溢緯有限公司 v. MS JOANNA LEUNG 或佔用人
[2026] HKLdT 60 · LDPD 669/2026
LDPD 669/2026
[2026] HKLdT 60
IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
APPLICATION NO. LDPD 669 OF 2026
_________________
|BETWEEN | | |
| |溢緯有限公司 |Applicant |
| |及 | |
| |Ms Joanna Leung 或佔用人 | Respondent|
_________________
Before: Mr Lawrence PANG, Member of the Lands Tribunal
Date of Hearing: 29 September 2026
Date of Decision: 23 October 2026
_________________
DECISION
_________________
1. This case originated from an application for recovery of
possession of a property situated at Flat C, 11/F, Tower 5A,
Oceanaire, No 18 Po Tai Street, Sha Tin, New Territories (“the
Subject Property”). The Subject Property is owned by Danson
Limited (ie the Applicant), a company incorporated in Hong
Kong. Following a change of directorship of the company on 31
March 2026, Danson Limited applied to the Lands Tribunal (“the
Tribunal”) on 26 May 2026 to evict the occupiers of the
Subject Property who include Ms Leung Ka Yan (hereinafter
referred to as “the Respondent”) who is also known as Ms
Joanna Leung. I delivered my judgment (“the Judgment”) orally
on 29 June 2026 in favour of the Applicant.
2. Upon the hearing on 24 July 2026 of the Interlocutory
Application by the Respondent dated 10 July 2026, stay of
execution of the writ of possession was granted until 14
August 2026 while the Respondent was seeking legal advice.
3. And on 27 July 2026, the Respondent applied for leave to
appeal against the Judgment. After the hearing on 13 August
2026, a decision (in Chinese) (“the Decision”) was handed down
on 24 August 2026, refusing the application and any further
stay of execution of the writ of possession.
4. A further application by the Respondent for stay of execution
of the writ of possession was refused by the Tribunal on 9
September 2026.
5. Then came this third application on 23 September 2026 by the
Respondent for stay of execution of the writ of possession
(“the Present Application”) through her solicitors, Messrs
Deannie Yew & Associates, relying particularly on the ground
that proceedings have been commenced by the Respondent in the
District Court on 16 September 2026, being DCCJ 4684/2026,
claiming beneficial interest in the Property on the basis of
common intention constructive trust.
The Respondent’s Stay Summons
6. Attached to the Summons filed by Messrs Deannie Yew &
Associates was an Affirmation of the Respondent also dated 23
September 2026, the contents of which are as follows:
“3. Young Tat Chiu Thomas (楊達潮)[1] (“Deceased”) and I started
courtship in 2009.
4. Deceased and I had been cohabited as husband and wife with my
son from previous marriage (“My Son”) since January 2013. We
were residing under the same roof in a property known as Flat C,
11th Floor, Tower 5A, Oceanaire, 18 Po Tai Street, Sha Tin, New
Territories (“Subject Property”).
5. After some period of cohabitation, Deceased liked My Son so
much. They were on very good terms. The Deceased even promised
that he would treat My Son as his own son. Therefore, at the
request of the Deceased but not otherwise, My Son changed his
name from Ng Ming Ho (吳銘浩) to Yeung Chun Shing (楊竣丞) by a
Deed Poll dated 26 July 2013, bearing the same surname in
Chinese character as the Deceased.
6. During our cohabitation, the Deceased treated me as his wife
whereas I also treated the Deceased as my husband. Deceased, My
Son, and I were residing in the Subject Property as our family
house and were a core family…
7. At all material times, I treated the Subject Property as our
family house. I did not and do not own any other landed property
in Hong Kong. I have been residing in the Subject Property for
over 13 years.
8. All along, Deceased told me and I believed him that he was the
owner of the Subject Property. Before we moved in, Deceased took
me to view the Subject Property which was vacant, represented to
me that the tenancy of the Subject Property had just ceased,
that he took back the Subject Property for self-occupation if I
was fond of the environment. In the end, we decided to move in
and cohabited since then. All along, Deceased represented
himself to be the only true owner of the Subject Property and he
did not have to and indeed had never have to pay any rent or fee
for the occupation.
9. As I deposed in my previous affirmations, there was a common
intention and common understanding between the Deceased and I
that the Deceased would let me become the owner of the Subject
Property and/or that I would be entitled to reside in the
Subject Property for as long as I would give up my career and
take good care of him.
10. Before cohabitation, I was working as an estate agent earning
commission. I was able to earn about HK$30,000.00 per month in
about 2012. I had many clients and was able to earn substantial
commission monthly.
11. After cohabitation, Deceased requested me to give up my career
and to look after him because he did not have good relationship
with his children and he was not in good health. At that time,
he told me that his wife had passed away many years ago. He even
promised me that if I was willing to stay with him, cohabitate
with him, accompany him to collect rent and/or to inspect many
of his properties, give him advice on property renting and
property investments, and look after him, he would support me
for the rest of my life and My Son until he finished his
tertiary education financially and he would let me own the
Subject Property as a matter of compensation and/or protection
to me. He said he was serious about that. He said he owned many
properties or his companies owned many properties. Based on the
common intention and understanding of the parties and his
promises made to me, I did give up my career and cohabitate with
him in the Subject Property and take good care of him. From time
to time, I gave my advice to Deceased on his property renting
matters and property investment.
12. I stress that I have never heard of “Danson Limited”[2] before.
I had never dealt with Danson Limited. It was plainly wrong that
license was given to me to stay in the Subject Property by
Danson Limited with Deceased as alleged by Danson Limited.
