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CACV 6/2020
[2021] HKCA 343
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL APPEAL NO 6 OF 2020
(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 1127 of 2018)
________________________
BETWEEN
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BEGUM TAHURA |
Applicant
(Appellant) |
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and |
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TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE |
1st Putative Respondent |
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DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION |
2nd Putative Respondent |
________________________
Before: Hon Chu JA, S T Poon and Marlene Ng JJ in Court
Date of Judgment: 20 April 2021
________________________ J U D G M E N T ________________________
Hon S T Poon J giving the Judgment of the Court:
1. On 17 August 2020, this Court (Chu JA, S T Poon and Marlene Ng JJ) handed down our judgment[1]dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan given on 23 December 2019 refusing to grant her leave to apply for judicial review.
2. On 14 September 2020, the applicant filed a notice of motion together with a supporting affirmation to apply for leave to appeal against our judgment to the Court of Final Appeal.
3. Pursuant to the directions made by the Registrar of Civil Appeals on 16 September 2020, the Notice of Motion shall be determined on paper only without an oral hearing, unless the court otherwise directs. We agree it is appropriate to determine this application on paper.
4. The applicant was also directed to lodge her written submissions by 28 September 2020. The applicant did not file any written submissions.
5. The background to this case and the applicant’s claim have been set out in our judgment. We will not repeat them.
6. Under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484, leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.
7. The notice of motion set out the following as grounds of appeal:
(1) It is not true that there is no substance in the grounds of application.
(2) On the strength of the grounds, no complaint was made about the poor performance of the duty lawyer because of fear of being picked out for misappropriating by the adjudicator.
(3) The applicant did not have enough time to address the bundle.
8. The applicant’s affirmation set out two further grounds of appeal as follows:
(1) The Court was wrong in law in holding there was no state acquiescence or involvement.
(2) The Judges also failed to find out the details of the current situation of Bangladesh.
9. The grounds contained in the notice of motion and the affirmation do not constitute proper grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. Importantly, they do not involve any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b). The grounds for the intended appeal as set out in the notice of motion and supporting affirmation bear no relevance to the Judge’s reasons for his decision. Neither the Judge’s decision nor this Court’s judgment had dealt with the appeal process before the Board, or state acquiescence or involvement or country conditions.
10. We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).
11. In the circumstances, the statutory requirements for giving leave to appeal is not met. Accordingly, we dismiss the notice of motion.
| (Carlye Chu) |
(S T Poon) |
(Marlene Ng) |
| Justice of Appeal |
Judge of the
Court of First Instance |
Judge of the
Court of First Instance |
The applicant, unrepresented, acted in person.
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