with the public psychiatric services, I form the impression that he had greater familiarity than Dr. Singer of the treatment currently available through the Hospital Authority.

68. On the balance of probabilities, I consider that suitable treatment for her condition is available to the Plaintiff through the Hospital Authority. Dr. Chung's evidence was that the cost of outpatient treatment through the Hospital Authority is $50-$60 per session. If her condition was unstable, she would need treatment every two weeks. If it was stable, which he believes it to be she would only require follow up treatment every two months.

69. It is not possible to quantify the cost of future treatment of the Plaintiff with any precision. Follow up treatment is necessary and future hospitalization may well be necessary. With the limited information I have, I award a sum of $40,000.00 to cover the cost of the Plaintiff's future medical needs. This amounts to $2,000.00 per annum over 20 years.

70. The award I make therefore is as follows:

General Damages:
Pain Suffering and Loss of Amenities :	$440,000.00
Loss of Future Earnings :	$462,000.00
Loss of Pension :	$42,717.00
Future Needs :	$40,000.00
Total General Damages :	$984,717.00
Special Damages:
Pre Trial Loss of Earnings :	$189,942.00
Hospital Expenses :	$4,681.00
Follow Up Treatment :	$4,130.00
Travelling Expenses :	$7,137.00
Loss of Income of Daughter :	$72,250.00
Nourishing Food :	$6,000.00
Total Special Damages :	$284,140.00
Total Damages :	$1,268,857.00

71. I therefore give judgment for the Plaintiff against all three Defendants in the sum of $1,268,857.00. The Plaintiff is also awarded interest on special damages at the rate of 5.77% from the date of the incident to today and thereafter at judgment rate until payment and interest on damages for pain suffering and loss of amenities at 2% from the date of issue of writ until today and thereafter at judgment rate until payment.

72. I also make an order nisi that the Plaintiff shall have the costs of this action to be taxed against the Defendants if not agreed and that the Plaintiff's own costs to be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations. This order nisi is to be made absolute unless any party

makes application to the court within 14 days of today.