13. In any event, it was later found after the Deceased’s death that
Deceased is the sole shareholder and director of Danson Limited.
14. I gave up my career and income-earning capacity 13 years ago at
the request of Deceased. I did not have any income of my own to
purchase property. I did not take up other employment as the
Deceased asked me not to and he said he would support me
financially for the rest of my life. He told me not to worry
about money and he would take good care of me and My Son
financially. Deceased requested to cohabitate with me as he
needed me to be with him like a family, to give him advice on
property renting and property investment as I was familiar with
this field, to take good care of him as he was a patient of
diabetes which required controlled diets and taking medicine.
Most importantly, he was fold of My Son and treated him as his
own son. Otherwise, he would not ask me to convince My Son to
change his name with the same surname 楊 as Deceased. But for
Deceased’s request, I would not ask My Son to do so.
15. Deceased stressed that he owned numerous properties in Hong Kong
and the Subject Property was just one of those properties
belonged to him.
16. I was acting in person in these proceedings and had not have the
benefit of legal advice.
17. …”
Stay of Execution of Writ of Possession
7. The application for stay is made under Order 45, rule 11,
Rules of the High Court and inherent jurisdiction of the
Court.
8. Order 45, rule 11 provides that:
“Without prejudice to Order 47, rule 1, a party against whom a
judgment has been given or an order made may apply to the Court
for a stay of execution of the judgment or order or other relief
on the ground of matters which have occurred since the date of
the judgment or order, and the Court may by order grant such
relief, and on such terms, as it thinks just.”
9. The words “on the ground of matters which have occurred since
the date of the judgment or order” require the applicant to
invoke matters going to the validity of the judgment which, if
established, might justify the court in saying that this is
not a judgment which on the new material it will allow to be
executed: China Citic Bank International Ltd v Durrant Simon
Patrick Michael, CACV 127/2014, 21 July 2014, §29.
10. It is significant to note that “matters which have occurred
since the date of the judgment or order” under Order 45, rule
11, have been interpreted as referring to “matters which went
to the validity of the judgment and which, if established
before the court, might justify the court in saying that this
was a judgment which on the material now placed before it, it
would not allow to be executed.” (Hong Kong Civil Procedure
2026, Vol 1, §§45/11/2 at p 1098; Credit Lyonnais v SK Global
Hong Kong Ltd [2003] 4 HKC 104 at 115A-B, §28, per Cheung JA).
In Tam Ho Man v Wong Kwok Tai, HCA 4736/1985 (unreported,
dated 20 October 1986) (cited by Cheung JA in Credit
Lyonnais), Hunter J observed at §3 that the examples given in
the authorities are “matters which go to question the validity
of that judgment as against the defendant”, which are “very
far removed from matters which go to the enforcement of that
judgment”. In Wong Wah On v Tsung Tsin Association [2019]
HKCA 795 at §12, the Court of Appeal held that “It was only
available when a defendant sought to recall or prevent
execution on account of ‘some matter occurring after the
judgment amounting to a discharge and which could not have
been and cannot be taken advantage of otherwise’”.
11. Bearing the above principles governing the exercise of the
court’s jurisdiction in mind, I proceed to consider the
Respondent’s Stay Summons.
Reliability of the Respondent’s Statements
12. In the Respondent’s Affirmation dated 23 September 2026, the
Respondent stated at §9: “there was a common intention and
common understanding between the Deceased and I that the
Deceased would let me become the owner of the Subject Property
and/or that I would be entitled to reside in the Subject
Property for as long as I would give up my career and take
good care of him.” She continued at §11: “and he would let me
own the Subject Property as a matter of compensation and/or
protection to me.”
13. Unfortunately, in the Respondent’s Notice of Opposition dated
3 June 2026 and during the hearing on 29 June 2026, the
Respondent did not mention anything like the above.
14. In her Notice of Opposition, the Respondent only
stated:「上述地址是業主楊達潮在25-01-2013
準許我以業主身份入住,並承認我是楊生的伴侶。在此期間我完全由楊生
贍養,包括兒子的供書教學。」
15. And during the hearing on 29 June 2026, the Respondent stated
at 10:33: 「……
入住嘅時候,係准許我以業主嘅身分喺屋苑嘅申請嗰個智能咭嗰張
form 嗰到,有佢嘅親筆簽名,因為我同佢係同居伴侶關係 ……
因為佢就喺第一日俾我喺嗰到住 …… 我喺哩個單位住左13年」At
10:34, she continued: 「……
佢當初係口頭承諾係俾我長期居住嘅,因為我係佢伴侶」Further at
10:37, she stated:「……
根據法律呢,佢對我哩種承諾係不可撤銷,……
係因為佢之前對我嘅承諾,係附帶產權不容反悔嘅承諾許可 ……
因為佢當初許可我即住喺到,並且口頭上係同我講,我係可以長期居住喺
呢度,咁佢呢種承諾,係附帶產權不容反悔嘅許可 ……」 That is, the
Respondent had been repeating that the Deceased had just
promised her that she could reside at the Subject Property for
a long term rather than the Deceased promising her to be the
ultimate owner of the Subject Property.
16. I had dealt with「附帶產權不容反悔」as proprietary estoppel as
stated in the Decision, though proprietary estoppel may not be
applicable in the present situation because the Deceased was
not the legal owner of the Subject Property and so could not
confer a proprietary interest of the Subject Property on the
Respondent. In any event, the constituent elements of
proprietary estoppel overlap with those of promissory estoppel
which appears to be more likely in the present case.
17. Similarly, in the Respondent’s application dated 10 July 2026
for stay of execution of the writ of possession, the
Respondent only stated「本人和
死者楊達潮在2013年居住在上述單位 ……
死者承諾我這間屋是我一直居住的,而佢也用行動履行他的承諾……」.
And even during the hearing on 24 July 2026, the Respondent’s
only stated her position at 9:34 as 「……
涉及13年同居受養人嘅權益 ……
同時我喺法援個申請嗰到呢,涉案物業嘅居住權係我嘅一個其中一個標的
物」. That is, the Respondent was repeating just her
right「在此期間」to reside at the Subject Property rather than
the Deceased promising her to be the ultimate owner of the
Subject Property.
18. Now in the Present Application, the Respondent, through her
newly appointed solicitors, has amended her claim as stated in
§9 of her Affirmation that “there was a common intention and
common understanding between the Deceased and I that the
Deceased would let me become the owner of the Subject Property
and/or that I would be entitled to reside in the Subject
Property for as long as I would give up my career and take
good care of him.”
19. Here, the Respondent alleges that she relied heavily on what
had been said by the Deceased. There is then clear authority
from the Court of Final Appeal that in a claim against the
estate of a deceased who cannot give evidence, the court shall
always approach such claims with some suspicion, especially in
the case of an alleged gift, where the only or principal
witness in support of the claim is the claimant: Yung Shu Wu v
Vivienne Sung Wu (2011) 14 HKCFAR 39, at §73.
20. Similarly as Walton J observed in In re Gonin, deceased.
[1979] 1 Ch. 16 at p 32:
“Now it is common sense that all claims against the estate of a
deceased person which had not been put forward whilst they were
still living fall to be scrutinised with considerable care, for
the obvious reason that the other party to the agreement is in
the nature of things unable to give his or her version of
events.”
21. In a similar vein, in Ko Nga Chun v Companhia De Desenvol
Vimento Wui San Limitada & Anor, HCA 277/2012 (unreported,
dated 24 May 2018) [2018] HKCFI 1134, DHCJ To refused to admit
the hearsay statement of a deceased witness, and said at §20:
“…… It is important that the evidence of such a crucial witness
should be tested by cross-examination … Without such cross-
examination, the defendants are severely prejudiced ...”
22. Although this case did not lay down any principle that
whenever the opponent is deprived of the opportunity to cross-
examine the statement maker, such a statement should not be
admitted or be given no weight. But this case reminds me that
the potential prejudice which could be brought by the lack of
opportunity to cross-examine the witness concerned.
23. In such regard, what Coleman J (as he then was) said in Yu Man
Fung Alice v Chiau Sing Chi Stephen, HCA 1584/2012
(unreported, 23 December 2020) [2020] HKCFI 2923) is
particularly relevant:
“53. […] evidence based on recollection of what was said in an
undocumented conversation which occurred so long ago is
inherently problematic. It is, however, perhaps only in the
last decade or so that courts have consistently properly
recognised the fallibility and potential unreliability of human
memory.
54. In Gestmin SGPA SA v Credit Suisse (UK) Ltd [2013]
EWHC 3560 (Comm) at §§16-20, Leggatt J made certain
observations on the point, to which he also returned in the Blue
v Ashley case. Those observations have commended themselves to
a number of other judges, including judges in Hong Kong: see,
for example, Sarah Sally Chan-Kent v Chim Sau Ching [2019] HKCFI
3066 at §45.
55. In the Blue v Ashley case at §68, Leggatt J also referred
to a paper published by two academic psychologists, Howe and
Knott ‘The fallibility of memory in judicial processes: Lessons
from the past and their modern consequences’ (2015) Memory, 23,
633 at 651-3. He also footnoted, but did not make any extensive
reference to, the book by the psychologist Schacter ‘How the
Mind Forgets and Remembers: The Seven Sins of Memory’ (2001).
56. The various judicial and academic observations would bear
repetition at some length, but I shall attempt to restate them
in more compressed form:
(1) While everyone knows that memory is fallible, we are
often unaware of the full extent to which our own and other
people’s memories are unreliable.
(2) Common and related errors include supposing that
(a) the stronger or more vivid a recollection, the more
likely it is to be accurate, and (b) the more confident a
person is of their recollection, the more likely it is to
be accurate.
(3) But memory is not a mental record fixed at the time
of the experience, then fading gradually over time. So it
is a misconception that memory operates like a camera or
video device making a fixed and chronological record of an
experience.
(4) Rather, memories are fluid and malleable, being
constantly rewritten whenever they are retrieved.
(5) What gets encoded into memory in the first place is
determined by what a person attends to, what they have
already stored in memory, and their expectations, needs and
emotional state.
(6) This information is subsequently integrated or
consolidated with other information already stored in a
person’s long-term, autobiographical memory.
(7) What is subsequently retrieved from that memory is
determined by the same multitude of factors, and
additionally by what drives the recollection of the event.
(8) What is retold about an experience depends on the
person to whom one is talking, and what the purpose is of
remembering that particular event.
(9) What gets remembered is reconstructed from the
remnants of what was originally stored, taking account of
whatever has already been forgotten or any interference
from any new experiences across the interval between
storing and retrieving a particular experience or event.
(10) So the content of memory for experiences involves active
manipulation, integration with pre-existing information,
and reconstruction of that information.
(11) Memory is particularly vulnerable to interference and
alteration when a person is presented with new information
or suggestions about an event in circumstances where his or
her memory of it is already weak due to the passage of
time.
(12) Therefore, and in addition, the process of civil
litigation itself subjects the memories of witnesses to
powerful biases.
(13) First, such witnesses often have a stake in a particular
version of events. This is obvious where the witness is a
party or has some type of loyalty to a party to the
proceedings.
(14) Secondly, other subtler influences come into play,
perhaps from the process of preparing a witness statement
and coming to court to give evidence for one side in the
dispute. The natural desire to assist, or not prejudice,
the party calling the witness, and the desire to give a
good impression in a public forum, can be significant (even
if unconscious) motivating forces.
(15) Considerable interference with memory is also introduced
in civil litigation by the procedure of preparing for
trial. A witness is asked to make a statement, often (as
in this case) when a long time has already elapsed since
the relevant events. The statement is usually drafted for
a witness by a lawyer who is inevitably conscious of the
significance for the issues of the case of what the witness
does or does not say.
(16) The witness statement is made after the witness’s memory
has been ‘refreshed’ by reading documents. Yet those
documents themselves often include statements of case and
other argumentative material, as well as documents not
previously seen by the witness, or documents which came
into existence after the events which the witness is being
asked to recall.
(17) The witness statement may go through several iterations
before it is finalised.
(18) Months or even years later, the witness will be asked to
re-read his or her statement and review documents again
before giving evidence in court.
(19) The effect of the process is to establish in the mind of
the witness the matters recorded in his or her own
statement and other written material, whether they be in
fact true or false, and to cause the witness’s memory of
events to be based increasingly on this material and later
interpretations of it, rather than on the original
experience of the events.
(20) There is also a powerful tendency for people to remember
past events concerning themselves in a self-enhancing
light.
(21) It is also not uncommon for witnesses to deceive
themselves in what are essentially honest but nonetheless
false recollections.
57. These matters do not mean that human memory is simply
unreliable. Often, memory is reliable. However, it is also
fallible, and so when assessing reliability, it is important to
have in mind what causes that fallibility.
58. Therefore, in a case such as the present case, it seems to
me that a sensible approach may be to limit (or at least be
cautious about) the reliance placed on the witnesses’ individual
recollections of what was said in conversations, and to give
more weight and make factual findings on inferences drawn from
any documentary evidence as well as known or probable facts, in
particular objective facts.
59. Documents which are likely to be helpful are those
contemporaneous documents which may describe not only what was
going on, but also the motivation and state of mind of those
concerned. Documents passing between the parties themselves can
be important, but in some cases ‘internal’ documentation may
also greatly assist.
60. In most cases, the credit of a witness on matters not
germane to the litigation is unlikely to be helpful, and the
demeanour of witnesses is not a reliable pointer to honesty or
accuracy. Witness evidence, written and oral, is obviously not
without purpose; but, its principal uses are to allow scrutiny
of any documentary record and to evaluate the witness’s
motivations, personality and working practices.
61. Evaluation of a witness’s evidence may, depending on the
particular circumstances, also include having regard to factors
such as: evasive and argumentative answers, tangential speeches
avoiding the question, blaming legal advisers for pleadings,
disclosure and evidence shortcomings, self-contradiction,
internal inconsistency, shifting case, new evidence, and
selective disclosure: see Painter v Hutchison [2007] EWHC 758
(Ch) at §3. There may be other factors in any particular case,
but this list gives important and helpful guidance. As will be
seen, some of them are rather pertinent to this case.
62. An examination of the consistency of conduct and documents
and motives will, therefore, likely be helpful. As long as it
is recognised that there is also a risk of potential (perhaps
unconscious) bias in the identification of them, it is the
inherent probabilities and likelihoods which will be of greater
assistance in deciding what, on the balance of probabilities,
actually happened.” (underline added)
24. In a more similar vein, in Watson v Foxman & others (1995) 49
NSWLR 315 at 319, McLelland CJ in Eq said:
“Furthermore, human memory of what was said in a conversation is
fallible for a variety of reasons, and ordinarily the degree of
fallibility increases with the passage of time, particularly
where disputes or litigation intervene, and the processes of
memory are overlaid, often subconsciously, by perceptions of
self-interest as well as conscious consideration of what should
have been said or could have been said. All too often what is
actually remembered is little more than an impression from which
plausible details are then, again often subconsciously,
constructed. All this is a matter of ordinary human experience.”
Although his Honour was addressing evidence of the content of
conversations, his observations seem to me to be of general application.
25. At this juncture as well, the Respondent’s failure to do
anything regarding a transfer of the Subject Property or any
share of interest in the Applicant during the 13 years of
cohabitation raises suspicion.
Common Intention Constructive Trust
26. Before me in the hearing on 29 September 2026, Ms Yanky S Y
Lam, counsel for the Respondent, submitted that the Respondent
has relied on common intention constructive trust in her claim
against the Subject Property.
27. A constructive trust arises in connection with the legal title
to property wherever one party, in reliance upon his common
intention held with another party, has so conducted himself to
his detriment or significantly altered his position that it
would be inequitable to allow that other party to deny him of
a beneficial interest in the property acquired: Mo Ying v
Brillex Development Ltd [2015] 2 HKLRD 985; Primecredit Ltd v
Yeung Chun Pang Barry [2017] 4 HKLRD 327.
28. In Luo Xing Juan v Estate of Hui Shui See (2009) 12 HKCFAR 1,
Miss Luo and Mr Hui had been a cohabiting couple for some four
years since 1996 (together with Miss Luo’s daughter from her
former marriage, Mon Din, for some of that time). In September
1997, they moved into a flat in Tsim Sha Tsui which was
purchased by Mr Hui in Miss Luo’s name. In February 1999, Mr
Hui proposed marriage to Miss Luo, which she accepted, and
they then moved into another property in Sai Kung (“the Sai
Kung property”) which was owned by Glory Rise Limited (“Glory
Rise”), a company in which Mr Hui was the majority
shareholder. Miss Luo spent some $70,000.00 on decorating the
master bedroom and in buying furnishings for the Sai Kung
property. She also arranged for her furniture in the Tsim
Sha Tsui flat to be moved there.
29. In June 1999, it was established that Mr Hui expressly
promised Miss Luo a 35% beneficial interest in the Sai Kung
property as a form of financial security in anticipation of
their marriage. Mr Hui then immediately transferred 35% of
the share in Glory Rise into Miss Luo’s name.
30. Meanwhile, Mr Hui was in a tight cash position and Miss Luo
lent him $1 million in June 1999. She also paid the mortgage
instalment for August 1999. By mid-April 2000, however, Mr
Hui was able to repay with interest the $1 million he had
borrowed from Miss Luo as well as the mortgage.
Unfortunately, while it was intended that the marriage would
take place in October of that year, Mr Hui fell ill on 31
August 2000 and died on 1 September 2000.
31. Ribeiro PJ, on behalf of the Court of Final Appeal, remarked
on the applicability of the common intention constructive
trust as follows:
“34. Prior to the deceased deciding that the Property should
serve as their family home, it had clearly been beneficially
owned as a marketable investment by Glory Rise[3]. The company
borrowed money from its shareholders and from a bank to purchase
the Property and executed a mortgage on it by way of security.
Glory Rise’s interest in the Property is said to have been
transformed into the interest of a trustee solely on the basis
of a constructive trust resting on the couple’s common
intention. There is certainly no reason – and none is alleged –
to lift the corporate veil or for treating Glory Rise as
anything other than a legal person distinct from its
shareholders. The basic proposition that a shareholder has no
legal or equitable interest in the company’s property (as
opposed to a right to share in the profits of its business and
to a distribution of any surplus on liquidation) therefore
applies.
…
38. Where a constructive trust is alleged to arise on the
basis of the parties’ common intention, it is the intention
commonly held by the property owner and the claimant regarding
their shared beneficial interests in the property that matters.
The trust is constituted by the claimant’s detrimental reliance
on their common intention and the unconscionability of the
property owner departing therefrom.
39. It follows that Glory Rise’s ownership of the Property is
crucial. The fact that A and B might form a common intention
that they should have shared beneficial interests in C’s
property cannot in principle be sufficient to impose a
constructive trust on C to hold C’s property on trust for A and
B. C is not party to and does not unconscionably depart from
any common intention, so there is nothing to constitute C a
trustee for A and B. If B does not make good his promise, he
might attract personal liability to A, but it does not mean that
an equitable interest in C’s property is created in favour of A.
…
41. The “intention” referred to must be the common intention
of Miss Luo and the deceased on the evidence canvassed. But the
existence of that common intention cannot transform Glory Rise
into a constructive trustee and does not result in Miss Luo
acquiring any proprietary interest in the Property. Moreover,
Miss Luo did not know at any stage before the deceased’s death
that the Property was held by a company so that there could not,
on the evidence, ever have been the posited common intention
that Glory Rise should hold the Property as trustee.
…
43. ... The Judge’s findings as to common intention relate
only to beneficial interests in the Property and also to the
shareholders’ loans to Glory Rise. There was never any
discussion of anyone acquiring an interest in the deceased’s
6,500 shares. On the contrary, the Judge found (as the evidence
clearly warranted) that the deceased’s intention was that “they
were to hold shares in the Company in the proportion of 35% and
65%”, although she found that this was a “legal nicety” which
the deceased had not communicated to Miss Luo. The deceased
plainly meant to keep the 6,500 shares and to remain the
majority shareholder. If the deceased had come under some
equitable obligation preventing him from dealing with his own
shares in a manner inconsistent with that obligation, this might
take effect as a personal equity – as discussed below in
relation to promissory estoppel – but that could not have
resulted in the creation of any beneficial interest in favour of
Miss Luo in the Property.” (underline added)
32. In my opinion, the same principle should apply to the present
case. There has been no evidence before me as to how the
promises by the Deceased had been communicated to the
Applicant, and had come to be adopted or assumed by the
Applicant, to become an assumption shared between the
Applicant on the one part, and the Respondent on the other
part. As the Respondent admitted in her Affirmation dated 23
September 2026 at §12, “I have never heard of “Danson Limited”
before.”
33. In Luo Xing Juan, Ribeiro PJ discussed the relationship
existing between Mr Hui and Miss Luo at §58 of the judgment as
follows:
“The deceased and Miss Luo were living together in the Property
as man and wife, treating Mon Din as their daughter, and
intending to get married in October 2000. In June 1999, at the
time his promise was made, the deceased was the controlling
shareholder of Glory Rise (having 80% of its shares) and had the
power to cause Glory Rise to exercise its rights over the
Property in a manner adverse to the interests of Miss Luo. If,
for instance, they had decided to separate, he would have had
the power to cause Glory Rise to evict her from the premises.
He could also have caused the company to dispose of the Property
without any of the proceeds going to Miss Luo. That is plainly
a sufficient relationship for the purposes of promissory
estoppel…”
34. However, the meaning of the promise conveyed by the promisor’s
words or conduct must be clear and unequivocal. In Luo Xing
Juan, Mr Hui should have made it clear that he was promising
not to enforce the relevant rights or powers. Ribeiro PJ
found as follows:
“64. … The substance of the promise, expressed in terms which
take into account the legal forms employed, was that the
deceased would, as controlling shareholder of Glory Rise, secure
for Miss Luo a 35% interest in the value of the Property if and
when the same should be realised by the company and that, unless
and until the Property was disposed of and her 35% entitlement
duly provided for, Miss Luo would have the security of being
allowed to occupy it as her home without interference by the
company. Put negatively, the deceased was promising to forgo
exercising his legal powers (as controlling shareholder of Glory
Rise) to cause the Property to be disposed of without Miss Luo
receiving a 35% share of the proceeds or to cause her to be
evicted pending disposal.
65. … In the present case, the deceased’s assurance was
explicit and was plainly intended by him to be relied on. It
naturally gave rise to Miss Luo’s expectations of a 35%
beneficial interest in the Property and security in its
occupation pending any disposal. And, as noted above, the Judge
found that in reliance upon the deceased’s promise, Miss Luo
continued to reside with him de facto as man and wife, forwent
the pursuit of employment opportunities of her own and paid the
$40,000 mortgage instalment for August 1999. These are
significant acts and omissions of detrimental reliance. In my
view, the combined expectation and reliance factors in the
present case plainly make it inequitable or unconscionable for
the estate now to act inconsistently with the deceased’s
promise. Accordingly, all the elements of promissory estoppel
are established and a personal equity is raised in favour of
Miss Luo. It becomes necessary to consider what relief should
be granted to give effect to that equity.” (underline added)
35. In the present case, the Deceased’s promise was not so clear
and unequivocal. This is particularly the case when the
Respondent’s new Affirmation of 23 September 2026 is taken
into account. The Respondent now alleges that the Deceased
had indeed made the promises (“the Promises”) that he would
let the Respondent become the owner of the Subject Property
and/or that Respondent would be entitled to reside in the
Subject Property for as long as the Respondent would give up
her career and take good care of the Deceased[4].
36. In my opinion, the Promises that the Deceased would let the
Respondent become the owner of the Subject Property and/or
that Respondent would be entitled to reside in the Subject
Property for as long as the Respondent would give up her
career and take good care of the Deceased were also vague and
uncertain. Did the Deceased intend to transfer his interest in
the Applicant to the Respondent? Did the Deceased intend to
arrange for the sale of the Subject Property to the
Respondent? Or did the Deceased, as the director of the
Applicant, simply want to grant a licence to the Respondent to
reside in the Subject Property for as long as the Respondent
would give up her career and take good care of the Deceased?
It would appear that these alternatives, if true, were decided
entirely at the Deceased’s sole discretion. This uncertainty
rendered it unlikely that the Deceased before his death, or
the Applicant would have intended the Promises, or the Common
Assumption based on them, to be legally binding, or to
constitute any legal obligation assumed by the Applicant which
is enforceable at law.
37. In the context of certainty in terms, Ribeiro PJ explained in
Unruh v Seeberger [2007] 2 HKLRD 414, (2007) 10 HKCFAR 31 that
the clarity required will seldom fall below what is
unequivocal for the relevant purpose. In Tung Woon Hing
Candice v Cathay Pacific Airways, HCLA 18/2019 (unreported, 29
March 2022) [2022] HKCFI 826, the Court explained that the
common assumption alleged must be unambiguous, and that the
evidence “must point to only one conclusion that there must be
a common assumption as alleged”.
38. In any event, as admitted by the Respondent in her Affirmation
dated 23 September 2026 at §12, the Deceased did not bother to
disclose to her that the Subject Property was not owned by him
personally but by the Applicant. It was probable that he
might have fulfilled his Promises by any of the alternatives
but as I mentioned at §9 of the Decision,
「楊先生生前也沒有把涉案處所的業權或擁有涉案處所的申請人公司股權
轉讓給她。」
39. In Spencer Bower: Reliance-Based Estoppel (5th edition, 2017),
the learned editors, having referred to the necessary
ingredient of the assumption of responsibility for an estoppel
by convention, continued at para 8.25:
“For this reason a party who fails to establish the necessary
intention to contract to found a claim in contract … is unlikely
to be able to make good that defect by claiming an estoppel
based on the convention as to the existence of such a contract,
as the want of contractual intention imports also a want of the
actual or apparent intention to assume responsibility to the
other party that would be necessary to found an estoppel.”
(underline added)
40. As the judgment in Blue v Ashley [2017] EWHC 1928 demonstrates
and explains, the intention to create a legally binding
contract, and certainty and completeness of the terms agreed,
are both essential requirements of a contract. The intention
must be to create legal rights and obligations, from which
legal consequences may flow, and it is not sufficient for the
parties to have intended to create and accept moral
obligations only. Vagueness and uncertainty in what was
expressed may show that the terms expressed were not in fact
intended to be legally binding at all. The court cannot
enforce or uphold a contract if it is legally or practically
impossible to give any sensible content to the agreement
(Scammell v Dicker [2005] EWHC Civ 405, para 30).
41. It is also important to note that even though in Luo Xing
Juan, all the elements of promissory estoppel were established
and a personal equity was raised in favour of Miss Luo, Glory
Rise was ordered to be would up. Miss Luo was entitled, on
disposal of the Sai Kung property, to receive a sum equivalent
to 35% of the net proceeds of sale (that is, the proceeds
after deduction of the reasonable expenses of the sale) out of
the sums to be distributed by the Liquidator to the estate
both as a creditor and a contributory of the company in
liquidation. Notwithstanding the above, Miss Luo was ordered
to give up possession of the Sai Kung property upon receiving
from the Liquidator reasonable notice (of not less than one
month) in writing to do so.
42. Soon after Luo Xing Juan, there was another case, Hong Kong
Hua Qiao Co Ltd v Cham Ka Tai, HCA 2619/2005 (unreported,
dated 30 July 2013) where a Mr Lee and his mistress, Madam
Cham, had cohabited as husband and wife at a property owned
and controlled by Mr Lee who died in an accident. Although
Madam Cham gave evidence that since she and Mr Lee started
cohabiting, Mr Lee had made a promise to her from time to time
that “she could live at the property for the rest of her life
and that she need not worry that she had nowhere to live or
that her living was not protected”. The Court of First
Instance decided that the promise was equivocal. That was not
a promise to make an absolute gift of a property to a person,
but at best, a promise of a life interest.
43. Once again, in the present case,
「楊先生生前也沒有把涉案處所的業權或擁有涉案處所的申請人公司股權
轉讓給她。」
44. In light of the above, my conclusion is that any assurance or
undertaking given by the Deceased that he would provide for or
take care of the Respondent in terms of her livelihood and
accommodation was NOT intended to create legal relations, or
any rights or obligations which could be enforced in a court
of law.
45. I appreciate that the Respondent had total trust in the
Deceased, and had relied completely on him for taking care of
and looking after her during their co-habitation. However, I
consider that precisely because of their close and trusted
relationship, there was no understanding between the Deceased
and the Respondent, at the time the former gave the
assurances, that there should be any legal results flowing
from the Deceased’s Promises. Nor do I consider that the
Respondent had expected anything from the Deceased other than
his moral duty to abide by his Promises, to take care of her.
No reasonable observer would have considered in the context
that it would have been open to the Respondent to take legal
action against the Deceased (moral judgment aside), for
damages or for declaratory relief, if he should renege from
his Promises.
46. Again in Luo Xing Juan, it was found that in reliance upon Mr
Hui’s promise, Miss Luo continued to reside with him de facto
as man and wife, forwent the pursuit of employment
opportunities of her own and paid the $40,000 mortgage
instalment for August 1999.
47. In the present case, the Respondent suggested that she had
given up her career as an estate agent as well in reliance on
the Promises.
48. Detrimental reliance is an element common to both proprietary
estoppel and common intention constructive trust. The party
asserting a claim to a beneficial interest must show that he
or she has acted to his or her detriment or significantly
altered his or her position in reliance on the agreement,
arrangement or understanding in order to give rise to a
constructive trust. There must be some connection between the
Respondent’s conduct and her belief that she has an interest
in the property. To constitute conduct amounting to an acting
upon the common intention, it must be conduct on which the
Respondent could not reasonably have been expected to embark
unless she was to have an interest in the property.
Unfortunately, the Respondent had remained reticent even when
the Deceased took no action to transfer any beneficial
interest in the Subject Property to her. Detriment arising
from reliance that could not reasonably be expected is to be
disregarded. See: The Law of Proprietary Estoppel, McFarlane,
para 4.69.
49. In James v Thomas [2007] 3 FCR 696 the parties formed a
relationship and the claimant moved into a property owned by
the defendant to live with the defendant as man and wife. The
property was solely owned by the defendant from where he
carried on business as an agricultural building and drainage
contractor. The claimant assisted in the business and engaged
in heavy work. She asserted an interest in the property by
way of constructive trust. She pleaded that:
“33. … whenever the parties discussed carrying out improvements
to the property and matters relating to the business, the
defendant would say to the claimant ‘this will benefit us
both’.”
50. Her claim for an interest in the property was rejected. The
English Court of Appeal, per Sir John Chadwick at 705, held
that:
“24. … More pertinently, if the circumstances so demand, a
constructive trust can arise some years after the property has
been acquired by, and registered in the sole name of, one party
who (at the time of the acquisition) was, beyond dispute, the
sole beneficial owner: Gissing v Gissing [1970] 2 All ER 780 at
786, [1971] AC 886 at 901, Bernard v Josephs [1982] 3 All ER 162
at 170, [1982] Ch 391 at 404. But, as those cases show, in the
absence of an express post-acquisition agreement, a court will
be slow to infer from conduct alone that parties intended to
vary existing beneficial interests established at the time of
acquisition.”
51. Sir John Chadwick further added that:
“36. The judge did not find it necessary to address the question
whether Miss James acted upon the assurances to her detriment.
That is understandable, given that he held that the assurances
were not sufficiently specific to found proprietary estoppel or
constructive trust. In the circumstances that I share that view,
I, too, find it unnecessary to address the question of reliance.
But, for completeness, I should add that the factors which lead
to the conclusion that the assurances were not intended or
understood as a promise of some property interest lead, also, to
the conclusion that it would be unreal to think that Miss James
did what she did in reliance on such a promise. The true
position, as it seems to me, is that she worked in the business,
and contributed her labour to the improvements to the property,
because she and Mr Thomas were making their life together as man
and wife. The Cottage was their home: the business was their
livelihood. It is a mistake to think that the motives which lead
parties in such a relationship to act as they do are necessarily
attributable to pecuniary self-interest.
…
38. … Her interest in the property (if any) must be determined by
applying principles of law and equity which (however inadequate
to meet the circumstances in which parties live together in the
twenty-first century) must now be taken as well-established.
Unless she can bring herself within those principles, her claim
in the present case must fail. As Baroness Hale of Richmond
observed in Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 at [61], [2007] 2 FCR
280 at [61] it is not for the court to abandon the search for
the result which reflects what the parties must, in the light of
their conduct, be taken to have intended in favour of the result
which the court itself considers fair.”
52. Similarly in Morris v Morris [2008] EWCA Civ 257 the claimant
is the wife of the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant and his
mother entered into a farming partnership. One of the assets
of this partnership is a farm property solely owned by the
mother. The wife assisted in the farming business and carried
out improvements on the farm. She asserted that she had a
beneficial interest in the farm by reason of constructive
trust, alternatively proprietary estoppel. Her claim was
rejected on appeal.
53. The English Court of Appeal, per Sir Peter Gibson, repeated
what was said in Morris v Morris:
“23. … the first question being whether an agreement
arrangement or understanding that the claimant was to acquire a
beneficial interest in the land has been shown. The authorities
make clear that a common intention constructive trust based only
on conduct will only be found in exceptional circumstances.
…
25. Nor do I see that the conduct that is relied on by
the claimant must lead to the conclusion that she was acquiring
an interest in land. It has been said in a number of cases that
the court should be cautious before finding that the activities
of a wife or a cohabitant can only be explained on the footing
that she believes that she was acquiring an interest in land.”
54. As regards the Respondent’s claim that she had paid for gas
charges and other outgoings, if any, in respect of the Subject
Property, this cannot amount to any detriment suffered, as the
expenditure would have been made by her in any event as part
of her own household and regular expenses (see Yuen Kam Lok
Eddy v Yuen Lai Fun Cindy & Another, DCCJ 3972/2020
(unreported, dated 31 December 2021) [2021] HKDC 1632, at §§28-
31).
55. There was no detrimental reliance on the common assumption,
even if this could be established.
Interim Rent
56. Order 29, rule 18, Rules of the High Court provides that a
defendant who counterclaims against a plaintiff can also seek
an order for interim payment.
57. Order 29, rule 12(b), Rules of the High Court also provides
that:
“If, on the hearing of an application under rule 10, the Court
is satisfied –
…
(b) that the plaintiff’s action includes a claim for
possession of land and, if the action proceeded to trial,
the defendant would be held liable to pay to the
plaintiff a sum of money in respect of the defendant’s
use and occupation of the land during the pendency of the
action, even if a final judgment or order were given or
made in favour of the defendant;…
the Court may, if it thinks fit, and without
prejudice to any contentions of the parties as to the
nature or character of the sum to be paid by the
defendant, order the defendant to make an interim payment
of such amount as it thinks just, after taking into
account any set-off, cross-claim or counterclaim on which
the defendant may be entitled to rely (underline added).”
58. This is the third time that the Respondent applied for a stay
of execution of the writ of possession since the Judgment was
delivered on 29 June 2026. Ms Young Hsiao Ling Shirley, the
present director of the Applicant, was concerned about the
interim loss of rental pending the delivery of the captioned
decision. I ordered an interim payment of $55,000 by the
Respondent into the Tribunal: see Car Po Ltd v Chan Pik Kuen,
HCA 13517/1998 (unreported, dated 26 March 1999), at §7 per
Keith J. This $55,000 was equivalent to approximately two
months’ rental of the Subject Property, being assessed on the
basis of a recent letting of Flat C, 10/F, Tower 5A,
Oceanaire, ie one floor below the Subject Property for a term
of 2 years from 24 July 2026 to 23 July 2028 at $27,000 per
month inclusive of rates, Government rent and management fee.
Conclusion
59. In view of the above, the Respondent’s Stay Summons dated 23
September 2026 be dismissed.
60. As a result of this decision, I order the interim rent in the
sum of $55,000 having been paid by the Respondent into the
Tribunal be released to the Applicant.
Costs
61. As I stated in the hearing on 29 September 2026, I make no
order as to costs.
|(Lawrence Pang) |
|Member |
|Lands Tribunal |
The Applicant, represented by Ms Young Hsiao Ling Shirley, acting in person
Ms Yanky S Y Lam, instructed by Messrs Deannie Yew & Associates, for the
Respondent
-----------------------
[1] Mr Young Tat Chiu Thomas appeared to have owned a lot of properties
through different incorporated companies. These companies somehow were
engaged in different litigations in the past and lately Mr Young appeared
in person on behalf of the 8th and 9th respondents in
i_y†å]mi'YÈ^mi;NËzHhÕlW 4Š nðl gP–lQøS, LDBM 66/2024 (unpanies. These
companies somehow were engaged in different litigations in the past and
lately Mr Young appeared in person on behalf of the 8th and 9th respondents
in 彩虹工業大廈業主立案法團 訴 置泰有限公司, LDBM 66/2024 (unreported,
dated 24 December 2024) and
正好工業大廈業主立案法團 訴 傑迅有限公司 及 梓陽有限公司, LDBM 82/2021
(unreported, dated 29 July 2025).
[2] Danson Limited is the English name of the Applicant.
[3] In comparison, the Subject Property has also been owned as a marketable
investment by the Applicant. As acknowledged by the Respondent in her
Affirmation dated 23 September 2026 at §8, the Deceased “represented to me
that the tenancy of the Subject Property had just ceased, that he took back
the Subject Property for self-occupation…”.
[4] See §§9 & 11 of the Respondent’s Affirmation filed on 23 September
2026.
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